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1 Introduction
Renewable economies in the Arctic
David C. Natcher and Timo Koivurova
Introduction
Arctic economic development has long been synonymous with resource 
extraction. For centuries, the Arctic has been exploited for its vast min-
erals, fisheries, marine mammals, water, oil, gas, and timber resources. 
While non-renewable resource extraction has created considerable wealth 
for some, the extraction of non-renewable resources has also left a wake 
of devastation in Arctic ecosystems and has threatened the wellbeing 
of Indigenous and other Arctic peoples who are left to bear the costs of 
past developments. In Canada, Justice Thomas Berger (1977, p. 123) fore-
warned nearly a half-century ago that “[i]t is a self-deception to believe 
that large-scale industrial development [will] end unemployment and 
under-employment of people in the North. We have never fully recognized 
that industrial development has, in itself, contributed to social, economic, 
and geographical dislocation.” Despite these warnings, non-renewable 
resource extraction continues to hold a prominent role in the development 
strategies of Arctic states and continues to be promoted by those of influ-
ence as the most expedient route to improving the socio-economic condi-
tions of Arctic communities.
While non-renewable resource extraction remains the economic linch-
pin of most Arctic states, local communities across the Arctic are making 
important strides in diversifying their economies through new and innova-
tive ways, all of which hold great promise for the sustainable development of 
Arctic regions. There are a number of drivers that justify the transition from 
extractive to renewable Arctic economies. The ethical and environmental 
values are of extreme importance and are at the core of the United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Adding additional urgency are the 
findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report 
4 that calls for action to limit global warming to no more than 1.5°C by 
2030. In the Arctic, where the impacts of climate change are projected to 
be most extreme, local action is not only warranted but critical. In response 
to these global challenges, Arctic communities are making novel techno-
logical advancements in digital technologies, renewable energy capabilities, 
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sustainable food systems, and other social economy enterprises. These 
advances are creating a paradigm shift in Arctic development where new 
technical and entrepreneurial skills are emerging. This is particularly appar-
ent in the many small- and medium-sized enterprises that have developed 
around the circular economy and industrial biotechnologies.
Notwithstanding the important advances being made in renewable econo-
mies, many parts of the Arctic continue to be challenged by under-developed 
and badly depreciated infrastructure. Arctic communities have also estab-
lished tenuous relationships and ineffective interaction with research and 
development organisations. Some Arctic regions are also being affected by 
declining and limited skilled labor forces, inadequate education and train-
ing opportunities, and ineffective legislative and policy support. These and 
other constraints have made it difficult to diversify local economies and les-
son their dependence on non-renewable resource extraction. While much 
of the transitionary burden will be on communities whose responses will 
be place-based and challenge-led, there will remain an important role for 
governments and international organisations to provide the necessary leg-
islation and policy support. This will be particularly necessary to overcome 
the infrastructure and labor constraints noted above. Yet, there is also a 
need for governments to disseminate practical information that can inform 
local actions and decision making. The sharing of knowledge and business 
development experiences can inform the efforts of others in ways that may 
lead to scalable outcomes across the Arctic.
This commitment is well reflected in Arctic Council’s Sustainable 
Development Working Group (SDWG) Strategic Framework (2017), where 
it has reaffirmed its commitment to supporting self-sufficient, resilient, 
and healthy Arctic communities. This commitment includes protecting the 
Arctic environment and to ensure the sustainable development of local live-
lihoods and the preservation of cultural traditions. These commitments are 
premised on the harmonisation of three core elements of Arctic sustainable 
development: social equity, economic development, and environmental pro-
tection. To facilitate this harmonisation, the SDWG has set out to compile 
practical knowledge that can be used by Arctic communities as they transi-
tion to more sustainable forms of development. This volume is an outcome 
of that commitment.
This volume was led by the SDWG’s Social, Economic, and Cultural 
Expert Group (SECEG) in their capacity to provide practical knowledge 
that can be used to advance the social, economic, and cultural well-being 
of Arctic peoples through sustainable and integrated approaches to renew-
able economic development. This is the first in a planned series of publica-
tions that will address various themes of Arctic sustainable development. 
In this inaugural volume, we have drawn on the expertise of scholars from 
across the Arctic, asking them to explore the challenges and unique oppor-
tunities that exist for renewable economies in Arctic regions. This volume 
offers various perspectives on Renewable Economies in the Arctic and how 
Renewable economies in the Arctic 3
these forms of economy are being supported scientifically, economically, 
socially, and politically. This volume is designed to provide the reader with 
a broad understanding of the current status and contribution of renewable 
resources to the Arctic economy and to create a foundation of knowledge 
on which to build policy, practice, and future research. We believe this can 
be an important contribution to scholarship, policy, and future economic 
development in the Arctic.
Our intention was to provide a holistic Arctic perspective, against the 
backdrop of prevailing social, economic and climatic related challenges. 
However, a challenge in achieving this holistic perspective is to adequately 
capture the enormous geographical, cultural, and economic complex-
ity that defines the Arctic. The diversity of the Arctic means the different 
regions will have their own assets and challenges, which require appropriate 
place-based responses that elude generalisation. Given the enormity of this 
challenge, we make no claims of absolute representation. Rather, we intend 
only to provide a glimpse, albeit well-informed by a group of international 
experts in their respective fields, of the breadth of advances being made 
in the Arctic’s renewable economic sectors. Undoubtedly some important 
examples have been excluded, and we encourage others to take up the 
challenge of bringing them to light for others to learn from. We hope the 
14 chapters presented here serve that purpose.
Chapter outlines
Following this introductory chapter, Tim Pasche and Olaf Kuhlke explore 
digital creative entrepreneurship as it is impacted by data connectivity 
and communication infrastructure in remote communities of the North 
American Arctic. In addition to summarising details related to access, data 
speeds, and bandwidth in specific regions of the North, this chapter looks at 
values-based Arctic digital entrepreneurial curricular development, collab-
orative possibilities between Nunavut and Alaska, and cites opportunities 
and challenges for the Arctic’s Indigenous creative economy. Similarities 
and differences between the United States and the Canadian Arctic in terms 
of opportunity and networking based on digital connectivity and cost of 
access are also explored. The chapter offers specific examples related to 
opportunities and barriers for Arctic small business development given var-
iances in digital access. The chapter concludes with a number of important 
policy recommendations for government and industry.
In Chapter 3, Ken Coates and Carin Holroyd show that Arctic regions 
have a great deal to gain and, equally, much to lose from the twenty-first 
century-onslaught of new technologies. Led globally by such large firms 
as Samsung, Apple, Nokia, Panasonic, Alphabet/Google, Microsoft, Sun 
Systems, Cisco, TenCent, and Huawei, the recent technological and eco-
nomic transformation has had profound effects on the global economy. 
New technologies like food factories, small modular nuclear reactors, 
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autonomous vehicles, and drones are already disrupting existing indus-
tries, while high-speed Internet and satellite systems provide the founda-
tion for radical changes in health care, education, governance, and business. 
Advocates of Artificial Intelligence (AI) argue that AI, along with 5G wire-
less capabilities, will have profound economic and social effects globally. 
Yet, the impact of these technologies on the Arctic is rarely mentioned in 
international discussions, and it remains unclear if the Arctic will see net 
benefits, dramatic losses, or mixed results from them. To some extent, the 
impact will depend on how Arctic states and communities approach the 
challenges and opportunities these new technologies represent.
In Chapter 4, Timo Jokela and his co-authors examine the impact of 
creative industries on renewable economies in the Arctic. Until recently, 
understanding of the frameworks of the creative industry and renewable 
economy has remained vague, especially in the field of art and design. In 
this chapter, the potential of art and design in promoting renewable econ-
omies is explored, using the concepts of ecosystem services, particularly 
cultural ecosystem services, and place-making as our theoretical and prac-
tical framework. This framework allows us to rethink the ways that crea-
tive entrepreneurs, businesses, and communities may collaborate, through 
art and design, in place-based development in the rapidly changing Arctic. 
By presenting case studies drawn from Alaska (United States), Canada, 
Finland, and Russia, the authors not only share experiences and findings but 
also suggest future lines of enquiry. The takeaway finding from this chapter 
is that creative, renewable economies in the fields of art and design can play 
an important role in the future of sustainable development in peripheral and 
remote areas in the Arctic.
Patrick Maher and his colleagues (Chapter 5) continue this discussion in 
their examination of Arctic tourism. Viewed through the lens of the “desti-
nation,” this chapter explores the various ways tourism has developed, and 
continues to develop, in the Arctic. Many Arctic actors assume that the pub-
licity of a specific place or region will lead to increased number of tourists 
and investors. But this has not poroven to be the case. Rather, an important 
success criterion for the tourism industry is to provide the right experience 
to the right visitor. For this to happen, the image of the Arctic alongside the 
realities of small communities must be addressed.
In Chapter 6, Chris Southcott reviews the role of the social economy in 
Nunavut, Canada. The social economy is made up of organisations in the 
not-for-profit sector that seek to enhance the social, cultural, health, eco-
nomic, and environmental conditions of communities. These organisations 
continue to be an important part Nunavut’s effort to resist an overdepend-
ence on extractive resource development in the region. While extractive 
resource industries will continue to be an important part of Nunavut econ-
omy, this chapter offers direction for how communities can leverage those 
resource revenues to hasten the transition to renewable economic develop-
ment opportunities.
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In Chapter 7, Martin Olsen argues that smaller institutions of higher 
learning within the Arctic must play a significant role in tackling the issues 
facing the region in a more practical sense. Olsen proposes that educational 
institutions should work with geographically embedded knowledge in a real 
work setting and focus on solutions relevant to the area and its stakeholders. 
However, for this to become a reality, changes to how many small Arctic 
universities currently operate must be made. To that end, an outline of an 
operational framework is offered that universities in the Arctic can consider 
as they strive to minimise reliance on input resources in order to maximise 
their sustainability output. Most instructively, this chapter describes a basic 
framework, and provides a point-by-point analysis of each step in the pro-
cess, outlining a theoretical basis and practical considerations.
Norma Shorty (Chapter 8) extends the knowledge-economy discussion 
through an exploration of Indigenous-led research that embraces Indigenous 
knowledges, philosophies, methods, and healing. In order for Indigenous 
knowledge to be sustainable, Indigenous peoples must return to their phi-
losophies, methods, and heritage in order to fully embrace what their ances-
tors left behind for them to decipher and put to use. This chapter makes a 
call for long-term Indigenous-led research, for the purpose of articulating, 
defining, and implementing Indigenous Knowledge as a critical and the 
most historically relevant renewable resource in the Arctic.
In Chapter 9, Karin Buhmann and her colleagues examine how cli-
mate change has spurred projects in Arctic countries to shift to low- 
carbon renewable energy sources. Several of these projects have been met 
by protests by local communities including Indigenous groups concerned 
with environmental and social impacts. These tensions underscore the need 
for stronger and meaningful involvement of communities and Indigenous 
peoples in impact assessments and consultation processes in order to iden-
tify and address concerns from the local perspective. Based on cases from 
Sápmi, Greenland, and Canada, this chapter shows that in some cases 
renewable energy projects can have perversely negative impacts on commu-
nity health and safety as well as the traditions and income-generating activi-
ties of Arctic Indigenous groups. The authors argue that the need for energy 
justice highlights the importance of approaching climate change responses 
and renewable energy transitions in ways that adequately address local con-
cerns, needs, and rights in a manner that is meaningful to those who may 
be adversely affected.
Dorothée Campou and Greg Poelzer (Chapter 10) carry this discussion 
forward by exploring the extent to which Indigenous communities partic-
ipate in the transition to renewable energy in the Arctic region. Using the 
concept of energy justice, this chapter provides legal and empirical argu-
ments to demonstrate the need to consider energy justice in order to ensure 
that the transition to renewable energy in the Arctic region addresses the 
rights of Indigenous peoples. In so doing, the authors outline the impor-
tance of renewable energy as a means to achieving sustainable development 
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and to fulfilling human rights in accordance with the international com-
mitments of Arctic states adopted under the auspices of the 2030 Agenda 
and the SDGs in 2015. Second, the chapter outlines the broader contexts 
and corresponding patterns of renewable energy development in the Arctic. 
Against this backdrop, the chapter examines the actual state of play of the 
energy transition and its impact on Indigenous peoples in the Arctic based 
on illustrative examples. For this purpose, the chapter includes examples 
from Canada, Alaska, and Russia and in the Nordic countries of Norway 
and Sweden. Based on this appraisal, the authors offer important recom-
mendations for policymakers and business leaders to achieve greater jus-
tice for Arctic Indigenous peoples during this current period of the global 
energy transition.
In Chapter 11, Bjørg Helen Nøstvold, Ingrid Kvalvik, and Morten Heide 
share the results from a study they completed on “Arctic Origin” as a mar-
keting opportunity for food producers in Arctic Norway. The assumption 
was that it is possible to achieve added value based on Arctic origin in stra-
tegic marketing, but to do this, it is vital to know what consumers perceive 
as Arctic qualities. The chapter shows that consumers associate reindeer, 
seafood, and game as Arctic species, and associate food from the Arctic as 
natural, pure, healthy, tasty, and traditional. The perception is quite simi-
lar in the north and south of Norway. This means that producers generally 
can use the same branding, unless they have a strong focus on a local food 
image. Furthermore, many of these characteristics are in line with current 
international food trends related to health and environmental sustainability.
In Chapter 12, Catherine Chamber and her colleagues examine fish-
eries that center on both capture fisheries and its related industries (e.g., 
fish processing, gear manufacturing, harbor operations, etc.) and subsist-
ence fisheries that contribute to local mixed economies. The Arctic marine 
socio-ecological ecosystem is experiencing a continuous, rapid change 
including shifts in the range of fisheries, decreasing sea ice coverage, 
increased risk of pollution, and varying forms of economic development 
and governance changes that can have both positive and negative impacts. 
The specific objective of this chapter is to use the best available data to 
contribute to scholarship, policy, and future development by identifying 
opportunities and threats for current and fisheries and aquaculture activ-
ities in the Arctic. The chapter concludes by identifying key considerations 
for Arctic communities and decision-makers interested in renewable econo-
mies that include fisheries and aquaculture.
In Chapter 13, David Natcher and his co-authors present the results of 
their recently completed study on the Arctic’s food producing potential. 
The aim of the project was to assess the potential for increased produc-
tion and added value of foods originating in the Arctic, with the overar-
ching aim of improving northern food security, and enhancing the social 
and economic conditions of Arctic communities. The results of the project 
Renewable economies in the Arctic 7
affirmed that the Arctic region is a considerable producer of commercial 
foods. Food industries are producing large volumes of food commodi-
ties that are culturally compatible with Indigenous/local food preferences 
and also have high export value. However, the research also found that 
the Arctic foods value chain is challenged by a host of social, economic, 
logistical, and political obstacles. While these challenges are experienced 
unevenly across the Arctic regions, Arctic food industries: (1) tend to be 
fragmented; (2) have tenuous professional connections; and (3) have lim-
ited communication streams. In this chapter, the authors make a call for a 
cluster-based approach to food innovation that can draw together Arctic 
food producers with governments, Arctic Indigenous communities, univer-
sities, research centers, vocational training providers, and industry associ-
ations. A cluster-based approach to food innovation would be guided by 
the combined efforts to respond to regional challenges in food security and 
renewable economic development.
In the concluding chapter (Chapter 14), Natcher and Ingram present the 
results a regional study that examined the nexus between water, energy, and 
food systems in northern Canada. In 2017, the Arctic Council, under the 
Finnish Chair, adopted the United Nations’ SDGs to inform its strategic 
policy direction; noting that the SDGs are global in scope but are amenda-
ble to the sustainable development of Arctic regions. In that same year, the 
Arctic Council’s SDWG made a commitment to use SDG targets as guide-
posts for advancing its sustainable development agenda. However, before 
those guideposts could be determined, the SDWG emphasised the need 
to better understand the nexus—or the connections and interactions— 
that occur between SDG targets. The SDWG cautioned that failing to 
consider the nexus between SDG targets could result in ill-informed and 
unintended policy outcomes, whereas an accurate accounting of the syn-
ergies and trade-offs between SDG targets could inform more sustainable 
policy solutions. With this direction, Natcher and Ingram examined the 
nexus between SDG 2—Ending hunger and achieving food security for all, 
SDG 6—Ensuring the availability and sustainable management of water 
and sanitation for all, and SDG 7—Ensuring access to affordable, relia-
ble, sustainable, and modern energy for all. Their focus on WEF-related 
SDGs is particularly warranted in northern Canada, given the high rates 
of WEF insecurities experienced by Indigenous communities. By assessing 
the positive and negative interactions between the WEF-SDGs, Natcher 
and Ingram concluded that 87 percent of interventions to alleviate WEF 
insecurities would be synergistic at some magnitude, meaning that efforts 
to address insecurity in one WEF sector will have positive spillover effects 
toward the others. With synergies significantly outweighing trade-offs, this 
chapter demonstrates that important opportunities exist to simultaneously 
address WEF insecurities through mutually beneficial actions that capital-
ise on and promote synergetic policies.
8 D. C. Natcher & T. Koivurova
Summary
A theme that runs throughout all chapters in this volume is the notion that 
Arctic economic development has historically been weighted by “southern- 
based” investments and influenced by a development discourse originating 
in the global south. While parallel experiences of colonisation, environmen-
tal stress, remote access, resource constraints, and food insecurity can be 
found, opportunities to amplify Arctic perspectives and resilient economic 
strategies warrant deliberate attention. The lessons learned from the chap-
ters in this volume represent our intentional efforts to shape research and 
introduce a development discourse that is unique to the people and condi-
tions of the Arctic. To that end, we call upon the Arctic Council and Arctic 
States to help facilitate local and international relationships, investments 
in research capacity, and the utilisation of research results to guide future 
Arctic economic policy. Through such a development platform, emerging 
and well-established renewable economies can have enduring benefits and 
can be a critical component to promoting the future prosperity and wellbeing 
of all Arctic communities.
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2 Arctic broadband connectivity 
and the creative economy
Access, challenges, and  
opportunities in Nunavut 
and Alaska
Timothy J. Pasch and Olaf Kuhlke
Introduction
The North American Arctic geographic region is increasingly attracting 
economic and political interest (Keil & Knecht, 2017; Smith, 2010). Along 
with climate change and geostrategic concerns, new business opportunities 
are emerging, and Arctic stakeholders are playing a key role in facilitating 
and creating favorable conditions for boosting Arctic economic activity 
(Petrov, 2017). There is a wide spectrum of Arctic business activities under-
way, of which oil and gas, mining, and shipping are perhaps among the most 
well-known.
Beyond extractive and transport-related industries, there is growing 
interest in the North American Arctic region’s human economic potential 
in areas such as eco-tourism, innovation and entrepreneurship. Indigenous-
owned, digitally connected culturally related businesses show increasing 
potential to address specific sustainable opportunities and needs of the 
region (Dana & Anderson, 2007; Patvardhan, 1990; Shadian, 2018).
In parallel to these economic trends, the North American Arctic is 
becoming more digitally connected (Christensen, 2003; Hudson, 2011; 
Warwick, 2019). Some researchers have argued that in order to succeed, 
new business development in the North American Arctic must be rooted 
in its people(s) and grounded in traditional knowledge toward the goal 
of innovative development, in order that the Arctic’s unique resources 
and human capital become competitive on a global scale (Pasch, 2015; 
Rodon & Lévesque, 2015). Rural Arctic communities are under pressure, 
as younger generations increasingly desire the services, opportunities, 
and education offered in greater metropolitan areas (Seyfrit, Hamilton, 
Duncan, & Grimes, 1998). Arctic business development is, therefore, an 
existential issue.
This chapter argues that creating economic opportunities of a sufficient 
size and critical mass, if properly balanced with community informatics 
and values, has the potential to offer rural and remote Arctic residents 
aspects of the quality of life they seek while celebrating and leveraging 
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traditional knowledge, languages, and lifestyle. New technologies are 
revising the concept of “remote” and are rendering previously inaccessi-
ble projects economically feasible (Caspary & O’Connor, 2003). Moreover, 
new communication technologies especially are disrupting traditional 
business models and forcing business to innovate and to reinvent them-
selves (Graham, Hjorth, & Lehdonvirta, 2017). With this said, challenges 
related to impacts of ICT on traditional knowledge and stability/integrity 
of Northern communities are significant and must be addressed (Young, 
2017, Young, 2019).
A number of regional, national, and international reports have care-
fully documented the rise of the creative economy (Bakhshi, Freeman, & 
Higgs, 2012; Duisenberg, 2010; Harris, Collins, & Cheek, 2013; Restrepo & 
Marquez, 2013). As 2013 UNESCO Creative Economy Report points out, 
“culture is now a driver [emphasis in the original document] of economic 
development, led by the growth of the creative economy in general and the 
cultural and creative industries in particular, recognized not only for their 
economic value but also increasingly for their role in producing new creative 
ideas or technologies, and their non-monetized social benefits” (p. 9).
As a consequence, scholars and policy makers alike have paid close 
attention to scalable, specific strategies and policy instruments that boost 
both public and private investment in cultural activities and creative occu-
pations (Florida, 2002; Hagoort, 2003; Kooyman, 2011; Oakley, 2004; 
Sorin & Sessions, 2015). Furthermore, the question of educating a digi-
tal creative workforce has resulted in considerable dialogue concerning 
how to develop culturally specific or culturally sensitive entrepreneurship 
training curricula for the creative economy and to make these accessible, 
for broad community audiences, online (Naudin, 2017; Röschenthaler & 
Schulz, 2015).
In this chapter, as a component of the section related to renewable Arctic 
economic opportunity, we examine the potential of developing such cultur-
ally specific or culturally guided entrepreneurship training curricula, and 
the access and/or barriers faced by aspiring entrepreneurs in remote Arctic 
communities, as they seek to utilize new communication technologies and 
digital tools (photography, videography, code, etc.) to generate sustainable 
job opportunities. Specifically, we seek to address the following questions:
1 What access do remote Arctic communities have to broadband technol-
ogy and digital tools to participate in the creative economy?
2 What concerns and barriers do remote Arctic communities face in devel-
oping viable business opportunities in the global creative economy?
3 What opportunities already exist in remote Arctic communities for par-
ticipation in the global creative economy? What conversations about 
jobs outside of the resource extraction economy and traditional subsist-
ence are being had?
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Background
Currents trends in Arctic environments and economies
The North American Arctic is undergoing measurable, visible and signif-
icant environmental, economic, and social changes. Observable warming 
trends in the Arctic present significant and sustained challenges including, 
but not limited to ecological shifts such as observable differences in ani-
mal migratory patterns, hunting range, ice thickness, and numerous other 
threats to traditional practices and ways of life (Stroeve, 2017; Wang, 2017). 
Such developments represent a significant challenge to traditional econ-
omies, along with associated sociocultural, environmental, traditional 
knowledge and linguistic/communicative concerns (Emmerson & Lahn, 
2012; Giles, 2003; Romero Manrique, Corral, & Guimarães Pereira, 2018; 
Stephen, 2018).
The warming/heating trends, despite the significant challenges mentioned 
above, may also paradoxically present some economic opportunities in the 
North American Arctic, through enhanced shipping and transport, mineral 
exploration, ecotourism, and infrastructure (Drewniak, Dalaklis, Kitada, 
Ölçer, & Ballini, 2018; Tol, 2009). This is evidenced in-part by enhanced 
global interest in Arctic shipping routes, increased activity in Arctic-based 
diplomatic and negotiating activity and geopolitical interests and stakes 
proposed by an increased number of (thirteen as of this writing) Arctic 
observer nations such as China (Arctic Council,n.d. )
These trends in the North American Arctic have raised concerns related to 
sovereignty over Arctic waters. Canada is particularly focused upon Arctic 
sovereignty and definitions (by the United States and other nations) of the 
Northwest Passage as either internal or international waters, issues that will 
impact oversight of environmental conditions and resources, reduce the 
ability to control shipping traffic and collect duties, and influence access 
(Geddert, 2019; Lajeunesse & Huebert, 2019; Lalonde, 2018; Stein, 2018). 
Initiatives such as China’s Polar Silk Road and guidebook for Chinese ships 
navigating the Northwest Passage are examples of international attention to 
and attempts to begin using the passage at large scale (Byers & Lodge, 2019; 
Koivurova, 2018; Liu, 2019). Such national sovereignty concerns directly 
impact economic opportunities and are linked to the sovereignty of the 
Indigenous populations of the Arctic.
While much of the North American Arctic economy is currently focused 
on commodity extraction and exports, resource-dependent communities 
prone to boom-and-bust cycles are looking toward digital and creative eco-
nomic models as tools to diversify their economic base (Alvarez, Yumashev, 
& Whiteman, 2019; Avango, Nilsson, & Roberts, 2013; Bennett, 2016; 
Johnston, Dawson, & Stewart, 2019; Nong, Countryman, & Warziniack, 
2018; Poppel, Flaegteborg, Siegstad, & Snyder, 2015). Developments such 
as the Arctic Investment Protocol of the World Economic Forum and early 
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adopters such as Guggenheim Partners indicate a global interest in how 
Arctic development proceeds (World Economic Forum, 2015).
The rise of the creative economy and its economic and social impacts have 
been widely documented and one tool for enhancing economic development 
of this type is through the creation of curricula in accelerators and incu-
bators (Connell, 2013, Felton, 2010, Flew, 2011, Heinsius and Lehikoinen, 
2013, Oakley, 2004; Sorin & Sessions, 2015). A key goal of these programs 
has traditionally been to prepare entrepreneurs to start businesses in the 
creative and cultural sectors, and some of these programs have been specif-
ically designed to address underserved minority populations (Leung, 2019; 
Salemink, Strijker, & Bosworth, 2017; Sum & Jessop, 2013).
As of this writing, a large number of these efforts have focused on major 
urban centers despite the fact that it is especially in the highly remote and 
underdeveloped regions of the planet where the digital/creative economy 
can be the most effective for economic diversification and poverty reduc-
tion (Florida 2006, Markusen and Gadwa, 2010; Duisenberg, 2010; Philip & 
Williams, 2019; Restrepo & Marquez, 2013).
Digital entrepreneurship education: From North 
American tribal colleges to community efforts
Tribal Colleges and other Native American Tribal groups in the United 
States are engaging with culturally centered digital/creative incubators 
designed around economic development (Dana & Anderson, 2007; Dixon, 
2019; Wuttunee, 2004). And in a most recent example, an Australian not-for-
profit accelerator, Barayamal, is now offering a variety of entrepreneurship 
education programs for tech startups, specific sensitivity and inclusion of 
Kamilaroi language elements (“Barayamal – Indigenous Entrepreneurship 
Australia,” 2019.)
In the Pueblo Nation, an accelerator was conducted entirely in the Zuni lan-
guage, enabling youth to participate in the Indigenous Comic-Com focused 
on Native Superheroes and creating new series focused on Native Realities: 
Superheroes of Past, Present, and Future (Murphy, 2018; Simón, 2016).
Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Member and Indigenous Journalist Mark 
Trahant has written extensively on the importance of digital content crea-
tion by Indigenous Peoples. As co-author and presenter with Pasch, Bjerklie, 
& Trahant (2016) at the ArcticNet Annual Scientific Meeting, he wrote:
So what can we in the Academy do about this? How do we make certain 
that the opportunity for a digital future is as real for an Indigenous 
Arctic as it for other global citizens? As we develop digital media we must 
not allow ourselves to repeat mistakes from the past, and especially the 
missing voices from Indigenous communities. I am fond of the work of 
the 1947 Hutchins Commission, formally the Commission on Freedom 
of the Press (Hutchins, 1947). That Commission said underrepresented 
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“constituent groups” are too easily misrepresented in any democracy. 
“We cannot assume (that) the mere increase in quantity and variety of 
mass communications will increase mutual understanding,’ Hutchins 
wrote. “It may give wider currency to reports which intensify preju-
dice and hatred” (Hutchins, 1947, p. 35). So, again, what can we in the 
Academy do about this? What can we do to make sure that in the Arctic 
indigenous voices are developing stories, content in digital-speak, and 
more important, being heard?
One of the challenges for Indigenous communities, including the Arctic 
region, is that we need better data about Internet or cell phone service. 
If you look at Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, Twitter, and other social 
media, it’s clear that Native young people use social media in similar ways 
to other young people. It’s also important to remember that the Indigenous 
population skews younger than the general population, and in many com-
munities the under-18 age group constitutes the largest population segment 
of typically fast-growing communities (Census Canada, 2017).
Indigenous communities already have a data gap. Many of our statis-
tics, ranging from unemployment to health metrics, are unreliable and out 
of date. We need better, faster data collection in Indigenous communities, 
in North America and globally (Kukutai & Taylor, 2016). The National 
Congress of American Indians says when it comes to data Native Americans 
are too often the “asterisk nation” because the information we see is scant 
and presented as a footnote (“Data Disaggregation NCAI,” 2019). http://
www.ncai.org/policy-research-center/research-data/data
A second opportunity here is the lifting of geography as a barrier. In the 
digital world, location does not matter. A business can operate successfully 
anywhere there’s a good connection to the Internet. The retail site Etsy is 
a good example. According to Mary Meeker’s research (2018), 35% of Etsy 
sellers started a business without much capital (compared to 21%of all small 
business owners). It’s the perfect space for authentic Indian art.
The important thing is that we are at the beginning of the digital trans-
formation. American Indians and Alaska Natives have a long history of 
adapting to new technology. This is just a new and exciting chapter. What’s 
interesting to us is that we need more of this across the Arctic. The talent is 
already there. We just need to open up more opportunities for its use and an 
exposure to a broader audience.
Our incubator and accelerator approach establishes a visible physical 
presence for sustainable economic development through the creation of 
Indigenous-owned businesses, assisting with training including but not 
limited to digital content production, expanding conceptual and practical 
possibilities for data sharing and collaboration in Arctic communities, and 
broader impacts (Mark Trahant, in Pasch, Bjerklie, & Trahant, 2016).
One major barrier to successful entrepreneurship education and training in 
the Arctic relates to historical and present-day postcolonial and neo-colonial 
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ramifications. Some previous efforts to adapt entrepreneurial education to 
the specific needs of Indigenous communities have inadequately addressed 
significant aspects of cultural imperialism/hegemony (Pinto & Blue, 2016). 
The concept of the institutionalized othering of Indigenous peoples in their 
own lands, and aspects related to glorifying “saviors” of a highly idealized/
romanticized Arctic have been explored in the literature (Huggan & Jensen, 
2016; Jensen, 2015; Pasch, 2015). Some existing Western entrepreneurship 
approaches have primarily utilized traditional models of capitalistic entre-
preneurship training and merely “translate” or localize them into a different 
cultural and linguistic context, without questioning the fundamental concept 
of entrepreneurship itself—or its fit for Indigenous communities. Programs 
of this type may not be aligned with local community values and the various 
types of remote-community entrepreneurship and ownership (from sole pro-
prietorship to tribally owned cooperatives) that are possible, and which of 
these might fit the community and its individual’s best.
This chapter argues that attempts to “train” Arctic residents in curric-
ula created elsewhere may impart little result or benefit, or may arguably 
even be highly detrimental to remote communities in the Arctic and other 
regions—unless the curriculum is the result of a collaborative effort includ-
ing culturally specific ways to integrate Indigenous knowledge directly into 
entrepreneurship training.
With expanding digital connectivity in the Arctic, the question of how 
future economic development in the North might proceed has become a 
more pressing question, as seen by increasing research into Arctic entrepre-
neurship, youth engagement, small business development through resilience 
and other programs in the circumpolar Arctic. A number of new programs 
have emerged across the Canadian and Alaskan North related to these goals.
Inspire Nunavut is one example of current Canadian-funded teams work-
ing on social entrepreneurship training in the Canadian North, focused 
on incorporating Indigenous values into curricular design and partnering 
with local participants and leaders. Merging the driving principles of tra-
ditional business with the mechanics of social entrepreneurship, while also 
integrating Inuit culture and values, “Inspire Nunavut provides youth in 
Nunavut with an opportunity to create new solutions in their communi-
ties via entrepreneurship” (“Inspire Nunavut,”n.d.). Through integrating 
Inuit traditional knowledge principles with entrepreneurship training this 
program has partnered with the Government of Nunavut and Employment 
and Social Development Canada, and has already shown success in the 
creation of new businesses in remote communities in Nunavut (“Inspire 
Nunavut,”n.d. ; Cornik, 2016)
EntrepreNORTH is a program based out of Yellowknife, Northwest 
Territories with its mission focused toward empowering Indigenous and 
community-based entrepreneurs to build sustainable businesses and live-
lihoods across Northern Canada. EntrepreNORTH provides a Northern 
Entrepreneur Support Program in addition to powerful thematic approaches 
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(for example, an On-the-Land Tourism Experiences and Services program) 
that has resulted in numerous Indigenous-owned companies. As indicated in 
the Impact Stories of the site, “Across Northern Canada, Indigenous entrepre-
neurs are catalysts of prosperity and drivers of social change within their com-
munities. Their success has a far-reaching ripple effect that leads to greater 
Northern self-determination and sustainability” (“EntrepreNorth,” n.d.).
TakingItGlobal has developed the ConnectedNorth program offering 
enhanced educational experiences for remote Indigenous communities 
via partnerships with Cisco and other organisations. ConnectedNorth’s 
principles build upon empowerment through Indigenous role models and 
principles incorporating a diversity of voices and making strong use of tech-
nologies to share educational experiences at a distance.
In Alaska, the Tanana Chiefs Conference (TCC), and its corporation, 
Doyon Ltd. is also focused on economic development. This tribal consortium 
consists of 6 sub-regions and 42 member tribes of the (primarily Athabaskan) 
Alaskan Interior. Their territory covers an area of 235,000 square miles, an 
area equal to about 37%of the entire state, and just slightly smaller than the 
state of Texas.
In addition to leading initiatives in areas such as health, housing and envi-
ronment, wellness, sustainability and energy; rural economic small-business 
development has become an increasing priority for the Conference. The 
TCC is working toward multiple economic initiatives including ecotour-
ism as well as investing in small businesses viewed as viable and based on/
aligned with community plans (“Tanana Chiefs Conference,” 2019). The 
Alaskan fieldworks informing this chapter took place in collaboration with 
the TCC and most particularly in the communities of Hughes and Huslia in 
the Yukon Tanana and Yukon Koyukuk subregions (see Figure 2.1).
While the Tanana Chiefs Conference represents a large part of the Alaskan 
interior and focuses on economic development and job training program-
ming, currently they have not yet developed an incubator or accelerator 
program. The creation of these opportunities, especially as informed by cur-
rently existing initiatives in Canada and other parts of the Arctic we believe, 
is fortuitous given increasing connectivity among and with remote Alaskan 
communities. At a recent Navigating the North Summit in August 2019, the 
theme focused on “Telecommunications and Technology to Arctic Economic 
Development and Public-Private Partnerships: Corporate, Government and 
Industry Leaders Focusing on the Rising Potential of Alaska” (“Navigating 
the North – Innovation Summit 2019,” n.d.). One panel in particular dis-
cussed future investment opportunities in Native communities, and the 
necessity of broadband expansion. This connectivity could enable not only 
in-person incubator and accelerator programs, but also allow for online and 
hybrid programming to be supported by broadband communication tech-
nology such as conferencing, webinars, and other forms of online learning.
Traditional urban accelerator programs, focused on the tech industry, 
who invest in the companies they help launch, also already exist in Alaska. 
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Take for example Launch Alaska, an Anchorage based tech start-up 
accelerator with a variety of companies in their portfolio (“Launch 
Alaska,” 2019). Launch Alaska provides the typical model for start-up 
companies: they guide promising new companies through an educa-
tional program—acceleration—and then invest in a selection of them, 
receiving part of the company’s equity in return for the continued tech-
nical assistance and networking. In contrast to this urban program in 
Alaska’s largest city, few other accelerator or comprehensive start-up 
entrepreneurship education programs exist across the state, especially in 
more remote communities.
In summary, there are currently a variety of efforts on the way to inte-
grate Canadian First Nation knowledge and curriculum with existing 
entrepreneurship training approaches. In Alaska, that process is very 
much in its infancy, with a more traditional urban technology accelera-
tor in place. Yet, all of these programs have successfully helped launch a 
number of (Indigenous) businesses that either serve their communities with 
modern services or sell Indigenous goods and services to a larger market. 
One area where both the Canadian and Alaskan Arctic continue to strug-
gle in remote communities, relates to the challenge of digital access and 
bandwidth.
Figure 2.1 Territory and subregions of the Tanana Chiefs Conference.
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The current State of Arctic digital access: Community 
informatics, digital media, and bandwidth
North American Arctic Bandwidth has the potential for enhancements in 
the near future, which (if successful) may significantly impact Arctic eco-
nomic development in remote regions. In 2017, the Quintillion Corporation 
succeeded in finalizing subsea connections linking the Alaskan community 
of Nome with Prudhoe Bay (and communities between), after which point 
terrestrial cable connects with Anchorage and Seattle. Phase Two of the 
project proposes submarine fiber optic cable between Alaska and Tokyo.
For Alaska and the Canadian Arctic, the proposed eastern extension 
of the network in Phase Three extends through the Northwest Passage in 
Canada and from there onwards to the United Kingdom. In a September 
2019 telephone discussion with Zach Naramore of Quintillion it was 
described that the exact route East through the Northwest passage has not 
yet been finalized. Ultimately, the route will depend on building a busi-
ness case that would allow us to successfully build the infrastructure, and 
then have customers benefit from … being in that location (based on) the 
geography.
Madeleine Redfern, the Mayor of Iqaluit Nunavut, indicated to the Special 
Senate Committee on the Arctic that Canada had missed out on connecting 
Baffin Island to fiber-optic lines from Nuuk, Greenland to Newfoundland. 
Redfern, 2018) stated that “you effectively cannot put a branching unit in 
after it has been built. It is as expensive as a new build.” She called for the 
construction of a fiber link from “Iqaluit to Nuuk at a cost of approximately 
$80 million; a cost that would have been reduced by half had a branching unit 
been installed in the original design phase” (“Senate of Canada- Northern 
Lights: A Wake-Up Call for the Future of Canada,” n.d.).
Given that client needs will impact the final route selection of the 
Quintillion Network proposed in 2021/2022 through the Northwest Passage, 
it may potentially be advantageous for Internet connectivity in Nunavut 
and Nunavik (and other Canadian Arctic regions) if successful negotiation 
between policymakers in the Canadian North could link remote Canadian 
Arctic communities during the third phase of this major North American 
Arctic infrastructure development.
Beyond Alaska, other Arctic regions including Cinia (Finland) and 
MegaFon (Russia) have created memoranda of understanding related to 
sub-sea data cable across the Arctic Sea. These connections also link Russia 
and China with the network, which raises a number of potential security 
concerns for the North American Arctic.
As one example of Arctic data security challenges, Huawei Corporation 
(China) indicated that it would partner with Ice Wireless and Iristel to help 
them connect (by 2025) rural communities in the Arctic as well as remote 
areas of north-eastern Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador. Huawei 
added that some 25 communities in the largely Inuit areas of the Nunavut 
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territory would also benefit from the deployment. One concern related to 
Huawai’s presence as a communication leader in the Canadian Arctic men-
tioned that this “does create a vulnerability in the event of an escalated 
Canada-China dispute, where Huawei could potentially be ordered to shut 
down those services, thus cutting Canadian Arctic communities off the 
Internet” (Byers & Lodge, 2019; Levinson-King, 2019).
Beyond the risk of services being shut down in the Arctic, questions of 
security in terms of United States/Chinese data sovereignty challenges have 
been frequent in the media as of this writing, and data for the Canadian 
North managed by Huawei could have further contraindications on United 
States/Alaskan collaboration and data management.
While some specific Arctic centers have achieved significantly fast(er) 
data speeds than previously due to 4G LTE connectivity, there remain 
numerous Arctic communities where data is either completely lacking, or 
provided at a significant premium resulting in higher costs and major limi-
tations in what is possible for North American Arctic entrepreneurship and 
small business development. Eric Anoee, an Inuit member of the board of 
the Nunavut Broadband Development Corporation expressed his view with 
the authors when asked if Internet speeds in the Arctic are an issue: “Yes, 
it is definitely an issue but we make do with it … ideally it should be on par 
with the rest of Canada. They (Internet speeds) should be seen as a Basic 
Human Right to have the same level of service with other Canadians.”
Figure 2.2 Quintillion Arctic broadband development strategy.
Source: https://www.qexpressnet.com/system/#FAQ
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Some data services to Nunavut are currently delivered via Telesat sat-
ellites running through gateways in each of the 25 Nunavut communities. 
Despite the 4G upgrades, wireless internet is a far cry from broadband con-
nectivity enjoyed by most of southern Canada. This may change due to sig-
nificant investment from the Government of Canada into R&D for Telesat’s 
broadband satellite constellation that may enable connectivity for the most 
remote Arctic communities.
Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Navdeep 
Bains said July 24 that the Canadian government views Telesat’s future 
low Earth orbit broadband constellation as the only means to con-
nect the country’s most remote citizens. “This is going to provide us 
with privileged access to this constellation, which will enable us to get 
Figure 2.3  Cinia/MegaFon proposed Arctic sea digital communication strategy 
(Knaapila, 2019).
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high-speed internet connectivity in rural and remote parts of Canada, 
and consistent with the commitment that we made in the budget where 
every single Canadian will have access to high-speed internet access by 
2030,” Bains said in a call with reporters”
(Henry, 2019).
In the June 2019 Canadian Special Senate Committee on the Arctic Final 
Report, it was stated that “The Canadian Arctic lags far behind the rest of 
Canada and other circumpolar countries in digital connectivity. Reliable 
and affordable broadband telecommunications services can improve the 
delivery of public services, help to preserve culture and language and ena-
ble economic diversification by connecting remote communities to each 
other and the rest of the world. Broadband telecommunications access in 
the Arctic is poor and, where available, expensive” (p. 45).
These findings were confirmed in conversations and community work-
shops during the summer of 2019 in the Kivalliq region of Nunavut and 
in the Alaskan interior. Some commentary related to technology included 
expressions of frustration such as: “We get really limited on what we can 
do using the web. And it’s unaffordable to use the internet, especially for 
the low-income parts of our population. Because obviously will you choose 
internet over food? You have to have the food” (Arviat, Nunavut).
The Honourable Paul Aarulaaq Quassa, Premier of Nunavut indicated 
that: “Connecting Nunavut with the rest of Canada through roads, fiber 
optics, telecommunication lines and electricity corridors would positively 
impact our territory in many ways: reducing our reliance on fossil fuels and 
impact on the environment; reducing the cost of food, goods and services 
through increased shipping methods; and increasing our participation in 
the digital economy and reducing the digital divide” (Quassa, 2018).
In the publication High-Speed Access for All: Canada’s Connectivity 
Strategy produced by Innovation, Science and Economic Development 
Canada (ISED) in 2019, the Minister of Rural Economic Development 
describes that in 2019 “we made a bold commitment to connect all 
Canadians to reliable high-speed Internet” (p. 2). The document contin-
ues that “Canada faced a national connectivity gap” with rural communi-
ties facing “the daily challenge of slower, less reliable Internet access than 
those in urban centres” (Innovation, Science and Economic Development 
Canada, 2019, p. 4). The report additionally confirms that “limited Internet 
has proven to be a real and significant challenge for Indigenous commu-
nities” with focus on affordability and connectivity made available within 
communities rather than requiring relocation (Innovation, Science and 
Economic Development Canada, 2019, p. 13). “The Rural and Northern 
Stream of the Investing in Canada Infrastructure Program provides up to 
CAN $2 billion to support various infrastructure projects that improve the 
quality of life in rural and northern communities” (Innovation, Science and 
Economic Development Canada, 2019, p.18).
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Infrastructure of this type, while transformative for Arctic economies in 
the Canadian North, at present are “still very fragile: a single event can 
cause a mass outage where people can’t send or receive emails, people can’t 
get money out of the bank machine, people can’t buy gasoline or groceries 
at the store,” stated Madeleine Redfern (Levinson-King, 2019).
Beyond land-based Internet possibilities a number of other space-based 
Internet options may potentially render undersea and terrestrial cable 
redundant. In particular for the Arctic, even if undersea connections are 
made, laying fiber on the tundra brings with it a host of other challenges 
related to permafrost, extreme weather conditions and the challenges of 
access to such remote regions.
OneWeb is a company proposing future space-based blanket coverage 
for the Arctic, in addition to Amazon’s Project Kuiper, SpaceX’s Starlink, 
Facebook’s Athena and Google’s Loon (among other companies). While 
Iridium phones are presently commonplace in the Arctic, until recent times 
connection speeds for data at 2.4kbps have been largely insufficient to ena-
ble large-scale remote-region digital communication and data transfer. The 
new Iridium NEXT satellite constellation array has the potential to blanket 
the North with high-speed communication technology. While in coming 
years there may indeed be a host of new devices connecting with new net-
works enabling enhanced digital communication in the Arctic, at present 
the reality is that when away from major communities data can be extremely 
sparse indeed.
Community informatics: Beyond data speed and focusing  
on community values
The importance of training in information technology, as well as job crea-
tion and participation in markets for digital products is widely recognized 
as essential for economic growth in modern economies. Key to the imple-
mentation of creative economic initiatives in rural and underserved regions 
is local access to and familiarity with information technology and digital 
media (Robert and Townsend, 2016). The importance of training in infor-
mation technology, as well as job creation and participation in markets 
for digital creative products is widely recognized as essential for economic 
growth in modern economies (Comunian, Gilmore, & Jacobi, 2015). And 
yet a digital divide still remains a limiting factor in many regions, including 
much of the circumpolar Arctic.
Even when high speed data is available (for example, the 4G LTE service 
available in Arviat via the qiniq system), the high cost of data coupled with 
immediate data caps when limits are exceeded means that monthly data 
limits can be reached extraordinarily quickly, effectively limiting the abil-
ity of Nunavummiut to upload films, transmit datasets, conduct live video 
meetings, and conversations, and participate in training sessions, as only 
some examples.
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Regardless of when broadband arrives in Nunavut, it is not merely speed 
of connectivity that can create value for a community. This chapter argues 
that economic and social value for a community is not solely based on the 
rapidity of digital connectivity. A number of researchers have proposed that 
it is not sufficient to merely overcome this digital divide by providing faster 
access, but rather by focusing on the real needs of users. “A preoccupation 
with the digital divide as a problem of technical connectedness more often 
than not serves the commercial interests of Internet service providers (ISPs), 
without necessarily empowering or addressing the critical needs of those 
one is striving to connect” (Clement, Gurstein, Longford, Moll, & Shade, 
2012, p. 16).
Some research like Landzelius (2006) has shown that increased passive 
consumption of digital commercial content (especially by youth) may be 
strongly at odds with cultural values and traditional knowledge. Community 
Informatics Theory argues that communities collaboratively accomplish-
ing meaningful self-determined goals utilizing technology/data provide 
a far more valid measure than data speeds alone, of enhancing economic 
opportunity while overcoming digital disparity (Kuersten, 2018; McMahon, 
Gurstein, Beaton, O’Donnell, & Whiteduck, 2014). Jason C. Young (2019) 
focuses on the impact of information and communication technologies on 
communities and especially on Inuit qaujimajatuqangit and knowledge 
transmission. In this piece, the author (2019) discusses how digital tech-
nology is negatively impacting the amount of time spent on the land and 
outdoors, degrading interactions between children and elders, and creating 
concerns not only by serving as a distracting element while on the land, but 
also replacing actual skill (such as navigation and situational awareness) 
with digital tools functioning as ersatz replacement for traditionally learned 
abilities. Both in terms of social interactions and learning, technology car-
ries with it numerous aspects of the post-colonial and real dangers in terms 
of cultural appropriation, and the balance that the author discusses between 
“good” and “bad” uses of ICT are highly applicable to digital entrepreneur-
ial curricular economic development as it is being developed in the North 
American Arctic. Community Informatics Theory and the thoughtful, value- 
driven creation of economic initiatives may assist in addressing some of the 
challenges researched in Young’s research.
In summary, there is tremendous potential to expand the fast-growing 
global creative economy to Arctic regions. A key advantage of this sector 
is the fact that many products and services developed under this rubric are 
digital in nature, such as (but not limited to) audio and video production, 
podcasting, still photography, augmented and virtual reality games and 
applications, coding, telepresence and numerous others. With broadband 
access, the remoteness of the Arctic can be overcome, and the resource 
extraction economy could be supplemented and even replaced in the long 
run by a digital creative economy that reduces the typically high transpor-
tation costs and creates location-independent jobs. Once proper, equal, 
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reliable and affordable broadband options are in place, value-based entre-
preneurship programs (incubators/accelerators) can offer opportunities 
for remote populations to participate in opportunities the creative digital 
economy has to offer. There are challenges related to such efforts, which are 
described in detail in the following chapter.
While this research argues that a culturally aligned and community- 
focused digital creative business incubator can assist in the development of 
new companies and jobs in remote regions, the implementation of any entre-
preneurship incubator/accelerator requires careful study of the values that 
communities themselves see in such a program, especially listening in terms 
of self-determining strengths, challenges and opportunities. Toward this 
goal of listening we conducted fieldwork in May and June 2019, as described 
in the following sections.
Methodology and research approach
The fieldwork informing this chapter was funded by the National Science 
Foundation grant: Developing and Testing an Incubator for Digital Entre­
preneurship in Remote Communities. The goals of the project include con-
ducting listening sessions toward informing the co-creation of a culturally 
centered curriculum on digital entrepreneurship for the purpose of enhancing 
economic and social opportunities in remote North American Arctic regions.
Conceptually, the project is based on the belief that any curricular design 
focused on sustainable digital economic development in the Arctic will be 
ultimately unsuccessful without fully incorporating (from the earliest phases 
of development) traditional knowledge, respect of each Arctic community’s 
communicative and linguistic preferences, and the foundational incorpora-
tion of traditions and community-based consensus of value and needs. We 
argue that digital technologies and communication infrastructure and cur-
riculum intelligently leveraged toward creative and culturally situated small 
business opportunities can assist in diversifying the economic development 
of the Arctic’s remote and resource-dependent communities.
To assess the likelihood of successfully creating a curriculum for digital 
entrepreneurship training in the Arctic, we first examined existing access 
to the telecommunication infrastructure in the North American Arctic. 
This was done through an extensive literature review as well as interviews 
with telecommunications providers and specialists in our host communi-
ties. Second, we conducted interviews with community members, workshop 
participants and key stakeholders in order to assess the personal, cultural, 
economic, and social barriers to both telecommunication access as well as 
business development, including entrepreneurship. Third, we examined the 
many existing opportunities for telecommunication access as well as busi-
ness development, and we discuss our findings below.
Our initiative additionally proposed to connect regions of Arctic Canada 
with regions/communities in Alaska, thus enabling the cross-pollination of 
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ideas and sharing of digital infrastructure and communicative networks/
databases that may assist in elevating the scale and scope of small busi-
nesses to ultimately become Indigenous-owned Arctic digital enterprises, 
potentially with linkages connecting Canada and the United States.
In May and June 2019, we traveled to Nunavut and to the Alaskan Interior 
for initial discussion and workshops with Inuit and Alaska Native tribal mem-
bers. We conducted research in the form of workshops, interviews, survey 
collection (in person and online), and in-person focus groups in the Hamlet of 
Arviat, Nunavut, Canada, and with the Tanana Chiefs Conference in Alaska, 
specifically in the Alaskan interior communities of Hughes, and Huslia as 
well as Fairbanks. We interviewed local tribal leaders, small business owners, 
and residents of the areas and conducted participatory workshops with mem-
bers of the respective communities (ranging from one to five days) to learn 
more regarding shared traditions, values, small business opportunities, and 
economic challenges related to living and working in the North American 
Arctic. We additionally brainstormed regarding possible economic collabo-
rations between Alaska and Nunavut, as well as about similarities and dif-
ferences between Alaskan and Nunavummiut perceptions of challenges and 
possibilities for renewably growing the creative economy in both regions. 
While in Alaska we traveled together with an Inuk colleague working toward 
facilitating in-depth discussions between Inuit and Alaska Native peoples in 
order to further enhance understandings of collaborative economic potential 
between Indigenous peoples of the United States and Canadian Arctic.
This initiative takes the perspective that any work with Arctic Indigenous 
communities on economic development, including that made possible through 
digital media and technology must respect and work with traditional value sys-
tems, and should result in a co-designed program, strategy or curriculum that 
ends up being owned by and led by Indigenous people (Castleden, Morgan, 
& Lamb, 2012; Ermine, Sinclair, & Jeffery, 2004; Louis, 2007; Nicholls, 2009; 
Weber-Pillwax, 2004). Thus, our workshops with the community sought to 
establish a conversation about the value system that guides community-based 
economic thinking and identifies perceived strengths and challenges; and 
based on that, develops ideas for the most needed businesses and the digital 
components that help promote them. The Technology of Participation (ToP) 
approach assisted in organizing the process of inquiry designed around a 
highly inclusive, listening focused approach (Nelson, 2017).
According to this phenomenological approach to inquiry, we began with 
a focused conversation topic, and asked participants to identify, without 
prompting or interruption, various characteristics of their communities: 
strengths and challenges, and the traditional as well as modern values they 
perceive as guiding them. Furthermore, participants discussed digital tools 
and aspects of data access that were viewed as economic opportunities for 
the community (and region), while also calling out aspects of Arctic digital 
infrastructure that were viewed as significant barriers to overall communi-
cation and successful small business development.
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As facilitators, we stepped back, observed and did not interrupt or 
guide this process. This brainstorming was followed by a group consen-
sus workshop, the second part of a typical ToP session. Here, participants 
begin to discuss, sort, categorize and prioritize various ideas, and come to 
a collective group consensus on their key values, strengths and challenges. 
Participatory strategic and action planning—the next steps of ToP—fol-
lowed, and community participants identified which business ideas and 
future economic development would address the strengths and challenges, 
while being true to community values. Technology of Participation tech-
niques have been widely used in a number of contexts and communities 
(including Indigenous communities) as small and large group interaction 
methods to facilitate difficult conversations about major community change 
efforts and challenges, and to develop action plans for the opportunities that 
exist (Bryson & Anderson, 2000; Nelson, 2017; Spencer, 1989).
The means by which ToP is framed is critical (Lee, McQuarrie, & Walker, 
2015). “Technologies of participation refers to arrangements of practices, 
metrics, discourses, and actors that perform community self-determination 
in ways that are designed to realize specific goals … deliberation can be sold 
as a commodity or it can help create group solidarity and identity … it can 
enable democratisation or elite rule. It derives its significance from how it is 
situated” (Lee, McQuarrie, & Walker, 2015, p. 83). For this reason, the synergy 
of Indigenous-centered research methodologies and community informatics 
theory with ToP was critically important for developing a conceptual frame-
work designed toward enhancing benefits to communities while reducing neg-
ative influences of technology, economic development and digital in-roads.
As part of the workshops, many discussions took place outside hamlets/
villages and out on the land. The conceptual framework guiding these dis-
cussions was in part driven by the perspective that even being indoors inside 
fixed-style houses was a colonial construct, and that being outside in tradi-
tional ways could create new opportunities for freedom of expression and 
heightened communication. For this reason on day 3 of the workshop in 
Arviat the group traveled overland via snowmobile and discussed at length 
in an environment much more conducive to communication. Many conver-
sations took place in Inuktitut. In Alaska, similarly the group left the tribal 
meeting halls to meet by the riverbanks and discuss, in addition to boat 
travel upriver and forest walks/ATV travel.
Developing an Arctic digital creative economy of  
the future: From values to challenges and strengths
Values
During our fieldwork in both Arviat, NU and Hughes, AK, we began our 
community workshop with a lengthy discussion of values. We asked the com-
munity members to identify the values that guide their work, and their life in 
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the community. All participants were asked to identify key values that guide 
their work and their actions in the community, and to place these on the large 
interactive wall (“sticky wall”) used in Technology of participation sessions.
Each participant then ranked their top two (2) priorities in each cate-
gory. The priorities were then ranked in descending order with the most 
frequently ranked priority at the top of the column. A graphic summary of 
the most frequently used terms during discussions in Arviat and Nunavut 
follows in Figure 2.4.
Some elements that rapidly emerged in discussions included
a The necessity of co-creation in all business endeavors. This means that 
in small communities, no business should operate without prior con-
sultation with the community, and with a clear mission to serve the 
community. In other words, there must be value alignment between 
individual business owners and the community.
b The focus on incorporating strong Indigenous socio-linguistic, tradi-
tional, elder-guided curricular aspects into all enterprises. New business 
development should strengthen the cultural fabric of the community, 
not weaken or dilute it.
c The development of trust and resilience. The communities we worked 
with expressed a strong need for emphasizing historical continuity and 
Figure 2.4  Graphical summary of the most frequently used terms in discussions in 
Arviat and Nunavut.
Arctic creative economy 27
the value of tradition. It was expressed repeatedly that elders working 
with youth would be a critical piece of identifying new business oppor-
tunities, since the elders highlighted the need for continuing traditions, 
whereas youth was interested more in modern technology and com-
munication. Negotiating that divide, and identifying ways to bring the 
elders and youth together in business and in the community is critical to 
build sustainable businesses that are embraced by the entire community.
d The importance of having community-led data sovereignty mechanisms 
strongly in place. Shared knowledge and clear acknowledgement of histor-
ical past wrongs (and current pitfalls), along with the importance of lead-
ership held by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous researchers working 
in a joint partnership were described. Individual and social/societal values 
were described as being a critical part of any economic effort.
There was a great deal of discussion related to Inuit traditional knowl-
edge or Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (Inuit IQ) and many of the concepts dis-
cussed during the workshop were drawn from these values and described 
in Inuktitut. The anonymized results of these conversations on community 
values were shared with Alaskan communities in order to compare and con-
trast values informing economic development between Nunavut/Alaska. 
Similar discussions were held in Hughes, Alaska where it became rapidly 
apparent that there are strongly shared guiding values across the North 
American Arctic in terms of economic and business development.
In summary, our discussions included a strong sense that any small busi-
ness development should emerge first and foremost from community values, 
which they should be value-based and should not lose sense of their values, 
no matter how successful they became. In Arviat, for example, we were told 
about Hinaani, a local textile design/fashion company that firmly operates 
in the modern world (by selling apparel across North America) but that also 
based all of their work and designs on Inuit art, culture, and stories.
One of the first key insights we gained from our work with our host com-
munities was that this discussion of values as part of a business and entre-
preneurship development workshop was highly unusual. We were repeatedly 
told that while there are other job training and entrepreneurship workshops 
offered in both communities, we were the first in their experience to start 
with an in-depth conversation about values, and how values should guide 
business. Following a discussion of values, we then guided our workshops 
through an exploration of perceived strengths, utilizing the same methodol-
ogy as described above.
Strengths
It became very evident throughout the weeks spent together in Nunavut 
and Alaska that culture and tradition were deeply important for the group, 
and regarded as their greatest strength. Respecting Elders and keeping 
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Indigenous languages vibrant and respected were topics frequently men-
tioned. A mutually shared sense of volunteerism, providing community 
help and support to others, and continuing the critically important tradi-
tions of hunting, being on the land, and keeping the environment healthy 
were all mentioned as foundational priorities.
A number of individuals mentioned that so many aspects of their com-
munities were so beautiful and attractive. “Similar to fall colors down 
south, up here we have very small changes in colors, in the moss and lichen, 
but so beautiful. The tea is so delicious. The colors on the (Hudson) bay. 
The Northern Lights have a deep meaning for our ancestors and for us.” 
Discussions of sustainable, Indigenous-guided ecotourism opportunities 
emerged from these conversations, with a focus on what specific community- 
related events could be of economic potential, without overtly disrupting 
the community or causing negative impacts to the communities.
In terms of education, business and entrepreneurship, a focus on practi-
cal training for needed industries was another strong focus area. The impor-
tance of more Indigenous medical staff and members of the police force 
were included, as were numerous aspects of traditional skills and talents 
already present in the communities that could become the base for renew-
able/sustainable small businesses. A traditional seamstress commented in 
Nunavut that:
“Now we have access to everything (patterns) on computer/via the 
internet. We can design our own clothes and trade patterns. With 
amouti (traditional Inuit parka for carrying a baby) for example, we 
combine traditional patterns with new designs. Our designs can help 
people around the world. Amouti bonds the mother and child more. 
For the first 3-4 months some people never even see the baby as they 
are nestled in the Amouti. Feeding is so much easier. Skin to skin, the 
mother knows what the child needs so much better. The child can “go” 
by simply “going” on the ground while moving and traveling. There is 
no waste.”
Numerous ideas and concepts were raised in terms of new industries 
and opportunities that the digital economy could make available across 
Nunavut and Alaska, and these are discussed in the opportunities section 
below.
Remoteness challenges
In order to assess what kind of entrepreneurship training the community 
would co-develop with us in the future, it was incumbent to address the 
many challenges—historical and contemporary—that remote Indigenous 
communities are facing.
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The challenges expressed had many areas of intersection between Arviat, 
Nunavut and Hughes, Alaska.
a Cost of travel to and from the Arctic, both for personal and professional 
travel, and for shipping of needed goods and services, is clearly a factor 
of significant import.
Figure 2.5 Hughes, AK and Arviat, NU strengths.
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b High cost of food and necessary supplies for remote communities is 
also a constant consideration.
c The need to travel significant distances for certain health care is a clear 
concern.
d In terms of communication, Internet speeds and telecommunication 
were also at the top of most participants’ minds. Limited bandwidth 
and the high cost of data were described in detail in both Nunavut and 
Alaska.
e While telephone (landline and cellular) connectivity was strong in 
Arviat, in Hughes especially the lack of cell towers coupled with land-
line connections prone to going out for extended periods of time caused 
connectivity issues that can directly impact the ability to communicate 
outside the community (both for personal and business purposes).
Technology challenges
The need for enhanced training and education in digital tools was another 
area of focus, in particular digital imaging/photographic skills were men-
tioned in both communities as sources of income for photographing artistic 
and creative works for sale, and in using for social media. Screen time was a 
concern in both communities with concerns expressed related to the cultur-
ally negative impact of some video games, movies and television not in-tune 
with traditional values. As a result, we had a number of discussions that 
emerged related to how digital tools were leading to a number of community 
Figure 2.6 Venn diagram of hughes, AK and arviat, NU challenges.
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members never leaving their homes, with this impacting negatively on time 
spent with family, on the land, engaging in traditional activities, and in 
some cases causing loss of jobs or reducing motivation to engage socially.
Housing challenges
Additional challenges described in the United States and Canadian Arctic 
communities we visited also showed similarities across borders. A hous-
ing shortage is a critical factor across the North American Arctic and was 
described in detail by many individuals with whom the authors had the 
opportunity to speak.
“Housing is a major issue. Looking at the increasing number of children 
in town, where will they live?.”
“A dire need is housing, overcrowding, societal problems. Overcrowding 
causes domestic violence, often there is not enough food for everyone in 
the same house, etc.”
“The issue is still there. Why is this still happening when the rest of 
Canada and the US is so different?”
Housing has been expressed in multiple TCC community reports as one 
of the most pressing issues in rural Alaska. With recent budget cuts in the 
State there is concern regarding reduced housing construction and home-
lessness support (Kesslen, 2019; Restino, 2018).
Drug and alcohol challenges
Alcohol abuse was repeatedly described in discussions in both Nunavut 
and Alaska as a challenge so serious as to be a cross-generational crisis. 
In some communities in Alaska, as one resident stated, “the (corporations) 
had to separate the dividend out, divvy it out (in smaller sizes), because 
there would be too much crime like drug use and alcohol abuse when people 
received too much at once.”
Bootleggers can make significant profits by bringing alcohol into dry com-
munities in the Arctic. A fifth of alcohol (750ml) can sell for many hundreds 
of dollars. Bootleggers can allegedly do this regularly and often, in conver-
sation we heard anecdotes of bootleggers who had regular businesses of 
bringing and shipping bottles into communities, resulting in significant neg-
ative social impacts caused to the communities. Links between alcohol (and 
other drugs) and suicide were also described as major issues in the North 
American Arctic that impacted the entire region significantly. Significant 
research well beyond the scope of this article investigates alcoholism and 
suicide in the Arctic (Brown, Dickerson, & D’Amico, 2016; Ogilvie, 2018; 
Seyfrit et al., 1998; Skewes & Blume, 2015; Wexler et al., 2015).
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Food insecurity challenges
Food insecurity was described as a major issue. This can take many forms 
including the extremely high costs of living in rural communities due to the 
greatly enhanced costs of shipping and transport, including the temptation 
of rural residents to purchase cheaper yet much less healthy options result-
ing in health concerns. One Arviat resident stated:
“Obviously we do not have highways, up here, everything has to be 
flown up here, and it’s really expensive, and we do have sealift, but it 
only once a year, early summer, This is by water. What about fresh pro-
duce? Milk, or fruits and vegetables, you cannot ship them by sealift for 
the year, because obviously they have a short shelf life.”
“We have no choice but to use air to bring in things like food, we need 
more road systems to assist with import(ation), however we are less than 
1% of the voting members of Canada, we do not make enough of a dif-
ference to the big politicians.”
“Within the federal level we do not have good representation from our 
cultural group. We need new members of parliament, senators. Again 
it goes back to the fact that we are too small, it’s hard but that doesn’t 
mean that we do nothing. One Inuit group on Facebook talking about 
food insecurity posted pictures of the high cost of food, and started a 
dialogue. They organized protests, and that kind of thing is good, and 
needed, and powerful. Even a small group on social media can have a 
significant impact in remote areas.”
In Alaska, food insecurity is also an ongoing and serious issue that 
impacts quality of life and economic development equally. For Inuit and 
Alaska Natives traditional hunting and fishing for country food is a major 
source of needed nutrition that is often unavailable in store-bought goods 
(or is simply unaffordable). Global heating is observably impacting tradi-
tional hunting ranges and ability of Arctic residents to reach herds due to 
costs of gasoline and other necessary equipment to undertake long-distance 
expeditions (Baskin, 2016; Chapin & Brinkman, 2016; Descamps et al., 
2017; Koptseva & Kirko, 2015; Poppel et al., 2015; Tse, Weiler, & Kovesi, 
2016).
The challenges of discrimination, nepotism, 
and the “Arctic welfare trap”
During conversations in communities in Alaska and Nunavut, the topic of 
economic nepotism and favoritism emerged regularly. Because communi-
ties can often be so small, issues of equitability and equal opportunities 
can quickly come to the forefront. In scholarly research issues of nepotism 
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have been described in other circumpolar Arctic research (Gremaud, 2017; 
Russel, 2015; Sejersen, 2015; Wang, Degeorges, & Forsvarsakademiet, 2014).
During one workshop discussion the following was mentioned:
“If you are part of the family you get the job. Some companies pre-hire 
before they even do interviews. They know that want this person, but 
they go through the procedure. That is really common in a lot of work-
places and companies. You are related to me, you are going to get hired.”
As some businesses in Arctic Indigenous communities may be owned by 
non-natives, there was a sense in workshop discussions that native people 
in their own communities are often being passed by in favor of individuals 
living outside the Arctic who are flown in (at great expense) to do a job at 
very high contractor rates rather than training and growing local talent and 
expertise in order to support local sustainable economic development.
“They (non-natives) would rather hire their own families, from down 
south, than someone capable from town like an (Inuk, or Alaska Native) 
mechanic. Even if you have the qualification, even if you have the certif-
icate, they want them because they are white and they think they know 
more. Even if you have the qualifications, there is a preconceived idea of 
this person as better compared to a local.”
Inequities in access to health services were described including descrip-
tions of time-delays in accessing healthcare for Indigenous peoples (as 
opposed to non-native people who were perceived as being seen immedi-
ately). Delays in law enforcement attention for natives as opposed to non- 
natives were also described. Some quotes related to these aspects included:
“We have a story when the mother (who is Inuk) had to wait many months 
to get health care, but the qallunaat (non-inuk) got help immediately”.
“Native people or people of color, if they are missing, you do not hear 
about them.”
One aspect that arose during discussions related to concerns that 
Indigenous residents of the Arctic held as regards travel outside the Arctic, 
or into larger towns or cities where more non- Indigenous residents were 
present. These elements of discrimination and even fear were noted in both 
Nunavut and Alaska:
“It is scary. People look at you (outside of the Arctic), and they’re like: 
‘she doesn’t look white, she must be Native, Dene, Inuit.’”
“It is dangerous to be down south with brown skin. Even when you are 
walking down the street, there are people who do not know your nation-
ality, but they are like ‘(expletive) Indians, or just like ‘savages’”.
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“It is especially bad, because you hear of these white people going miss-
ing, they are on the news 10 minutes later. But native people, you do 
not hear about it for 6 weeks, 2 months later, or maybe never. A white 
person, 10 minutes later they are on the news, amber alert”.
Governmental welfare support in the Arctic was a topic that emerged on 
several occasions during workshop discussions. In some communities there 
was a sense expressed of the “welfare trap” or “welfare spiral” consisting of 
welfare resulting in a contraindication for willingness to start a small busi-
ness or even commence new employment.
For some, the risk of starting a job, or creating a personally owned small 
business could result in the potential loss of welfare and an increase in the 
cost of housing that was far too great a risk to take. For this reason wel-
fare was described by some as preferable to employment due to the reg-
ular income and reduced cost of housing. While future research into this 
phenomenon is certainly required it would seem that further governmental 
incentives for those interested in remote community small business devel-
opment could be beneficial, so that a system designed to assist those in need 
would not be revoked for those who are taking the potentially significant 
risk of attempting to build their personal, local, and regional economies.
All of the issues described above are only a small fraction of the total 
challenges described. This section is not meant to be a comprehensive or 
exhaustive synopsis of challenges impacting Arctic sustainable entrepre-
neurship, but rather to serve as a brief and highly limited example of the 
scale and scope of issues that those living in the North American Arctic are 
encountering on a daily basis. If a resilient and sustainable North American 
economy beyond extractive resource economies is to be developed, it is 
incumbent that social issues be focused upon in tandem with culturally 
aligned entrepreneurial curricular and training elements in order to ensure 
healthy communities wherein enhanced business development may truly 
flourish with resilience.
Unique opportunities
Digital entrepreneurial nomadic economies
As a final step, in both our workshops and in individual interview in Arviat 
and Hughes, we asked participants about the unique opportunities they see 
for a digital creative economy in the Arctic.
One incredibly powerful motivator and mindset that was expressed by 
Indigenous residents of both Nunavut and Alaska during this fieldwork was 
that of the desirability of self-reliance, living off the land, with freedom to 
leave and return to town at will while sharing resources in community: a 
lifestyle that was indicated as being highly attractive to many among whom 
the authors discussed. This is also an entrepreneurial mindset: to use the 
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resources available, and find solutions to problems while thriving in the 
harshest environments. Entrepreneurial definitions today look at the utili-
sation of scarce resources for the benefit of the community.
When the opportunity arose for participants in the Arviat workshop to 
travel onto the tundra to hunt and fish and spend time on the land, it was 
perceived by all with great anticipation. A number of participants indicated 
that this was the first time that they had had the opportunity to travel away 
from town in years. For others (Inuit residents born in the community), it 
was the very first time that they had ever gone on a hunting expedition. When 
a discussion began surrounding this issue, some comments included that:
“Access to travel on the land has become a luxury for the rich”
“We do not have access to our culture on the land because the cost of 
gasoline is so expensive”.
“An ATV is over 10k, Snowmobiles up to 15k. I can’t afford it and I 
never leave town.”
Connections between the traditional Indigenous nomadism of the past and 
the concept of digital nomadism of today were discussed in a hunting cabin 
near Maguse Lake, Nunavut. The concept discussed was that of possibili-
ties for Inuit and other remote-region Arctic entrepreneurs living as digital 
nomads going back out on the land, using solar power for electrical power and 
leveraging (forthcoming) broadband digital connectivity outside of towns. 
This concept could incorporate digital currency transfer enabling payment to 
remote communities (including payments for services rendered on the land), 
and could enable digital Arctic nomadic entrepreneurs the possibility of con-
ducting economic activity (possibilities mentioned included photography, 
drone filming/tracking of wildlife, videography, patterns for clothes, ecotour-
ism, guiding, hunting, games and apps based on traditional knowledge, etc.).
The concept of digital nomadism exists in the research literature however 
often in terms of project-based. “Western professionals using a range of infor-
mation systems (IS) and information technology (IT) tools to work digitally 
over the Internet while travelling perpetually” (Schlagwein, 2018). A number 
of articles describe the concept in terms of dissatisfied young urban digital 
workers constantly searching for more desirable, exotic locales within which 
to work (Jarrahi, 2019; Müller, 2016; Nash, 2018). The concept as it is being 
described in this writing however does not relate to attempting to wander in 
search of another locale to replace one’s own, but rather to enable the full 
immersion in one’s own born environment, in a sense to assist in reconnect-
ing with the land/disconnecting from the colonial past which necessitated 
the loss of nomadic heritage due to residential schools, forced relocation, 
and other factors (Bombay, Matheson, & Anisman, 2014; Dombrowski et al., 
2016; Elias et al., 2012; Evans-Campbell, Walters, Pearson, & Campbell, 
2012; Felt, Procter, & Natcher, 2012; Tester & Kulchyski, 2011).
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Presently the resources necessary to enable culturally focused Arctic dig-
ital nomadic economic development are still lacking. Transportation (ATV/
Snowmobiles) still requires fossil-fuels, costs of which can be extremely 
high (and transport of which is extremely costly). Renewable power sources 
with reliable, strong batteries that can run vehicles (and function well in 
extremely cold temperatures) would be game-changers in the North. Power 
for small electronics is improving in terms of solar charging (GoalZero1 for 
example) however even beyond power sources, the key component of digital 
connectivity for cellular and data is greatly lacking outside of towns/hamlets. 
Iridium technology offers excellent solutions for connectivity (calling) and 
limited data (currently improving under the IridiumNEXT development) 
however the possibility of true satellite or terrestrial broadband could ena-
ble connectivity even in regions now considered disconnected.
Economic activities that could take place on the land are far-reaching 
in terms of possibilities. Eco-tourism is one area of great potential, pro-
viding sustainable experiences to tourists from across the world with a 
focus on environmental sustainability, stewardship and culturally guided/
values-driven locally owned initiatives. One of TakingItGlobal/Connected 
North’s Digital Media Kits provided to some Arctic program partici-
pants consists of a MacBook Pro, a DJI Drone, a GoPro, a 360° camera, 
Microphone, and iPhone. This kind of technology can generate an entire 
broad spectrum of potential economic activity able to be leveraged with 
adequate power, connectivity, and training
Culturally enhanced AirBnB experiences have generated interest in a 
number of communities in the North American Arctic in terms of ecotour-
ism. Renee Linton of the Tanana Chiefs Conference has been spearheading 
initiatives related to a rural AirBnB Pilot Project designed to encourage 
entrepreneurism in interior Alaska TCC Ecotourism readiness surveys 
and village planning and development programs are designed to assess the 
suitability of ecotourism initiatives and alignment with community plans 
and tribal values (TCC, 2020). Some discussion during workshops centered 
around what would be needed in order to incentivise tourist travel to remote 
regions, and what would be viewed as “minimum necessities” in order to 
make ecotourism more attractive. Some of these necessities described 
included running water, electricity, communications (telephone and espe-
cially Internet connectivity), temperature control (heating and, increasingly 
cooling in summer months) and insect barriers among other factors. The 
potential possibility of allowing tourists to observe or even participate in 
some cultural events (only if approved by the communities) was mentioned 
as a possible incentive for increased ecotouristic activities. “Combining the 
AirBnB experience with cultural experiences, with beading, with country 
food, with participation in creating crafts” (Participant in Hughes, AK).
It should be mentioned that AirBnB is not meant here to serve as a utopian 
expression of ecotourism, but rather as one potential option for encourag-
ing sustainable ecotourism in the Arctic. A number of research articles have 
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described successful (and unsuccessful) attempts at leveraging this and other 
initiatives toward encouraging rural entrepreneurship, describing potential 
benefits but also challenges and concerns related to significant increases 
of tourism in rural circumpolar Arctic and other Indigenous regions (E. 
Henry, Newth, & Spiller, 2017; Jæger, 2019; Koninx, 2018; Leeming, 2016; 
Müller, 2019; Outi et al., 2019; Sisneros-Kidd, Monz, Hausner, Schmidt, & 
Clark, 2019; Spangler, 2018; Veijola & Strauss-Mazzullo, 2019).
The interest in including art and traditional crafts into the ecotourism 
experience was expressed during workshop discussions: “When one does 
not know a lot about small businesses, it boils down to what we already 
know, culturally, it is our passion, what we like to do. For example, our art, 
jewelry making, or traditional art, if we market it well especially online, 
coupled with social media…before where you were so far from the market-
place, now that gap is now bridgeable due to the web.”
In Hughes specifically, local residents who had made beautiful works of 
art had very little confidence in marketing these productions even though 
internet access was available. Taking high-quality images of the work was 
extremely helpful in terms of providing the best visibility and sale price pos-
sible for residents. Such training can be accomplished quite rapidly and can 
have measurable impacts in terms of financial takeaway.
Conclusions and recommendations for further research
The North American Arctic is entering into a unique yet tumultuous period 
where changes in environmental conditions coupled with extraordinarily 
increases in primarily extractive industries, are resulting in the exacerbation 
of significant social issues in Indigenous and other isolated communities in 
Alaska and Nunavut. Developing a value-based knowledge economy and 
providing an avenue for creative digital expression not simply for its own 
sake, but as a source of locally owned and operated economic development 
driving investment and national/international support, is potentially trans-
formative economic activity for the future of the North American Arctic 
economy. Linkages between Nunavut and other Canadian Arctic territories 
with Alaska in terms of economic development hold potential for dynamic 
international circumpolar economic collaboration.
There is an extraordinarily untapped economic and social opportunity in 
facilitating North American Arctic Indigenous communities’ efforts toward 
the development and application of their unique values, cultural traditional 
knowledge and expertise for the specific purpose of stimulating the knowl-
edge economy in the North. Value-driven, community-centered digital cre-
ative industries focused on the unique environment of the North American 
Arctic, with collaborative hubs linking Alaska with Nunavut, Nunatsiavut, 
Nunavik and other regions, could result in the alleviation of a number of 
critical social issues currently hindering human and economic development 
in the Arctic.
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In order to fully enable resilient, sustainable economic development in the 
North American Arctic, it is incumbent upon Canada and the United States 
to comprehensively address the major social and infrastructural issues cur-
rently present in the North. Such investment can, this chapter argues, assist 
in the development of robust, sustainable, resilient and highly unique Arctic 
economies that will far outweigh the infrastructural and social commit-
ments required.
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3 The cool economy
Technological innovation 
and the prospects for a 
sustainable Arctic economy
Ken Coates and Carin Holroyd
Introduction
Over the past 20 years, governments have become preoccupied with the com-
mercialization of scientific and technological innovations as the cornerstone 
of the “new economy” (Schwab and Davis, 2018). National innovation poli-
cies have directed billions of dollars to basic and applied research, funding 
efforts to bring new products and services to market and supporting system-
atic efforts to train citizens to capitalise on opportunities. Around the world, 
the combination of advanced electronics, mass digitisation, high-speed wire-
less communications, robotics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and 
a wide variety of other technologies are transforming the global economy. 
Millions of jobs have been lost or reconfigured as a result of technologi-
cal innovation in everything from manufacturing to banking, health care 
monitoring, and communications. Estimates of the medium-term impact 
of technology-based job loss call for between 25% and 50% of existing jobs 
to be displaced through technological innovation (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 
2014; David, 2015; Ford, 2015; Frey & Osborne, 2017). Obviously, other jobs 
will emerge as a result of the scientific and technological developments, but 
more of these new positions will be in the research laboratories, high-end 
factories, and design studios than in the field. Most of the job losses will be 
in traditional manufacturing, service firms, and retail operations, including 
in rural and remote regions (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993).1
The emergence of the innovation-based economy changed government 
approaches to regional and national economic development. Commercial 
innovation has been focused on the triple-helix model of academic/research, 
government, and business collaboration, and on a simplified innovation 
system that involved an expansion of highly trained personnel, government 
investment in high risk, high return research, and specialised commerciali-
sation efforts. These investments were believed to produce new businesses, 
employment, and societal prosperity. This approach underpinned Japan’s 
late 1990s innovation economy, the rapid growth of South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and such North American regional success stories as Silicon 
Valley, the Seattle-Microsoft sector, and the Toronto and Waterloo Region 
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in southern Ontario (Bramwell & Wolfe, 2008; Bramwell, Nelles, & Wolfe, 
2008; Collins, 2001; Holroyd & Coates, 2012, 2015; Kenney, 2000; Niosi 
& Bas, 2003; Pempel, 1987). Only a few northern regions, Oulu (Finland’s 
center for Nokia’s operations) and the Luleå region being the best example, 
fit into the new economy model (Inkinen & Suorsa, 2010; Rantakokko, 2012).
Various national governments spent billions of dollars on the promotion 
of the commercialisation of science and technology, building on and fue-
ling a dramatic expansion in emerging technologies that have transformed 
the global economy.2 Little of this investment capital made its way into the 
Arctic. The intensely competitive innovation economy focused on major 
universities and polytechnics, highly coordinated urban eco-systems, and 
existing high-technology companies (Etzkowitz, 2002, 2003; Etzkowitz & 
Leydesdorff, 2000; Etzkowitz & Zhou, 2017; Gibbons, 1994). The transition 
from the traditional approaches to the imperatives of the new science-based 
era left little place for rural and remote regions around the world, including 
agricultural zones and economies based on mining and forestry. Indeed, 
some of the technological developments, including robotics, long-distance 
control of machinery, digital surveillance, improved communications, and 
e-commerce and e-finance systems, changed and disrupted the traditional 
Arctic and sub-Arctic economies (Hall, 2020; Hall, Leader & Coates, 2017).
The potential for building an innovation economy in the North
Economically, the Arctic is a surprisingly complicated place. Overall, peo-
ple in the region have high incomes, based largely on the wages paid in the 
natural resource economy where the workforce is transient and often from 
the south. A larger group of public servants generally earn less money but 
still have sizeable incomes and stable employment. A transient population 
of military personnel does not earn high incomes but receive housing and 
other benefits. Indigenous peoples generally have the lowest annual incomes 
in the Far North, although the gap is significantly smaller in Scandinavia 
than in Canada, Alaska, and Russia. The private sector commercial econ-
omy is more diverse, with those businesses connected to the resource sec-
tor following the boom and bust cycles that are the norm in the industry. 
Tourism generally pays less well and is often seasonal in nature.
Across the Circumpolar world, local and national governments, compa-
nies, and individuals have worked throughout the post-World War II era 
to create a more sustainable foundation for their economy. The effort has 
emphasised the urgent need to address Indigenous poverty, to create eco-
nomic opportunity in small and remote communities, to improve overall 
prosperity, and to provide more stability across society. For decades, efforts 
across the Circumpolar world emphasised natural resource development, 
major infrastructure projects, and the provision of government services. In 
most jurisdictions, although less so in Alaska and Russia, transfer payments 
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from governments to northerners make up a significant part of the regional 
economy. The standard formulas, based on government and private sector 
infrastructure projects, emphasised small business development but did not 
change the overall commercial trajectory in the region.
Several Arctic areas are actually extremely technologically advanced. 
The military establishments, particularly in Siberia (Russia) and Alaska 
(United States) are as sophisticated as any on earth (Farish, 2013; Osherenko 
& Young, 2005; Sergunin, 2015). Their military activities are economi-
cally extremely important; indeed, Alaska has, since the start of the Cold 
War in the 1950s, been sustained by a high and continued level of military 
spending, especially through the Elmendorf Airbase near Alaska and Fort 
Wainwright Army Base close to Fairbanks and numerous surveillance sites 
across the state focused on containing the Russian threat (Spohr, Höring, 
Cerioli, Lersch, & Soares, 2013). (In the 1950s and 1960s, the Americans 
also paid for the construction of an elaborate network of radar stations, 
particularly the Distant Early Warning Line (D.E.W), across the North 
American Arctic, providing an important economic boost to numerous iso-
lated Indigenous communities (Fritz, 2010).) Similarly, there is a large and 
growing military presence across northern Russia that provides an impor-
tant foundation for the regional economy and society (Bondar, 2015; Flake, 
2014). In neither location, however, has the substantial military expendi-
ture become the base for a technological eco-system, even though military 
investments have, for decades, been integral to the commercialisation of 
science and technology in the superpower states.
Other northern locations also have the advanced technological infrastruc-
ture. Svalbard, the Norwegian/international archipelago in the High Arctic, 
is typically seen as a northern tourism platform, but it has enormously power-
ful data collection systems focused on the Northern environment. The island 
also holds the world’s seedbank, which stores seeds from every commercially 
viable crop globally (Grydehøj, 2020). Inuvik, Northwest Territories, a post-
oil and gas boom small town near the Arctic Ocean, has superb satellite and 
space monitoring technologies, as does the University of Alaska-Fairbanks’ 
geophysical laboratories3 and Sweden’s space center in Kiruna, Norrbotten 
(Gareis & Mercer, 2015). The University of Alaska-Fairbanks, the North 
American Arctic’s most research-intense institution, has supported commer-
cialisation in sectors as diverse as musk-ox rearing, northern mining, fishing 
and oil and gas exploration, but is only now attempting to make inroads in 
high-technology commerce (Jingfors & Klein, 1982). Only in Kiruna has the 
scientific enterprise begun to be directly connected to a plan for commercial-
isation and regional economic development.
However, the majority of Arctic and sub-Arctic isolated communi-
ties, especially those without road access, have almost no scientific infra-
structure. Even basic cell phone and Internet coverage is inadequate and 
exceptionally expensive. Iqaluit, the capital of Nunavut and a town of over 
7,000 people in Canada’s Eastern Arctic, only recently secured average 
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Internet connectivity (Infrastructure Canada, 2019). Ironically, its neighbor-
ing capital, Nuuk in Greenland, has been connected to the Canadian fiber 
optic network for several years (McGwin, 2018). The Government of Canada 
declined the opportunity to build a spur line from St. John’s, Newfoundland, 
to the Nuuk fiber optic cable. At present, there are several serious proposals 
for a fiber optic line across the Canadian Arctic, enhanced satellite-based 
Internet, and a variety of other Circumpolar connectivity efforts. If success-
ful, then only Russia, the provincial North in Canada and remote parts of 
Alaska would be left as the most Internet and cell phone deficient regions 
in the Circumpolar world. The problems go beyond the Internet, however. 
Most remote communities rely heavily on diesel-generated electricity, which 
is both expensive and unreliable. In addition, few of these remote settlements 
have individuals with advanced technological abilities, including the skills 
needed to keep Internet-enabled devices fully operational.
Access to high-speed, reliable, and reasonably priced Internet is clearly 
critical to the future of the new economy in northern regions. Across the 
Arctic and sub-Arctic Scandinavia, almost all of the communities have 
competitively priced, high quality Internet and cell phone services. Almost 
the entire region has significantly better Internet services than the territorial 
capitals in Canada and remote regions across North America and Russia. 
The larger centers in Greenland, likewise, have high levels of connectivity. 
This means that these areas have access to the global Internet retail world 
and to such comprehensive entertainment sites as Netflix, Hulu and the like. 
The availability of high-speed, dependable Internet also means that Arctic 
businesses, artists, and content providers reach international markets and 
audiences (Delaunay, 2014). However, where high-speed Internet has been 
provided, including northern Scandinavia, urbanised parts of the provin-
cial Norths in Canada and the major cities in Alaska, there has not so far 
been a surge in entrepreneurship and commercial innovation that can be 
connected to the development of digital infrastructure.
What also matters in terms of e-commerce and regional economic devel-
opment is the balance between the loss of regional business to outside ven-
dors—in the North American Arctic and sub-Arctic the retail “leakage” is 
severe—and the increased sales for northern sellers because they can reach 
international consumers quickly and reliably. Through e-commerce, busi-
nesses in small, isolated communities have access to global markets, reacha-
ble through website-based business systems. But at the same time, northern 
consumers have thousands of stores, including mega-retailers like Amazon.
com, Alibaba, and Rakuten, that offer more products at lower prices than 
local retailers (Warf, 2011). Ironically, national governments have been sub-
sidizing postal rates for northerners, which means that e-commerce firms 
can get supplies to Arctic communities at a lower cost than regional stores 
can. In Iqaluit, Nunavut, as an example, consumers have been ordering car-
tons of toilet paper, delivered cheaply by mail, undercutting local businesses 
(Rohner, 2019).
50 K. Coates & C. Holroyd
At present, the Arctic is not well-positioned to capitalise on the technology- 
rich economy. With a few partial exceptions (including the universities in 
Tromsø, Bodo, Umeå, Luleå, Oulu, Rovaniemi, Fairbanks, and Anchorage), 
the Arctic lacks the research facilities and the highly skilled personnel nec-
essary to develop marketable innovations and create sustainable innova-
tion eco-systems. Northern entrepreneurs often struggle to find risk capital 
and the local markets needed to allow them to scale-up operations. Most 
Arctic education systems are not currently focused on producing students 
well-versed in science, and technology, engineering. Even more fundamen-
tally, smaller towns and even some of the larger communities do not have 
the Internet connectivity and technological infrastructure needed to build 
robust new economy operations. A small number of knowledge produc-
ers—filmmakers, creative personnel, musicians, and others—have capital-
ised on digital delivery systems to expand their commercial operations but 
these initiatives have yet to accumulate into a significant foundation for a 
sustainable northern economy.
While there will be substantial technology-based disruptions, are likely, 
successful adaptations by educational institutions, companies, regions, 
and governments could transform the Arctic. The flexibility, creativity, and 
responsiveness of technology-based companies could bring new solutions to 
bear on everything from energy supplies, environmental monitoring, local 
food production, on-site medical support, advanced education, and pro-
fessional services. At present, southern companies and agencies have been 
extending their reach into the Far North, upsetting regional economies. 
Over time, regional firms can both produce Arctic-centered solutions to 
northern problems and opportunities and use modern communication tech-
nologies to serve customers and markets in the south and around the world. 
If the Arctic is passive in the face of the new economy, the region will endure 
substantial economic disruptions and, potentially, a demographic and com-
mercial hollowing out. With a coordinated, Arctic-wide innovation agenda 
focused on responding to regional needs and opportunities and building out 
to service northern, rural and remote markets, the Far North could use the 
new economy to launch an era of job creation, business development, and 
prosperity. In the end, as will be argued herein, the more engaged outcome 
is unlikely, with significant implications for the Far North.
Over the last century, the North has attracted fanciful notions about how 
to jump-start the regional economy. In the past few decades, only a few have 
worked: oil and gas in the Russian North, Prudhoe Bay oil in Alaska, dia-
monds in the Northwest Territories, iron ore in Nunavut, North Sea oil off 
Norway, Santa Claus in Rovaniemi, Finland, and the massive hydro-electric 
developments in northern Quebec (Gouvernement du Québec, 2019; Simard, 
2017; Brun et al., 2017). In the high-tech sector, notable developments are 
few in number, including Luleå’s impressive transformation into Europe’s 
server farm center and Skellefteå’s planned battery mega-factory. This is 
not for a lack of effort in some communities, particularly in Norway. The 
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massively subsidised Svalbard Island has an impressive science and tech-
nology-based economy but is not a model that can be replicated in many 
other locations. The combination of extensive satellite connectivity and a 
large international Arctic science capacity in Longyearbyen and a series of 
former mine sites has provided Svalbard with the foundations for a high- 
income academic and research-focused economy. Troms County in Norway, 
led by the University of Tromsø: Norway’s Arctic University, has made a 
concerted effort to build an innovation-centered economy, with some sig-
nificant achievements in the blue (ocean) economy, including off-shore oil 
and gas extraction (Hörnström, 2007; The Arctic Institute, 2019). Nord 
University in Bodø is deeply committed to the promotion of the new econ-
omy in the Arctic, focusing primarily on the promotion of entrepreneurship 
and commerce. Considerably further south, in Trondheim, Norway, the oil 
and gas economy has spawned a substantial innovation eco-system that has 
built a more sustainable system beyond the natural resource sector.
Northern Sweden has made a concerted effort to make the transition 
from the traditional natural resource economy to an expanded base that 
capitalises on new technologies. Skellefteå, a medium-sized city built on the 
mining industry, spent two decades trying to re-invent itself for the twenty- 
first century. In 2017, Northvolt concluded a lengthy inter-city competi-
tion and selected Skellefteå as the city for one of the world’s largest battery 
factories. The plant, slated to open in 2023, will produce lithium-ion batter-
ies for the growing electric car market. If the 3.8 billion Euro factory devel-
ops as forecast, Skellefteå will require several thousand skilled workers for 
the main plant and subsidiary operations. This one commercial operation 
will double the size of the community and provide a level of sustained new 
economic activity that is quite unique in the sub-Arctic.
Other parts of northern Sweden have undertaken similar transitions. 
Umeå, on the southern fringe of northern Sweden, has built creative and 
commercial environmental and renewable energy sectors around the city-
owned utilities and the research capabilities of the University of Umeå 
(OECD, 2020). The long-time mining city of Kiruna, site of the wealthiest 
iron ore properties in the world, has focused its twenty-first century efforts 
on space industries, incorporating advanced education and detailed investi-
gations into commercial aspects of space research. Arjeplog, a small natural 
resource town, reinvented itself as the world’s most important center for win-
ter automobile testing, inverting its summer economy into a winter-focused 
one. Luleå has become the posterchild for sub-Arctic new economic devel-
opment, building off the strengths of the Luleå University of Technology, 
and producing hundreds of highly qualified personnel in the region. A sat-
ellite campus in Skellefteå focuses on gaming; a connection with the city’s 
economic development office supported the emergence of several start-up 
gaming companies. The University’s presence, plus the important combina-
tion of a winter climate and abundant an inexpensive hydroelectricity, made 
Luleå a highly competitive site for massive server farms. It became, in short 
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order, one of Europe’s most important server hosts, managing large por-
tions of the continent’s data. More than any other place in the Circumpolar 
world, northern Sweden demonstrates that sub-Arctic regions can use their 
natural resource wealth to build a diverse and robust economy that is inter-
nationally competitive and connected to the imperatives, demands, and 
profits of the high-technology economy (Holroyd & Coates, n.d.).
The Yukon’s economy relies heavily on government spending, based 
through sustained and reliable transfers from the Government of Canada,4 
provides a foundation for a high income, high-skilled government econ-
omy. The mining sector has been historically important in Yukon since the 
Klondike Gold Rush in the late nineteenth century, but the territory has 
struggled to find stability after a strong boom through the 1960s. The indus-
try rebounded in the 2010s, largely behind resurgence in the Dawson City 
and Mayo region. The Yukon Government’s innovation efforts are locally 
significant but fall far short of creating either a regional eco-system or con-
necting to a Circumpolar innovation movement. The transition of Yukon 
College to Yukon University is more symbolic than transformational, for 
there is not a large investment of new money in the change. The funding 
of a local incubator, likewise, is in part a repurposing of funds previously 
spent through Yukon College. But together with a major commitment to 
high-speed Internet connectivity throughout the territory, the Government 
of Yukon has continued to support efforts to build the knowledge econ-
omy locally. At present, however, the territorial effort has improved the 
Whitehorse entrepreneurial culture but has had significantly less impact 
across Yukon (Coates & McPhee-Knowles, n.d.). The Yukon’s effort, how-
ever small, is by far the most consistent and sustained in northern Canada, 
but it is overshadowed by the degree to which federal and territorial spend-
ing remains the solid foundation of the territorial economy.
The Government of Yukon understands that the boom and bust mining 
sector is not a strong foundation for the region; the Northwest Territories 
and Nunavut, in contrast, remain firmly committed to the natural 
resource economy. There is a small and active Nunavut Research Centre 
based in Iqaluit, but its most successful venture involves facilitating the 
work of southern academic institutions, researchers, and students. The 
Northwest Territories has the most robust effort to localise research activ-
ity in the Circumpolar world, mostly involving the hiring and training of 
local staff to support the work of outside scientists. Efforts to convince 
the Government of Canada to invest substantially in Arctic science 
peaked with the establishment of the Canadian High Arctic Research 
Station (CHARS) based in Cambridge Bay. CHARS, instituted by Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper in 2012, attracted initial investments of some 
$190 million and a $7 million annual budget, which was the cornerstone 
of the Conservative Party’s campaign to enhance the northern economy. 
CHARS, located in the Central Arctic and far from the economic centers 
in the North, was focused on natural and Arctic science research and was 
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not intended to be an innovation facility. As such, the CHARS invest-
ment continued the Government of Canada’s pattern of seeing the Far 
North more in scientific than economic terms, and not recognizing that 
such initiatives did more to support southern researchers and institutions 
than these did to promote and enhance northern business.5
The Circumpolar World has seen some significant “new economy” 
achievements. The greatest advances occurred in the oil and gas and min-
ing sectors, including off-shore exploration and development off Norway, 
the use of drones in mineral exploration in Yukon, and in the government- 
commercial interface in Arctic search and rescue. Greater changes lie in the 
offing, through the development of automated trucks (which will accelerate 
job losses in the Arctic) and the introduction of remotely controlled mining 
processes (already being used in the Kiruna iron ore mine and potentially 
disruptive of the workforce requirements for future mining projects). The 
eventual application of 3D printing could change northern commerce dra-
matically, as could the extension of digital business implementations.
Inverting innovation
Many of the future innovations, almost certainly developed in the South, 
especially in education and health care, have comparatively little impact on 
northern business. At the same time, these same innovations could reduce 
employment in the Far North—with virtual systems replacing on-site 
professional staff—and therefore further harm the northern economy. 
More dramatically, communities are adapting renewable energy systems, 
including solar power, wind and geothermal energy, to northern settings. 
These are important innovations, with many upsides, but one important 
effect could be the further reduction of jobs in the North. Russia, unfet-
tered by environmentalist interventions, has moved rapidly to implement 
a range of nuclear power options, including a floating nuclear power plant. 
Implementations of food factories, as at Mayo, Yukon, are providing small-
scale proof of concept with important benefits in terms of food security and 
local production. Scientific and technological innovation, delayed in the Far 
North, has the potential to both disrupt and improve economic realities 
in the North. It is yet unclear the relative benefits of rapid technological 
change in the Circumpolar World. It is obvious that, while significant tech-
nological contributions to the Arctic quality of life are already in progress, 
the net effect could well cause job losses and a weakening of the northern 
economy overall.
To sustain a dramatic improvement and stabilisation of the northern 
economy through scientific and technological innovation, the Circumpolar 
World needs to actually invert innovation. The current approach to the 
innovation economy serves southern universities, major urban centers, and 
southern-based companies more than northern commerce and the Arctic 
economy. Developments in the South, aimed for southern consumers and 
54 K. Coates & C. Holroyd
economies, the argument went, would filter into the North, even though 
they were not designed for the region, in the region, or by business and 
researchers in the region. Indeed, almost all the innovations were imple-
mented without a conversation with northerners or even with an evaluation 
of the potential impact of disruptive technologies on northern peoples.
Inverting innovation requires repositioning the scientific and technolog-
ical enterprise to focus on the needs of remote and northern regions. Many 
of the arguments about contemporary infrastructure, for example, focus on 
the need to bring the Arctic areas up to national and international stand-
ards by importing southern models into the North rather than on build-
ing region-specific technology models. Northern institutions and northern 
businesses can be empowered to develop new technologies that could be 
used, first and foremost, to address northern liabilities, needs, and interests. 
Inverting innovation would, likewise, require a change in emphasis from 
the standard investments in traditional science and university research and 
a new focus on addressing regional social problems, a strategy that has 
recently found favor in Japan (Fujisawa et al., 2015). The effort would require 
major changes in the Far North. It would require an upgrading of education 
systems, particularly in the smaller communities and the post-secondary 
institutions, to build the foundations to long-term engagement in scientific 
and technologies discoveries. A new approach would require, further, the 
upgrading of Arctic Internet and technological systems, major changes in 
the policy of sub-Arctic and Arctic governments. Using the often-under- 
utilised power of government procurement, regional authorities will have to 
work with local, regional and Circumpolar businesses to identify northern- 
centric products and services that could, if properly developed, find Circum-
polar markets. The innovation empowered North would include widespread 
introductions of alternative energy, major changes in housing design and con-
struction, improvements in educational delivery, quality and suitability for 
the Arctic, more accessible and engaged government services, and dramatic 
changes in wildlife and resource management.
This kind of a transition will not be cheap or easy and is certainly not 
assured. Countries and regions around the work are making comparable 
efforts to respond to the opportunities presented by the innovation econo-
mies. There is no shortage of demand for venture capital and highly skilled 
personnel. Business opportunities have to be identified and this is limited 
by the small, marginal, and widely scattered northern consumer and indus-
trial markets. It is important to note that the largest commercial ventures 
connected to the “new economy,” including the Northvolt battery plant 
in Skellefteå, Sweden, and the large server farms and related enterprises 
around Luleå, were both designed to capitalise on standard northern advan-
tages (including winter and inexpensive hydroelectricity). National govern-
ments could do a great deal more to shift innovation expenditures to focus 
on local needs and opportunities and to investigate, as the United States 
has done so successfully over the years, commercial possibilities arising out 
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of military activities. The possibilities are limited here, given the current 
small scale of military activity in the region, although rapid militarisation 
of the Russian Arctic could result in a 1950s-type surge in military-based 
economic development.
The Circumpolar World does not have a lot of advantages in the current 
highly competitive innovation environment. Indeed, a review of the stand-
ard factors of regional economic development—available highly skilled per-
sonnel, strong local post-secondary institutions with substantial research 
capacity, access to investment capital, a smart and wealthy consumer base, 
ready access to international markets, update-to-date infrastructure, and 
a strong entrepreneurial culture—reveals significant deficiencies in the Far 
North. Indeed, the smaller communities across the Arctic, already suffering 
from the diseconomies of smallness, isolation, and limited educational and 
commercial prospects, are much more likely to be disrupted by the “new 
economy” than stimulated by it. In the major cities, governments (including 
the armed forces) dominate the local economy and can usually crowd out 
the demand for workers, capital, and resources by the innovation sector. 
Conversely, these government-dominated centers could, as Whitehorse, 
Yukon, is attempting to do, become nodes of innovation activity.
As the Circumpolar World looks to position itself within the global 
innovation economy, the region and its residents face crucial questions 
about how they want to proceed. They could continue along the current, 
half-hearted path of engagement in the commercialisation and science and 
technology. There will be occasional achievements, primarily those of indi-
vidual companies and cities, like Oulu, Kiruna, Luleå, and Skellefteå, that 
make themselves attractive to local business and international investors. 
They can, like Tromsø and Bodo in Norway, emphasise connections to the 
local resource economy, in this instance fishing and oil and gas exploration, 
and mobilizing local researchers and businesses to advance regional innova-
tion. Laurentian University (in the city of Sudbury in northern Ontario) has 
collaborated with the government and business to create a strong regional 
innovation system connected to mining, but even this technically impres-
sive effort has produced few jobs and new businesses.
Both of these approaches have proven somewhat economically suc-
cessful and have stabilised local economies in important and long-term 
ways. In each of these cases, leading investments by governments in post- 
secondary education and research capabilities have been mobilised to sup-
port regional business operations. Investments in post-secondary institu-
tions are no guarantee of commercial success, though, as seen by the uneven 
economic developments connected to the major campuses of the University 
of Alaska (Fairbanks, Anchorage, and Juneau), the University of Northern 
British Columbia, (Prince George, B.C.), Lakehead University (Thunder 
Bay, Ontario), University of Lapland (Rovaniemi, Finland) and the smaller 
colleges and university colleges across the Far North. Post-secondary insti-
tutions help societies in many ways, including by giving a boost to the local 
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economy through the presence of students, faculty, and staff and by stabi-
lizing the regional society. But, unfortunately, the opening or expansion of a 
new institution does not ensure a burst of scientific and technological inno-
vation and the expansion of the economy (Kudtuashove & Sorokin, 2019). 
The effort to create a pan-Arctic institution, the University of the Arctic, 
produced small successes but not the region-integrating transformation 
desired (Poelzer, 2017).
There are other options available to northern regions seeking to connect 
to the global innovation effort. Northern communities could, recognizing 
the realities of the international innovation economy, realise that they will 
not be truly competitive and retain their focus on the current combination 
of government spending and natural resource development, specializing 
on monitoring and shaping the adoption of new technologies in the North. 
In this scenario, local businesses and government would assess and attract 
innovative technologies, adjusting training and employment systems to 
ensure that local workers benefit as much as possible from the new circum-
stances. Regions taking this approach would highlight the ability of emerg-
ing technologies to lower the expense of Arctic production, improve mineral 
exploration, and reduce societal costs through active engagement with the 
introduction of new products, including through the permitting, licensing, 
and regulation of science-based innovations.
Arctic regions could be more assertive in promoting an innovation-based 
economy. They would have to adapt the current model, which starts with an 
emphasis on basic research and early stage development, to suit the compar-
ative shortcomings of the Arctic innovation environment. In this instance, 
Arctic authorities would leave much of the basic research to southern and 
urban institutions, continuing to focus their efforts on northern eco-system 
research. Innovation efforts would emphasise attracting external research-
ers and companies to bring compelling technologies to the North to ascer-
tain their commercial suitability in the Arctic. The commercial effort would 
focus on testing and adapting emerging technologies to northern condi-
tions, working with local business to see if northern consumers will accept 
the new product or service and marketing the items to other Circumpolar 
and remote regions. This latter approach, which is used by individual entre-
preneurs and businesses, particularly in the mining sector, has not been 
adopted by regional governments as the foundation for the economy.
The search for a strong, stable, and sustainable Arctic economy remains 
a cornerstone of national and regional government efforts in the Far North. 
The Arctic’s long-standing reliance on natural resource development has left 
the region subject to the vagaries of boom and bust cycles. Although com-
mentators rarely see government as a core element in the economy, the real-
ity is that Arctic governments (especially if military spending is included) 
provide stability to northern economies. These regions are all heavily sub-
sidised—Russia removed many of its financial supports after the collapse 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, leading to a sharp decline in the 
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Siberian economy—and enjoy considerable stability for reasons of strategic 
importance, a commitment to social justice on reasons of regional equity and 
Indigenous equality, and the assertion of national sovereignty (Mote, 2018).
National and regional governments the world over have approached inno-
vation with a combination of apprehension and enthusiasm. There is grow-
ing political and administrative awareness of the potential of the “Second 
Machine Age” or the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” to transform econo-
mies and cause substantial disruptions in the worlds of work and business 
(Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Schwab, 2018; Spencer, 2017). Technology-
based services such as electronic banking, automated mines, online enter-
tainment, e-commerce, and digital health systems are displacing northern 
workers and undermining the viability of Arctic companies. But at the 
same time, advanced manufacturing and 3D printing technologies have 
the potential to address many Arctic supply and construction issues.6 The 
technological future is filled with potential and uncertainty. The Arctic’s 
discussion of the next economy has been only tangentially engaged in these 
conversations, even though the technological disruptions have already been 
felt in many sectors. The reality is that times of technological disruption 
can distort and challenge existing economies, often resulting in substantial 
changes for good and for ill. The early decades of the twenty-first century 
are proving to be such a time for much of the world, especially the North.
Conclusion
Given the exceptionally high cost of being competitive in high technology 
fields and serious deficits in infrastructure and highly qualified person-
nel, the chances are slim that the North will be able to capitalise on the 
commercial advantages of the age of science and technology. There will 
be individual companies that do well and a small number of Arctic-based 
“lone eagles,”7 high-value professionals who chose the North for lifestyle 
reasons and who work globally. Technological intrusions will continue, 
particularly in the natural resource sector; this could result in substantial 
northern job loss and workplace redefinition. Technological advances will 
make the Northern economy different, just as demand for more ecologi-
cally sustainable development could reduce the importance of traditional 
natural resource development, at least outside Arctic Russia. It is not yet 
clear which economic sectors, beyond government operations and seasonal 
international tourism, have sufficient scale to contribute substantially to 
the building of northern prosperity. Technology-driven economic growth, 
while still attracting a great deal of government attention, has rarely worked 
well outside of major metropolitan areas. There is little reason to believe 
that the Arctic will stand out as an exception to this rule.
At present, there are few reasons to be overly optimistic about the inno-
vation future, and therefore the pursuit of a sustainable economy, in much 
of the Far North. The region generally lacks the fundamentals of a truly 
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innovative economy, save for a few centers. Northern Sweden and Troms 
County in Norway are perhaps the prototypes of an adaptable, competi-
tive sub-Arctic or Arctic economy. Northern Scandinavia is doing compar-
atively well in this regard, buoyed by continued resource development and 
some new economy successes. At present, however, the Circumpolar world 
is not well-prepared for the rapid, technology-based, and science-informed 
transformation. The world appears to be shifting toward a city-state econ-
omy, with economic opportunity focused in the larger centers with the most 
research-intensive university, college and institute environments. With the 
natural resource economy in a state of dramatic flux, the disruptive poten-
tial of the innovation economy could lead to a further weakening of the 
Arctic and sub-Arctic.
The age of science and technology has been surrounded by hyperbole 
and unchecked enthusiasm as people are now discovering, as jobs are lost 
and companies are displaced. In the Far North, disruptions are emerging 
faster than tangible economic benefits. While small improvements and 
individual corporate successes are both happening and likely, the mac-
ro-economic prospects are not overly promising. Preparations for the new 
economy require a reinvention of public education, a reformatting of gov-
ernment-business relations, and a whole economy approach to adapting 
emerging technologies to improve the quality of life in the Far North.
Notes
 1. On the global innovation-based economy, see Kao, John. Innovation nation: 
How America is losing its innovation edge, why it matters, and what we can do to 
get it back. Simon and Schuster, 2007; Zhou, Lazonick, and Sun (Eds.) China 
as an innovation nation. Oxford University Press, 2016; Holroyd and Coates. 
Innovation nation: science and technology in 21st century Japan. Springer, 2007; 
Senor, and Singer. Start-up nation: The story of Israel’s economic miracle. 
Random House Digital, Inc., 2011.
 2. The gambles do no always work. For an excellent reminder of this reality, see 
Wong, Joseph. Betting on biotech: Innovation and the limits of Asia’s develop-
mental state. Cornell University Press, 2011.
 3. The website of the Geophysical Institute is https://www.gi.alaska.edu/
 4. The annual federal transfer to the Yukon Territorial Government amounts to 
approximately $1.2 billion per year.
 5. Information on CHARS can be found at https://www.canada.ca/en/
polar-knowledge/CHARScampus.html.
 6. On 3D printing and house construction, see https://www.conferenceboard.
ca/e-library/abstract.aspx?did=9948.
 7. For an interesting Alaskan commentary see Odasz, Frank (1999).
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Introduction
In this chapter, we discuss some of the ways in which art and design prac-
tices might help to support and develop renewable economies in the Arctic. 
We use the term Arctic Art and Design (AAD) to refer to contemporary art, 
design, and media productions aiming to contribute to renewable econo-
mies and sustainable development in the particular context of the North and 
the Arctic. The sustainable development of the Arctic is defined in a vari-
ety of ways for different purposes and occasions (Fondahl & Wilson, 2017; 
Gad, Jacobsen, & Strandsbjerg, 2019; Stephen, 2018; Tennberg, Lempinen, 
& Pirnes, 2019). The dimensions of sustainability in this context include cul-
tural and social sustainability, which means that the contemporary renew-
able productions must respect cultural diversity and heritage and must be 
produced in collaboration with local inhabitants, so that the economic ben-
efits are shared with the region. Various aspects and examples of AAD have 
been studied in the research projects conducted in the Arctic Sustainable 
Arts and Design (ASAD) network at the University of the Arctic (ASAD, 
2019; Jokela & Coutts, 2018). In this chapter, we use this concept to describe 
art, crafts, design, and cultural productions that transmit the heritage of 
Arctic nature and culture. It is not limited to Indigenous art, instead, it also 
covers non-Indigenous arts and their liminal productions such as indus-
trially produced craft-based products (Jokela, Huhmarniemi, & Hautala-
Hirvioja, 2019). We use the concept of AAD to highlight the view of art, 
design, and crafts as interwoven with one another and as an integrated part 
of the eco-social culture in the North (Härkönen, Huhmarniemi & Jokela, 
2018; Jokela, 2017). The idea follows the concept of duodji, which sees Sámi 
art, craft, and design as the union of expression, production, and way of 
living (Guttorm, 2015). In addition, the concept of AAD carries the idea 
of applying arts to societal and economic needs (Huhmarniemi & Jokela, 
2019; Jokela, 2013) and combining the methods of socially engaged art 
and service design (Härkönen & Vuontisjärvi, 2018; Jokela & Tahkokallio, 
2015). AAD as the creative renewable economy can be seen as one of the 
Arctic models of smart specialisation on green economy and as a model to 
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aim to economic and social resilience in rapidly changing Arctic regions 
(Giacometti & Teräs, 2019; Woien, Kristensen, & Teräs, 2019).
As industries traditionally associated with the Arctic region, such as large-
scale resource extraction and global exploitation of finite natural resources, 
are increasingly seen as unsustainable, we applaud the move toward more 
sustainable business practices. We argue that the creative industries, and 
art and design in particular, can play a central role in developing new, more 
sustainable business opportunities that benefit the economy while preserv-
ing and promoting more local, place-based, and renewable business prac-
tices. The underpinning philosophy of AAD is closely related to that of 
the cultural and creative industries (Hesmondhalgh, 2007) or, as described 
by Howkins (2001), the creative economies. According to Howkins (2001, 
pp. 88–117), the creative economy comprises advertising, architecture, art, 
crafts, design, fashion, film, music, performing arts, publishing, research 
and development, software, toys, and games, TV and radio, and video 
games. Writing almost a quarter of a century ago, Landry and Bianchini 
(1995, p. 4) contended that “the industries of the twenty-first century will 
depend increasingly on the generation of knowledge through creativ-
ity and innovation.” The economic impact of the creative industries has 
been measured on worldwide by United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD, 2018), and in Nordic Arctic countries (Olsen et al., 
2016) and has been found to exceed that of the driver industry. The creative 
economy report by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD, 2018) concluded: “The creative economy is recognized as a 
significant sector and a meaningful contributor to national gross domestic 
product. It has spurred innovation and knowledge transfer across all sectors 
of the economy and is a critical sector to foster inclusive development.” In 
this report, both creative goods or products and creative services are sub-
sumed under the term “creative economy.” The discourse of potential of 
the creative economy started, and still is, mainly connected to urban cities, 
centers, and innovation hubs.
Few articles and studies have characterised the processes of creative 
economy development in the Arctic and hardly any of them specialised to 
the field of art and design (Nordic Councils of Ministers, 2018; Olsen et al., 
2016; Petrov, 2014, Petrov, 2016, Petrov, 2017). The discussion is often focused 
on the challenges creative economies face under limiting factors such as 
the exploitation of nature at the core of the Arctic economy, population 
decline, high economic costs due to long distances, and the globalisation 
of the Arctic region. For example, crafters in Lapland are said to be life-
style entrepreneurs and microentrepreneurs who give priority to artistic 
work and hesitate to step into business-oriented work, for example, with 
the tourism field (Kugapi, Huhmarniemi & Laivamaa, Forthcoming, 
2020). Opportunities for renewable economies are hardly discussed, and 
the material and cultural heritage of the Arctic, commonly connected with 
Indigenous crafts and the skillful use of natural materials, has not been 
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recognised as having the potential to make significant contributions to the 
economy, although we argue that this is now changing.
Our AAD model focuses on the economic potential of renewable nat-
ural and cultural resources that are plentiful in the Arctic. The notion of 
ecosystem services (ES) is central to our thinking (Milcu, Hanspach, Abson, 
& Fischer, 2013). ES focus on the use of nature, its conservation, and its 
social, cultural and economic relation to the Arctic. In addition to ES, such 
as water, wood, fibers, and food provisions and their use as new renewable 
bioeconomy (Teräs et al., 2014), the concept also includes cultural ecosystem 
services (CES), that is, the “non-material benefits obtained through spiritual 
enrichment, cognitive development, reflection, recreation, education, and 
aesthetic experiences” (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005, p. 4). 
Even when these cultural values are included in ES typologies, cultural, 
experiential, and other non-material values have generally received less 
attention compared to monetary and ecological values. Only a few stud-
ies, among other Chan, Satterfield, and Goldstein (2012) and Daniel et al. 
(2012), have paid attention to the cultural aspects of CES.
In this study, we will fill the gap by investigating the potential of art 
and design as renewable economies using the concepts of CES, and place- 
making as our theoretical and practical framework. Drawing on some of 
our own research and development projects, we present four cases that illus-
trate the ways in which AAD can be a contributor to a creative renewable 
economy. Our examples are from Alaska (United States), Canada, Finland, 
and Russia. We will share our experiences and findings and suggest future 
lines of enquiry.
Cultural ecosystem services and place-based 
development as conceptual framework
The authors of this chapter have been collaborating on the research and 
development of wide-ranging themes in AAD for many years. The ASAD 
research and development network, which was founded in 2011, has been 
instrumental the development of this innovative work (ASAD, 2019). Since 
its inception, ASAD has sought to “identify and share contemporary and 
innovative practices in teaching, learning, research and knowledge exchange 
in the fields of arts, design and visual culture education” (ASAD, 2019; 
Jokela & Coutts, 2018b). The organisation is one of the thematic networks 
of the University of the Arctic that aim to “foster issues-based cooperation 
within networks that are focused but flexible enough to respond quickly to 
topical Arctic issues” (University of the Arctic, 2019).
Among ASAD members, there has been emerging an interest in CES, 
and we believe that in the rapidly changing Arctic, discussions on CES can 
be used to weigh the balance between the use of nature, its conservation, 
and the social, cultural, and economic relations in the Arctic. According 
to the study by Milcu et al. (2013), mobilising CES as binding elements 
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between social and ecological conceptual constructs is the core idea of the 
sustainability ideal. Hearnshaw and Cullen (2010) point out that thoroughly 
accounting for CES will be helpful in balancing primarily economic consid-
erations and facilitate a more inclusive socio-ecological approach by explor-
ing the interactions between social, ecological, and economic processes.
We know that in a global world, all cultural values in art and design may 
have little direct dependence on ecosystems, but we argue an especially 
significant relationship between ecosystems and the fulfillment of human 
needs can be demonstrated in Arctic CES.
We see that CES offer a theoretical and practical framework to think 
differently about the ways in which creative entrepreneurs may collaborate 
with communities using local natural, cultural, and social resources. Such 
collaboration, of course, must be undertaken in a way that is sensitive to 
and respectful of the unique nature, culture, and heritage of the Arctic and 
takes into account megatrends such as climate change, globalisation, and 
urbanisation (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2011; Stephen, 2018.)
In our thinking about AAD, CES are closely connected to place-based 
strategy, which is also known as place-making and can also be understood 
as an economic development strategy. It is the practice of using places and a 
community’s capacities to make economic progress (Milone & Ventura, 
2010; Vodden, Gibson, & Baldacchino, 2015). Building on existing strengths, 
this approach focuses on CES and the unique features of particular places to 
boost existing businesses and create new ones and even attract new invest-
ment. According to Daniels, Baldacchino, and Vodden (2015), place-based 
strategy is a reaction to conventional top-down, single-sector, national- 
stage development projects. Thus, place-making can also be understood as 
an identity policy of remote, rural and peripheral places that are centers for 
their inhabitants.
We are also familiar with the criticism of utilising CES in art and design 
and in the discussion of the creative economy. Spiritual and aesthetic cul-
tural values are not best captured by instrumental or consequentialist think-
ing and they are grounded in conceptions of nature that differ from the ES 
conceptual framework (Cooper, Bardy, Steen, & Bryce, 2016). The different 
attitudes toward the use of CES can sometimes be quite passionate, since 
they are tightly bound to human values and behavior as well as social and 
cultural institutions and economic and political organisations. In the Arctic, 
they are also bound to Indigenous and non-Indigenous issues and relations.
An important factor is the effect of the diversity of ES to the diversity 
of Indigenous and non-Indigenous cultures in the North and the Arctic. 
Ecosystems influence the types of social relations that are established in par-
ticular cultures. The social relations in fishing societies, for example, differ 
in many respects from those in nomadic reindeer herding or non-Indigenous 
agricultural societies. According to Stephen (2018), the climate crisis has 
caused changes in harvesting, hunting, and fishing cultures, which has had 
a wider impact on cultural identities and traditional knowledge. In other 
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words, the climate crisis has brought about changes in the ecosystems and 
has had effects on socio-economic and political realities, which has affected 
the cultures and self-understanding of Arctic Indigenous populations. We 
argue this is the case in many non-Indigenous communities in the North 
and the Arctic as well.
Besides material and social relations, Indigenous cultures of the Arctic add 
spiritual and religious dimensions and values to ecosystems. This calls for a 
certain cultural sensitivity in approaching Arctic art and design activities. 
Most often, it is commercial design productions and items that represents 
identities (for example, clothing) that cause heated discussions on cultural 
appropriation and exploitation. Visual symbols such as patterns and orna-
ments have significance in the continuation of cultures and even the shar-
ing of world views (Joy, 2019; Kramvig & Flemmen, 2019; Minnakhmetova, 
Usenyuk-Kravchuk, & Konkova, 2019; Schilar & Keskitalo, 2018). Thus, 
seeing Indigenous cultural traditions as an economic resource can cause 
tensions (Olsen et al., 2019 forthcoming; Smith, 1999). However, if members 
of Indigenous peoples themselves are participating in the transformation of 
tradition into contemporary and economic products, then there is less or no 
criticism. For example, the Sámi people were invited to collaborate in the 
production of the Disney film Frozen 2, which depicts Sámi culture.
In our review of the studies and articles dealing with CES, we have seen 
that the majority of these articles have been published in ecological jour-
nals. From an art and design point of view, this may be a partial explanation 
for the rather vague discussion of the creative industries or art and design 
in most of the examined articles. On the other hand, however, art history 
research has shown that even when the concept of CES is not in use, nature 
still provides a rich source of inspiration for arts, design, craft, media, and 
architecture, especially in the Arctic (Mäkikalli, Holt, & Hautala-Hirvioja, 
2019). The way nature inspires artists, can be seen to CES.
Besides art, many people find aesthetic, expressive, and emotional values 
in various aspects of ecosystems. For example, people value landscapes that 
are known for their beauty or the “sense of place” that includes locally and 
culturally significant stories and heritage (Hølleland, Skrede, & Holmgaard, 
2017; Lindhjem, Reinvang, & Zandersen, 2015). These can all be connected 
to renewable creative industries because they affect where people choose 
to go to spend their leisure time or improve their well-being. CES plays 
an important role in nature, ecological, and cultural tourism and recrea-
tion, which is often supported, represented, advertised, and made know by 
means of the creative industries (de la Barre et al., 2016; Müller & Viken, 
2017; Rantala et al., 2019). When considering creative services as art and 
design products and goods, we see many opportunities for collaborations 
between art and design and tourism as renewable economies in the Arctic.
The following four case studies will demonstrate how art and design can 
play a role in cultural sensitive place-based renewable economies based on 
CES around the North and the Arctic.
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Isuma: A lens to Canada’s North
Canada is known for its abundance of natural resources and empty wil-
derness, seemingly ready for the taking. However, basing the economy on 
resource extraction such as mining and fossil fuel-related industries so prev-
alent in the Arctic is not sustainable. In order to protect the balanced eco-
systems of both humans and non-humans, there is a growing need for the 
development of alternative and diverse economies more aligned with sus-
tainability, in relation to both the environment and the well-being of com-
munities and culture in the North (Schott, 2016). In many examples, CES 
literature refers more to recreational or touristic values, rather than a deep 
engagement with what the concept of culture means (Ihammar & Pedersen, 
2017). Meanwhile, in Igloolik, Nunavut, the artist collective Isuma demon-
strates the potential of cultural initiatives and renewable economies, using 
the concepts of ES, particularly CES, and place-making, while honoring 
their material and cultural heritage (Big River Analytics, 2017).
As Canada’s first Inuit video-based production company, Isuma has a 
surprisingly long history (Kunuk, 2019). Co-founder Zacharias Kunuk 
began exploring the possibilities of the film almost three decades ago, when 
he used the profits from selling his traditional soapstone carvings to pur-
chase his first video camera. This technology introduced him to new pos-
sibilities of storytelling, highlighting the life and landscape of the North, 
and in 1990 Kunuk and his collaborators, Paul Apak Angilirq and Norman 
Cohn, created Isuma Productions.
Since its inception, Isuma has produced a number of feature films, docu-
mentaries, TV series, and short films, including Atanarjuat: The Fast Runner 
(2001), The Journals of Knud Rasmussen (2006), Before Tomorrow (Le jour 
avant le lendemain) (2008), and One Day in the Life of Noah Piugattuk (2019), 
based on the landscape and stories of the Canadian Arctic. In 2008, they 
launched IsumaTV, a collaborative multimedia knowledge-sharing plat-
form for Indigenous filmmakers and media organisations, and in 2012 they 
introduced Digital Indigenous Democracy, an innovative platform linking 
communities and presenting politics and legal issues within a culturally 
accessible framework. Based on knowledge and skill sharing, these initia-
tives feature stories of heritage and contemporary life. They promote inter-
est in the land and people that contribute to the development of CES and 
related renewable economies through sharing with audiences and preserv-
ing for themselves the experiences of society and cultures in the North.
Isuma’s films and other media projects are in oral Inuktitut, and like 
many AAD projects, encourage cultural preservation and resilience. This 
provides the community Elders with the ability to understand and appre-
ciate the films, while strengthening the development and revitalisation of 
language and culture. The content on IsumaTV is accessible in over eighty 
languages, including Indigenous languages such as Cree, Ojibwe, and the 
Northern Athabaskan languages of the Na-Dene peoples. This contributes 
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to the restoration of vulnerable languages which are intrinsic to cultural 
identity and knowledge.
To further this outreach and communication, Isuma has instituted an 
innovative digital service that brings media access, otherwise unavaila-
ble, to small, isolated communities in the Canadian North (Leask, 2016). 
Isuma productions and other creative Indigenous media activities have fos-
tered interest, especially among northern youth, in educational and train-
ing opportunities that support these growing and economically impactful 
cultural initiatives, and in developing professional practices in video and 
film production, broadcasting, and related industries. Media education is 
provided by not-for-profit educational initiatives such as Wapikoni (2019) 
and Our World (2018) that work with local schools and hold workshops in 
remote Indigenous communities, encouraging youth to follow their pas-
sions while giving them practical skillsets to pursue their ambitions.
As Isuma becomes increasingly recognised in the Canadian North, it is 
also making an impact internationally. Isuma’s Atanarjuat: The Fast Runner 
won Best First Feature Film at the 2001 Cannes Film Festival, and the pro-
duction company has been recognised by six Genie Awards and numer-
ous other international film awards. In 2019, the collective was selected to 
represent Canada in the prestigious Venice Art Biennale (Canadian Art, 
2017; Sandals, 2019). In addition to the regional economic benefits of the 
film industry, the stories of the people who have been underrepresented 
and isolated from national and international conversations are now on the 
world stage, sharing culture and values, building resilience, and creating 
and strengthening international and intercultural alliances.
The changing landscape of the Arctic, a theme in many of Isuma’s films, 
is a global topic of growing concern. For the Indigenous residents of the 
Canadian Arctic, this issue literally hits close to home: living off the land is 
not only an essential source of sustenance, but also necessary for the pres-
ervation of culture, language, and knowledge passed down from one gener-
ation to another. Isuma initiatives and the positive responses to their work 
demonstrate the importance of representing different knowledge systems, 
worldviews, and attention to cultural sensitivity within the concept of CES 
(Chan et al., 2012; Lepofsky et al., 2017).
Lapland snow and ice design and art in Finland
The snowy landscape has an important role to play in the local customs and 
traditions, identities, and cultures in the Arctic. The use of snow and ice in 
tourism has a long history in Finland, Lapland, and can be found in many 
forms, starting with snow-related sports. Snow and ice can be seen as ES 
and winter traditions as CES.
The concept of winter art was introduced in 2003 to describe the artistic fea-
tures and phenomena related to winter aesthetics in Lapland, considering the 
cultural changes and opportunities related to the winter: “One manifestation 
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of this change is the brisk increase in winter festivals, winter theatres, snow 
and ice sculpting events and snow architecture. At their best these phenom-
ena can be called winter art” (Jokela, 2003, p. 7). Since then, art and design 
at the University of Lapland and the cold climate engineering department 
at the Lapland University of Applied Sciences have collaborated with local 
businesses on a project entitled Lapland Snow Design. The collaboration 
aimed to create new knowledge, innovations, and practices for the tourism 
and business sectors that utilised thinking and competence in snow and ice 
construction technologies (Jokela, 2014, 2019).
Long-term development brought artists, designers, and companies 
together in order to develop new high-quality products in cooperation with 
universities and businesses. At the same time, creative services based on the 
winter ecosystem were developed. The objective was to develop an inter-
nationally competitive product to leverage Lapland’s versatile expertise of 
snow-related technologies and applications in the different services of the 
tourism industry. Different types of snow and ice environments, collabora-
tive design methods, and marketing concepts were implemented during the 
project. Besides the development of new design and implementation meth-
ods for winter art, another goal was to build regional teamwork capacity 
and boots place-based thinking. The aim was to develop new and more effi-
cient organisations to expand the applications of winter art in the business 
sector. One of the key outcomes of the project was the creation of a cluster- 
type regional network of experts that were able to apply the products in 
domestic and foreign contexts. The practices were designed to be flexible, so 
that they could be applied in a variety of environments and tailored to meet 
the needs of customers in different kinds of services.
Combining tourism and the development of culture-oriented creative 
industries, winter art, and snow design have contributed to the creative 
renewable economies in Lapland. Between eight and ten large-scale snow 
hotels with sleeping rooms, restaurants, bars, chapels, showrooms, and so 
on and several smaller-scale tourism facilities are built in Lapland every 
year (Jokela, 2014, 2019). Compared to Sweden, where the Jukkasjärvi Ice 
Hotel was first built in 1990 and still remains the only ice hotel in the coun-
try, in Finland, knowledge and skill in the renewable use of snow and ice 
was disseminated throughout the region to improve the competence of the 
local people through educational, participatory, and place-based activities 
(Gelter & Gelter, 2013).
Crow day, sharing traditions in Siberia, Russia
Today, the vast areas of the Russian North are turning into a complex 
site of conflict between Indigenous people, local non-Indigenous inhabit-
ants, state-owned and private monopolies (extractive industries), and even 
tourists (Pashkevich, 2013). In order to ground the very idea of ethical and 
culturally sensible tourism in the environmentally and culturally fragile 
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setting of the Russian Far North, the researchers and designers from the 
Arctic Design School (USUAA), propose a novel understanding of a tourist 
destination. It is a “laboratory” where innovative solutions to short-term 
existence in the extreme environment are generated and shaped together by 
tourists and local inhabitants. As global warming advances, these solutions 
can be further applied to facilitate adaptation to severe conditions and the 
development of new lifestyles for longer term visitors and non-Indigenous 
settlers across the Arctic regions.
In evidence for this vision, this case study presents designers’ engagement 
with the Indigenous cultural heritage—not ignoring but learning from it, 
and not blindly preserving traditions but keeping them alive and available 
for the present and future (Nugraha, 2012). It is centered on an experiment 
within the AAD educational model: as a part of a master’s course entitled 
“Regional Design” at USUAA, a student named Alexandra Nikolaeva 
developed a project, “A Hybrid Tradition: A designer’s renewal of the tra-
ditional Crow Day,” a context-sensitive adaptation of the identically named 
festival of the Ob Ugric people of Western Siberia. The main task was to 
redefine tourism as a form of mutually beneficial engagement with the land 
and the people, with an emphasis on inclusive participation. Seen through 
the CES lens, this case reveals the distinctive ability of the AAD approach 
to “wrap up” the protection and appreciation of the cultural and spiritual 
heritage into the “gift pack” of a memorable tourist experience.
Crow Day represents the end of the so-called Winter Year and the arrival 
of the long-awaited spring, (Golovnev, 1995). The design exploration into 
the context and structural elements of the celebration began with an investi-
gation of historical materials such as publicly available collections, in-house 
publications, and catalogues of the archives and museums.
Diverse visual data provided insights into the complexity of human-envi-
ronment interactions within the traditional culture of Northern and Arctic 
inhabitants. At the first stage of data analysis, the rites and ceremonies asso-
ciated with the traditional Crow Day celebration were divided according to 
their sacredness, which determined their potential for public accessibility 
and tourist involvement. The three resulting groups were: (1) entirely sacred 
rituals that are performed by the community, for example, young girls or old 
women, and cannot be joined or even observed by others; (2) partly sacred 
rituals where spectators are allowed, but participation is restricted; and 
(3) open or public rituals where everyone can join the celebration. Accordingly, 
there were three interactive situations identified: a tourist as a participant, a 
deliberately invited spectator, and an occasional witness.
At the ideation stage, a cultural basis for design interpretation was pro-
posed: to link the Northern Crow Day with the widely recognised and inter-
culturally relevant celebration of New Year. The design outcomes included 
essential attributes for new and old rituals, such as a stylised New Year Tree, 
thematic food, a carnival with masks and costumes and a culminating cere-
mony of making a wish.
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In terms of practical implications, the outcomes, namely the designed 
objects and celebration scenarios, can contribute to shaping the region’s mul-
ticultural identity by disseminating environmentally and culturally appropri-
ate “best practices” or “know-how” that originated in the heart of the Arctic. 
In the long run, contextually relevant design explorations can inform the pro-
cess of developing and inhabiting remote Arctic or Northern territories.
A tourist memento—creating place-based 
sustainable souvenirs in Alaska
Traditionally, education for tourism has been provided by tour operators, 
while universities teach or conduct research on tourism from a more theo-
retical perspective. Given the sensitivity of the Arctic environment and the 
speed with which it is changing, it is incumbent on Northern universities 
to become more involved in the process of transmitting knowledge, raising 
public awareness, and encouraging stewardship of the Arctic. Tourism is an 
ideal mechanism for this effort.
In order to encourage renewable economies, promote stewardship and 
raise awareness of the Arctic, a collaborative approach to provide tour-
ism “packages” is proposed.1 These interdisciplinary solutions are needed 
to increase knowledge and engagement about sustainable tourism in the 
Arctic. A model for a designed sustainable tourism should include (1) citizen- 
engaged environmental observation, (2) place-based sustainable art, and 
(3) outdoor recreation and leadership.
Citizen-engaged Environmental Observation is a type of knowledge co- 
production that has received increasing interest as more people become 
affected in some way by Arctic environmental change (Alessa et al., 2015). 
Citizen science has proved to be an indispensable means of combining sci-
entific, environmental research with education and public engagement. It 
has significant potential for engaging the tourism industry that provides a 
unique platform from which to conduct research in remote Arctic locations. 
Participants engaged in a sustainable tourism program are well-positioned to 
collect observational data on environmental change (de la Barre et al., 2016).
Place-based Sustainable Art creates artwork using local materials in the 
context of place and environment. As Hicks and King (2007) have observed, 
“Art education is well situated to address environmental problems that 
emerge at the point of contact between nature and social life.” By creating 
place-based sustainable souvenirs (art), participants can become more fully 
engaged. Compared to purchasing imported tourist souvenir products, 
this creative experience promotes positive memories and a sense of deeper 
connection and meaning. It can be an effective methodology for systemat-
ically and purposefully developing art projects about the environment and 
sustainability.
Outdoor Recreation Leadership enhances the health and wellbeing 
of people and communities (Brymer, Cuddihy, & Sharma-Brymer, 2012; 
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Godbey, 2009; Gobster and Buchner, 2010). Outdoor recreational activities 
are designed to create a learning environment inspiring a passion for guard-
ianship for our ecosystem. It focuses on life-long learning opportunities, 
stewardship of resources, and collaborative teamwork. A designed sustain-
able tourism program is fundamental to establishing this resiliency.
However, this project is an experimental “makerspace” introducing a 
unique approach to sustainable tourism in the Arctic—focusing on being 
environmentally and culturally responsible while appreciating nature and 
promoting conservation. We believe that participants will build skills and 
knowledge in basic biological sciences, understand environmental issues 
and develop wilderness travel proficiencies. Making a “place-based souve-
nir” as a part of the sustainable tourism experience will promote a sense of 
appreciation for the Arctic’s natural environment and play a critical role in 
terms of renewable economic activity in the region.
Artification of the Arctic tourism and cultural revitalisation
Through analysing the case studies and juxtaposing them with a review of 
the current literature, we can demonstrate some key points of potential and 
challenges for art and design in the development of renewable economies in 
the North and the Arctic.
When using CES, the creative economy has both commercial and cultural 
value. The AAD model, as the intersection of art and design practices with 
planning and production, can be used effectively when designing and pro-
ducing renewable goods and creative services often connected with respon-
sible and sustainable tourism in the North and the Arctic. We recognise 
that tourism in the Arctic is characterised by a process that Naukkarinen 
(2012) has described as artification. This refers to situations and processes 
in which something not originally regarded as art is transformed into some-
thing that resembles art or is influenced by artistic ways of thinking and 
acting. According to Naukkarinen (2012), this phenomenon can be found 
in business, wellness and healthcare services, and academic education and 
research. We argue that Arctic tourism is a scene for artification when cre-
ative and learning tourism are developed is in relation to CES and through 
AAD. For example, this could include nature and northern lights photogra-
phy tours; wintery, snow and ice experience environments; learning tour-
ism makerspace or slow food design production as well the revitalisation 
of Indigenous cultures through film productions or festivals (de la Barre, 
& Broucher, 2013; Gelter & Gelter, 2013; Jokela, 2014; Jokela et al., 2020; 
Leask, 2016;Urry & Larsen, 2011).
In AAD, CES are understood not as simple products of nature that are 
utilised for particular economic benefits, but rather, as relational processes 
that people actively create and express through interactions with cul-
tural ecosystems (Fish, Church, & Winter, 2016). In advancing this view-
point, AAD approximates to Chan et al.’s (2012) understanding of CES as 
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experiences and capabilities that arise from human–ecosystem relation-
ships. We argue that through creative industries like art and design, these 
relationships can be transformed into renewable economies.
Reports from around the world have demonstrated that creative indus-
tries generate income through trade and intellectual property rights and 
create new opportunities, particularly for small- and medium-sized enter-
prises. Even though the importance of and interdependence between crea-
tive economies and cultural services have been consistently recognised, they 
are often characterised as subjective and difficult to quantify in monetary 
terms. It is evident that their potential for future development is underesti-
mated by national and regional decision-makers and officials responsible 
for regional development.
When transformed into renewable AAD products and services, CES must 
always contribute to the satisfaction of human needs and wants, which nec-
essarily involves subjective considerations. Besides economic value, while 
being subjective, CES also benefit human capacities by facilitating knowl-
edge, social, and cultural development and, in the Arctic case, revitalisation 
of local Indigenous and non-Indigenous traditions. We argue that responsi-
ble artification can take place through the development of novel renewable 
products and services through AAD.
From artification toward Arcticfication: 
A risk or an opportunity
Without involving Northern and Arctic people as collaborators, we are 
faced with the obvious danger of reducing Arctic ecosystems to an exotic 
resource that benefits external parties rather than Arctic inhabitants. While 
the North and the Arctic are culturally rich and diverse, Arcticfication is the 
tendency to present the Arctic as a cold and snowy destination devoid of 
human activity. Arcticfication has been reinforced by tourism marketing, as 
presentations of such magnificent landscapes can trigger touristic demand 
(Rantala et al., 2019). As Chartier (2018) has described, the phenomenon 
has deep roots in Western art and scholarship, where the Arctic was histori-
cally marginalised as the “Imaginary North” —as an empty and horizontal 
landscape rather than a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-lingual space 
with a rich cultural history and diverse living traditions. At the same time, 
Arcticfication is also the social process that has created, on the one hand, 
new geographical images of Northern Europe as part of the Arctic and, 
on the other hand, new social, economic, and political relations (Müller & 
Viken, 2017). In the development and implementation of novel AAD-based 
renewable economic practices, Arcticfication presents an opportunity to 
introduce these innovations to decision-makers and into the larger social 
and political discussions on the future of the Arctic and the world.
Today, as insiders, many artists and designers in the Arctic have the 
agency to reflect and depict the transformations, nature, and culture of 
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the region (Huhmarniemi & Jokela, forthcoming, 2020). In addition, more 
research is being conducted on creative industries and the use of art and 
design in areas such as tourism, which is a growing economic field in the 
Arctic (Huhmarniemi & Jokela, 2019; Huhmarniemi et al., 2021; Kugapi, 
Huhmarniemi & Laivamaa, 2020; Miettinen, Sarantou & Kuure, 2019). As 
our study has shown, AAD and place-based development utilising CES as 
an economic development strategy are particularly relevant in the North 
and the Arctic today. When communities, artists, and designers in remote 
and rural places commit to place-making as a method of economic develop-
ment, the dual benefit of commercial and cultural development will stimu-
late the region’s prosperity and well-being.
Responsible utilising of CES in AAD calls creative capacity building
Our study has shown that there are various opportunities for innovative 
applications of AAD in remote and peripheral areas. We agree with Petrov 
(2014) and Vodden et al. (2015) in arguing that innovation in the creative 
economy is not restricted to cities and innovation hubs only, but there are 
certain challenges in the Arctic. According to studies, the Arctic needs to 
generate more human capital by investing in its people to keep them in the 
region (Karlsdóttir & Junsberg, 2015; Karlsdóttir et al., 2017; Petrov 2016, 
2017). The advent of what is often referred to as the “knowledge economy” 
necessitates the enhancement of human skills and creativity, which will be 
a key to the next stage of the development process toward AAD as the cre-
ative renewable economy. This calls for novel models for educating artists 
and designers for the Arctic. Artists with traditional artists training may 
lack the will and skills to work as entrepreneurs and producers of services, 
or they don’t have enough specific knowledge about the Arctic to apply their 
skill to particular northern circumstances (Huhmarniemi & Jokela, 2019; 
Kugapi, Huhmarniemi & Laivamaa, forthcoming, 2020).
We refer that as drivers of the Arctic creative economy, art and design 
higher education institutions and universities can lay the ground for the for-
mation of multidisciplinary and interprofessional creative clusters, like the 
Arctic Design Cluster in Rovaniemi, Lapland. The cluster is built around 
the research and education of the Faculty of Art and Design to boost the 
regional economy by implementing processes where art, design, creative 
services, and CES are combined with place-making to exploit existing 
strengths of the region.
Conclusion
Through the case studies and literature review, this chapter has filled 
the notable gap in the research connected to art, design, and CES. We 
argue that identifying, analysing, and using CES as the potential for crea-
tive renewable industries; particularly AAD can play an important role in 
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the future of the Arctic in terms of sustainable economy. Merging CES and 
AAD with a place-making strategy is a way to exploit the existing strengths 
of communities to create renewable economies in the rural and remote areas 
of the Arctic.
As our study has demonstrated, there is no single way to implement the 
CES approach in the creative economy and art and design. Implementation 
necessarily depends on local, regional, social and cultural conditions. As 
the concept of CES is subjective and always linked to society and culture, 
it is necessary to understand the specific conditions they are operating in. 
Both identified trends: Artification of Arctic tourism and cultural revital-
isation practices and Arcticfication as a risk or an opportunity for AAD 
should be recognised and utilised in responsible way when implementing 
CES in creative renewable economy in the Arctic. Therefore, art and design 
as renewable economies must be implemented through culturally sensitive 
and place-based strategies to respond to the challenges and ensure sustain-
ability in the North and the Arctic. Higher art and design education have 
an important role to secure creative human capacity and promotion of sus-
tainable future in Arctic.
Note
 1. The concept is co-developed by Audrey Taylor, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of 
Environmental Studies, Department of Geography and Environmental Stud-
ies; Herminia Din, Ph.D., Professor of Art Education, Department of Art; 
and Timothy Miller, Director, Department of Health, Physical Education and 
Recreation at the University of Alaska Anchorage.
References
Alessa, L., Kliskey, A., Pulsifer, P., Griffith, D., Williams, P., Druckenmiller, M. … 
Jackson, L. (2015). Best practices for community-based observing: a national work-
shop report. Arctic Observing Summit. http://www.arcticobservingsummit.org/
sites/arcticobservingsummit.org/files/Alessa%20et%20al%20-%20CBONReport_
DRAFT%20FINAL-updated-2016-03-07.pdf
ASAD. (2019). Arctic sustainable arts and design thematic network. ASAD Network. 
http://www.asadnetwork.org/
de la Barre, S., & Broucher, P. (2013). Consuming stories: Placing food in the Arctic 
tourism experience. Journal of Heritage Tourism, 8(2-3), 37–41.
de la Barre, S., Maher, P., Dawson, J., Hillmer-Pegram, K., Huijbens, E., Lamers, 
M. … Stewart, E. (2016). Tourism and Arctic observation systems: Exploring the 
relationships. Polar Research, 35(1), 24980.
Big River Analytics. (2017). Impact of the Inuit Arts economy. Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada, Government of Canada. https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.
gc.ca/eng/1499360279403/1534786167549
Brymer, E., Cuddihy, T. F., & Sharma-Brymer, V. (2012). The role of nature-based 
experiences in the development and maintenance of wellness. Asia-Pacific Journal 
of Health, Sport and Physical Education, 1(2), 21–27. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/1
8377122.2010.9730328.
76 T. Jokela, G. Coutts, R. Beer et al.
Canadian Art. (2017, December 13). Inuit Art Collective Isuma to Represent 
Canada at 2019 Venice Biennale. Canadian Art. https://canadianart.ca/news/
isuma-venice-biennale-canada-pavilion-2019
Chan, K., Satterfield, T., & Goldstein, J. (2012). Rethinking ecosystem services to 
better address and navigate cultural values. Ecological Economics, 74, 8–18.
Chartier, D. (2018). What is the “Imagined North”?. Presses de l’Université du 
Québec.
Cooper, N., Bardy, E., Steen, H., & Bryce, R. (2016). Aesthetic and spiritual val-
ues of ecosystems: Recognising the ontological and axiological plurality of cul-
tural ecosystem “services”. Ecosystem Services, 21(B), 218–229. doi: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2016.07.014.
Daniel, T. C., Muhar, A., Arnberger, A., Aznar, O., Boyd, J. W., Chan, K. M. A. … 
von der Dunk, A. (2012). Contributions of cultural services to the ecosystem ser-
vices agenda. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(23), 8812–8819. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1114773109.
Daniels, J., Baldacchino, G., & Vodden, R. (2015). Matters of place: The mak-
ing of place and identy. In K. Vodden, R, Gibson, & G. Baldacchino (Eds.), 
Place peripheral: Place-based development in rural, island, and remote regions 
(pp. 23–40). ISER Books.
Fish, R., Church, A., & Winter, M. (2016). Conceptualising cultural ecosystem 
services: A novel framework for research and critical engagement. Ecosystem 
Services, 21(B), 208–217. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2016.09.002.
Fondahl, G., & Wilson, G. N. (Eds.). (2017). Northern Sustainabilities: Understanding 
and addressing change in the circumpolar world. Springer Nature.
Fullerton, C. (2015). Arts, culture, and rural community economic development: A 
Southern Saskatchewan case study. In K. Vodden, R, Gibson, & G. Baldacchino 
(Eds.), Place peripheral: Place-based development in rural, island, and remote 
regions (pp. 180–210). ISER Books.
Gad, U., Jacobsen, M., & Strandsbjerg, J. (2019). Introduction: Sustainability as a 
political concept in the Arctic. In. U. P. Gad & J. Strandsbjerg (Eds.), The politics 
of sustainability in the Arctic: Reconfiguring identity, space and time (pp. 1–18). 
Routledge.
Gelter, H., & Gelter, J. (2013). An innovation lost. The Ice Dome Concert Hall Project 
in Piteå. In L. Lindeborg, & L. Lindkvist (Eds), The value of arts and culture for 
regional development: A Scandinavian perspective (pp. 252–266). Routledge.
Giacometti, A., & Teräs, J. (2019). Regional economic and social resilience: An 
exploratory in-depth study in the Nordic countries. Nordregio. doi: http://dx.doi.
org/10.6027/R2019:2.1403-2503
Gobster, P. H., & Buchner, D. M. (2010). Healthy outdoor recreation: An inte-
grated approach to linking physical activity with wellness goals. In L. Payne, 
B. Ainsworth, & G. Godbey (Eds.), Leisure, health and wellness: Making the con-
nections (pp. 437–446). Venture Publishing.
Godbey, G. (2009). Outdoor recreation, health, and wellness: Understanding and 
enhancing the relationship. RFF Discussion Paper No. 09–21. doi: http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.1408694
Golovnev, A. V. (1995). Govoryashhie kul’tury [Talking cultures]. URO RAN.
Griffith, D. (2014). Imagining natural Scotland. Creative Scotland Publications
Guttorm, G. (2015) Contemporary Duodji—A personal experience in understand-
ing traditions. In Jokela T. and Coutts G. (Eds.), Relate North: Art, heritage and 
identity, (pp. 60–77). Lapland University Press.
The potential of art and design 77
Hesmondhalgh, D. (2007). The cultural industries (2nd ed.). SAGE Publications.
Hearnshaw, E., & Cullen, R. (2010, August 26-27). The sustainability and cost- 
effectiveness of water storage projects on Canterbury rivers: the Opihi River case 
paper [Paper presentation]. The NZARES Conference, Nelson, New Zealand.
Hicks, L. E., & King, R. J. H. (2007). Confronting environmental collapse: Visual 
culture, art education, and environmental responsibility. Studies in Art Education, 
48(4), 332–335.
Howkins, J. (2001). The creative economy: How people make money from ideas. 
Penguin.
Huhmarniemi, M., & Jokela, T. (2019). Environmental art for tourism in the 
Arctic: From handicraft to integrated art and reform on artists’ skills. Synnyt/
Origins, 1(2019), 63–80. https://wiki.aalto.fi/pages/viewpage.action?pageId= 
151504259
Huhmarniemi, M. & Jokela T. (2020). Arctic arts with pride: discourses on Arctic 
arts, culture and sustainability. Sustainability 12(2), 604. https://doi.org/10.3390/
su12020604 
Huhmarniemi, M.; Kugapi, O.; Miettinen, S. & Laivamaa, L. (2021). Sustainable 
Future for Creative Tourism in Lapland. In N. Duxbury; S. Albino & C. Pato 
Carvalho (eds.), Creative Tourism: Activating Cultural Resources and Engaging 
Creative Travellers (pp. 239–253). Cabi International. 
Härkönen, E., Huhmarniemi, M., & Jokela, T. (2018). Crafting sustainabil-
ity. Handcraft in contemporary art and cultural sustainability in Lapland. 
Sustainability, 10(6). doi: https://doi.org/10.3390/su10061907
Härkönen, E., & Vuontisjärvi, H. (2018). Arctic art & design education and cultural 
sustainability in Finnish Lapland. In T. Jokela & G. Coutts (Eds.), Relate North: 
Practising place, heritage, art & design for creative communities (pp. 86–105). 
Lapland University Press.
Hølleland, H., Skrede, J., & Holmgaard, S. (2017). Cultural heritage and ecosystem 
services: A literature review. Conservation and Management of Archaeological 
Sites, 19(3), 210–237.
Jokela, T. (2003) Introduction. In H. Huhmarniemi, T. Jokela & S. Vuorjoki, 
S. (Eds.), winter art. Statement on winter art and snow construction (6–11). 
University of Lapland.
Jokela, T. (2013). Engaged art in the North: Aims, methods, contexts. In T. Jokela, 
G. Coutts, M. Huhmarniemi, & E. Härkönen (Eds.), Cool: Applied visual arts in 
the North (pp. 10–21). University of Lapland.
Jokela, T. (2014). Snow and ice design innovation in Lapland. In E. Härkönen, 
T. Jokela, & A. J. Yliharju (Eds.), Snow design in Lapland: Initiating cooperation 
(pp. 180–181). University of Lapland.
Jokela, T. (2017) Art, design, and craft interwoven with the North and the Arctic. 
In M. Huhmarniemi, A. Jónsdóttir, G. Guttorm, & H. Hauen, (Eds.), Interwoven 
(pp. 4–11). University of Lapland.
Jokela, T. (2019). Arts–based action research in the north. In Oxford Research ency-
clopedia of education. Oxford University Press.
Jokela, T., & Coutts, G. (Eds.). (2018a). Relate North: Art and design education for 
sustainability. Lapland University Press.
Jokela, T., & Coutts, G. (2018b) The North and the Arctic: A laboratory of 
art and design education for sustainability. In T. Jokela & G. Coutts (Eds.), 
Relate North: Art and design education for sustainability (pp. 98–117). Lapland 
University Press.
78 T. Jokela, G. Coutts, R. Beer et al.
Jokela, T., Coutts, G., Huhmarniemi, M., & Härkönen, E. (Eds.). (2013). Cool. 
Applied Visual Arts in the North. Publications of the Faculty of Art and Design of 
the University of Lapland C 41. http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-484-638-7
Jokela, T., Huhmarniemi, M., & Hautala-Hirvioja, T. (2019). Preface. Synnyt 1/2019 
special issue on Arctic Arts Summit, 6–12. https://wiki.aalto.fi/pages/viewpage.
action?pageId=151504259
Jokela, T., Huhmarniemi, M., & Paasovaara, J. (Eds.). (2020). Soveltava taide ja 
luontokuvaus. [Applied visual art and nature photography]. Lapland University.
Jokela, T., & Tahkokallio, P. (2015). Arctic design week: A forum and a catalyst. In 
T. Jokela & G. Coutts (Eds.), Relate North: Art, heritage & identity (pp. 118–139). 
Lapland University Press.
Joy, F. (2019). Sámi cultural heritage and tourism in Finland. In M. Tennberg, 
H. Lempinen, & S. Pirnes (Eds.), Resources, social and cultural sustainabilities in 
the Arctic (pp. 144–162). Routledge.
Karlsdóttir, A., & Junsberg, L. (Eds.). (2015). Nordic Arctic youth future perspectives. 
Nordregio.
Karlsdóttir, A., Olsen, L., Harbo, L., Jungsberg, L., & Rasmussen, O. (2017). Future 
regional development policy for the Nordic Arctic: Foresight analysis 2013–2016. 
Nordregio.
Kugapi, O., Huhmarniemi, M. & Laivamaa, L. (2020). A Potential treasure for 
tourism: Crafts as employment and a cultural experience service in the Nordic 
North. In A Walmsley, K. Åberg,  P. Blinnikka, G.T. Jóhannesson, G.T. (eds.), 
Tourism Employment in Nordic countries: Trends, practices, and opportunities 
(pp. 77–99). Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kramvig, B., & Flemmen, A. B. (2019). Turbulent indigenous objects: Controversies 
around cultural appropriation and recognition of difference. Journal of Material 
Culture, 24(1), 64–82.
Kunuk, Z. (2019.). Zacharias Kunuk. Isuma. https://www.isuma.tv/members/
zacharias-kunuk
Landry, C., & Bianchini, F. (1995). The Creative City. Demos.
Leask, J. (2016). IsumaTV Builds Innovative Digital Systems to Share High-Def 
Streaming Video in Low Speed Remote Communities. First Mile. https://firstmile.ca/ 
isumatv-builds-innovative-digital-infrastructure-to-share-high-def-streaming- 
video-in-remote-communities
Lepofsky, D., Armstrong, C. G., Greening, S., Jackley, J., Carpenter, J., Guernsey, 
B. … Turner, N. J. (2017). Historical ecology of cultural keystone places of the 
northwest coast. American Anthropologist, 119(3), 448–463. doi: https://doi.
org/10.1111/aman.12893.
Lindhjem, H., Reinvang, R., & Zandersen, M. (2015). Landscape experience as 
a cultural ecosystem service in a Nordic context: Concepts, values and deci-
cion-making. TemaNord, 2015, 547. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/TN2015-549
Miettinen, S., Sarantou, M., & Kuure, E. (2019). Design for care in the peripheries: 
Arts-based research as an empowering process with communities. NORDES Nordic 
Design Research, 8. https://archive.nordes.org/index.php/n13/article/view/467
Milcu, A. I., Hanspach, J., Abson, D., & Fischer, J. (2013). Cultural ecosystem services: 
A literature review and prospects for future research. Ecology and Society, 18(3), 44.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. (2005). Ecosystems and human well-being: 
Synthesis. Island Press. http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document. 
356.aspx.pdf
The potential of art and design 79
Milone, P., & Ventura, F. (Eds.). (2010). Networking the rural: The future of green 
regions of Europe. Van Gorcum.
Minnakhmetova, R., Usenyuk-Kravchuk, S., & Konkova, Y. (2019). A context- 
sensitive approach to the use of traditional ornament in contemporary design 
practice. Synnyt/origins, Special issue on Arctic Arts Summit 1, 49–62. https://
wiki.aalto.fi/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=151504259
Müller, D. K., & Viken, A. (2017). Toward a de-essentializing of indigenous tour-
ism? In A. Viken & D. K. Müller (Eds.), Tourism and indigeneity in the Arctic  
(pp. 281–289). Channel View.
Mäkikalli, M., Holt, Y., & Hautala-Hirvioja, T. (Eds.). (2019). North As a meaning in 
design and art. Lapland University Press.
Naukkarinen, O., (2012) Variations on artification. Contemporary Aesthetics, 
Special Volume 4 (2012) ARTIFICATION. https://digitalcommons.risd.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1189&context=liberalarts_contempaesthetics
Nordic Council of Ministers. (2011). Megatrends. TemaNord, 2011, 527. http:// 
norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:702166/FULLTEXT01.pdf
Nordic Councils of Ministers. (2018). Arctic business analysis: Creative and cultural 
industries. Nordisk Ministerråd. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/ANP2018-708
Nugraha, A. (2012). Transforming tradition. Unigrafia Aalto University.
Olsen, L., Berlina, A., Jungsberg, L., Mikkola, N., Roto, J., Rasmussen, R., & 
Karlsdottìr, A. (2016). Sustainable business development in the Nordic Arctic 
[Nordregio working paper 2016: 1]. Nordregio.
Olsen, K. O., Abildgaard, M. S., Brattland, C., Chimirri, D., de Bernardi, C., Edmonds, 
J. … Viken, A. (2019). Looking at Arctic tourism through the lens of cultural sensitiv-
ity. ARCTISEN – A transnational baseline report. University of Lapland.
Our World. (2018). Our World: Youth, Film, Culture. https://www.ourworldlanguage.ca/
Pashkevich, A. (2013). Tourism development planning and product development 
in the context of Russian Arctic territories. In R. H. Lemelin, P. T. Maher, & 
D. Ligget (Eds.), From talk to action: How tourism is changing the polar regions  
(pp. 41–60). Lakehead University.
Petrov, A. N. (2014). Creative Arctic: Towards measuring Arctic’s creative capital. 
In L. Heininen, H. Exner-Pirot, & J. Plouffe (Eds.), Arctic yearbook 2014: Human 
capital in the North (pp. 149–166). Northern Research Forum.
Petrov, A. N. (2016). Exploring the Arctic’s “other economies”: Knowledge, creativ-
ity and the new frontier. The Polar Journal, 6(1), 51–68.
Petrov, A. N. (2017). Human capital and sustainbale development in the Arctic: 
Towards intellectual and empirical framing. In G. Fondalh & G. N. Wilson 
(Eds.), Northern Sustainabilities: Understanding and addressing change in the cir-
cumpolar world. Springer.
Rantala, O., de la Barre, S., Granås, B., Þór Jóhannesson, G., Müller, 
D. K., Saarinen, J. … Niskala, M. (2019). Arctic Tourism in Times of 
Change: Seasonality. Tema Nord. http://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/
diva2:1312957/FULLTEXT01.pdf
Sandals, L. (2019). Zacharias Kunuk Speaks on Isuma’s Venice Biennale Project. 
Canadian Art. https://canadianart.ca/news/zacharias-kunuk-speaks-on-isumas- 
venice-biennale-project
Schilar, H., & Keskitalo, E. C. (2018). Ethnic boundaries and boundary-making 
in handicrafts: Examples from northern Norway, Sweden and Finland. Acta 
Borealia, 35, 29–48.
80 T. Jokela, G. Coutts, R. Beer et al.
Schott, S. (2016). The changing face of economic development in the Canadian 
North. Open Canada. https://www.opencanada.org/features/changing-face- 
economic-development-canadian-north
Smith, L. T. (1999). Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples. 
Zed Books.
Soini, K., & Birkeland, I. (2014). Exploring the scientific discourse on cultural sus-
tainability. Geoforum, 51, 213–223.
Stålhammar, S. S., & Pedersen, E. (2017). Recreational cultural ecosystem services: 
How do people describe the value? Ecosystem Services, 26(Part A), 1–9. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2017.05.010.
Tennberg, M., Lempinen, H., & Pirnes, S. (Eds.). (2019). Resources, social and cul-
tural sustainabilities in the Arctic. Routledge.
Teräs, J., Lindberg, G., Johnsen, I. H. G., Perjo, L., & Giacometti, A. (2014). 
Bioeconomy in the Nordic region: Regional case studies. Nordregio.
Stephen, K. (2018). Societal impacts of a rapidly changing Arctic. Current Climate 
Change Reports, 4, 223–237.
Urry, J., & Larsen, J. (2011). The tourist gaze 3.0. Sage.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2018). Creative 
economy outlook: Trends in international trade in creative industries. UNCTAD. 
https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2328
University of the Arctic. (2019). Thematic Networks and Institutes. University of the 
Arctic. http://www.uarctic.org/organization/thematic-networks/
Wapikoni. (2019). Mission, Values, and Objectives. Wapikoni. http://www.wapikoni.
ca/about/who-are-we/mission-values-and-objectives
Vodden, K., Gibson, R., & Baldacchino, G. (Eds.). (2015). Place peripheral: Place-
based development in rural, island, and remote regions. ISER Books.
Woien, M., Kristensen, I., & Teräs, J. (2019). The status, characteristics and poten-
tial of smart specialisation in Nordic regions. Nordregio Report, 2019, 3.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003172406-5
5 Touring in the Arctic
Shades of gray toward a 
sustainable future
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Trine Kvidal-Røvik, Dieter K. Müller,  
& Outi Rantala
Introduction
Throughout this chapter, we will use the lens of the “destination” to look at 
the way tourism has developed, and continues to develop, in the Arctic. In 
Canada this includes Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut, Iceland 
as a whole nation, Northern Norway (the counties of Troms and Finnmark, 
plus the county of Nordland), Sweden (Norrbotten Västerbotten county 
and in some cases the region of Swedish Lapland) and Finnish Lapland. 
Over time, these destinations have seen some tremendous changes in tour-
ism, as shown by the numbers in Tables 5.1 and 5.2; alongside other Arctic 
jurisdictions:
In tourism studies, we often talk about destinations, but as Morgan, 
Pritchard, and Pride (2011, p. 4) acknowledge, destination is a concept which 
is “variously used by marketers and professionals (as a geopolitical system 
with its own Destination Management Organizations) and by sociologists 
and geographers (as a socio-cultural construction).” In line with this descrip-
tion, a place only becomes a destination through the narratives and images 
communicated by its tourism promotion material (Morgan et al., 2011).
Tourism and the production of place images have become an important 
aspect of modern societies and the image of the Arctic matters to the over-
all sustainability of tourism in Northern areas. That is, sustainable soci-
eties, based on regional resources, require that tourism “is balanced with 
the development of inclusive and democratic places for people living in the 
Arctic” (Rantala et al., 2019, p. 19).
Understanding the image of the Arctic, rests on an understanding of how 
place meanings are created. Place can be understood as a commodity to be 
consumed, and representations tied to place are important to this consump-
tion (Andersson, 2010; Urry, 1995). Thus, tourism is not necessarily that 
different from other industrial sectors—the consumption is simply taking 
away experiences, perhaps with tangibles such as photographs and other 
souvenirs, versus physically removing trees or minerals.
What a place is, and how a place comes to be seen, will depend on a variety 
of conditions, “ranging from local institutional contexts and interactions, to 
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specific situations concerning economic and social life as well as narratives 
and symbols available” (Granås, 2009, p. 119). Places compete in attracting 
residents, businesses, and visitors, and as Morgan, Pritchard, and Pride (2011, 
p. 3) state, “A place with a positive reputation finds it easier to vie for atten-
tion, resources, people, jobs, and money; a positive place reputation builds 
place competitiveness and cements a place as somewhere worth visiting.”
Of particular relevance to tourism, place images create expectations and 
demands among potential customers and collaborators, which the local 
businesses and communities must relate to. At the same time, representa-
tions (while potentially produced with intentions such as creating attractive 
destination brands) are also key to inhabitants—their sense of place and 
identification as a local to a certain area. Amundsen (2012, p. 140) points out 
that, “tensions between definitions of what should be offered to tourists and 
Table 5.1  Early 2000s, estimated Arctic tourist numbers (data from 2001-2010; 
modified from Maher, 2013)
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how local places should develop thus involves a range of perspectives and 
actors and it is likely that this continues to be a source of dispute.”
This speaks to a dynamic that is important to address when discussing 
overall sustainability of Arctic societies; and across societies in different 
regions. Tourism scholars situated in the northern areas around the world 
are asking how tourism can be developed so that it “strengthens commu-
nities and makes them better places to live in,” something which further 
“begs the question of how to find the balance between economic, social and 
environmental sustainability” (Rantala et al., 2019, p. 40), the essence of a 
Table 5.2  Most recent, estimated Arctic tourist numbers (updated from Maher, 2017)
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green economy, which when tied to the marine environment, as much of the 
Arctic is, is also a blue economic approach.
An important success criterion for the tourism industry will be to provide 
the right experience to the right visitor. For this to happen, the image of the 
Arctic alongside realities of small communities must be addressed. Many 
regional actors assume that the publicity of a place will lead to increased 
number of tourists, investors or inhabitants (Falkheimer, 2006), and this 
may not always be the right trajectory. So how are Arctic places positioned 
at the moment? As a green option for development, versus yet another 
exploitative/non-renewable one. The next section of this chapter will outline 




Canada’s Arctic, specifically the jurisdictions of Yukon, Northwest Territories 
and Nunavut, together cover over 3.5 million km2. This is roughly 40% 
of Canada’s landmass; yet the total population is less than 1% of the total 
Canadian population (115,000). As a result, the diversity of tourism products is 
extensive due to shear geography, yet the capacity to develop a broad sector is 
limited. Much of the tourism in Yukon has historically been linked to travelers 
transiting the Alaska Highway, with United States travelers being the primary 
supply as they make their way from the southern States to their Northern fron-
tier. Yukon has a strong history of Indigenous presence in its tourism indus-
try (see Hull, de la Barre, & Maher, 2017), which also extends to the creative 
success of non-Indigenous cultural tourism. In the Northwest Territories, 
hunting and fishing has long been the draw; alongside paddling journeys and 
more recently the sparkle of viewing the Aurora Borealis and diamond mines. 
Nunavut, which until 1999 was a part of the Northwest Territories, has no 
external road access, and thus has seen increased access by expedition cruise 
ships and as such a far larger dependence on marine tourism (see Johnston, 
Dawson, & Maher, 2017). Nunavut was created through a land claim process 
and as a result is heavily invested in tourism that shares a variety of Inuit tra-
ditional activities, such as carving, kayaking, dogsledding, drum dancing, etc.
Iceland
Iceland has a long history as a destination for travelers and explorers, but 
only during the last decades of the twentieth century has tourism started to 
develop at an exponential pace (compare Tables 5.1 and 5.2). The population 
of this cold-water island state is less than 360,000; of which approximately 
60% lives in the capital region of Reykjavík, on the southwest corner of the 
island (Statistics Iceland, 2020). Iceland barely touches the Arctic Circle, 
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yet it is very much part of the same popular imagery surrounding other cir-
cumpolar destinations. The travelogues of many explorers and adventurers 
who visited Iceland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries described the 
island as a place of natural wonders, a narrative that was further boosted by 
its “island-ness,”—the sense of distance, isolation, separateness, tradition, 
and “otherness” (Jóhannesson, Huijbens, & Sharpley, 2010). This image is 
still partly sustained today in Iceland’s marketing material for tourism.
Norway
Northern Norway, which consists of the counties of Troms Finnmark, and 
Nordland makes up a large area of Norway’s mainland (35%), but the pop-
ulation is only approximately 486,000 people (less than 10% of Norway’s 
overall population). Statistics shows the importance of tourism as an indus-
try in Northern Norway. In 2018, the industry supported NOK 19.3 billion 
in economic activity, and employed 17,242 people. At those levels, the indus-
try accounted for 7.1% of 2018 employment in Northern Norway. In com-
parison, the employment shares or other primary industries (including fish 
processing) was 6.2% and other industries such as petroleum development 
and mining was 5.7% (NHO, 2019). Importantly, at the same time as visitor 
numbers are increasing, expectations of professionalism among industry 
players are increasing.
Recently, public attention has also begun to focus on the growth in winter 
tourism in the region, which a recent national tourism strategy describes as 
the most significant change in tourism over the last few years (Innovation 
Norway, 2021). This has clearly changed “the conditions for the tourism indus-
try and influenced social life in the villages and towns most strongly affected 
by this increase” (Rantala et al., 2019, p. 21). Even though the Summer sea-
son is the biggest season for tourism in Northern Norway, there is an impor-
tant increase in Winter tourism, a growth linked with long-term initiatives to 
develop the region into a. year-round destination for international tourism 
(Innovation Norway, 2021). Winter has increased its “market share” of total 
international visits throughout the year from 9 to 30% over the last decade, 
and in 2016/2017 more British and Asian visitors came to Northern Norway 
during the Winter than during the Summer season (NHO, 2017).
Sweden
The Swedish North is historically the home region of the Indigenous Sami; 
however, in the nineteenth century, the state and industry identified the area 
as a rich source of natural resources, such as timber and minerals (Sörlin, 
1988). At the turn of that century, tourism was identified as a part of the 
industrial mix of the region (Müller, Byström, Stjernström, & Svensson, 
2019). Yet it was not developed into a core industry until recently.
For 100+ years, tourism functioned as an alternative and complementary 
livelihood during bust periods in the traditional natural resource industry 
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cycle (Müller, 2013a). Today, tourism in the Swedish North is experienc-
ing a boom period. In this context, new products and new seasons have 
emerged meeting the increasingly global demand for northern tourism. In 
the footprints of the Icehotel, established in the early 1990s, more winter 
tourism products are being developed; including dog-sled tours and aurora 
borealis chasing Thus, commercial overnight stays during the winter season 
are growing almost twice as much as during summer (Tillväxtverket, 2018).
Despite the steadily growing figures, tourism in the Swedish North is still 
small-scale compared to many other parts of the world. The region has only 
520,000 inhabitants or 5% of the Swedish population. Within the region, 
approximately a third of the guest nights are related to international tour-
ists (Tillväxtverket, 2018). A majority of these guest nights occur in Umeå 
and Luleå, the two counties’ coastal capital cities, where a majority of the 
small population is concentrated. In the inland areas, particularly places 
accessible by airplane, there is some positive development. Kiruna, the 
home municipality of the Icehotel, and the primary spots for aurora obser-
vations, takes a dominant position (Müller, 2011).
Finland
Finnish Lapland is often regarded as a peripheral area of Finland, since it 
covers 30% of the area of Finland, but only 3% of the Finnish population 
lives in Lapland. The area is seen as rich in material resources for forestry 
and mining, but also rich in exotic imaginaries for the tourism industry. The 
current reliance on these traditional industrial sectors brings turnover and 
employment to the county, but the tourism sector has steadily increased 
its importance during the last three decades. When considering the local 
community perspectives, highlighting peripherality, exoticness and 
resource-richness seems too straightforward. We are currently witnessing 
an overwhelming human influence upon the Earth (for example, Crutzen, 
2002) —and in line with that the need to bring up alternative perspectives 
in the era of environmental crises. It should be highlighted that Lapland 
has biodiversity rich areas, know-how on multiple uses of the forests—e.g. 
superfood companies, and lively creative industries. Thus, the vision of 
the county of Lapland is to be the world’s cleanest county in 2040, based 
on “Arcticness,” openness and smartness. The vision is to be achieved by 
applying sustainable practices and smart technologies into the use of the 
resources—accompanied by a high level of digitalisation (Hyry et al., 2017).
Policy and development
As can be seen in the background context, there are many similarities 
between these Arctic tourism destinations. They rely on a few unique fac-
tors: large landscapes (at different scales) that attract visitors because they 
are so different to the tourists’ regular city landscapes; very small popula-
tions; peripheral constraints (perceived or real); and historical narratives of 
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exoticism and marginalisation. This next section will examine some policies 
and development trajectories across borders. Common themes include the 
dependence on transport (specifically aviation), seasonality, the role of the 
periphery against the core, sustainability of the system, access and environ-
mental protections, and the realities of the workforce.
Aviation
In Iceland, aviation is the precondition for large scale tourism on the 
island. Soon after World War II, two Icelandic airlines started to operate 
international flights and established route networks connecting the island 
to Europe and North America. These companies later merged under the 
name Icelandair. Icelandair, continued to develop a hub and spoke system, 
making effective use of the location of Iceland in the middle of the North 
Atlantic, connecting various destinations in Europe and North America. 
Icelandair has been the major driver of tourism development in the coun-
try and still holds a key position in that regard. Other Icelandic-based air-
lines have operated for some periods, but have struggled to survive. Most 
recently, WOW air, established in 2011 went bankrupt in spring 2019. It had 
operated with a similar hub and spoke system as Icelandair. Many inter-
national airlines have also operated routes to and from Iceland in recent 
years, especially during the high season (22 additional airlines during sum-
mer 2019).
On a far smaller scale, airlines are a critical piece of the tourism infra-
structure for many areas of Arctic Canada. Nunavut relies on airlines to 
bring visitors to the territory, with no road access linking it to the rest of the 
country; and the linkages of small regional (largely domestic) airlines across 
the three territories is a necessity. These airlines have been owned and/or 
managed by the territories themselves and specific Indigenous groups, more 
so than the major airline players (Air Canada and WestJet), thus they have 
unique community connections and expectations.
Although aviation is critical to some destinations, in other areas there 
is the recognition that we need to move beyond the development of flight 
connections and airports. In Finnish Lapland, the focus is now on regional 
accessibility by train. This links to the impacts of tourism being recognised, 
and actors such as the Responsible tourism network of Lapland, having 
more visibility than in the past.
Seasonality
The most recent tourism strategy for Finnish Lapland highlights year-long 
sustainability (Sievers, 2020), and in doing so prioritises tourism development 
that increases the amount of tourism during the snowless seasons. One reason 
for focusing on snowless seasons is the aim to balance the impacts of tourism 
on the local environments and societies away from the busy winter season.
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While tourism originally developed in the summer in Finnish Lapland, 
since 1980s the winter has been the high season. There were plans already 
afoot in the 1950s to build a “Christmas land” in Rovaniemi, but it was 
not until mid-1980s that the plans were actualised and the Santa’s Village 
Christmas tourism destination was built at the Arctic Circle (Ilola, 
Hakkarainen, & García-Rosell, 2014). The winter season continues to be 
the most important season in most of Lapland, with the month of December 
being the most popular, both in terms of overnight stays and passenger traf-
fic. The lowest number of overnight stays in 2017 was in May, with 63,000, 
whereas in December there were 465,000 overnight stays registered. The 
months from January to April form the second peak season after Christmas 
tourism, and the summer and autumn months from June to September the 
third season. According to a survey conducted among entrepreneurs from 
northern Finland, northern Norway and northern Sweden, tourism entre-
preneurs see May as the most problematic period for developing tourism 
and autumn season as the most potential one for the development of year-
around tourism (Rantala et al., 2019, p. 25).
In Iceland, tourism is easily characterised by seasonality. More than 90% 
of all tourists enter the country via Keflavík international airport, close to 
the capital Reykjavík; and during the summer months of June, July and 
August. There is some growth in tourist arrivals during the winter, but this 
is an interesting trend in light of the often uncertain and harsh weather 
conditions at that time. Although it has led to considerably less seasonality, 
particularly in the capital region and along the south coast of the island, i.e. 
the areas most easily accessible during wintertime. A new challenge is now 
the significant regional differences in tourism within the country, which is 
not likely to change in foreseeable future.
Tourism in Northern Norway has also been characterised by seasonality, 
and while this might work well for some businesses in Northern Norway, 
for instance “Indigenous entrepreneurs, who may rely on seasonal engage-
ment in tourism to make the entrepreneurship fit into the annual life cycle of 
their Indigenous community” (Rantala et al., 2019, p. 33), particularly rein-
deer herding. It also brings about some challenges as well, with year-round 
tourism said to better enable “larger companies to deal with environmen-
tal issues, and to recruit competent staff, who demand full-time position” 
(Rantala et al., 2019, p. 32).
Returning to Finnish Lapland, the strong seasonality of tourism has neg-
atively impacted local communities and environments due to the pressure 
of a single high peak (Rantala et al., 2019). There are new practices being 
developed to mitigate the impacts of a peak season; i.e., in Rovaniemi a 
social worker has been hired—since 2013—to work with foreign tourists in 
the regional hospital from November to April. The social worker enables 
hospital employees to concentrate on serving local people and also ena-
bles hospital to get payment back from their services (previously local tax 
money has been used to take care of tourists in the hospital). Seasonality 
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has also strengthened the image of tourism work as low-skilled and pre-
carious (Rantala et al., 2019), which has led to labor shortages during the 
high season. At the same time, the seasonal nature of tourism has enabled 
communities “to take a break” from tourists and formed a basis for lifestyle 
entrepreneurship (Rantala et al., 2019). This is present in Canada’s Yukon 
too, with lifestyle entrepreneurs working on their own time. A particular 
example is how dog sledding kennels can focus on their racing and training 
at some times of the year, and tourism endeavors at others.
Peripherality
Paulgaard (2008, p. 56) puts it well when she says, “the branding of the place 
and the people within the field of tourism represents the local culture in 
accordance with the hierarchical understanding of the distinction between 
centre and periphery.” Müller (2015, p. 149) adds that “while the periphery 
position can represent a practical challenge of distance, it is not necessar-
ily the physical distance that can be seen as the challenge, but rather the 
symbolic distance embedded in such a center-periphery construct.” Müller 
(2015, p. 149) expands that to point out,
“it should be noted that the Arctic is not a remote destination. It is 
in fact surrounded by major demand markets in North America and 
Europe, and is in fact much closer to these markets than other popu-
lar destinations like Southeast Asia and Australia. Hence, it is not the 
physical distance that makes the area remote, but rather the cognitive 
perception of a different climate and ecosystem. Still, traveling in the 
Arctic can be expensive, but this is a consequence of limited market 
demand rather than physical distance.”
Tourism in Northern Sweden has been promoted as an opportunity to 
create employment and stabilise communities in rural and northern periph-
eries (Müller & Brouder, 2014). Many tourism stakeholders in the North 
embrace this message (Lundmark & Müller, 2010). Governments promote 
the numerous national parks and nature reserves in the North as resources 
for tourism development and obviously, tourism is seen as an industry that 
can support a transition to a more environmentally friendly use of northern 
resources, too.
However, not everybody in the tourism industry embraces this idea. Instead, 
some stakeholders see nature protection and the regulations that follow along 
as a threat to business (Lundmark & Stjernström, 2009; Müller, 2013b). This 
applies not least when motorised transportation is included in the products. 
Furthermore, nature protection does not seem to have the promised positive 
impacts on employment (Byström & Müller, 2014; Lundmark, Fredman, & 
Sandell, 2010). A similar discussion takes place in Canada, where many parks 
and protected areas have been created in the Arctic—in the past due to a lack 
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of population, and a center-based desire to protect a system of ecosystems. 
Nowadays, protection is a recognition of Indigenous land claims and overall 
stewardship (see Maher, 2012). Some Indigenous Sami entrepreneurs consider 
tourism as integrated part of their traditional activities and use the income 
from tourism to support their reindeer herding (Leu, 2019).
In Finnish Lapland, previous tourism strategies categorised different 
areas into strong tourism centers, and this categorisation was used for 
directing investments (Hakkarainen & Tuulentie, 2008; Regional Council 
of Lapland, 2007). This has led into tourism, which is driven by tourism 
centers (small cities) that are then complemented by peripherical attractions 
(Hakkarainen, 2017). In Arctic Canada, this is similar to the situation in 
each territory; hubs such as Whitehorse and Yellowknife act as the conduits 
to attractions elsewhere in the territories. Again, it is driven in part by avia-
tion infrastructure, as noted earlier.
In Northern Norway, tourism growth is also unevenly distributed; 
Nordland County has considerably higher tourist numbers than the rest of 
Northern Norway. Finnmark County to the north east has tourism num-
bers that are less than half of those of Nordland. In Nordland, the summer 
season is a peak season, while in Troms County, located in the middle of the 
region, the summer and winter seasons have more equal numbers, and the 
development from 2012 to 2018 led to higher numbers during winter. In the 
town of Tromsø, the number of international commercial overnight stays 
during the Winter season increased from 18.000 in 2008 to 200.000 in 2018, 
and AirBnB comes on top of this (Jakobsen & Engebretsen, 2019). In the 
same period, the growth in winter tourism in the most northern part of the 
region was much more limited. With such different structures of the com-
munities, we could perhaps say there is no “one size fits all” when it comes 
to tourism development in northern Norway.
In the past, there have also been one-sided media accounts that re-cre-
ate the myths of Northern Norwegians, versus those in the south near 
Oslo and Bergen as “naïve and natural, living among the fjords and the 
fish” (Paulgaard, 2008, p. 51), and this has been claimed as the reason why 
young people cease to identify with the northern places in which they live. 
Speaking to this issue, Guneriussen (2008, p. 233) says,
“this region has been considered a backward, poor, weakly-developed 
and mostly pre-modern periphery in Norway, in need of state subsidies 
and regional development programmes in order to become ‘modern’. 
Such a negative labelling of the region has been typical and not only 
by ‘outsiders’ (particularly representatives from national political, eco-
nomic and cultural centres). It has also been an important part of the 
northerner’s self-understanding or self-image. People in the north have 
habitually considered themselves subordinate in many respects. They 
felt that the modern centre in the south, with all its advanced technology, 
culture and economic power represented a higher level of development.”
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Similarly, Kraft (2008, p. 222), stated that “Northern Norway has tra-
ditionally been constructed according to a north-south axis, with ‘south’ 
as the centre of power and decision-making, and ‘north’ as a suppressed 
and exploited backyard. Related to this perspective of subordination and 
victimization, the people of the north have been imagined thorough a prim-
itivist discourse, in contrast to a presumed modern, Western identity.”
Despite these controversies, there seems to be a general agreement among 
stakeholders that tourism should continue to develop as an industry that 
contributes to sustain communities and labor markets in such peripheral 
regions. A recent government commission in Northern Sweden outlined 
ideas that clearly set tourism in the context of a green economy (SOU, 2017). 
In this context, a more sustainable transportation system including the avail-
ability of public transport in peripheral areas is among the proposed actions. 
This is remarkable considering the low population density; but could be a 
model to assist the ongoing core-periphery tension in many of the regions 
discussed here. Furthermore, since many of the tourism entrepreneurs in 
the region (Swedish Lapland) have been attracted to the region by outdoor 
activities and the related lifestyles themselves, they engage in adapting their 
activities to become environmentally friendly and sustain the resource base 
of their lifestyle and business (Carson, Carson, & Eimermann, 2018).
Sustainability
The focus on sustainability and on the need to balance the tourism sec-
tor’s activities can be seen as a tremendous dilemma, resulting from the 
strong increase of the tourism industry during the last few decades, and 
the impacts of this increase. In Finnish Lapland there are some estimates 
that the actual number of the overnight stays may be 2.5 or 3 times larger 
than the 3.1 million reported because many visitors spend nights in private 
rental cabins and in AirBnB accommodations that are not being registered. 
Airbnb accommodations have increased rapidly during the last years. In 
Rovaniemi—the capital city of Lapland, there were a total of 136 AirBnB 
accommodations listed in March 2016, while in November 2017 they reached 
500, and at the beginning of 2019 the number rose to almost 900. In com-
parison that is 14.4 AirBnB locations per 1,000 inhabitants in Rovaniemi, 
while the same number in the far larger capital city of Helsinki is 4.2 per 
1,000 inhabitants (Retrieved January 13, 2020 from https://shareabletour-
ism.com). This issue is considerable threat to sustainability in Iceland too, 
particularly Reykjavik.
The extensive increase of AirBnB accommodations and sharing economy 
has caused conflicts in the development of tourism—especially in Rovaniemi 
region. These conflicts include, e.g., the lack of clarity of rules and regula-
tions regarding AirBnB accommodation in the city. However, the sharing 
economy—and especially the trend toward “living like a local” —has enabled 
the inclusion of new responsible areas into the agenda of tourism development 
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in Finnish Lapland (Haanpää, Hakkarainen, & Harju-Myllyaho, 2018). The 
same situation, although under smaller circumstances, can be seen in Arctic 
Canada and Norway. Visitors may get stretched by the limited accommoda-
tion options available, and while they wish to have a “local” experience that 
causes tensions around commodification and country food security.
The workforce
In Iceland, tourism exports account for approximately 40% of foreign cur-
rency income and provides 8.7% of GDP in 2017 (Mælaborð ferðaþjónustun-
nar, 2019). Approximately 33.000 people or 16% of the labor force work in 
tourism, of which one third is migrant workers. Development has been 
driven by entrepreneurs operating within a weak organisational and regula-
tion framework. The sector has been characterised by a few large firms and 
an abundance of micro and nano-sized companies.
The importance of tourism in the regional economy of Finnish Lapland 
is also significant, as the share of tourism in GDP was 5.7%, while Finland’s 
national average was 2.5% (House of Lapland, 2020). In 2017, Lapland 
accounted for over 4,000 person-years of work in the tourism sector; up to 
7,000 people when including also the seasonal workforce (House of Lapland, 
2020). The turnover of the tourism industry was 630 million euros in year 
2017, with 16% growth from the previous year.
With different county- and municipality-level strategies, development 
plans, and visions, the tourism sector is often expected to bring employ-
ment and income to peripherical communities. People in these communi-
ties are expected to develop different kinds of tourism related services and 
innovations—without offering them concrete tools (Hakkarainen, 2017). 
Hence, tourism does not inevitably bring the means “to save” the peripheral 
areas from outmigration, but little by little tourism has formed as one way 
to enhance employment in the villages in Finnish Lapland—for example 
by combining tourism work to reindeer husbandry, mining, car-testing, or 
agriculture (Hakkarainen, 2017). By combining different sources of liveli-
hood, the seasonal nature of tourism has been mitigated for local conditions
Growth in tourism leads to increased use of the region’s areas and services 
that are also used by locals. This places much stronger demands on strategic 
and comprehensive planning from both the authorities, the companies, and 
other actors in the tourism industry. Growth has led to an increased use of 
nature and public areas. In Northern Norway, tourism businesses and the 
communities are experiencing a paradoxical situation:
“On the one hand the infrastructure presently available is too limited 
for further growth during the high season, while on the other hand 
because of the limited infrastructure, it is not viable to run tourism the 
whole year round”
(Rantala et al., 2019, pp. 38–39).
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Some international and regional organisations have raised concern for 
these potential impacts on the natural environment, wildlife, local resi-
dents, and Indigenous population, in the wake of the increased tourism in 
the region (Chen & Chen, 2016). One specific aspect of some of these dis-
cussions, deals with the Norwegian allemannsretten/“right to roam,” which 
has relevance in terms of pressure on nature in northern areas. Even though 
public access rights have been at the core of discussions regarding use of 
land for tourism, “public interest in access has largely prevailed because 
at the heart of the Nordic conception of citizenship is a deeply embedded 
tradition of outdoors sporting and recreational activity, as embodied in a 
cultural sensibility towards friluftsliv (a simple life in nature) and idrett (pur-
poseful outdoor sporting activity), underpinned by the notion of allemanns-
retten” (McNeish & Olivier, 2017, p. 290). If this issue remains unaddressed 
in tourism, it will potentially undermine the sustainable development of 
Northern communities in both Norway and Sweden.
Also, the core of Arctic tourism is made up by many small companies 
and lifestyle entrepreneurs that offer experiences and services for visitors. 
These small companies are often “based on lifestyle entrepreneurships that 
are strongly embedded in places, environments and communities” (Rantala 
et al., 2019, p. 30). In order for tourism industry to grow, and become increas-
ingly professionalised, larger companies might be beneficial, however lim-
ited growth in tourism may be a better solution to the region, following the 
concept of carrying capacity that determines the optimal number of visitors 
to be hosted at given time and space (Chen & Chen, 2016).
Next steps
Across the destinations included in this chapter, it can be seen that tourism 
holds wide-ranging opportunities, as well as considerable impacts within 
society. In a relatively short period, 2000 onwards, there has been a change 
from consumption of resources to a service-based economy.
For example, in Iceland, the national economy, which has historically 
fluctuated in tandem with environmental conditions of the sea for fishing 
and market conditions for aluminum now sees tourism as one more pillar 
for the economy. Though tourism is also marked by fluctuations and volatil-
ity as recent downturn reflects. Iceland is a nature-tourist destination, with 
more than 90% of visitors saying that the natural environment of the coun-
try gave them the idea to travel to Iceland (Óladóttir, 2019). So it may be 
particularly prone to negative dialogue on overcrowding and environmental 
damage, except that overall, tourists state they are happy with their visit 
(Ferðamálastofa, 2019). In fact, the main source of complaints in Iceland is 
about pricing and expenses.
This is the dilemma for many destinations; cheap flights, packaged 
accommodation, and the negative impacts of tourism associated with over-
tourism (see Jóhannesson & Lund, 2019); versus true sustainability and 
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responsibility. Travel choices are at an impasse. Today, sustainability is a 
global imperative, across all sectors and society as a whole. Blue and green 
economics dictate where we should be headed in Canada and the Nordic 
states. Long-term sustainable development of tourism in the Arctic relies 
on engaging in community development and caring for local environments 
(Rantala et al., 2019). There is a need to consider how to achieve a mar-
ket mix that minimises travel emissions and pays respect to the planetary 
resource limitations in the Anthropocene (Gren & Huijbens, 2014).
Globalisation implies a spatial expansion of the tourism system that now 
increasingly includes long-haul travel to reach the destination, while the 
time spent at the destination seems to decline. The related emissions do 
not match the idea of a tourism industry that sells experiences of unspoiled 
nature and aspires to become part of a sustainable future.
For a number of years, scholars have challenged the image of Arctic 
places; in Northern Norway, the notion of being peripheral and wild has 
been challenged; implying that Northern Norway is about to become a new, 
vital and “dynamic area” in the nation, in Europe and even in a global con-
text (Guneriussen, 2008, p. 233), but “myths are not easily deconstructed, 
even though they may not correspond to people’s experiences in their daily 
life” (Paulgaard, 2008, p. 53). Also, the myths may not be negative for all, 
“the construction of a centre and periphery as asymmetrical counter-con-
cepts has both positive and negative connotations” (Paulgaard, 2008, p. 52).
It is still a perceived reality that one needs to be “in touch with wilder-
ness” in order to become “a healthy, natural human being” (Guneriussen, 
2008, p. 242) and the “Arctic magic” is something that is seen to appeal 
to “modern actors who long for something extraordinary” (Guneriussen, 
2008, p. 242). This is a tool for tourism in the Arctic to capitalise on. The 
North “has come to be conceived as something very attractive when viewed 
from within a modern and highly urbanized culture” (Guneriussen, 2008, 
p. 242) and “wilderness has become a prime attractor for various forms of 
tourism—a spectacle for modern spectators, something good and authentic 
with which to make contact” (Guneriussen, 2008, p. 242).
DMO’s such as Visit Norway, discuss being attracted by the Midnight 
Sun, fishing opportunities, and picturesque landscapes; seduced by the 
Northern Lights and snow-related activities in the winter, such as husky 
rides and visiting ice hotels (Chen & Chen, 2016). This can be said of nearly 
all the regions covered in this chapter; then does it become superficial or 
even fake? Perhaps it can also be beneficial to the sustainability discourse; 
the next steps are “stay home” if you live in one of these areas, or is it “rather 
urgent that the Arctic government[s] and host communities contemplate 
the consequences of global warming on future tourism development and 
put forward appropriate policies and regulations to better anticipate and 
respond to ongoing climate transformations” (Chen & Chen, 2016, p. 5). 
Again, this is a balance of how one sees ongoing tourism development as 
part of blue or green economies or is it the antithesis of such.
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In order to apply sustainable practices on development to tourism, wider 
discussion is needed regarding the future aims and directions; that move 
beyond simply increasing tourism. The strong increase of tourism has 
already had diverse implications—such as a need to hire extra personnel in 
a hospital, a need to invest more on the infrastructure of recreational areas 
that are used based on everyman’s rights, and need to clarify regulations 
and rules related to sharing tourism between core centers and peripheral 
spaces, in all seasons.
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Nunavut and the rest of Canada’s North has undergone tremendous social, 
cultural, and economic change over the past 60 years. Northern communi-
ties have experienced processes of development quite different from most 
other communities in Canada. These processes have resulted in many 
unique challenges. These challenges have been met by communities devel-
oping approaches that serve to assist these communities to ensure healthier 
and more sustainable futures. While increased attention is being devoted 
to the importance of non-renewable extractive developments in the region, 
these other approaches remain important and are being utilised to support 
renewable resource development in the region.
One of these new approaches is that of the social economy (Bouchard, 
2011; Quarter, Mook, & Armstrong, 2017). It is a means of social action 
which seeks to empower communities by developing social capital and 
human capital capacity through assisting non-profit, voluntary, and co- 
operative organisations work more effectively in the interests of their com-
munities. This chapter summarises research done to examine the potential 
of the social economy to assist Northern communities to deal with changes 
these communities are experiencing. It is an attempt to provide a “portrait” 
of the social economy in Nunavut and to outline the barriers and opportu-
nities. It is based largely on the results of a survey of social economy organ-
isations undertaken in Northern Canada in 2008.
Data from this survey shows that when compared to the other Northern 
territories, Nunavut has a much higher percentage of social economy 
organisations engaged in activities that elsewhere are provided by profit- 
oriented private sector organisations. Many of these are engaged in renew-
able resource development. It also shows that social economy organisations 
in Nunavut tend to be younger than those elsewhere in Canada and that 
Nunavut has a much smaller percentage of organisations that are legally 
registered as charitable organisations. Membership numbers for social 
economy organisation show healthy growth with a relatively high level of 
activity, although fewer of these organisations use volunteers than in the 
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other territories. In terms of challenges, obtaining and retaining paid staff 
is one of the most important along with decreasing government funding. 
In terms of general needs faced by social economy organisations, Nunavut 
respondents identified finding funding as the most important overall need 
followed by providing staff training and development.
Findings confirm that social economy organisations continue to be an 
important part of community developments in Nunavut and that they are a 
significant contributor to the renewable resource sector. Despite challenges, 
these organisations continue to be an important part of any attempt to resist 
an overdependence on extractive industry development in the region. While 
extractive industry development may continue to be important in Nunavut, 
a review of problems being experienced by social economy organisations 
suggest that communities could potentially use financial, training, and other 
benefits from non-renewable resource development to help social-economic 
organisations better contribute to renewable resource development.
The social economy and development in Nunavut
Until World War II, Nunavut was isolated from many of the changes occur-
ring in the rest of Canada. The Inuit people of the region were able to main-
tain their traditional lifestyles: lifestyles both supported and challenged by 
the interests of the fur trade. This started to change with military develop-
ment during the World War II. The establishment of military installations 
in the region introduced new influences and created infrastructure such as 
airbases that allowed for increased exposure to southern influences after 
the war.
Almost from the beginning of this change, there was a debate about how 
the “modernisation” of the North should be managed. The fur trading indus-
try and the Canadian government first thought it best to keep the Indigenous 
population as isolated as possible from the forces of change (Damas, 2002). 
Continued dependence on their traditional activities was considered to be the 
best option for the Inuit peoples of the region. During the 1950s, the federal 
government reversed its policy on the issue and decided that as Canadian 
citizens, the Indigenous peoples of the North had a right to basic services 
such as education, health, and social services. These could best be provided 
by establishing permanent settlements for the Inuit people of the region.
Yet it was recognised that the North would not be simply an extension of 
the urban life of the southern parts of Canada. The communal and sharing 
culture that was the basis of traditional Inuit culture should be maintained 
by special approaches to development. Co-operatives and community eco-
nomic development initiatives were highlighted (Lotz, 1982; MacPherson, 
2000; Pell, 1990). With the assistance of the federal government, the Inuit 
people of Nunavut established co-operatives as the main vehicles for eco-
nomic development in their communities. The people of the region tried 
to ensure that Inuit traditional ways and knowledge became part of the 
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economic development of their communities by using community-based 
initiatives. With the negotiation and signing of new treaties, these alterna-
tive approaches became institutionalised by the Indigenous peoples them-
selves in their attempts to maintain traditional activities (Saku, 2002).
The economic institutionalisation of Inuit traditions through a preference 
for community-based or social economy, initiatives is seen in the Nunavut 
Economic Development Strategy (NEF, 2003), the first development strat-
egy developed following the creation of Nunavut. Its guiding principles link 
IQ with “placing control of economic development in the hands of com-
munity members” and “integrating economic development activities with 
community efforts in the areas of community wellness, community learn-
ing and community governance.” Social economy organisations are clearly 
identified as important agents of desirable economic development.
These ideals were reiterated in subsequent updates on the Strategy pro-
duced by the Nunavut Economic Forum (Impact Economics, 2005, 2008a). 
In 2007 and 2008, two separate studies were commission by the Nunavut 
Economic Forum to look at non-profit organisations and their role in the 
development of Nunavut. The 2007 study was the first to try and get a gen-
eral idea of the situation of non-profits in Nunavut and the challenges that 
they face (Aarluk Consulting, 2007). As is noted later on in this report, 
the conclusions of the 2007 study are similar to those found in this report: 
non-profits are essential elements of Nunavut communities, but they are 
faced, by funding and human resource difficulties. Further analysis of the 
situation in 2008 confirmed and elaborated on the findings of the 2007 study 
but highlighted the important potential of the non-profit sector to improve 
well-being in Nunavut’s communities (Impact Economics, 2008b).
The Government of Nunavut Report Card, evaluating the performance 
of Nunavut ten years after its formation, noted that improvements could be 
made to make Nunavut a better place to live (North Sky Consulting, 2009). 
In many ways, the Report Card was a reiteration of points made in the ini-
tial Nunavut Economic Development Strategy. It noted the need for greater 
involvement of people in their community and their government. Greater 
involvement would assist in ensuring a greater degree of self-reliance and 
ensure that more effective education and training, housing, poverty reduc-
tion, and cultural programs are developed and delivered. Although the 
Report Card did specifically state the usefulness of social economy organ-
isations in making these improvements, the previously mentioned reports 
all noted the importance of community-based, non-profit and voluntary 
organisations in achieving greater community involvement.
The conditions of the social economy in the Canadian North
Indigenous traditions linked to the mixed economy, the role of the state, 
and dependence on natural resource exploitation can be expected to have 
an impact on the type, form, operation, and development of social economy 
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organisations in the Canadian North. Each of these factors impact the 
social economy in different ways. It is not a simple matter of saying that this 
factor will have a positive impact or that factor will have a negative impact. 
The reality will be much more complex.
Indeed, we can discover initial clues to this complexity in the findings of 
the 2003 National Survey of Non-profit and Voluntary organisations. While 
publicly available data from this survey does not allow in-depth investiga-
tion of social economy organisations in the north, a 2005 report from this 
study did list some interesting statistics related to the situation of non-profit 
and voluntary organisations in the three northern territories (Statistics 
Canada, 2005). It should be pointed out that this data does not include all 
social economy organisations. In particular cooperatives, an important 
part of many communities in the North, were not included in the 2003 sur-
vey. The study did not allow for a comparison of Nunavut with the other 
regions of the Canadian North.
The study counted 851 organisations in the Territories. It is interesting 
to note that this was the highest percentage of social economy organisation 
per population in Canada. At 825 organisations per 100,000 population, 
the percentage was significantly more than the Canadian average of 508 per 
100,000 population (Statistics Canada, 2005, p. 19). Only a minority of these 
organisations are Registered Charities. At 37%, this rate is the lowest in the 
country and significantly less than the national average of 56% of organisa-
tions that are Registered Charities (20). Not surprisingly, compared to the 
provinces, the Territories had the highest percentage of non-profit or volun-
tary organisations serving Aboriginal communities (20).
The study listed interesting financial characteristics of social economy 
organisations in the North. Organisations in the Territories had average rev-
enues of $1.4 million. This was higher than the average of organisations in 
all other provinces in the country (Statistics Canada, 2005, p. 30). Compared 
to the provinces, social economy organisations in the Territories had the 
highest percentage of income from “Earned income” —fees for goods and 
services. This source comprised 57% of all income for these organisations 
in the north.
Data showed that social economy organisations in the North varied from 
other provinces by primary activity. The Territories had the highest per-
centage of organisations involved in Law, Advocacy, and Politics (Statistics 
Canada, 2005, p. 19). The region also had higher than average percent-
ages of organisations involved in Arts and culture, Sports and recreation, 
Education and research, the Environment, and Business and professional 
associations and unions. The region had lower percentages of organisations 
involved in health, social services, development and housing, grant-making, 
fundraising, and voluntarism promotion, and religion.
The study also showed that social economy organisations in the 
Territories were most likely to report problems related to organisational 
capacity (Statistics Canada, 2005, p. 53). Interestingly the one capacity area 
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where they did not have problems was obtaining board members. Northern 
organisations are also far more likely to report problems, such as difficulty 
providing training to board members (52% in the territories versus 34% in 
Canada); difficulty providing staff training and development (45% versus 
27%), and, difficulty obtaining the type of paid staff the organisation needs 
(44% versus 28%).
Many of these conditions were investigated further in an inventory, or 
portrait, of the social economy in Northern Canada undertaken by the 
SERNNoCa research project (Abele & Southcott, 2016; Southcott, 2015). 
This attempt at a mapping of the social economy of the Yukon, Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut, Nunavik, and Labrador involved two stages. The first 
was a “census” of all social economy organisations in the Canadian North. 
A list of all possible social economy organisations with their main activity 
and location was constructed. The second was a questionnaire survey in 
order to uncover some of the basic characteristics of these organisations in 
comparison with other regions of Canada.
SERNNoCa researchers were very much aware that much social econ-
omy activity, especially in smaller northern communities that rely heavily 
on the mixed economy, is not undertaken by the formal organisations that 
this portraiture work was researching. Much of this activity is done in a 
much more informal manner that can only be studied using different tech-
niques. Other research projects were undertaken by SERNNoCa to try and 
better understand this aspect of the social economy in the North (Abele, 
2009; Natcher, 2009).
No single list exists for all social economy organisations in the North. 
As a result, an important first step in the portraiture process was the con-
struction of this list. Before the list could be assembled, researchers had to 
decide on a definition of what constitutes a social economy organisation. 
The mapping exercise used in this project is based upon a broad definition 
of social economy that refers to activities that focus on serving the commu-
nity rather than generating profits. The focus is on economic activities that 
are not primarily state-driven and not primarily profit-driven and include 
the traditional economies of Indigenous populations of the North. While a 
literature review of definitions was conducted, the project leaned most heav-
ily on the definitions contained in Bouchard, Ferraton, and Michaud (2006).
Creating a list of social economy organisations in the Canadian North 
proved to be problematic. This was particularly the case with many 
Aboriginal organisations that undertake activities similar to social econ-
omy organisations but that are the products of treaties giving sovereign 
power to these communities. As it was pointed out by at least one ques-
tionnaire respondent, to include these organisations as a social economy 
organisation is to deny the legitimacy of these self-government initiatives. 
Provisional lists of social economy organisations were established in 2006 
and 2007 to serve as the sample frame for the initial questionnaire survey. 
Table 6.1 shows the numbers for each region of the Canadian North for 
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these initial provisional lists. These lists included all potential social econ-
omy organisations and as such it was recognised at the time that the actual 
census list of social economy organisations would be smaller.
The construction of the list of social economy organisations gave research-
ers quite a bit of information about Northern social economy organisations 
independent of that gathered from the questionnaire. An extensive amount 
of information about these organisations can be gathered unobtrusively, 
directly from the internet. As concerns the Canadian North as a whole, as 
of May, 2008 1,190 organisations were identified as being probable social 
economy organisations (Southcott and Walker, 2009).
The activities of social economy organisations in the Canadian North
Internet-based research done on the census allowed researchers to identify 
the main activity of all but 28 organisations. These results are shown in 
Table 6.2.
These figures show several important differences in the types of social 
economy organisations that exist in each of the territories. In looking at 
Nunavut, compared to the averages for the Territorial North, it has a much 
higher percentage of social economy organisations engaged in trade, finance, 
and/or insurance. This is due primarily to the importance of co-operatives 
in the retail trade sector in Nunavut compared to the Northwest Territories 
and especially the Yukon. Another important difference concerning the 
social economy in Nunavut is the relative absence of organisations engaged 
in law, advocacy, and politics. This can be partially explained by the fact 
that many of the national advocacy groups have not established branches in 
Nunavut. Finally, Nunavut has a larger than an average number of organi-
sations that are business associations, professional associations, or unions. 
The main reason for this is the fact that each community in Nunavut has 
a hunters and trappers association, the existence of which is linked to the 
1993 Nunavut Land Claim Agreement. As well, there are more arts and 
Table 6.1 Provisional list of social economy organisations in Northern Canada
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crafts business associations in Nunavut than in the other territories. This 
clearly shows the importance of social economy organisations for renewable 
resource development in Nunavut.
The 2008 questionnaire survey of Nunavut 
social economy organisations
The initial census served as the sampling frame for the 2008 questionnaire 
survey. In order to ensure that comparisons were eventually possible across 
Canada, the construction of the questionnaire was loosely based on a question-
naire designed by social economy research networks in both Atlantic Canada 
Table 6.2 Social economy organisations in the territorial North by main activity
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and Southern Ontario. Due to the remoteness of many communities, it was 
decided to deliver the questionnaire using e-mail where possible and mail where 
this was not possible. In Nunavut, the questionnaire was sent out to 285 organi-
sations. Just under half, 127 were sent out by mail and the rest by e-mail.
Looking at the results for the three Territories, it can be seen that a total 
of 153 questionnaires were returned from respondents identifiable as social 
economy organisations. This represents a response rate of 13%. Looking at 
each of the territories, the Yukon had a response rate of 14%, Nunavut had 
a response rate of 13%, and the Northwest Territories of 11%. The relatively 
low response rate from the questionnaire survey means that the results from 
the survey may not be representative of all social economy organisations 
in the Territories. At the same time, there was at least one indicator, which 
suggests that the results could be fairly representative.1 As noted above, 
we do have main activity statistics for the entire territories. When these are 
compared to the activity statistics for the questionnaire respondents, we 
see that the statistics for the two groups are remarkably similar. As well, 
the percentage of respondents from each territory is similar to the percent-
age of social economy organisations found in the census.
Types of organisations
Table 6.3 shows the types of organisations that responded to the question-
naire in both Nunavut and all three territories. We can see that the respond-
ents in Nunavut had fewer non-profits, fewer voluntary organisations, and 
more cooperatives.
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Figure 6.1  Social economy organisation in Nunavut by main activity: SERNNoCa 
Census.
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Looking at the data more closely, we see that there were fewer non-prof-
its because there were more cooperatives and because some organisations, 
such as Hunter and Trappers organisations, are unsure whether they were 
non-profit or not. The relative importance of organisations created in asso-
ciation with the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) is a unique 
aspect of the social economy in Nunavut.
There were significantly fewer voluntary organisations in Nunavut that 
responded to the questionnaire than in the rest of the Territorial North. 
This could be an indication that the formal voluntary sector in Nunavut 
is smaller than elsewhere in the North, but more research needs to be done 
before this can be stated as a certainty. Several organisations that stated 
they were not voluntary organisations also stated that volunteers are used 
in various activities.
Legal differences among non-profit and voluntary organisations may 
influence the types of activities they undertake and their ability to access 
resources. A key distinction is between those organisations that are regis-
tered charities and those that are not. To better understand the key char-
acteristics of the social economy organisation in Nunavut and the rest of 
Northern Canada, it is important to understand whether most organisations 
are part of larger organisations, legally constituted as a non-profit organisa-
tion, or a registered charity. It is also interesting to find out the percentage 
of social economy organisations that are organised as worker cooperatives, 
but this is a question that is included primarily to allow comparisons with 
other regions of Canada.
Table 6.3 shows that approximately 30% of the respondents in Nunavut 
were organised as a federation or association, a similar percentage to 
respondents in all the territories. Just over 31% were a subunit of a larger 
Table 6.3 Structures of social economy organisations
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parent organisation, a somewhat higher percentage than for the territories 
as a whole. One of the most interesting findings is that only 50% of respond-
ents stated that they were legally registered as a not-for-profit or charity. 
This is significantly less than the percentage of respondents in all the terri-
tories. While this difference is partially explained by the larger number of 
cooperatives among the respondents in Nunavut, it is clear that fewer social 
economy organisations in Nunavut are accessing the advantages that may 
come from a legal not-for-profit or charitable status.
Age of organisations
The national survey of non-profit and voluntary organisations done in 2003 
showed that in Canada as a whole most of these types of organisations have 
existed in communities for a long time. The average age of organisations 
was 29 years. Organisations in Canada’s North are much younger than the 
national average, reflecting the particular historical development of the 
North. Data from the 2008 survey showed that the average age of respond-
ent organisations in all three territories was 21 years. Comparing the three 
territories, we see that Nunavut has the newest organisations, with an 
average age of 16 years, followed by respondent organisations in the NWT 
(21 years) and the Yukon (24 years).
Looking at Nunavut’s organisations more closely, we see that co-oper-
atives are by far the oldest organisations. The average age of Nunavut’s 
co-operative organisations was 34 years. Some Hunter and Trappers organ-
isations, though reorganised following implementation of the NLCA, 
also reported that they had existed for 30 years or longer. Almost 40% of 
Nunavut respondent organisations have been in existence for less than ten 
years, while almost 75% have been in existence for less than 25 years.
The location of social economy organisations in Nunavut
Figure 6.2 lists the percentages of respondent organisations by their main 
community of operations. As stated above, because of the low number of 
respondents, these percentages are not necessarily an adequate representa-
tion of the location of all social economy organisations in Nunavut. Still, in 
analysing the findings of the questionnaire, survey it is important to deter-
mine whether the sample of respondents is reasonably representative of the 
general population.
Without a better census of social economy organisations for Nunavut, 
population statistics are a good guide to tell us whether the respondents 
are reasonably representative of Nunavut social economy organisations. 
According to the 2006 Census, Iqaluit represents only 21% of the population 
of Nunavut, yet they represent 47% of our respondents. Respondents from 
Iqaluit are therefore probably over-represented. Cambridge Bay represents 
5% of the population of Nunavut compared to the 8% of respondents for 
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the questionnaire survey. Rankin Inlet has 8% of the population Nunavut 
as well as 8% of questionnaire respondents. Other communities in Nunavut 
represent 66% of the total population, yet only 37% of questionnaire 
respondents. organisations in these other communities are therefore proba-
bly underrepresented in our findings.
While Iqaluit is probably overrepresented, it is important to state that of 
the 18 organisations that listed Iqaluit as the main community operations, 
7 also stated that they have operations in other communities. Only one organ-
isation that listed their main community as outside Iqaluit, Rankin Inlet, or 
Cambridge Bay stated that they have operations in other communities.
Membership
One of the key strengths of social economy organisations is their members. 
Membership is sometimes restricted to certain individuals and at other 
times open to all. It is usually relatively easy to become a member of an 
organisation, and for this reason, the degree of involvement of members 
varies. An organisation that has an active membership has the potential to 
do much to both support the interests of the individual members and the 
community at large.
Not all organisations have members, but the majority does. The National 
Survey of Non-profit and Voluntary organisations showed that 76% of 
these organisations had members. Our survey showed that the percentage 
of respondent organisations in the Northern Territories with members was 
significantly higher at 86.3%. The percentage of respondent organisations in 
Nunavut with members was 89.5%.
For all three territories, 111 organisations were able to list the number of 
members, which totaled 56,901. This meant that respondent organisations 
had an average membership of 513. In Nunavut 26 respondent organisations 
were able to list the number of members, which totaled 29,683 for an aver-
age membership of 1,142. It is important to note that membership numbers 
Figure 6.2 Main location of respondent organisations.
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varied greatly based on several criteria, such as the geographic area covered 
by the organisation and whether the membership was voluntary or related 
to pre-determined criteria such as land claims. A probable reason that the 
numbers for Nunavut were so high was that several organisations included 
all Inuit in a given area of Nunavut.
Some organisations have restrictions on who can become members. 
Table 6.4 shows the percentage of respondent organisations with restricted 
membership eligibility and the main characteristics of these restrictions. In 
the territories as a whole, 39% of all organisations had membership restric-
tions. In Nunavut, this percentage was slightly higher at 47.4%.
When looking at the characteristics of these restrictions, we see that for 
all the territories, First Nation/Métis/Inuit affiliation and geographic area 
are the most important factors of restriction, while age and gender are also 
important. In Nunavut, by far the most important reason for membership 
restriction among questionnaire respondents was First Nation/Métis/Inuit 
affiliation. Almost 16% of questionnaire respondents stated their membership 
was restricted based on the criteria. Further examination shows that many of 
these organisations have restricted membership due to treaty requirements.
Level of activity
One indicator of the health of social economy organisations is whether 
their membership numbers are increasing or decreasing. Table 6.5 lists the 
growth or decline of memberships for respondent organisations from three 
years ago. Overall most organisations had membership numbers that were 
stable—71.2% in all the territories and 61.8% in Nunavut. Very few organisa-
tions showed decreases in the number of members. In all the territories, 8.3% 
showed decline, while in Nunavut, 2.9%, or one organisation, indicated their 
membership numbers were declining. Most declines were seen in the Yukon. 
Table 6.4 Membership of respondent organisations by eligibility restriction
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Out of 11 organisations that indicated their membership was in decline, 7 were 
based in the Yukon. The highest percentage of organisations whose member-
ship showed growth was found in Nunavut. For all the territories, 20.5% of 
organisations indicated that their membership had grown over the past three 
years, while in Nunavut, this percentage was significantly higher at 35.3%.
An indicator of whether social economy organisations are active or not is 
whether they have regular annual meetings. As well, an active, well-organised 
organisation that is responsive to its membership would generally, but not in 
all cases, have a quorum at its Annual General Meeting (AGM) and would 
have the organisation’s financial report approved. Data from the 2008 sur-
vey shows that the large majority of social economy organisations that 
responded to the questionnaire have AGMs and that these meetings have 
quorum and approve the financial reports of the organisation.
Looking at the percentage of the membership that attends AGMs, we 
see in Table 6.5 that there is a great deal of variety. For the territories as a 
whole the largest single category of participation of members is 0 to 25%. For 
Nunavut, the largest category is that of 51% to 75%. The frequency of gen-
eral membership meetings is another indication of whether organisations are 
active or not. For the territories as a whole, respondent organisations held an 
average of 4.3 meetings a year for the general membership. For Nunavut, the 
number of meetings was significantly less at 2.5 meetings a year.
Board activity and membership
Generally speaking, social economy organisations are run by a smaller 
group of individuals who are more involved in the guiding the activities 
of the organisations. This smaller group of individuals is generally known 
Table 6.5 Levels of activity
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as a governing Board. Information about the activity and composition of 
Boards can help us better understand the nature of social economy organ-
isations. As can be expected, organisations held more Board meetings 
than general membership meetings. Looking at the respondent organisa-
tions in all three territories, an average of 7.6 Board meetings were held 
a year. In Nunavut alone, this number was slightly less at 6.6 meetings a 
year. The average number of Board members for respondent organisations 
in all the territories combined was 6.8, while the number was slightly less 
in Nunavut at 6.4.
The survey respondents were asked if all their Board positions were filled 
or not. In both the territories as a whole and Nunavut 55% of the organisa-
tions responded that all the Board positions were filled, meaning that 45% 
had vacant positions. The vast majority of Board members are volunteers 
that receive no compensation for their participation. Of all the respondent 
organisations in all three territories, only 16.2% gave any sort of compen-
sation to Board members. At the same time, there is a significant difference 
between Nunavut and the other territories in this regard. A much higher 
percentage of Nunavut organisation (35.2%) gave compensation to its Board 
members.
Figure 6.3 shows the characteristics of Board members for those organ-
isations that responded to the questionnaire. It is interesting to note that 
55% percent of Board members in Nunavut are either First Nation, Métis, 
or Inuit while the corresponding figure for all the territories in 31%. It is also 
interesting to note that while a majority of Board members in all the territo-
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Figure 6.3 Characteristics of board members by percentage of all board members.
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Volunteers and employees
One of the most significant differences between Nunavut and the other terri-
tories is that fewer social economy organisations in Nunavut use volunteers 
for their activities. While 78.9% of respondents in all the territories use vol-
unteers, only 55.3% of Nunavut respondents do.
In terms of the number of volunteers used by respondent organisations 
each year, there is a lot of variation. Looking at the Territories as a whole, 
most organisations used less than ten volunteers in a given year. The next 
largest category is 11 to 20 volunteers. Over 14% of respondent organisa-
tions used over 50 volunteers a year. The percentages of Nunavut are also 
included, but because of the small number of Nunavut respondents (22), the 
percentages are not very reliable.
In both Nunavut and the other territories, approximately 46% of respond-
ents reported that their organisations had no paid employees and therefore 
issued no T4 slips. Of the remaining 54% of respondents, there was a signif-
icant difference between Nunavut and the rest of the territories in terms of 
the average number of employees per organisation. The average number of 
employees in respondent organisations in all the territories was 6.5, while in 
Nunavut, the average was much higher at 12. Nunavut has a larger number 
of smaller organisations employing less than 40 people, while the other ter-
ritories have a large number of bigger employers.
Human Resource issues
Respondents were asked if they had human resource problems. The most 
serious problems in this area relate to obtaining and retaining paid staff. 





















Figure 6.4  Percentage of respondents rating the statement “Obtaining and retain-
ing paid staff is….”
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it was an issue that did not apply to them. Generally, this is because these 
particular organisations do not have paid staff. Just over 40% stated that 
this was either a serious or moderate problem. In Nunavut, just under 30% 
stated it was a serious problem. Next in importance was training. Just under 
38% of Nunavut respondents listed providing staff training and develop-
ment as a serious or moderate problem against 22% who said it was not a 
problem.
Obtaining and retaining Board members does not seem to be that much 
of a problem in Nunavut. While 30% of respondents agreed that it was either 
a serious or moderate problem, 38% said it was not a problem. Providing 
training to board members is the least serious problem. In Nunavut, less 
than 30% of respondents claimed it was a serious or moderate problem com-
pared to over 40% who said it was not a problem.
Finances
In addition to the many contributions that social economy organisations 
make to communities, they also represent an important economic pres-
ence. The NSNPVO Survey showed that many non-profit and voluntary 
organisations earn income by providing goods and services for a fee; some 
also depend substantially on governments—particularly provincial gov-
ernments—for funding. Smaller organisations rely heavily on donations of 
money and in-kind donations of goods and services.
Figure 6.5 shows the sources of revenue for social economy organisations 
in the North according to the 2008 survey. For respondents in all the territo-
ries 87.8% received funding from another organisation such as a government, 
a foundation, or a corporation. In Nunavut, this total was slightly less at 
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Figure 6.5  Graph of percentage of respondents answering yes to the statement “Did 
your organization receive….”
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form of grants or contributions. In all the territories, 73.2% of organisation 
received funding from this source compared to 73.7 in Nunavut. It is notable 
that the NSNPVO Survey of 2003 showed a much lower reliance on govern-
ment sources in the rest of Canada, where only 49% of non-profits and vol-
untary organisations received government funding. In comparing Nunavut 
organisations with those in the rest of the North we can see that a slightly 
higher percentage of Nunavut social economy organisations receive funding 
from government payments for goods and services, non-government sales of 
goods and services, and a lower percentage receive funding from donations, 
either monetary or in-kind, and other types of revenues.
Respondents were asked whether their organisation’s revenues had either 
increased, decreased, or stayed the same over the past three years. Only 12% 
of all the respondents in the North stated that their revenues had decreased 
and in Nunavut only one organisation did. A large percentage, 48% in all the 
territories and 48.6 in Nunavut stated that their revenues had increased over 
the past three years. This is an indication that these organisations are contin-
uing to be a dynamic part of the economic makeup of the Canada’s North.
The respondents were also asked if a series of financial issues identified 
in previous research were a problem for their particular organisation. The 
results are displayed in Figure 6.6. Of all the issues listed, the most seri-
ous for Northern social economy organisations was reductions in govern-
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Figure 6.6  Graph of percentage of respondents rating the statement “For your 
organisation is…” for funding.
116 C. Southcott
a serious or moderate problem. In Nunavut the percentage was even higher 
at 53.1%. In Nunavut, 37.5% of respondent organisations stated that reduc-
tion in government funding was a serious problem. Obtaining funding from 
organisations such as government, foundations or corporations was the 
second most important problem followed by the reporting requirements of 
funders. Earning revenues through the sale of goods and/or services was 
the least important problem for organisations in all the territories and in 
Nunavut.
Organisations were also asked if their organisation made a surplus profit 
last year from the sales of goods or services. There is a significant differ-
ence between the respondents in Nunavut and those in the other territories. 
Only 21.1% of respondents in all territories stated that they earned a surplus 
last year, whereas 38.3% of respondents from Nunavut did. While not many 
social economy organisations generate a surplus, respondents were asked 
what would happen if a surplus was generated. Clearly the most popular 
direction of distribution is back into the organisation—an option identified 
by slightly more than half of respondents, in both Nunavut and the other 
territories. The next most popular direction of distribution is to hold it in 
reserve for community benefit or in a community trust. In all the territories, 
17% of the respondents favored this option while the percentage in Nunavut 
was slightly less at 13.2%. In all the territories, only 4.6% of the respondents 
indicated they would distribute the surplus to individual members, but this 
percentage is significantly higher in Nunavut at 13.2%.
Inconsistencies in the data collected required that more work be done to 
verify the amounts of budgets, especially for the other territories. The data 
for Nunavut was recalculated based on an analysis of revenue data and, 
as such, is sufficiently reliable to give a general idea of amounts of budgets 
for social economy organisations and their importance for the economy of 
Nunavut.
Table 6.6 lists the original data for all the territories and the recalcu-
lated data for Nunavut. The 32 Nunavut social economy organisations for 
which reliable operating budgets could be obtained list a total budget of 
$14,364,228. Dividing this by the 32 organisations we find that the average 
budget is $448,882. As stated above, given that these 32 organisations are a 
fairly representative sample of the 295 social economy organisations listed 
Table 6.6 Budgetary data
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in the 2008 version of the SERNNoCa census, we can state that the social 
economy organisations in Nunavut manage approximately $132 million in 
funds each year.
While government grants account for the largest amount of revenue at 
46% of total revenue, sales of goods and services (33%) and memberships 
and subscriptions (145) are also important sources of revenue.
General needs
The respondents were asked a series of questions about issues related to 
their general needs. The first of these questions asked how much collabora-
tion their organisation has with other social economy organisations such as 
non-profits, voluntary organisations, or co-operatives. Most organisations 
have some degree of collaboration. At the same time, there is less collabo-
ration in Nunavut compared to the territories as a whole. In all territories, 
31% of organisations collaborate a lot with similar organisations, while in 
Nunavut this percentage is only 17.6%
Respondents were asked the degree to which a series of issues was a prob-
lem for their organisation. Figure 6.7 lists the responses to these questions. 
Finding funding was clearly the most important overall need of the social 
economy organisations responding to the questionnaire. Of all the respond-
ents, 55% listed it as either a moderate or serious problem. Only 15% said it 
was not a problem. The numbers for Nunavut were similar to the averages 
for all the territories.
Getting volunteers is the next most serious problems faced by the respond-
ents in all the territories. Of all the respondents, 42% said it was either a 
serious or moderate problem. Just over 18% said it was not a problem. In 
Nunavut, the issue is less a problem than in the territories as a whole as just 
23% stated it was a serious or moderate problem and 26% stated it was not 
a problem. In Nunavut 26% of respondents stated that getting volunteers 
was an issue that does not apply to them compared to only 11% in all the 
territories.
Providing staff training and development was the second next most 
important issue to respondents in Nunavut and the third most important for 
respondents in all the territories. Only 12% in both Nunavut and the territo-
ries as a whole said it was a problem that did not apply to them. In Nunavut 
a slightly higher percentage of respondents stated it was not a problem, but 
47% of Nunavut respondents stated it was a serious or moderate problem.
Internal capacity in areas such as internal administrative systems, infor-
mation technology, software, or databases was clearly not as important an 
issue as the previous three. This is especially the case in Nunavut were only 
22% of respondent organisations listed it as a serious or moderate problem.
The least serious issue for most respondents was collaboration with other 
social economy groups. While very few organisations stated that it was not 
a problem that applied to them, only13% in all the territories said it was a 
118 C. Southcott
serious or moderate problem. In Nunavut, no organisation listed it as a seri-
ous problem, and only 17% stated it was a moderate problem.
The survey also asked respondent a series of open-ended questions to 
allow respondents to mention issues that might not have been adequately 
dealt with in the questionnaire. Responses to these questions are listed 
below (Figure 6.8). The first asked respondents if they had any special 
research needs that could help their organisation better contribute to the 
well-being of their community.
Responses varied considerably, with some looking at general questions 
for Nunavut and other concerned with issues specific to their organisation.
Finally, respondent organisations were asked about concerns or problems 
that their organisation has had in the past. Funding surfaces as an impor-
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Figure 6.7  Graph of percentage of respondents rating the statement “For your 
organization….”
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Summary and discussion
Few places in the world have gone through social change with the speed and 
intensity that the communities of Nunavut have. In the space of 50 years, 
the people of this region have had to adapt themselves from a traditional 
migratory hunting and fishing existence based on community co-operation 
and self-reliance that had served them for generations to an urban lifestyle 
characterised by dependence and new economic and social values such as 
individualism, competition, and industrialism. This transition has not been 
easy. The loss of much of their former self-reliance and the disparagement 
of their traditional culture has taken a toll on these communities. This is 
seen in the numerous social and health challenges that are often brought to 
public light.
Yet despite these challenges, it is not unfair to say that the people of 
Nunavut have been able to survive this transition and are now looking to 
change the power relations that characterised their adaptation processes in 
the past. Rather than adapting their cultural values and lifestyles to Western 
patterns, they are now increasingly adapting Western values and lifestyles 
Figure 6.8  Responses from Nunavut respondent organisations to the question 
“Does your organization have any special needs in terms of research 
that could help your organization better contribute to the well-being of 
your community and region?”
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to meet their needs. While this is most evident in the creation of Nunavut, it 
is also evident in the ability of the people of Nunavut to develop innovative 
community organisations, often based on traditional cultural values, that 
are designed to meet the needs of their community.
Elsewhere in Canada and the rest of the world, these innovative commu-
nity organisations have been called social economy organisations in that 
they are separate from private and government and function as an economic 
organisation that is based on the values of service to a community to meet 
social needs rather than generate profits. When given the choice, the people 
of Nunavut have, since the beginning of the transition, given preference to 
these types of organisations. This is seen, starting in the late 1950s, in the 
use of co-operatives as the organisation of choice to deal with economic 
needs. More recently, communities in the region have started to develop a 
range of new social economy organisations to assist in the well-being and 
sustainable development of their communities.
The research summarised in this chapter is an attempt to provide a 
portrait of the social economy in Nunavut and to outline barriers and 
opportunities faced by these organisations. Previous research had indicated 
that these organisations were facing funding and human resource difficul-
ties. The SERNNoCa survey undertaken during 2008 confirmed the find-
ings of these earlier studies and has given us a better understanding of some 
of the characteristics of these organisations. Because of the importance of 
co-operatives in the retail and arts and crafts sectors when compared to the 
other Northern territories, Nunavut has a much higher percentage of social 
economy organisations engaged in activities that elsewhere are provided 
by profit-oriented private sector organisations. Social economy organisa-
tions in Nunavut tend to be younger than those elsewhere in Canada except 
for co-operatives and hunter and trapper organisations. The structures of 
organisations in Nunavut differ from elsewhere in the North in that Nunavut 
has a much smaller percentage of organisations that are legally registered as 
charitable organisations.
Membership numbers for social economy organisation show healthy 
growth with a relatively high level of activity. The composition of the gov-
erning Boards of social economy organisations in Nunavut differs slightly 
from those elsewhere in the North in that a higher percentage of Board 
members in Nunavut are Indigenous, but a lower percentage are female. 
Another key human resource characteristic of social economy organisa-
tions in Nunavut is that fewer of these organisations use volunteers than in 
the other territories. In terms of human resource challenges, while obtain-
ing and retaining Board members is not a major problem, obtaining and 
retaining paid staff is.
Regarding finances, the survey results confirmed previous indications 
that social economy organisations represent an important economic force 
in Nunavut. Rough calculations based on questionnaire results indicate 
that social economy organisations in the territory manage approximately 
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$132 million in funds each year. Government funding, as is the case for 
social economy organisations throughout the North, represent a higher per-
centage of revenues then elsewhere in Canada. Compared to the other terri-
tories, Nunavut social economy organisations receive a higher percentage of 
revenues from the sales of goods and services and a lower percentage from 
donations. In general, revenues for these organisations are on the increase. 
Decreasing government funding is the most serious financial challenge being 
faced by organisations in Nunavut.
When asked about the relative importance of a series of general needs 
faced by social economy organisations, Nunavut respondents identified 
finding funding as the most important overall need. Providing staff training 
and development was the second next most important issue identified by 
respondents in Nunavut. The least serious issue for most respondents was 
collaboration with other social economy groups. When asked what research 
would benefit the social economy in the North, responses tended to note the 
importance of research on general social and economic issues of concern to 
Nunavut. Clearly, respondent organisations are concerned about the gen-
eral well-being of their communities.
Generally, the research indicates that, despite challenges, the social 
economy is stronger and more important in Nunavut than elsewhere. This 
confirms the observations found in other research that the Indigenous tradi-
tions in Nunavut continue to influence the way communities view economic 
development (Abele & Southcott, 2016; Harder & Wenzel, 2012; Southcott, 
2015). The desire for a larger role for co-operative and collaborative rela-
tionships in the economy likely stems from the role these relationships 
played in pre-contact activities and their continued importance for tradi-
tional subsistence activities (Natcher, 2009). While extractive activities, and 
profit-oriented organisations that are associated with these activities, are 
increasing in importance in Nunavut, it is unlikely that most communities 
would see these activities and their organisations as an end in themselves. 
They are seen by many as being necessary to provide communities with nec-
essary jobs, training, and funding (Bernauer, 2011). At the same time, it is 
likely that communities would use these extractive industry benefits to sup-
port more sustainable and renewable forms of long-term economic devel-
opment. Social economy organisations appear to be the preferred vehicle 
by which Nunavut communities would like to shape their economic future.
Note
1. As the survey was not based on random sampling, probability theory-based
indicators of representivity could not be used.
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7 An academic lead in developing 
sustainable Arctic communities
Co-creation, quintuple helix, 
and open social innovation
Martin Mohr Olsen
Introduction
In the pursuit of renewable economies and communities within the Arctic, 
it is essential that we keep in mind the regenerative properties and inher-
ent potential for renewal contained within the region’s institutions of higher 
learning. While colleges and universities in the periphery naturally tend 
to be smaller and less resourceful compared to their metropolitan coun-
terparts—they are, more often than not, centers of specialised local and 
regional knowledge. Not only do institutions of higher learning located in 
remote regions often play a vital part in maintaining and developing local 
languages, practices, and cultures—they are also ideal incubators for the 
education and training of local agents of change capable of making a genu-
ine impact on both local and regional issues. Realising that smaller institu-
tions can often be protective and somewhat conservative, it is nevertheless of 
growing importance that they make an increased, systematic, and collabo-
rative effort toward engagement in issues of sustainability on multiple opera-
tional levels in order to combat many issues facing the Arctic region; climate 
change and ecological challenges that affect the sustainability of communi-
ties, political, geopolitical, and securitisation issues, effects from resource 
extraction, impacts of increasing tourism, etc. (Arctic Council, 2016).
While it may be easy to tout the benefits and values of small, local, and 
specialised universities—it should also be acknowledged that universities 
in the periphery are fighting at least two distinct, yet interwoven, problems. 
On the one hand, Arctic universities often rely heavily or entirely on govern-
ment subsidies that are often subject to prevailing political moods and often 
see allocations differ from year to year, making it hard to plan ahead and 
plan for long-term commitments or strategies. Located in smaller countries 
and communities, they are also often unable to attract major sources of 
external funding from benefactors or industry and establishment of large-
scale research projects is similarly rare. As issues of sustainability facing the 
Arctic mentioned align with all three aspects of sustainability; economic, 
environmental, and social—the involvement of universities as key stake-
holders is paramount for the development of much-needed solutions. At the 
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same time, unfortunately, such demands for solutions to often very complex 
issues can place an even greater burden upon the universities.
In this chapter, I will argue that smaller institutions of higher learning 
within the Arctic must play a greater role in tackling the issues facing the 
region in a more practical sense. They should work with geographically 
embedded knowledge in a real-work setting and focus on solutions relevant 
to the area and its stakeholders. However, I will also argue that for this to 
become a reality, changes to how many small Arctic universities currently 
operate must be made. What follows is an attempt to outline an operational 
framework that addresses the two problematics mentioned above; issues of 
resources and sustainability. The framework presented is an early attempt 
at a conceptual visualisation of all the different practical aspects that uni-
versities in the Arctic will need to consider systematically in order to min-
imise reliance on input resources in order to maximise their sustainability 
output. The framework is being developed for use by the new Innovation 
Unit at the University of the Faroe Islands and is under continual revision. 
In order to explain the basic framework, a point-by-point analysis of each 
step in the process will be given, outlining a theoretical basis and practical 
considerations.
Background and context
Before we get to the conceptual framework, there are two contextual aspects 
that should be clarified. First, some background on how this project is based 
on prior work and attempts to speak to some objective needs with Arctic 
academia, and secondly, a short description of the newly formed Innovation 
Unit at the University of the Faroe Islands, and their role in the project, will 
be given.
Initial insights
The chapter is an attempt to follow up on our recent review of emerging 
trends within the Arctic academic environment (for more, see, Blaxekjær 
et al., 2018). The first of these trends is a cross-sector demand for more inno-
vative and entrepreneurial skills to be included in academic courses and 
curriculums. Where the main justification for entrepreneurship and innova-
tion in an academic setting was initially economic growth—it can now be 
found in most academic fields (Chiu, 2012; Reffstrup & Kærn Christiansen, 
2017). Second, there is a growing interest in going beyond the three main 
pursuits that are at the core of most university mission statements (teach-
ing, research, and dissemination). This fourth emerging mission state-
ment, at times, referred to as “co-creation of sustainability” (Trencher 
et al., 2014) is in many cases a way for universities to experiment with novel 
triple- and quadruple helix models that can facilitate cooperation, but has 
also allowed them to diversify from purely economic pursuits to a wider 
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array of non-commercial purposes dealing with sustainability (Trencher 
et al., 2014; Rosenlund, Rosell, & Hogland, 2017). Third, the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) have also, however slowly, begun to take hold 
in the Arctic region. Places of higher learning, such as the University of the 
Faroe Islands, the University of Greenland, and local stakeholders in gen-
eral, are noticing the benefits of taking a stance on including sustainability 
into their missions. In recent years, there has been a positive increase in the 
amount of focus given to the SDGs within Arctic universities. And, fourth, 
as is evidenced by the number of conferences and university collaborations 
with a focus on the Arctic and sustainability—there is a genuine window 
of opportunity for smaller regional universities to make their mark and 
take part in the growing interest in the region and the resources available. 
While we have seen an increasing interest in these trends over the last couple 
of years, it is important to note that for smaller Arctic universities, acting 
on and realising these interests can be a challenge. As has been mentioned 
above, a large number of Arctic universities are publicly funded, are lacking 
in resources and staff, are spread out over a vast geographic area where 
travel is expensive and cumbersome, and often lack networking possibilities 
and the patronage of large donors or collaborators.
The innovation unit1
Reacting to these emerging trends, the University of the Faroe Islands 
decided to initiate a response in the form of a small and lean project office 
that will be tasked with analysing and mapping best practices available to 
a relatively small and resource-weak institution. Novel to the University of 
the Faroe Islands, we were able to secure funding for a full-time member of 
staff that was not bound by any teaching responsibilities or office work. The 
Innovation Unit is headed by a coordinator not affiliated with any specific 
department or academic discipline, rather she answers to the rector and 
the board of directors. The unit is intended to be flexible and nimble in 
that it can incorporate members of staff for short-term projects as well as 
initiate long-term working groups for larger initiatives. As such, the name 
Innovation Unit was deliberately chosen in order to convey its ad hoc con-
figuration and the non-physical placement within the conventional organi-
sational hierarchy.
The main intent behind the Unit is to have it function as an auxiliary 
support on matters that would otherwise be beyond the scope of the duties 
of the university management staff and beyond the resources of the research 
staff. It is meant to facilitate and coordinate projects and initiatives that 
would previously likely have fallen into the boundary between two organ-
isational camps, resulting in inaction. By adhering to the tenets of bound-
ary spanning, the unit attempts to push a holistic agenda of maximising 
benefits on behalf of not only the university as a whole, but also the wider 
community it finds itself in (Tushman, 1977). It purposely looks to deal with 
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complex projects that can be classified as “wicked issues,” projects that 
cross academic disciplines and rely on the participation of multiple depart-
ments, civil society, municipalities, governmental agencies, and industry to 
solve (Williams, 2002).
The initial findings for the Innovation Unit reveal that there are four 
distinct, yet overlapping, foundational changes that should be made at an 
institutional level in order to meet these growing trends relating to sustain-
ability. First, using the SDGs as primary guidelines in decision making and 
in the evaluation of the viability of new projects or existing modes of oper-
ation. Second, adding to the core mission statements of the organisation 
(teaching, researching, and knowledge transferal) to include a fourth mis-
sion statement of sustainable co-creation. Third, revising and formalising 
how the university deals with external stakeholders based on sound Helix 
models. Fourth, the implementation of modern innovation protocols such 
as Open Innovation and Social Innovation in order to foster local capacity 
building, dialogue, a shared sense of ownership, and mechanisms that can 
mitigate risk and help launch socially beneficial initiatives beyond the initial 
stages of prototyping and proof-of-concept.
A framework for the future
In an effort to outline the conceptual framework proposed for the Innovation 
Unit, what follows is an analysis of the constituent theoretical elements con-
tained within it. First, I will argue for a systematic implementation of the 
Sustainable Development Goals. Secondly, I will give an historical sum-
mary of the university mission statement and then turn my attention to the 
arguments for a review of the beneficial addition of a fourth-mission state-
ment based on sustainability co-creation as is outlined in Trencher et al. 
(2014). Third, I will give a quick overview of the Triple Helix approach and 
then focus in on Ranga and Etzkowitz (2013) analysis of Triple Helix Spaces, 
followed by a quick outline of the benefits and utility of quadruple- and 
quintuple-helix models as they are outlined in Carayannis and Campbell 
(2012) and Carayannis, Barth, and Campbell (2012). Fourth, I will provide 
some background relating to both Open and Social Innovation and then 
focus on how these two approaches could favorably be combined into the 
new concept of Open Social Innovation as has been outlined in Chesbrough 
and Di Minin (2014) and Martins and De Souza Bermejo (2014). I will then 
conclude that these four theoretical concepts (the SDGs, academic mission 
statements, Helix Models, and innovation frameworks), when combined 
into a framework, allow a small university such as the University of the 
Faroe Islands to put forward a set of guidelines that are both rigid in terms 
of adherence to sustainability and co-creation, while also being flexible in 
terms of scale and resources.
The conceptual operational framework, as seen in Figure 7.1, has been 







Figure 7.1 Conceptual operational framework.
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and De Souza Bermejo (2014). The structure of the framework is based on 
common project management tactics and equally assumes a project man-
agement approach to its use and function. The flow is fairly straightfor-
ward, from left to right, beginning as all projects do, with an initiation that 
involves ownership and description of the project or process, moving on to 
an auditing phase where adherence to SDGs, university strategy and collab-
orative approaches are defined, a processing phase is then initiated where 
participants follow Open Innovation guidelines in order progress to an out-
put phase—which in turn leads to an impact phase. While important, the 
initiation phase will not be covered below.
The sustainable development goals
Since the near-global agreement on the UN’s Sustainable Development 
Goals in 2015, the Faroe Islands have been relatively slow to officially adopt 
the goals and their targets. While the Faroese government did not officially 
announce Faroese adherence to the SDGs until February of 2018, inter-
est in- and dissemination of the SDGs was quickly picked up by a few key 
stakeholders (Government of the Faroe Islands, 2018). Since early 2018, the 
Prime Minister’s Office has been developing a local baseline for the tracking 
of progress, the University of the Faroe Islands has organised a number of 
workshops, events, and conferences based on the SDGs, the Municipality of 
Tórshavn has voted to implement the SDGs as guidelines for future policy 
work, salmon farmer Bakkafrost has publicly announced an adherence to a 
number of key goals, and the SDG are often debated and referred to by pol-
iticians and stakeholders. Along with these efforts, the University green-lit 
the establishment of a long-intended cross-disciplinary SDG working group 
overseen by the Innovation Unit. The work of this group is two-fold: best 
practices for internal implementation of the SDG throughout the University 
in terms of daily operations, curriculums, and projects—and simultane-
ously through external collaborations.
Academic focus on sustainability and sustainable development are not 
new to HEIs. A very vocal cry for academic engagement with sustainabil-
ity, in general, has been very visible in the literature since the 1990s and 
especially since the early 2000s. Definitions of and frameworks for sustain-
ability within HEIs sustainable operations, sustainable research, environ-
mental literacy, ethics, curriculum development, and internal and external 
multi-helix partnerships and collaborations have already been outlined and 
analysed many years ago, the use of positive feedback loops and Education 
for Sustainable Development (ESD) tactics, accountability, assessments and 
measurements of the impact of sustainability development in HEIs and the 
use of systems transitions and participatory design processes in relation to 
stakeholder engagement in relation to HEI sustainability, etc. (Lukman & 
Glavič, 2007; Wright, 2002; Godemann et al., 2014; Ferrer-Balas, Buckland, 
H., & de Mingo, M., 2008). Much of the recent literature on sustainability 
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and sustainable development that has been published after the SDG’s 
launch in 2015 is thematically preoccupied with addressing the Sustainable 
Development Goals head-on, but in many regards, the arguments and the-
oretical basis are much the same and build on previous works such as those 
mentioned.
For the Innovation Unit at the University of the Faroe Islands, the initial 
question with regards to the SDGs was very binary and simple: “In doing 
this, are we working against the principles of any of the SDGs?” If the oper-
ation or project could be argued to have a negative impact on any of the 
SDGs, they would be scrapped or reworked. However, in a broader sense, 
this simplistic way of filtering does nothing to further implementation or 
garner collaborative support for further development internally or exter-
nally, and the need for a proactive stance rather than a reactive one quickly 
became apparent. In the context of a larger operational framework, the first 
question we should be asking is: “In doing this, are we furthering the princi-
ples of the SDGs – if so, how many and to what extent?” Cross-referencing 
with a national baseline would, of course, also benefit an initial scoring as 
this is able to provide far better metrics on the benefits of a certain opera-
tion or project. If the answer is positive, we should (as is outlined in SDSN 
Australia/Pacific, 2017, pp. 10–30) ask ourselves how the operation can con-
tribute to the SDGs through: internal operations and governance, educa-
tion, research, and external leadership.
This type of early stage evaluation is typical to general project manage-
ment along with risk assessment and delegation of ownership, but the really 
beneficial aspect to this type of scoring is that is lends itself to a speedier and 
more nimble learn-by-doing style of SDG implementation, not unlike Jeff 
Sutherland’s SCRUM methodology (Sutherland, 2014). Rather than spending 
years developing local implementation guidelines that run the risk of being 
too unwieldy or dated—an early score-card with simple metrics outlining 
benefits and drawbacks that allow for easy reporting and quick iterations 
will allow for better results, the option for broader inclusiveness and collab-
orations, and an accumulative positive net effect in relation to expertise and 
know-how down the line. There are, of course, more elaborate and technical 
ways of assessing the implementation of the SDGs on an academic level. 
Laurent, A. et al.’s (2019) SDG Assessment Methodology is one such tool.
University strategy and mission statements
With a solid foundation ensuring adherence to the SDGs and considering 
their implications as they relate to internal operations, education, research, 
and external leadership, as seen above, an operational framework is slowly 
starting to take shape. With the initiating participant having covered own-
ership and the factoring in of sustainable development goals and targets, it 
is equally important that they experience there being a willing institutional 
support toward practical societal contributions within the organisation.
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The three common missions that can be found in most university char-
ters or strategies are education, research, and dissemination. While the 
University of the Faroe Islands and its staff generally strive to go beyond 
these three missions, there is no codified or systematic approach to any such 
operations. Arguing for a systemic approach to academic work that goes 
beyond these three common missions, I will be relying on Trencher, Yarime, 
McCormick, Doll, and Kraines’ (2013) analysis of an emerging fourth mis-
sion they refer to as: co-creation for sustainability. In order to discuss this 
new type of academic mission, a very brief outline of the missions relating 
to teaching, research and dissemination will follow below before I return to 
an analysis. It is important to note that these activities in no way stand-alone 
within academia, each are pillars supporting the same roof and the same is 
true for any fourth pillar we might add. Trencher et al. (2013) illustrate this 
point very well in Figure 7.4 of their paper (Trencher et al., 2013, p. 168).
Teaching
Growing out of cathedral and monastics schools of late medieval Europe, 
the first institutions historically to be acknowledged as “universities” were 
the University of Bologna and the University of Paris, established in the elev-
enth and twelfth centuries, respectively. The driving force behind these and 
more than 100 universities that were established around Europe between the 
twelfth and the fifteenth century, was the expansion of the Catholic Church 
and the need for a systematised approach to instruct students in matters 
relating to the church; theology, law, and medicine (Arbo & Benneworth, 
2007, p. 19). This first mission of teaching was to be the main objective of 
early universities well into and beyond the Enlightenment.
Research
Following the Enlightenment, a genuine demand for academic reform was 
raised in the established European academic institutions. As new types of 
schools and disciplines were developed in order to cater to social changes 
brought on by the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial 
Revolution, and the growing field of natural sciences—the older institutions 
were increasingly seen as part of the l’ancien régime of days past. Following 
the carnage of the Napoleonic Wars, a renaissance was to hit the Prussian 
academic establishment that would cement the second mission of research 
as a cornerstone of academia. Brought on by the shuttering of a number 
of prominent Prussian universities during the wars and a renewed sense of 
nationalism following the wars, the establishment of the Berlin University 
in 1810 was guided by the “ideals of Bildung, academic freedom and the col-
lective research process as its corner-stones” (Östling, 2018, pp. 23–9). This 
notion of Bildung has generally attributed to Wilhelm von Humboldt, and the 
transition from an academic environment focused purely on teaching, to one 
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of teaching and research were to be codified in what became known as the 
Humboldtian Reform or Humboldtian Model (see Wittrock, 1993; Östling, 
2018) which dictated a more holistic approach to academic education where 
students were given academic autonomy to pursue their interest and engage 
with the world through reason and self-determination. Within this ideal, the 
pursuit of knowledge was to be available to all and aim to change the world 
for the better independently of economic interests. In other words, knowl-
edge for the sake of knowledge (see Östling, 2018; Anderson, 2004).
Dissemination and technical transferal
While the third mission encompasses academic dissemination to peers and 
the public in a variety of forms not covered by the first and second missions, 
the focus here is rather on the technical transferal of knowledge for use out-
side of the academic realm (E3M Project, 2012). The rise of this part of 
the third mission emerged from Vannevar Bush, 1945 conceptualisation of 
a “university-industrial complex” following the World War 2 (Bush, 1945). 
Bush’s blueprint for academia was meant to “establish a link between univer-
sity research and business innovation” in order to “advance economic well 
being” (Zomer & Benneworth, 2011, p. 83). As Clark (1998) and Etzkowitz 
(2002) point out, the connection between academia and industry within a 
third mission formulation dates back to the European agricultural universi-
ties and the American land-grant universities of the Industrial Revolution. 
However, Bush’s university-industrial complex did not pick up speed until 
the 1980s, helped along with the passing of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 that 
allowed researchers to claim ownership of federally funded inventions and 
technical advancements through patents (Mowery, 2007 as cited in Trencher 
et al., 2013). This new law was instrumental in capitalising, commercial-
isation, and commodification of knowledge (Zomer & Benneworth, 2011, 
p. 84; Etzkowith, 1998, p. 826). This commodification, in turn, gave rise 
to the Entrepreneurial University (see for example: Clark, 1998; Etzkowitz, 
1998; Etzkowitz, Webster, Gebhardt, & Terrad, 2000), where external fund-
ing often dictates the direction of research and applied sciences in order to 
maximise profits outside of the university. Led by MIT and Stanford—for 
the Entrepreneurial University, “identifying, creating and commercialising 
intellectual property have become institutional objectives [with the aim of] 
improving regional or national economic performance as well as the univer-
sity’s financial vantage and that of its faculty” (Etzkowitz et al., 2000, p. 313 
as cited in Trencher et al., 2013, p. 151).
It should be noted here that technical transferal of knowledge in the 
form of patents or products might not be relevant to the majority of smaller 
Arctic universities. In cases where this commercial component is missing 
or lacking, the argument for an organisational focus on social issues such 
as sustainability would be a much simpler sell as that addition of the next 
mission we will deal with will show.
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Co-creation for sustainability
As is argued by Trencher et al. (2013, pp. 156–157), the term “social contri-
bution is a useful synonym for describing the core notion of the third mis-
sion.” However, they go on to argue that “the idea of societal contribution is 
today widely perceived and promoted as being chiefly an economic contri-
bution” championed by OECD efforts to “emphasize the economic benefits 
and gains in international competitiveness for governments when universi-
ties focus their third-stream activities on innovation transfer and spurring 
regional development” (Trencher et al., 2013, pp. 156–157). In their critique 
of the third-mission regime, Trencher et al. (2013) conclude that efforts to 
introduce the concept of sustainability and green innovation into the exist-
ing third mission has yet to produce much in the way of results—likely due 
to the fact that the majority of funding and knowledge transfer relates to 
medicine, biomedical- and computer research. Based on their analysis of 
the current state, their “position is that the potential of the third mission 
regime to function as a useful guiding concept or propelling force in the 
quest for low-carbon development and sustainable transformation of indi-
vidual towns, cities, and regions is yet to be proven” (Trencher et al., 2013, 
pp. 156–157). They (Trencher et al., 2013, pp. 157–9) then argue for a fourth 
mission statement, one of co-creation for sustainability. They do not argue 
that this new mission should supplant the third mission, but rather sup-
plement it in compounding the effects of all four mission statements by 
transforming Entrepreneurial Universities into Transformative Universities 
(Trencher et al., 2013, p. 169, emphasis is of the author) that weave together: 
teaching, research, dissemination, and co-creation for sustainability. This 
mission, they argue (Trencher et al., 2013, p. 158) is one that requires the 
transformative university to encompass a broad range of transdiscipli-
nary sciences working together long-term on crucial issues that are place 
and stakeholder oriented. Further, they call for large-scale coalitions with 
multi-helix specialists and non-specialists utilising Open Innovation tactics 
in order to produce socially embedded knowledge and mutual learning. To 
clarify, let us take a look at Helix models and Innovation frameworks in turn.
Helix models
If the Berlin University of 1810 could be said to be Single Helix and the 
addition of industry to form the Entrepreneurial University of the 1980s 
could be said to be a Double Helix, then the addition of government as a 
third actor is what makes up the Triple Helix Model. Conceptualised by 
Etzkowitz (1993) and Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1995) in an effort to inter-
pret the shift from a dualistic relationship between universities and indus-
try in the industrial society, to the triadic relationship between academia, 
industry, and government in the modern knowledge society, the Triple Helix 
Model is commonly seen as the standard for modern academic cooperation.
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Triple Helix
Often depicted as three intertwined strands in the style of the classic rep-
resentation of DNA, the Triple Helix model is probably better illustrated 
in the style of a Venn diagram consisting of three circular spheres of influ-
ence; academia, industry, and government overlapping. Since Etzkowitz 
and Leydesdorff’s early work of the 1990s, an abundance of theoretical 
development has pushed the conceptual framework of the model forwards 
immensely and we will not be able to gain a complete overview of the liter-
ature here. A majority of the early literature is concerned with the in-depth 
analysis of systemic and organisational interactions at fairly large scales 
where actors tend to be portrayed as entire universities, entire companies 
or entire governments—often ignoring the roles of individual actors such 
as members of staff or specialised working groups. While much of the early 
theoretical work on the topic provides a good foundational approach to how 
these three spheres of influence can come together, they do not, however, 
“provide an explicit analytical framework for conceptualizing Triple Helix 
interactions in an innovation system” (Ranga & Etzkowitz, 2013, p. 238) 
and the large-scale holistic focus on “‘block’ entities, without going deeper 
to the level of sphere-specific actors” (Ranga & Etzkowitz, 2013, p. 242) are 
not conducive to the Arctic conditions dealt with here. For the sake of the 
operational framework, I will be relying on Ranga and Etzkowitz’s (2013) 
more fine-grained analysis of the Triple Helix systems approach below.
In very broad strokes, the conventional theoretical approach to the Triple 
Helix model is based on two complementary perspectives; one institutional 
and one evolutionary. Within the institutional approach, the way the three 
spheres of influence interoperate fall into three different configurations: 
A statist configuration, where the government acts as the main driver and 
planner for innovation and development. A laissez-faire configuration with 
limited governmental control is where the industry is the main driver and 
universities provide skilled workers. And, a balanced configuration where the 
institutions act jointly in formalised partnerships (Ranga & Etzkowitz, 2013, 
p. 239; Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, p. 111). For our sake, my references 
to the Triple Helix model will refer to the balanced configuration where tri-
lateral networks and hybrid organisations are possible (this is also similar to 
the notion of Triple Helix type 3 as noted by Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1998, 
p. 197). The evolutionary perspective argues that universities, industry, and 
government exist and co-evolve within social systems where they are influ-
enced by markets, technological advancement, environmental concerns, and 
so on. The interoperation between the stakeholders here relies heavily on two 
processes of communication—a functional and indirect one between science 
and markets, and an institutional and direct one between private and public 
control that allows for selective adjustments that ensure a regeneration of the 
system (Ranga & Etzkowitz, 2013, p. 240). Especially the move from Triple 
to Quadruple and Quintuple Helix is very much contingent on the view that 
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stakeholders must operate within a social system of change through individ-
ual actors that are able to set up lines of communications and work together 
in order to adjust and reshape the system.
Ranga and Etzkowitz (2013, pp. 241–254) break down the conventional 
understanding of the Triple Helix model using the innovation systems con-
cept or, as it was later known; national innovation systems (NIS) (Ranga 
& Etzkowitz, 2013, pp. 240–241) in order to analyse it at a more granular 
scale. Their Triple Helix systems approach breaks down the Triple Helix 
model into three elements: First, system components (and their boundaries), 
these are the institutional spheres of university, industry, and government— 
consisting of the institutional actors themselves and any individual actors, 
and where these networks overlap. While the institutional actors can, as 
such, be argued to interact—the interest here is rather on the individual 
actors involved; innovational initiators, entrepreneurial researchers, R&D 
staff, the management or policy writers. Second, relationships between the 
system components, meaning direct collaboration, conflict moderation, 
collaborative leadership, and so on. It is through meaningful and carefully 
moderated relationships that actors are able to work together, transfer 
knowledge, network and replicate the system. Third, the functions of the 
system, relate to the generation, diffusion, and use of knowledge and inno-
vation as an absolute main ideal. This is the end product of the model, the 
coming together of different stakeholders in order to produce and dissemi-
nate new knowledge that can be utilised to benefit a greater need.
Ranga and Etzkowitz (2013, pp. 247–250), however, argue that in order to 
get to this end product, it will need to be realised through what they call Triple 
Helix spaces: the Knowledge Space, the Innovation Space, and the Consensus 
Space. Very much relevant to our operational framework, they can, in an 
Arctic low-resource context, be understood as follows: The Knowledge 
Space is where an aggregation of local and regional research and knowl-
edge exists. This could take the form of a local database managed by local 
research councils, tracking the output and needs of universities, industry, and 
government in order to ensure that research is not fragmented or needlessly 
Figure 7.2  The three different configurations of the way the three spheres of influ-
ence interoperate in the institutional approach.
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duplicated.2 Up to date data on the knowledge being produced and govern-
mental or municipal projects needing attention could help streamline collab-
oration. The Knowledge Space should also aim to attract funding and leading 
research through networking and dialogue. The aim of the Innovation Space 
is to provide a common platform for stakeholders to manage the development 
of new and innovative firms and industries. This can be done through the 
creation of integrated environments where academia, research, and the needs 
of industry, governments, and municipalities can come together in order to 
find solutions. The Consensus Space is a coming together of stakeholders into 
a forum where they are interdependent and can begin to see themselves as 
part of something greater than their department, company, town, or country. 
This can take the form of brainstorming meetings and dialogue sessions that 
aim to solve issues that are not solvable by any one sector of society, such as 
housing shortages, unemployment, pollution etc.
Quadruple Helix
If we reconsider the earlier steps in this proposed framework, the academic 
mission statement of co-creation for sustainability is predicated on the col-
laboration between academia, industry, government—and also civil society 
Figure 7.3 Quintuple-Helix model.
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and the media. This broad and inclusive approach is very much in line with 
the arguments made by Carayannis and Campbell (2009, pp. 206–207) 
for a fourth dimension to the existing Triple Helix model, and it is simi-
larly very close to the evolutionary perspective of the triadic arrangement 
of academia-industry-government needing to exist within a malleable and 
changing social system and not a theoretical vacuum (Ranga & Etzkowitz, 
2013, p. 240). For Carayannis and Campbell (2009, pp. 206–207), a Quadruple 
Helix model considers the necessity of the media as a means to transport 
public discourse and playing a vital role in the communication of social 
realities, norms, and values. Adding to that, a Quadruple Helix model also 
incorporates the actions of agents of culture, civics, and arts within the com-
munity. As such, the Quadruple Helix model is easily able to accommodate 
the Helix spaces mentioned above, and there are no practical barriers to the 
inclusion of NGOs, interest groups and cultural movements. This inclusive-
ness has the possibility of, as Carayannis and Campbell (2009, p. 207) argue, 
result in a “democracy of knowledge, driven by a pluralism of knowledge and 
innovation […].”
Quintuple Helix
Returning to the Sustainable Development Goals and their focus on sus-
tainable development and ecological stewardship, there is yet another Helix 
Model that concerns itself with these issues. Building on their argument 
for a Quadruple model, Carayannis and Campbell (2010) go on to argue 
for the fifth sphere of influence; the environment. While the Triple- and 
Quadruple Helix models concern themselves mainly with economic and 
cultural innovations and gains, the Quintuple Helix model adds elements 
of sustainable development and social ecology, and ultimately argues 
that this added level of the model has the ability to structure the Helix 
model approach in such a way that it can allow stakeholders to concern 
themselves with eco-innovation and eco-entrepreneurship (Carayannis & 
Campbell, 2010, pp. 58–63).
Innovation frameworks
While the three different Helix Models outlined above concern themselves 
with variations of theoretical and practical takes on collaboration and inno-
vation, there are two further conceptual manifestations of innovation that 
can be favorably considered in this context. At one end, we have the profit 
maximisation of Open Innovation—and on the other end, the maximisation 
of social good inherent in Social Innovation. While these initially seem dia-
metrically opposed, I hope to make a convincing argument that by combin-
ing these two approaches to innovation at the tail end of a framework an 
Open Social Innovation approach to innovation might have a useful role to 
play in making sustainable development viable within the Arctic.
Developing sustainable Arctic communities 137
Open innovation
The initial ideas relating to open innovation date back to the 1960s onset of 
the Information Age and the spread of computers, but the formalised term 
used in reference to industry opening up their silos of research and devel-
opment to external researchers and developers in order to licence, spin out, 
and divest products was conceptualised and coined by Henry Chesbrough 
in 2003. While Chesbrough’s (2003) initial conceptualisation was heavily 
slanted toward accelerated development of new technologies and goods by 
making an organisation’s boundaries more permeable and hopefully more 
profitable, later refinements of the term argue that the process can also be a 
useful way of managing the flow of knowledge across organisational bound-
aries both internally and externally simultaneously using “pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary mechanisms in line with the organization’s business model” 
(Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014)—that is, measured in both monetary and 
non-monetary terms.
In short, Chesbrough and Bogers (2014) argue that Open Innovation 
is based on the premise that the drive for innovation and the sources of 
knowledge that can drive innovation are dispersed widely in society and the 
economy. They invoke Bill Joy’s (co-founder of Sun Microsystems) Law that 
states that “most of the smartest people work for someone else” (Chesbrough 
& Bogers, 2014). Open Innovation, briefly, is a way to scale the boundaries 
of otherwise closed-off organisations in order to allow for novel approaches 
to stagnant problems by outside expertise. In practice, this involves indus-
try establishing an Open Business Model (Vanhaverbeke & Chesbrough, 
2014) that is inclusive to external stakeholders and innovators. This type 
of model sets up a “division of innovation labour” where one party might 
research and develop a new idea—and another party, in turn, carries it to 
market (Vanhaverbeke & Chesbrough, 2014, pp. 52–53). Vanhaverbeke and 
Chesbrough (2014, p. 54) give a number of examples of how this approach 
can be useful; inside-out modes that result in licensing agreements and 
spin-offs, outside-in modes that draw in external expertise and combine it 
with an existing business model and modes where an industry makes use 
of external or internal knowledge to develop entirely new business models. 
While Chesbrough’s definition of the term is generally applied to a com-
mercial setting—the notion that very capable and innovative actors are 
to be found outside the boundaries of an organisation is just as likely to 
hold true to non-commercial organisations such as a university, a munic-
ipality or an NGO. While the literature on Open Innovation is too broad 
and varied to cover here, this main takeaway of being able to look beyond 
institutional and organisational walls for expertise and inspiration is the 
key. While the more typical combination of Open Innovation and academia 
is fairly commonplace at many technical universities and business schools 
around the world—applying the same mindset of openness that a business 
might employ to further commercial interest to an academic reality allows 
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for even more and more diverse collaborative arrangements when combined 
with the tenets of Social Innovation. Especially for small non-technical 
Arctic universities, when combined with the fourth mission statement of 
co-creation for sustainability and a strong multi-helix approach, the con-
cept of Open Innovation is easily transformed from a profit-making indus-
try strategy into an academic collaborative approach based on openness 
and stakeholder inclusion. By utilising Open Innovation as a core strat-
egy, the operational framework allows the university and its stakeholders 
to move forward both in a conventionally technical innovation track, or 
it can use the same tactics to focus its energy on maximising social good 
through Social Innovation. Further, Open Innovation when employed from 
the perspective of a university can even facilitate technical and social inno-
vation in parallel—facilitating the development of a viable new product or 
service based on social issues. The majority of literature dealing with Open 
Innovation deals with how it benefits Technical Innovation, so I will not 
be covering it here. Its exclusion should, however, not be seen as it being of 
lesser interest or importance to the framework. For the sake of understand-
ing how small institutions can better target social issues, we will concern 
ourselves with the value of Social Innovation and how Open Innovation can 
be used as an important tool to realise social innovation-based projects.
Social innovation
Open Innovation is, at least from a theoretical standpoint, very much tied 
to business innovations which in turn are motivated by profit maximisa-
tion. Social Innovation, on the other hand, is predominantly motivated by 
the goal of meeting social needs (Mulgan, 2006, p. 146). Social Innovation 
can be defined as “innovations that are social both in their ends and their 
means. [They are] new ideas (products, services, and models) that simulta-
neously meet social needs and create new social relationships or collabora-
tions. In other words, they are innovations that are both good for society 
and enhance society’s capacity to act” (Murray and Mulgan, 2010, p. 3).
A very different aspect to Social Innovation, as opposed to innovation 
in a more broad sense, is that Social Innovations need not be wholly new 
ideas—but can be new to those benefiting from them. Further, Social 
Innovations tend not to be inherently new in and of themselves, but rather a 
combination of already available technologies or solutions (Mulgan, 2006, 
p. 151). Boelman and Davies (2015, p. 6) also argue for this newness criteria 
along with the requirements that Social Innovations should meet a social 
need in positive ways, they should be put into practice, they should engage 
and mobilise beneficiaries through governance and they should transform 
social relations through greater access to power and resources. They further 
argue that Social Innovations (Boelman & Davies, 2015, p. 7) can take many 
different forms; new services, products, practices, processes, rules, regula-
tions, and organisational forms.
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A core distinction between Open Innovation and Social Innovation, is 
that Social Innovation aims to solve issues not generally solved by com-
mercial interests (Nicholls, Simon, Gabriel, & Whelan, 2015, p. 3). They 
can be issues such as human rights, environmental concerns, healthcare, or 
education—often in developing or remote regions of the world. According 
to Murray and Mulgan (2010) and Rayna and Striukova (2019) the Social 
Innovation process can be broken down into six different stages:
1 Prompts, inspirations, and diagnoses: Initial stage during which various 
factors trigger the need for innovation, after which a diagnostic of the 
problem and the framing of the question ensue.
2 Proposals and ideas: Idea generation stage using a variety of methods 
based on insight and experience.
3 Prototyping and pilots: Stage during which ideas are put into practice to 
be tested and, subsequently, refined.
4 Sustaining: Stage at which the idea is adopted for everyday use and is, as 
a result, streamlined. Income streams are identified at this stage.
5 Scaling and diffusion: Stage at which there is an attempt to scale up and 
diffuse the innovation beyond its original test bed.
6 Systemic change: This stage is the ultimate goal of social innovation, but 
also the most difficult to achieve due to its wide-scale, the large number 
of stakeholders it involves and the multiple barriers to change that exist.
Figure 7.4 Social innovation stages.
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Of these six stages, the first three are relatively straightforward even in 
resource-poor situations and areas. Broadly they rely on idea generation 
as a response to social issues that can be undertaken by even small groups 
of people or even individuals. In a small-scale academic setting, this is gen-
erally how far a group of students would be expected to be able to push a 
project for an assignment or the level of refinement a group of independent 
volunteers might be able to develop a project funded by a small municipality 
or government (of which I have taken part in more than my fair share). It is 
only in the last stages of the innovation process that any meaningful impact 
will be seen. The main reason for failure at steps 4 and beyond is often 
the obvious lack of income streams for projects that aim to do social good 
in areas where there tends to be little in terms of economic value. While 
these types of small-scale projects can be a good way to illustrate proofs-of- 
concept (free communal urban gardens, for example), they quickly tend to 
fizzle out after only a short time due to a lack of resources.
Another, perhaps not so obvious, reason for failure at this crucial point in 
the process is often the absence of supportive networks. Mulgan (2007) and 
Rayna and Striukova (2019) point out that failures to connect with networks 
that can provide expertise and experience are a common pitfall for social 
innovation processes. Similar to how the industry might employ Open 
Innovation as a means to entice external expertise into the fold—they argue 
that this is a tactic that could be extremely applicable in terms of bringing 
social innovation to market, so to speak. Rayna and Striukova (2019, p. 385) 
argue that “[b]y enabling access to a larger pool of resources and skills, as 
well as diffusion paths, applying open innovation paradigm to social inno-
vation could enable to overcome critical challenges at all six stages of the 
social innovation process.”
Open social innovation
I have argued that Open Innovation and Social Innovation are two rather 
different strands of innovation frameworks that serve very different needs. 
Yet the similarities of bringing products to market tie the two processes 
together in more ways than one. In both cases, maximising profits and max-
imising social good, the processes hinge on networking, external expertise, 
and novel business models. While commercial enterprises make use of busi-
ness models in order to turn a profit, social innovations will ultimately have 
to rely on some form of operational resources (likely in the form of mone-
tary funding) in order to sustain themselves and in turn scale, diffuse and 
enact systemic changes.
The concept of Open Social Innovation seems to be first proposed by 
Dominic Chalmers (2013). In his article, he argues for similarities between 
the Open and Social Innovation similar to the ones noted above. As argued 
above, some main reason for failures to launch social innovation processes 
are lack of long-term operation resources and a lack of expert networking. 
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Chalmers expands upon the knowledge searching and networking issues by 
arguing that social innovators would do well to focus more on their users 
as well as initiating boundary-spanning knowledge searches that look for 
expertise and innovation that exist beyond their organisation’s traditional 
domains to combat “industry blindness” (Chalmers, 2013, p. 25).
Chalmers (2013) goes on to identify a third stumbling block (related to 
resources) that is common for social innovation processes; risk aversion. He 
argues that a common barrier “to the adoption of social innovation lies in 
the risk associated with disruptive innovation [in that] those offering sup-
port to social innovators in the form of capital are institutionally condi-
tioned to favour incremental ‘safer’ forms of innovation” (Chalmers, 2013, 
p. 26). In order to combat risk aversion, Chalmers argues for five different 
propositions for social and community-based organisations (Chalmers, 
2013, pp. 27–28):
1 Adopting a more “open” approach will mitigate risks associated with 
introducing new innovations.
2 Adopting problem solutions from different domains will reduce the risk 
of new innovations failing.
3 Incorporating user knowledge into the innovation process will increase 
their chances of success.
4 Participating in some form of open, networked innovation will be more 
effective at developing innovations addressing the root causes of social 
problems.
5 Engaging in “open source” collaboration will be more effective in tack-
ling vested interests and dominant competitors.
Here we see the beginnings of merging of Open and Social Innovation. 
In applying Open Innovation mechanisms to the issues facing Social 
Innovation, social innovators should adhere to a networking paradigm that 
involves multiple boundary-spanning stakeholders—which in turn would 
help mitigate risk aversion from investors and funders.
Martins & De Souza Bermejo (2014) follow up on Chalmers work and 
argue as the main point that “when Social Innovation is seen from a col-
laborative point of view, organizations become more porous structures 
that make it possible to overcome the barriers that prevent communities 
from innovation from the bottom up. Thus, when organizations are open 
they strengthen localism and provide a means for civil society to become 
involved in finding solutions” (Martins & De Souza Bermejo, 2014 ). They 
go further to attempt a conceptual model of the relationship between Open 
Innovation and Social Innovation seen in Figure 7.5.
They argue that the collaborative interplay between Open and Social 
Innovation not only has the capacity to produce new solutions to social 
problems and changes to social practices, but at the same time is also able 
to facilitate and stimulate new technical innovations in the form of new 
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products, services or processes that in turn result in economic develop-
ment. At the same time, Chesbrough and Di Minin (2014, p. 170) venture a 
definition of the concept. They defined Open Social Innovation (OSI) to be 
“the application of either inbound or outbound open innovation strategies, 
along with innovations in the associated business model of the organisation, 
to social challenges” (Chesbrough & Di Minin, 2014, p. 170). They argue 
that Open Social Innovation is especially apt at solving stages 3–5 of the 
Social Innovation process (Chesbrough & Di Minin, 2014).
Regardless of where the prompt originates; industry, government, aca-
demia, or civil society—social innovation and socially innovative projects 
more broadly will mostly follow the six steps outlined above. They will need 
to pass through a phase of idea generation, prototyping, and testing phase, 
and eventually a process of sustaining itself so that it can scale and hope-
fully change society for the better. Most of these socially conscious commu-
nity-based efforts at social change will likely struggle to move beyond the 
initial prototyping and proof of concept stages due to the lack of operation 
resources. And as Chalmers (2013) argues, it can be hard to find funding for 
risky disruptive innovation aimed at a segment of society that might not be 
seen as very profitable, politically incorrect or otherwise unpalatable for 
whatever reason.
Before moving on the how this might look from an academic perspec-
tive, I hope that (albeit brief) the arguments for utilising Open Innovation 
tactics in conjunction with Social Innovation processes will seem com-
pelling. How they can be made to push Social Innovation initiatives 
beyond stages of initial prototyping and proof-of-concept, how they can 
mitigate risk and how they can break down institutional borders and 
Figure 7.5  Conceptual model of the relationship between open innovation and 
social innovation.
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attract external expertise. None of the examples used so far have con-
cerned themselves with academia. They have all focused on industry and 
NGOs. What is wholly absent from the literature is a perspective from 
within academia. In the following concluding section, I will attempt to 
outline why I think the framework presented is such a natural fit for small 
Arctic universities.
An academic perspective
As I have noted above, Open and Social Innovation tactics are generally 
considered to belong in the domains of commercial enterprises and action- 
oriented civic groups such as NGOs or governmental agencies. Only in rare 
instances does the literature attempt to shine a light on how these tactics 
could be employed by academia in an effort to pursue issues of sustainabil-
ity, innovation, entrepreneurship, or social change. The University of the 
Faroe Islands is comparable to a number of Arctic universities. It is a small, 
publicly funded university servicing around 800 students in five different 
departments. Apart from offering courses in social sciences, economy, law, 
natural science, and Faroese, it also houses a teacher’s college and a degree 
in nursing. In relation to mainland Europe and the Arctic region broadly, it 
is a geographically isolated university with a relatively low level of contact 
with other institutions of higher learning in the region.
At the time of writing, the University is facing a number of issues. It is 
seeking to modernise, systematize, and professionalise a wide array of oper-
ational aspects of the organisation; this includes the development of a new 
university strategy and updated mission statements. It is also attempting to 
broaden its local, regional, and international reach in terms of collabora-
tions, research networking, and funding—all with very limited resources. 
Further, the university is also reacting to the emerging trends within the 
Arctic academic environment described above (Blaxekjær et al., 2018). The 
small size of the University of the Faroe Islands and other similar universi-
ties in the Arctic that often exist to service the local population and seldom 
profile themselves in a manner that would attract an international student 
body or sizeable amounts of external funding, must often make do with 
local networks and draw on local sources of funding for research—or rele-
gate themselves to taking on smaller and often non-technical roles within 
larger European or Arctic research projects.
The current lack of much international research presence facing many 
of the smaller Arctic universities does, however, allow them to occupy aca-
demic niche positions relating to local knowledge and development. This 
hyper-specialisation and localisation of knowledge has, especially in recent 
years, become a growing trend within the Arctic and often sees small Arctic 
universities being able to punch above their weight, participating in a much 
more level footing on their home turf due to valuable local insights and 
expertise. Coming to terms with how valuable these smaller universities are 
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to their local communities and how much social good they are able to ini-
tiate through socially conscious activities would not only maximise organ-
isational output, but it would also have the added benefit of building up 
local competences and credibility with regards to regional and international 
collaborations.
In order to operate optimally, an operational framework such as the one 
presented here would need to be functional on a number of levels in order 
to deliver practical lasting results. If the output is to be sustainable social 
innovation, it must cover the three general aspects of sustainability - eco-
nomic, environmental and social. To reach that level, it must, therefore, 
encompass some form of technological innovation that creates local jobs 
or adds positively to the economy in the form of new products or services 
and it must also contain an element of social innovation that results in new 
sustainable practices or developments. However, in order to have commer-
cial and social innovations complement each other in a sustainable way, 
university lead initiatives will need to rely on a collaborative process with 
industry on one side and civil society and government on the other. This 
process, the Innovation Unit argues, fits perfectly with the mechanisms of 
Open Innovation. It is here that university-led Open Innovation is able to 
facilitate openness, dialogue, networking, risk and stakeholder manage-
ment, and a collaborative effort to push projects beyond stages four and five 
of the social innovation track.
To get to a point where this facilitation of sustainable development 
between academia, industry, and civil society becomes possible, the uni-
versity must progress through a preparatory phase of internal auditing 
that ensures the inclusiveness of stakeholders, the strategic value for the 
university and a strict adherence to sustainability throughout the pro-
cess. Before the Open Innovation tactics can be utilised in an open, col-
laborative process, the university and key stakeholders should conduct a 
Helix-model audit. Following a Triple Helix model stakeholders would only 
include academia, government, and industry (Etzkowitz, 1993; Etzkowitz 
& Leydesdorff, 1995). Using a Quadruple Helix model would include civil 
society in the process (Caryannis & Campbell, 2009). Even better, by utilis-
ing a Quintuple Helix model the university is able to include a fifth sphere 
of influence: the environment (Caryannis & Campbell, 2010). A prerequisite 
for successful Helix model collaborations led by the university is of course 
that the university takes on an active and participatory role. In order for the 
university to do so, projects must have a strategic value that complement 
university missions statements of education, research, and dissemination. 
In order to boost impact, the Innovation Unit advocates that the university 
goes beyond these three common mission statements and initiates a fourth 
mission statement of sustainable co-creation as is put forward by Trencher 
et al. (2013). As noted above, there is a clear wish from a number of Arctic 
universities that the UN Sustainable Development Goals be implemented as 
a guiding framework for curricula and daily operations. If the output of this 
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operational framework is to be sustainability in its different forms, then the 
SDGs are currently likely the best way to audit the sustainability of initia-
tives. The SDGs are simple, easy to understand, give participants a common 
language through their goals and targets and are at the same time not very 
confrontational as a tool. As a yardstick, simply asking whether a project 
or an initiative would be counter to the tenets found in the SDGs would be 
a good start. If so, it should be reconsidered or scrapped. If a project is not 
counter to the SDGs, an audit and analysis of how well the project is in line 
with the SDGs, how many goals and targets it will cover and a measure-
ment of impact should be produced. Also, the university should consider 
how participation in the project or initiative and subsequent adherence to 
the SDGs might positively impact internal operations and governance of 
the organisation and the institution, how it might be used for educational 
purposes, for research purposes—and how it might be used as a way for 
the university, along with stakeholders, to illustrate leadership and commit-
ment toward sustainability within the community.
At the time of writing, the Innovation Unit at the University of the Faroe 
Islands is further developing the framework and lobbies for it to be imple-
mented as a way to assess upcoming projects and processes. It is our firm 
belief that a structured and theoretically sound approach to social issues 
will allow the university to present itself as an open, inclusive stakeholder 
and champion of sustainability in the Faroese Islands.
Notes
 1. At the time of publishing the Innovation Unit (now formally the Research and 
Enterprise Unit) has chosen to initially focus on mission two (research).
 2. www.isaaffik.org is one such initiative.
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The objective of this chapter is to contribute to an understanding of 
Indigenous-led research processes which embrace Indigenous research 
agendas for the express purpose of sustaining Indigenous knowledge 
through Indigenous research, Indigenous philosophies, Indigenous 
methods, and Indigenous healing. As a curriculum developer, a scholar, 
and teacher of Tlingit constructs at Yukon University and privately, 
the researcher is Tlingit. The researcher’s affiliation is to Tlingit peo-
ple; this affiliation assists with international work which seeks to define 
Indigenous engagements and practices. Burdened with trauma from con-
tact and colonisation, the researcher grew up believing that Tlingit sto-
ries were myth, that there was little or no value in understanding Tlingit 
history or language. These kinds of ideas are remnants of Canada’s 
Indian Act policies; these policies shaped the researcher’s educational 
pathway to the point of near amnesia on who are the Tlingit of Alaska, 
British Columbia, and the Yukon. Teaching Tlingit constructs in insti-
tutions of higher learning has led the researcher to realise that Tlingit 
people, like many other Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic and across the 
world, are healing and decolonising from contact and historical discrim-
ination. For the Tlingit, the act of decolonisation is achieved through 
the Indigenization of their worldviews: speaking and thinking in Tlingit 
to each other; by hosting ceremonies and groups where there is clan bal-
ance so that speaking protocols are adhered to; by ensuring there are 
Tlingit-led enquiries and processes for Tlingit-led answers; by holding 
up Tlingit-led participation and assessments; and more. Tlingit Elders 
who are fluent in their Tlingit languages are the key to ensuring cultural 
ethics and protocols are adhered to (Dauenhauer N. & Dauenhauer R. 
1987, 1990, 1994). Looking back, it is extraordinary what the Tlingit have 
endured: Boarding Schools, Indian Ceremonies Removal Acts, Indian 
Land Removal Acts, Indian Languages Removal Acts, the installation 
of International Borders, ad nauseum. Amongst many Tlingit Elders, the 
impacts of past government policies have laid an undeniable trajectory 
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which is struck with grief, sorrow, and general social unease and unrest 
due to loss of land, language, family, and culture.
Background
The day is done (November 5, 2017). The lead instructor/researcher closes 
the chapter on the boarding school curriculum she was asked to write by 
her employer in 2015. What resulted was pages and pages of notes, a draft 
curriculum framework, over one hundred hours of videotape, place-based 
curricula for Kindergarten to Grade 12 Social Studies for Juneau School 
District, and a YouTube (Sharing Our Knowledge Conference, 2016) 
Elders’ presentation on boarding school at a Sharing Our Knowledge 
Tlingit Clan Conference. At the beginning of the Tlingit Elders’ work-
shops, English was the dominant language being spoken and written. As 
time progressed, Tlingit became the dominant language, spoken and writ-
ten. Together, over a two-year period, Tlingit Elders sat and discussed 
the impact boarding school and other Bureau of Indian Affairs’ policies 
continue to have on Tlingit people. The lead instructor/researcher led 
the Elders through a series of focused and grant-supported workshops, 
which resulted in the application of Tlingit thinking, Tlingit language, 
Tlingit philosophies, Tlingit fluency, the articulation of Tlingit learning 
and teaching methods, and so much more. The method of data collec-
tion included the lead instructor/researcher being a learner, a teacher, and 
a facilitator. The focused discussion topics were for the express purpose 
of revitalising Indigenous languages, literacies, knowledge, and histories 
amongst Tlingit peoples.
Tlingit Elders and the lead instructor/researcher were paid for their 
participation by the employer, Goldbelt Heritage Foundation. Goldbelt 
Heritage Foundation is a non-profit organisation in Juneau, Alaska, and is 
dedicated to the revitalisation of the Tlingit language and culture. From the 
onset, the grant recipients and participants of the circle were the providers 
of traditional knowledge and traditional foods. The circle worked towards 
obtaining and recording Tlingit knowledge; the circle welcomed dynamic 
and responsive agendas; the circle encouraged the use of microphones and 
speakers; the circle enjoyed comfortable chairs, tables, and good light; the 
circle mandated an open-door policy for their families and youth; the circle 
made room for young and emerging Tlingit culture and language experts, 
for non-native Tlingit cultural experts, and literature on the Tlingit.
As part of a larger team of educators, Alaska and Yukon Elders and 
Knowledge Bearers worked on Indigenous knowledge inclusion in several 
meaningful and significant ways. The Elders recognised that the Alaska 
and Yukon border is a colonial construct. From the onset, the grant recip-
ients and Elders and Knowledge Bearers were part of the planning team, 
laying foundations, planning language focus and culture activities, ensur-
ing jurisdiction over the Tlingit place and Tlingit values, and cultural 
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appropriateness. As the Elders embraced ideas, programs, and implementa-
tion concerning language and culture, the Elders focused on life before con-
tact as a way to articulate and define foundational aspects to life in the past, 
today, and life in the future. To the Tlingit, perseverance is the key: “Before 
the great floods, we had already been through a lot” (Goldbelt Heritage 
Foundation Elders, Boarding School discussion, 2017). In rebuilding who 
are the Tlingit peoples of Alaska, British Columbia, and the Yukon, par-
ticipating Tlingit Elders, parents, and youth determined what is healing to 
them. In developing place-based scholarship, Tlingit constructs and lan-
guages must be intact. Researchers and scholars of Tlingit knowledge must 
adhere to Tlingit ethics and protocols. This is especially true if the goal is to 
sustain Tlingit knowledge processes for the purpose of living and sustaining 
Tlingit knowledge in the context of social justice and other ideas such as 
renewable resource economies.
Sustaining Tlingit knowledge
Given the issues arising from contact and colonisation, how do Tlingit 
sustain their knowledge in the area of renewable economies in the Arctic? 
What do Tlingit think about solar energy, wind energy, geothermal pres-
sure, wood, water, oxygen, fish, and precious metals? Tlingit concepts about 
solar energy are found in ancient stories, such as Raven giving birth to the 
sun, moon, and stars. That is, Raven’s demand for the sun, moon, and stars 
produced the sun, moon, and stars, and provided for an ever-increasing 
population. Once Raven freed the sun, moon, and stars, Raven fixed man 
and woman. The Raven story also tells listeners how long the Tlingit have 
been in the area—since the beginning of time. In applying a Tlingit lens to 
precious metals, Tlingit value copper and historically went to any length 
to obtain it. Copper is dáanaa (currency, status, wealth) and receiving cop-
per at a Ku.éex is a high honor. One of the trail networks inland is named 
by scholars and researchers as the Kohklux trail. This trail is known by 
Athabaskans and Tlingit as the “Grease Trail”. This trail is one of many 
trade trails between Tlingit and Yukon First Nations. One route of this 
trail extends from Haines, Alaska to Skagway, Alaska then onto the Yukon 
and another route of this trail extends from Klukwan, Alaska to Haines 
Junction then onto Yakutat, Alaska and/or White River, Yukon for cop-
per (de Laguna, 1972, p. 88 [citing Davidson 1901 who published the trail 
that Kohklux and his wives drew out]). After Alaska was sold to the USA, 
portions of the Kohklux trail on the Chilkoot (Skagway, Alaska) side were 
documented by US Army Lieutenant Schwatka in the summer of 1883. In 
2020, the Grease Trails inland form the basis of our Alaska, Klondike, and 
Yukon highways. At the time of the Gold Rush in the Yukon, 1896, many 
Tlingit were hired as packers because of their strength and expertise. In 
our institutions of higher learning and in history, the focus when we talk 
about Yukon and precious metals is gold. Today, in the time of COVID-19, 
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studies are suggesting that germs have a shorter life span on copper. Since 
the time of written history, Tlingit languages, histories, and methods have 
been overshadowed and diminished by “settler” histories and ideas. In the 
not-so-distant past, Tlingit knowledge had to fit into western frameworks in 
order to be understood.
An Alaska, British Columbia, and Yukon research example which high-
lights local Indigenous knowledge sustainability, local agreements, and 
treaties, and international research conventions is the Kwäday Dän Ts’ìnchi 
archeological find. The finding of the Long-Ago Man in the Ice, also known 
as Kwäday Dän Ts’ìnchi led to comanaged science and culture tables (Royal 
British Columbia Museum et al., 2017). Kwäday Dän Ts’ìnchi was found in 
ice near the Ruby Mountain Range (Champagne and Aishihik First Nations, 
2009). Shortly after Kwäday Dän Ts’ìnchi was found, he not only received 
a proper burial, but he also received a forty-day smoking party (Klukwan) 
and a one-year memorial party (Champagne and Aishihik), also known as 
Ku.éex. Kwäday Dän Ts’ìnchi was cremated. This reveals Athabaskan and 
Tlingit law for the treatment of human remains. Based on Kwäday Dän 
Ts’ìnchi’s clothing and stomach contents, he was traveling inland from the 
coast of Alaska. Kwäday Dän Ts’ìnchi was probably travelling at the same 
time that Columbus “discovered” the Americas. Athabaskan, Tlingit, and 
Western researchers determined that Kwäday Dän Ts’ìnchi was on one of 
the well-used Grease Trails between Klukwan, Alaska and/or Yakutat, 
Alaska and/or Copper River, Alaska (Royal British Columbia Museum 
et al., 2017).
The coproduction and comanagement of Southern Tutchone, Tlingit, 
and Western research revealed pathways to understanding Indigenous clan 
identity with respect to mitochondrial DNA markers (Monsalve, 2017). 
Most Alaska and Yukon First Nations communities are matrilineal. This 
means that Indigenous identity is set through the female line. Indigenous 
knowledge systems, including heritage language, thinking, objects, prop-
erties, families, ancestors, histories, songs, and values, are transmitted 
through matrilineal lines. Modern science has found that sperm carries its 
DNA markers in their tails and necks and is left behind during fertilisa-
tion (Monsalve, 2017). Kwäday Dan Ts’ìnchi DNA supports what Southern 
Tutchone and Tlingit ancestors inherently knew about DNA markers 
(S. Adamson, personal communication, 2019).
Today, many Alaska and Yukon First Nations people and Elders work 
with appropriate agencies to develop meaningful and relevant engagement 
connections regarding Indigenous finds and collections (Royal British 
Columbia Museum et al., 2017). Tlingit investigation and science is tied to 
balance, to ownership, to spirit, to the seen, to the unseen, to the known, 
and to the unknown (Goldbelt Heritage Foundation Elders, Tlingit Science 
Framework discussions, 2017). As seen in recent Kwäday Dan Ts’ìnchi pub-
lications, comanaged research tables can reveal Indigenous and western 
ways of knowing (Royal British Columbia Museum et al., 2017).
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To coproduce and learn or teach Indigenous languages and knowledge is 
to address systemic discrimination in Alaska and Yukon public institutions. 
Discussions that embrace culture, language, and policy will bring up dia-
logue and memories concerning past and current treatment of Indigenous 
Peoples and equity and equality in public institutions, communities, and 
societies. Sustaining Indigenous knowledge means that modern research 
processes must allow for time and resources for Indigenous Peoples to rec-
oncile their histories and languages amongst themselves. The coproduction 
of knowledge with other knowledge occurs after Indigenous Peoples have 
had time to go away and discuss matters at hand. Through this process of 
internal dialogue, Indigenous learning frameworks will form the basis for 
further work in articulating what is Indigenous knowledge for the purpose of 
influencing Indigenous lives, cultural endeavors, public and post-secondary 
schooling, and further research (Goldbelt Heritage Foundation Elders, 
Tlingit Science Framework discussions, 2016). Indigenous knowledge are 
collective and are often clan-based. At the practitioner stage, the researcher 
is a facilitator of knowledge as opposed to a gatekeeper of knowledge.
Indigenous knowledge-gathering activities and research must be seasonal 
to honor the various harvesting events. This was heard at various Social 
Economic and Culture Expert Group events in Finland and virtually.
Using Indigenous ways of recording events with history, art forms, face 
paints, and oratory, most Indigenous Peoples know that Indigenous stories 
are true (Shorty, 2015). Systemic discrimination and powerful English con-
structs surrounding the word “story” tend to ignore the history in the story 
and many believe that Indigenous stories are myth. Unpacking Indigenous 
stories brings forward ancestors’ knowledge and wisdom, the strength of 
Elders, ideas of land, and working together (Sealaska Heritage Foundation, 
Core Cultural Values Poster). Dialogue and research amongst Indigenous 
Peoples must allow time for healing (Goldbelt Heritage Foundation Elders, 
Native American Graves Repatriation Act, 1990, discussions, 2017 for 
Native American Graves Repatriation Act 1990 due to the unearthing of 
unmarked graves in 2012 at an elementary school in Douglas, Alaska).
To engage with Indigenous Elders at the local level will produce new 
knowledge, research tools, and processes, on what is Indigenous thinking on 
Indigenous learning frameworks about the ancestors, the values, the land, 
the environment, the foods, the non-tangible, the tangible, and the history.
For many Indigenous Elders, Indigenous Peoples need to teach 
Indigenous constructs, especially if Indigenous Peoples are reconciling 
and sustaining Indigenous knowledge and languages which are based on 
the past and for the purpose of future children and grandchildren (Tlingit 
Elders, Boarding School discussions, 2015-2017). Protocols and laws on the 
handling of Indigenous knowledge and languages for public institution use 
by Indigenous and non-Indigenous educators is an area that will need explo-
ration and definition. Perhaps Indigenous Peoples prefer to keep this area 
grey, perhaps due to ideas about power in the unknown.
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Haa Kusteeyí1 (Way of Life) and Dooli2 (Law) sum up the ideas which 
govern Alaska and Yukon philosophies and views on sovereignty, spirit-
uality, and stewardship of land, air, water, and the unseen. The idea is that 
Alaska and Yukon First Nations enjoy specific environments and territo-
ries, have clan crests, have ancestors, have a collective good, have history, 
sacred places, stories, songs, dances, symbols, law, respect for the land and 
her resources, traditional practices, knowledge, and an identity. Alaska and 
Yukon Elders say that the way they pass on Haa Kusteeyí and Dooli must 
be the foundation to the development and implementation of traditional/
contemporary practices and knowledge (Sealaska language proficiency 
meeting, September 24, 2010).
Using Indigenous constructs, the highest level of authority is reserved 
for Haa Shageinyaa (Our Heavenly Father). This reverence for a higher 
order of things is the first and most important idea of all (Goldbelt 
Heritage Foundation Elders, Tlingit Science Framework discussions, 2016). 
Everything has a spirit yet, very little research time is devoted to discussions 
on sacred spaces for sacred learning (Goldbelt Heritage Foundation Elders, 
Tlingit Science Framework discussions, March 2016). Indigenous Peoples 
in Alaska and Yukon are discussing and implementing “reconciliation” 
so there is a real need for Arctic research projects to embody Indigenous 
research agendas. Without prejudice, Indigenous Peoples need research 
support and space to explore and teach Indigenous constructs amongst 
themselves in order to collectively reconnect and/or reconcile with their 
heritage ancestors, land, languages, methods, and philosophies. Research 
agendas need to include space for Indigenous identity building, Indigenous 
culture sharing, Indigenous language renewal, Indigenous methods renewal, 
and healing amongst themselves. Throughout the teaching, learning, and 
research processes, Indigenous Peoples follow their protocols and their laws 
while demonstrating care for the continuation of language and culture by 
speaking and thinking in their languages together and with their children, 
adults, and youth.
At Arctic Council meetings, Arctic Indigenous Peoples still report that 
some researchers come to the villages and are sometimes disruptive and 
want to conduct research on the knowledge that is specific to “science” or 
to projects outside of what the villages want or feel is important. In other 
words, Indigenous Peoples are asked to participate and to fit their thinking 
into a western research paradigm. Not only is this “fitting” unethical, it is 
morally wrong considering concepts of cultural genocide through Indian 
Acts, policies, relocations, nationality, and land reassignments. To be clear, 
Arctic Council is a high-level interagency that facilitates “soft law” arrange-
ments for participating members on issues pertaining to Arctic issues. While 
the deliberations of the Arctic Council are not legally binding, the conversations 
of the Arctic Council do force consideration to Indigenous matters (Amanda 
Graham, personal communication, August 26, 2020). Indigenous Peoples 
are Permanent Participants of Arctic Council. In this light, Arctic Council 
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facilitates and promotes full consultation rights on negotiations and deci-
sions which impact Arctic Indigenous Peoples through participation from 
the Permanent Participants. It is important to note that, most often, the 
results of Arctic Council deliberations do serve as a “moral guide” (term 
coined by Amanda Graham, personal communication, August 26, 2020) 
for participating countries on research issues impacting Arctic regions. 
How does the circumpolar research region engage with Indigenous Peoples 
and humans from the Alaska and Yukon region in areas such as sustain-
able development and environmental protections? Western research has 
provided many publications on Indigenous history, cosmology, epistemol-
ogies, and stories. With respect to decolonising the institution of Arctic 
Council towards the inclusion of Indigenous research methodologies, how 
do Indigenous Peoples define social, economic, and culture laws of engage-
ment for issues of arising out of Arctic Council research?
As stated, Arctic Council does provide a permanent forum for Arctic 
Indigenous research concerns and, in this light, can advance Indigenous 
research for participating countries. Permanent Participants are part of the 
Arctic Council table and are given voice and time in Arctic Council round-
tables and discussions. Arctic Council and Permanent Participant deliber-
ations and declarations do influence local, regional, and federal research 
initiatives, policies, and programs such as the International Arctic Science 
Committee and the International Arctic Social Science Association (IASSA), 
as well as local and community-based research entities such as the inde-
pendent Arctic Institute of Community-Based Research out of Whitehorse, 
Yukon Territory, Canada. In light of all this, the National Research Council 
of Canada calls for rigor regarding research standards and here is where 
the contact and colonisation history of Indigenous Peoples comes into play. 
Without repeating historical injustices such as land displacement, language 
loss, children and family connections severed, cultural ceremonies severed, 
recall that Goldbelt Heritage Foundation Elders collectively found their 
way through the tough conversations as they spoke to each other in their 
languages, using their ceremonies, and living their culture. Through this 
process, Tlingit knowledge was expressed in the Tlingit language, using 
Tlingit methods towards sustaining Tlingit knowledge. Collectively, and in 
their heritage languages, the Tlingit found their way back to their ancestors 
and were able to state that: “Before the great floods they’d already been 
through a lot” (Goldbelt Heritage Foundation Elders, Boarding School 
deliberations, 2016). In moments of despair, the Elders recalled what their 
ancestors endured over ten thousand years ago. Tlingit had been written out 
of history and what replaced Tlingit history was dominant culture history 
(English). Historically, Tlingit have been in this place since Raven released 
the sun, moon, and stars because Raven wanted the sun, moon, and stars. 
Tlingit use repetition as a way to teach values; Tlingit worldview is circular; 
advancing, going back, ebbing, flowing, dynamically, and in spirals. The 
difference is between inductive and deductive reasoning.  Indigenous thought 
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is inductive, from the earth, sky, the unseen, the unknown (Bernie Johnson, 
personal communication, August 16, 2020). Bernie Johnson is 75 and a deep 
Southern Tutchone thinker—Bernie has chosen not to live conventionally—
he is a drifter. Bernie also noted that western thinking is in blocks, squares—
Indigenous thought is in circles, spirals—the circle can fit in the square, but 
there are still the unknown parts. The square cannot fit in the circle (when 
it comes to translating Indigenous knowledge for science, research, writ-
ing). As declared in Canada, Indigenous research engagement protocols are 
intended to support, not replace a direct relationship with Indigenous Peoples 
(Assembly of First Nations, 2009).
Hence, what does this mean with respect to how public and research 
institutions display and use Indigenous knowledge? Often outside authors 
are celebrated for what they publish on local Indigenous experiences, his-
tory, peoples, and politics. At the public institution level, it should be the 
local history that is displayed, and the resources developed around those 
local experiences should be viewed as supports, not as replacements of local 
Indigenous knowledge. Using modern research methods, the author and/
or researcher is celebrated, and the multitudes of Indigenous Elders and 
knowledge bearers remain unnamed in author bylines.
In the application of an Indigenous research paradigm, the research 
question must involve the community right from the start. Research ques-
tions must place equal research value on Indigenous knowledge, languages, 
histories, and philosophies and engage with local Indigenous Peoples, 
especially when it comes to the formation and plans towards the research 
question itself. Research needs to be authenticated by Indigenous Peoples 
themselves (time to go away and discuss the research question, as well to 
define Indigenous enquiry and levels of research involvement). Most often, 
when there are research gaps with local Elders or traditional teachings, the 
research solution is to oversimplify or generalise specific and place-based 
knowledge. One of the current solutions to overcome this scenario is to ask 
a First Nation individual who is willing to volunteer time to come forward 
and address the issue. The term “volunteer” is used as the rate of honoraria 
for Indigenous knowledge inclusion is often not on par with modern expert 
inclusion.
Given new research on Indigenous Peoples by Indigenous Peoples what 
do Indigenous research instruments and research analysis look like today? 
There are now a growing number of Indigenous Peoples holding doctoral 
degrees, which could potentially level the research playing field as these 
doctoral degree holders can apply for research dollars and be Principal 
Investigators in matters which pertain to Indigenous Peoples. Past research 
has really paved the way to help develop and review how Indigenous research-
ers think today. In 1999, Indigenous researcher and author, Linda Smith 
recommended that Indigenous Peoples decolonise their methodologies.
Against today’s social climate, Indigenous Peoples are still finding them-
selves being othered (Smith, 1999) in constructs and trade fields which clearly 
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are the intellectual and cultural property of Indigenous Peoples. In 2000, 
Shawn Wilson said that Indigenous research paradigms include building 
respectful relationships, being responsible, and giving back. In 2005, Ray 
Barnhardt and Oscar Kawagley brought our attention to ideas of deep cul-
ture. In 2007, Beth Leonard wrote that the Indigenous research paradigms 
need to incorporate those elements not seen (intangible power); and Leonard 
further states, that the English language does not do an adequate job of 
translating intangible power as expressed through Indigenous histories, 
stories, oratories, medicine, and more. From 2015 to 2017, coastal Tlingit 
Elders wanted to set the stage on what is important to them; and to research 
and analyse elements of culture that will help boarding and mission school 
survivors and those that have been impacted by elements of contact and 
colonisation to relearn Tlingit dialects and language, know the Tlingit cul-
ture and history stories, and know deeply who are the Tlingit people. Tlingit 
people want to invest in research projects which build on their individual 
and collective identities while articulating and using cultural constructs 
that are based on their deep cultural values (Shorty, 2016). Tlingit people 
are seeking to heal themselves with their ancestors, lands, histories, heritage 
languages, cultures, worldviews, politics, learning and teaching methods, 
research, and data collection (Goldbelt Heritage Foundation Elders, per-
sonal communications, 2015-2017).
Sustainable Indigenous methods that plan forward by looking back 
include heritage language, include Youth and Elders to ensure that the 
“words of the Elders do not fall upon the ground” (G. Davis in Dauenhauer 
& Dauenhauer, 1981), and a time for healing (Goldbelt Heritage Foundation, 
NAGPRA discussions, 2017). Sustaining Indigenous knowledge methodolo-
gies allows for time on the land or sea with Indigenous adults, youth, Elders, 
and knowledge bearers. As demonstrated through Indigenous Peoples his-
tories, acceptance is key to moving on. When Indigenous Peoples speak 
their language with one another, they are sustaining Indigenous knowledge 
and are working collaboratively and in their traditional ways. Land and 
food sovereignty reveal place-based research, ceremonies, philosophies, 
methodologies, and subject matter experts. In order to heal the impact of 
colonisation, Indigenous Peoples must be able to speak and think in their 
heritage languages and to make a life as an expert in their fields of study. As 
exemplified by the researcher’s primary Indigenous research experiences, 
reconciliation of Indigenous Peoples to their culture, language, and tradi-
tions through public institutions can occur with careful, mindful, inclusive 
planning and dialogue lasting for more than two years.
When public school teachers of science sat with Tlingit Elders to copro-
duce knowledge on Kindergarten to Grade Twelve science, the center of the 
dialogue was worldview. Western or modern science at the public-school 
level addressed learning points that are not typically included in Tlingit 
“scientific” learning situations. One example was with hot rocks. Tlingit 
used rocks to cook their foods, when they cooked in wood or willow vessels. 
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The lesson was a chemistry lesson on specific-heat capacity: focusing on the 
types of woods or barks needed to make food containers, the kinds of weave 
to make the vessels watertight, the types of hot rocks needed to withstand 
cold to gradually cooking water. The science lesson asked the learners to 
make deductions on how the cooking rocks are formed, the heat transfer, 
the heat density (S.T., 2017, rough notes for Food Tools of Our Ancestors). 
Indigenous science brought forward clan-owned stories which were related 
to “hot rocks” and demonstrated how long this particular Tlingit clan have 
been in this particular area. As can be seen from the hot rock exercise, the 
coproduction of knowledge between schoolteachers and Elders can provide 
full circle, progressive, thinking on trends, solutions or recommendations 
with respect to Indigenous knowledge sustainability in a public-school 
context. Elders are utilised for sharing their knowledge on cooking rocks 
and food sovereignty and for their proficiency with philosophies, relevant 
cultural activities, language, and long-ago land connections. What is not 
written are the spaces for this lesson to occur. This lesson would take place 
outside with parents, children, youth, Elders, and teachers, including com-
munity specialists, all working together to co-produce knowledge in the 
area of fire rock cooking.
The coproduction of knowledge in curriculum writing processes can pro-
vide vital cultural and scientific knowledge which can inform contemporary 
Indigenous challenges such as wind energy, food sustainability, and mineral 
extraction.
Discussion
A glimpse at Canadian policies on Indigenous Peoples reveals laws that 
greatly disrupted Indigenous connections to family, heritage languages, 
history, land, oratory, place names, philosophies, and values. Contact and 
colonisation have negatively impacted many Indigenous Peoples through 
loss of heritage languages, through the lack of public space for cultural 
practices, through the loss of families, and identities. Because Indigenous 
knowledge, culture, and language have been lost through laws, boarding 
schools, and genocide, Indigenous philosophies, and worldviews may be 
incomplete: if one believes that culture is in understanding the context and 
details of Indigenous languages and thoughts.
Indigenous culture specialists, Elders, and non-Indigenous subject experts 
have tried to Indigenise science constructs and have found that through this 
process Indigenous constructs tend to remain subordinate to modern sub-
ject ideals and constructs (Goldbelt Heritage Foundation Elders, Hero’s 
Journey with public schoolteachers’ discussions, 2017). The attempt to make 
Indigenous knowledge fit into western research constructs for the purpose 
of the scholarship process often highlights what is present in literature and 
what is absent in the process. For instance, some course objectives have 
learning outcomes which include Indigenous focuses, and these outcomes 
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remain silent on the laws and protocols that Indigenous Peoples follow 
when they are working with their culture. This lack of direction for working 
with culture, laws, protocols, and language processes in a modern context is 
quite concerning, especially when researchers come to Arctic communities 
with their research guidelines already set out.
Tlingit people, through their own research process, ensure that there are 
clan-balanced Elder and knowledge bearer tables formed specifically to 
“unpack” the task at hand. Collectively, Tlingit informs Tlingit thought, 
meaning no one person speaks for all. Tlingit speaking protocols ensure 
validation of what is being said. Clans speak to each other, weaving in his-
tory, land, oratory, and sacredness in their speeches. Research tables and 
discussions lasting more than two years often lead to Indigenous languages 
and thought application, deeper personal and professional understand-
ings, values application, ancient and modern oratory, history, and social 
justice (Goldbelt Heritage Foundation Elders, Tlingit Boarding School 
discussions, 2015-2017). Dedicated research time and funds ensure that 
Indigenous and western research processes, which are often in opposition 
to one another, co-exist. Indigenous culture is oral. Written and non-written 
forms of Alaska and Yukon First Nations do record history through clan 
emblems, totem poles, personal names, place names. Without fluent Elder 
leadership or place-based significance, it is easy to teach Indigenous sub-
ject matter out of sequence or as myth. Indigenous Peoples pass on culture 
and knowledge through their clans and tribes, languages and lived expe-
riences, place, and now through schools, both public and higher learning. 
Indigenous knowledge are collective and are often clan-owned and oper-
ated. Indigenous Peoples are actively teaching themselves about who they 
are on their own terms, with their own timelines. Alaska and Yukon Peoples 
continue to trace the development of their worldviews through their com-
munication with each other, about past, present, and future times. In each 
of these contexts, Indigenous history and oratory, which have been con-
structed since time immemorial, are drawn upon in relation to the cultural 
context in which history and oratory is situated.
Those Elders who are fluent in their Indigenous languages and thoughts 
and who have been raised by their grandparents carry with them an authen-
tic worldview which is based on the authentic teachings of their ancestors 
in their languages and with its culture. This authentic worldview embed-
ded in Tlingit methods does contribute to an understanding of Indigenous-
led research processes which embrace Indigenous research agendas for the 
express purpose of sustaining Indigenous knowledge through Indigenous 
research, Indigenous philosophies, Indigenous methods, and Indigenous 
healing. Indigenous Elders know that Indigenous knowledge must stand on 
its own because everything is interconnected. Indigenous knowledge is tied 
to Indigenous languages and is place-based and eco-specific (Barnhardt 
& Kawagley, 2005; Leonard, 2007; Topkok, 2015). Indigenous Peoples 
want time and resources to reconcile with their language, culture, and 
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philosophies (Elders Boarding School Dialogue, Tlingit Clan Conference, 
September 2019). Public dedicated space and time for Elders and Indigenous 
languages will assist Indigenous Peoples methodologies on healing and 
reconciling who are Indigenous Peoples in light of what has happened to 
them (Goldbelt Heritage Foundation, Youth and Elders dialogue, 2017). 
Using an Indigenous research lens, Indigenous women recognise that gen-
dered discussions include girls, women; men and boys; babies, and Elders 
(Empowering Indigenous Women Workshop, March 2018). Indigenous 
women want to have their voices include men and boys as Indigenous 
constructs are balanced. Co-constructed research agendas, including the 
preparation for the collaboration itself, will ensure the growth and sustain-
ability of Indigenous knowledge and heritage languages at all research and 
implementation levels. Based on the presentation of Indigenous research 
practice, it is noted that Indigenous research methods deviate from west-
ern research practices because most often, Indigenous knowledge databases 
are formed at the time of needing the Indigenous data. Modern research 
processes uphold the literature and peer review processes. The Indigenous 
scholarship process requires local and place-based rigor with regard to 
how Indigenous knowledge is presented (Empowering Indigenous Women 
Workshop, March 2018). Researchers need to meet on Indigenous home-
lands where the topics being researched are located. Researchers must 
respect the interplay between Indigenous Peoples, lands, and Indigenous 
foods (Snowchange Cooperative, 2017).
With respect to engagement and co-production of Indigenous knowledge, 
there is a need for co-operation and a deeper analysis of what collaboration 
and coproduction looks like. In the area of food, plants, medicines, arts, 
culture, peoples, and knowledge, local Indigenous knowledge cannot be 
replaced with secondary resources.
Many Arctic Indigenous Peoples are recognising that knowledge and 
product appropriation continues to occur at alarming rates. For instance, 
Indigenous medicines such as willow bark are being marketed for profit by 
health and food scientists. These marketed items are copyrighted to the mar-
keter, not to the Indigenous knowledge keepers. Ethically, any Indigenous 
research should ensure healing from contact and colonisation by embracing 
Indigenous language, methods, sovereignty, and worldviews. At the practi-
tioner stage, the researcher or teacher of Indigenous knowledge is a facili-
tator of Indigenous and place-based knowledge as opposed to a gatekeeper 
of knowledge. Indigenous knowledge activities and research must be cul-
turally relevant as well as seasonal to honor the various harvesting events 
(eulachan, herring eggs, seaweed, berries, salmon). The facilitator ensures 
meaningful Indigenous engagement (no tokenism) by ensuring the speak-
ers are clan balanced. The facilitator ensures that Indigenous spirituality 
is incorporated by ensuring cultural laws and protocols are followed. The 
facilitator ensures that all contribute to the understanding of Indigenous-
led research processes which embrace Indigenous research agendas for the 
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express purpose of sustaining Indigenous knowledge through Indigenous 
research, Indigenous philosophies, Indigenous methods, and Indigenous 
healing. To coproduce, learn, and teach Indigenous languages and knowledge 
is to address systemic discrimination in public institutions. Discussions that 
embrace culture, language, and policy will bring up dialogue on, and memo-
ries of, land, language, and family losses. Sustaining Indigenous knowledge 
means that modern research processes must allow for time and resources for 
Indigenous Peoples to reconcile their histories, lands, and languages amongst 
themselves. The coproduction of knowledge with other knowledge occurs 
after Indigenous Peoples have had time to go away and discuss matters at 
hand. Through this process of internal dialogue, Indigenous learning frame-
works will form the basis for further work in articulating what is Indigenous 
knowledge for the purpose of influencing Indigenous lives, cultural endeav-
ors, public and post-secondary schooling, and further research (Goldbelt 
Heritage Foundation Elders, Tlingit Science Framework discussions, March 
2016). Unpacking Indigenous stories brings forward ancestors’ knowledge 
and wisdom, strength of Elders, ideas of Land, working together (Sealaska 
Heritage Foundation, Core Cultural Values Poster). Dialogue and research 
amongst Indigenous Peoples must allow time for healing (Goldbelt Heritage 
Foundation Elders, Native American Graves Repatriation Act discussions, 
2017). To engage with Indigenous Elders at the local level will produce new 
knowledge, research tools, and processes, on what is Indigenous thinking on 
Indigenous learning frameworks about the ancestors, the values, the land, 
the environment, the foods, the non-tangible, the tangible, and the history.
For many Indigenous Elders, Indigenous Peoples need to teach 
Indigenous constructs, especially if Indigenous Peoples are reconciling 
and sustaining Indigenous knowledge and languages which are based on 
the past and for the purpose of future children and grandchildren (Tlingit 
Elders, Boarding School discussions, 2015–2017). Protocols and laws on the 
handling of Indigenous knowledge and languages for public institution use 
by Indigenous and non-Indigenous educators is an area that will need explo-
ration and definition. Perhaps Indigenous Peoples prefer to keep this area 
grey due to ideas about power in the unknown.
Conclusion
Ancestral knowledge provides the background, the research, the scholar-
ship to knowing who the Indigenous Peoples of Alaska and Yukon are. As 
evidenced in coproduced research tables, when Indigenous Peoples work in 
their culture and speak their languages, their philosophies, values, lands, 
and identities are revealed. Sustaining Indigenous knowledge means that 
Indigenous Peoples speak and think in their languages and acknowledge 
that their languages connect them to a deeper understanding of who they 
are, in context to themselves, society, and the Arctic. Arctic research tables 
must continue to host workshops to explore the question of how to be more 
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inclusive of Arctic Indigenous research at discussions, conferences, work-
shops, meetings. As Indigenous Peoples rebuild and reconfirm their lan-
guages and societies, there is acute awareness about gaping social and land 
wounds resulting from colonisation (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of Canada, 2015). In spite of this tumultuous past, this chapter suggests how 
scholarship and research can engage with Indigenous Elders and knowledge 
bearers about renewable Arctic economies, including Indigenous knowl-
edge sharing and research processes. Indigenous Peoples want to invest in 
research projects which build on their individual and collective identities 
while articulating and using cultural constructs that are based on the deep 
cultural values of their respective cultures. Research needs to be authenti-
cated by Indigenous Peoples themselves (time to go away and collectively dis-
cuss the research question, as well to define Indigenous levels of involvement, 
including supports to bridge levels of involvement). With respect to tradi-
tional knowledge and its intended purpose, how does the circumpolar region 
engage with the human dimension in the Arctic? What will our research 
instruments and research analysis look like? What will our time together 
grow? How is our research ethic of “do no harm” implemented to concepts 
like traditional knowledge? Traditional knowledge is an oral construct 
and is exact (don’t add anything in and don’t take anything away3). Using 
Indigenous constructs, traditional knowledge is based on oral history and 
there are rules and laws for using traditional knowledge. Within Indigenous 
knowledge there are concepts of ownership, jurisdiction, and processes for 
working among the people. A basic philosophy about Indigenous knowl-
edge is that the accumulation of Indigenous knowledge is for the benefit 
of future generations. Philosophies, methods, and heritage languages con-
tribute to an understanding of Indigenous-led research processes, which 
embrace Indigenous research agendas for the express purpose of sustaining 
Indigenous knowledge about who are the Indigenous Peoples of this land. In 
conclusion, why did the ancestors leave migration and glacial stories behind? 
One answer might be, so that their great-grandchildren would know where 
to go and would know what to do when the ice and floods come again.
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9 Toward socially sustainable 
renewable energy projects through 
involvement of local communities
Normative aspects and practices  
on the ground
Karin Buhmann, Paul Bowles, Dorothée Cambou, 
Anna-Sofie Hurup Skjervedal, & Mark Stoddart
Introduction
While scientists’ warnings about climate change and their calls for urgent 
action are gradually coming to be accepted by politicians and regulators 
across the globe, the implications of a warmer climate are particularly fast 
and acute for the Arctic. This has spurred projects in Arctic countries to 
shift to low-carbon energy sources, in particular wind, hydro and solar 
power (Business Index North, 2017; McCauley, Heffron, Pavlenko, Rehner, 
& Holmes, 2016). While these forms of energy are renewable and therefore 
environmentally sustainable in a narrow sense, decisions on their locations 
have caused a range of protests by local communities including Indigenous 
groups. The protests are typically fueled by concerns over the social and/
or environmental implications of the projects. On the one hand, the pro-
jects may offer jobs and economic development. On the other hand, they are 
seen as posing new risks for people living in the Arctic. Just because energy 
sources are renewable, this does not mean they are free from adverse social 
impacts or that they are regarded as socially acceptable. Developing and 
storing energy from renewable sources like wind and the sun depends on 
technical solutions, some of which in turn depend upon minerals, including 
rare earth elements (REE), copper or cobalt. In many countries, but par-
ticularly in the global South, issues of labor conditions and the environmen-
tal impacts of mining and the processing of minerals are well-documented. 
As deposits of such minerals in the global South are becoming depleted, 
and the Arctic increasingly more accessible due to the changing climate, 
Arctic countries are emerging as potent sources of minerals for the global 
production of wind and solar energy technologies and batteries for stor-
ing renewable energy. Scaling up renewable energy infrastructure is in line 
with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 13 on urgent action to combat 
climate change and its impacts, as well as SDG 7 on access to affordable, 
reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all (UN, 2015a). However, the 
texts of the Paris Climate Change Accord and the Sustainable Development 
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Goals recognise that the transition to a low-carbon economy should be 
implemented with respect for human rights (UN, 2015a, 2015b).
There is often a close connection between harmful environmental and social 
impacts. This is recognised by the inclusion of social aspects in environmen-
tal impact assessment processes (Esteves and al., 2012; Nenasheva, Bickford, 
Lesser, Koivurova, & Kankaanpaa, 2015). Likewise, the Aarhus Convention 
(UN, 1998) on public participation in environmental decision-making includes 
health aspects. The connection carries over into debates on injustice and dis-
proportional burdens carried by certain groups, including Indigenous peo-
ples, in the interest of others (see also the chapter by Cambou and Polzer in this 
volume). Environmental injustice is a situation where specific social groups 
disproportionately bear the risks or negative impacts of development projects 
(Mohai, Pellow, & Roberts, 2009). Similarly, an emerging energy justice lit-
erature defines energy injustice as a situation where the benefits and negative 
impacts of energy projects are disproportionately distributed and where those 
who are impacted by energy development are not able to fully participate in 
the decision making and planning that affects their communities (McCauley 
et al., 2016). Social expectations as well as national and international legal 
norms require that renewable energy projects include meaningful engagement 
with local communities that are or can be affected by a project. With varia-
tions across the Arctic, local law and regulations require companies to assess 
the environmental and other societal impacts of their planned projects and 
address adverse impacts, while local governments are required to organise con-
sultation processes (Nenasheva et al., 2015). International soft law guidance 
issued by the United Nations (UN) and OECD require impact assessments 
and measures to address adverse impacts to be undertaken with meaningful 
engagement of potential or actual victims of harmful impacts (Buhmann, 2016; 
Ruggie, 2013). Referring to those whose human rights are or can be adversely 
affected by projects, the term “affected stakeholders” applied by the UN and 
OECD instruments includes a strong focus on rights-holders. Public demands 
to become part of the planning and decision-making processes increase as 
advances in technology enable access to information on projects and enable 
those affected to effectively organise to respond to such projects (Buxton & 
Wilson, 2013). Such demands reflect an expectation that impact assessments 
involve stakeholder engagement that is meaningful from the perspective of 
those affected by the project. Theory and practice recognise that processes 
for engaging local communities and other affected stakeholders in decision- 
making are conditions for making good decisions (Forester, 1989; Parenteau, 
1988; Pearce, Edwards, & Beuret, 1979; Tauxe, 1995; Webler, Kastenholz, & 
Renn, 1995). As exemplified below in the section on stakeholder engagement, 
experience across the Arctic testifies to the need for stronger engagement by 
companies and governments with consultation processes in order to identify 
and address concerns from the local perspective.
The urgency of mitigating climate change and meeting the thresholds of the 
Paris Climate Change Agreement are legitimate needs recognised by a global 
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society. However, when actions taken in response to that urgency are pitched 
against equally legitimate interests of communities and Indigenous groups 
related to their traditions and foundations for their own sustainable econo-
mies, then complexity increases. Further complexity is added by impacts on 
employment and rights to participate in decision-making, for example through 
consultations and other forms of impact assessment involving meaningful 
stakeholder engagement. Some Arctic countries have recognised the right of 
Indigenous groups to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), but others have 
not. Handling climate change exacerbates moral dilemmas as communities 
in one area are being placed under social or environmental pressures in the 
larger global interest. The essence of the moral dilemma is that opposition to 
a project (for example by an Indigenous community in one place due to risks 
to their traditional lifestyles) may place other communities in far-away places 
under increased risk of climate-change-related harm (such as flooding). As one 
Sápmi leader said in June 2019 to the lead author of this chapter, it is a funda-
mental moral question that challenges conventional perceptions of balancing 
interests and rights. This emergent challenge is currently under-researched. 
This chapter contributes to addressing this gap by exploring the issue of stake-
holder involvement in regard to renewable energy projects, in the recognition 
that involvement is often the key to solving difficult dilemmas.
In a global perspective, research-based knowledge on what makes 
stakeholder engagement meaningful is limited (Maher & Buhmann, 2019; 
Skjervedal, 2018; Zoomers & Otsuki, 2017). In turn this raises several 
sub-questions, including what makes a process “good” and how involved 
organisations can turn formal requirements and top-down approaches into 
meaningful engagement from the perspective of local communities. We con-
tribute by addressing the issue in an Arctic context, drawing on a series of 
cases of stakeholder involvement that illustrate varieties of perceptions of 
processes on the ground, and analysing these against normative foundations. 
Selected cases from Arctic countries serve to identify what constitutes mean-
ingful stakeholder engagement through “stories” of what works well and 
what does not work well or is perceived by Arctic communities as inadequate.
The chapter applies an interdisciplinary approach. Grounded within the 
social sciences, the chapter relies on legal, sociological and general social 
science and communication studies methods for analysis of political and 
normative foundations through document-based studies and fieldwork.
Background
The normative interface between climate change mitigation 
and socially sustainable economic activities
On a global scale, a connection between social sustainability and renewable 
energy is recognised in theory as well as in political agreements on sustaina-
ble development. While climate change and adequate responses are pressing 
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challenges for all societies, responses involve navigating conflicting social 
priorities (Hoffmann, 2011; Hulme, 2009). The introductions to the decla-
rations that embody the SDGs and the Paris Climate Change Agreement 
explicitly note that the transition to a more holistically sustainable and 
low-carbon economy must be accomplished with respect for social impacts, 
in particular human rights (UN, 2015a, 2015b). SDG 17 on partnerships 
explicitly notes that SDG implementation must not cause harm, and the 
Paris Agreement refers to responsibilities for human rights, including those 
of affected local communities and vulnerable groups.
The SDG implementation provisions explicitly refer to the United Nations 
Guiding Principles (UNGPs) on Business and Human Rights (UN, 2011). 
These are a set of globally applicable guidelines for how states and com-
panies should act to avoid human rights harm related to business opera-
tions. Due to the comprehensiveness of human rights, this includes social 
and many environmental risks or impacts caused by economic activities. 
Jointly with the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (UN, 2008) (a 
UN study which provides a theory-based foundation for business respect for 
human rights), the UNGPs are considered current state of the art concerning 
business respect for human rights (Wettstein, 2012). They advance “human 
rights due diligence” as a management approach for companies to identify 
and manage their adverse impacts on society. It is clearly stated that impact 
assessment undertaken as part of the due diligence process should build on 
meaningful stakeholder consultation, especially with “affected stakehold-
ers,” including communities and individuals affected by proposed or actual 
projects. Under the term “risk-based due diligence,” this approach has been 
adopted by several transnational business governance instruments, including 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD, 2011) and the 
IFC’s performance standards which inform the Equator Principles. Applied 
by more than 30 export credit agencies and more than 90 banks and financial 
institutions, the Equator Principles have the capacity to influence decisions 
to fund renewable energy projects in many places, including the Arctic. The 
OECD’s Guidelines apply to companies operating in or out of the currently 
48 adhering states. As all Arctic countries except Russia are OECD mem-
bers, and because the Guidelines’ definition of “multinational” is inclusive, 
the Guidelines cover most companies and institutional investors involved in 
renewable energy across the Arctic. Testifying to the importance of involving 
stakeholders as part of the due diligence process, the OECD in 2017 issued 
guidance for the implementation of the Guidelines for meaningful stake-
holder engagement in the extractive sector (OECD, 2017). Underscoring the 
Arctic relevance, translation into the Sámi language was published in 2019.
Impact assessment and meaningful stakeholder engagement
Theory and practice on social impact assessment is evolving in response 
to the confluence of established theory-supported best practice on social 
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impact assessment, and emergent normative standards on human rights 
impact assessment (Vanclay & Esteves, 2011; Harrison, 2013).
Impact assessment is a process that involves scoping, assessing and mitigat-
ing impacts, often implemented through a permit conditional on the impact 
assessment being undertaken (Esteves, Franks, & Vanclay, 2012; Vanclay, 
2003). Risk-based due diligence has come to be associated with impact assess-
ments because this due diligence approach aims at preventing harm, miti-
gating harm that is inevitable (typically already occurring), and accounting 
for processes to do so (UN, 2011; Buhmann, 2018a). Meaningful stakeholder 
engagement is an integral element in a sound impact assessment process as 
well as in activities to monitor, follow up and adjust action to prevent or mit-
igate adverse impacts. As the OECD Guidance (2017:18) notes, “Stakeholders 
themselves can contribute important knowledge to help identify potential or 
actual impacts on themselves or their surroundings. The values and priorities 
of impacted stakeholders are vital considerations in evaluating impacts and 
identifying appropriate avoidance or mitigation steps.”
Indeed, stakeholder participation is an essential qualitative component 
of an impact assessment process (Nenasheva et al., 2015). Involving affected 
stakeholders in line with the normative foundations of the UNGPs and the 
OECD Guidelines means that communities affected by projects related to 
renewable energy should be consulted in a meaningful manner, and their 
concerns addressed. Explicating implications for specific contexts, imple-
mentation guidance for the IFC performance standards notes, i.a., that
Nomadic peoples may have rights—whether legal or customary—to 
pass through client-controlled land periodically or seasonally, for sub-
sistence and traditional activities. Their rights may be linked to certain 
natural resources such as […] herds of migratory animals […]. In its due 
diligence, the client should establish whether nomadic peoples have such 
rights, and, if possible, with the safeguards mentioned above, the client 
should allow them to exercise these rights on company-controlled land.
(IFC, 2012, GN63)
Aiming to prevent social harm, risk-based due diligence differs from con-
ventional financial or legal due diligence that firms have long performed 
with the aim of preventing harm to the firm (Buhmann, 2018a). Meaningful 
stakeholder engagement with affected communities can benefit not only 
the community but also the involved company and government agencies 
(Udofia, Noble, & Poelzer, 2017). If done well it can help companies retain a 
“social licence to operate” that facilitates current and future operations and 
expansions, contributes to early identification of risks of adverse impacts 
at the site of operations or supply chains, and helps avoid the costs of con-
flict arising from lost productivity due to temporary shutdowns and senior 
personnel time being diverted to manage grievances (OECD, 2017, p. 14; 
Ruggie, 2013; Kapoor, 2001).
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In some Arctic countries environmental impact assessments include 
broader societal aspects, such as impacts on health, employment, traditions 
and business operations (Nenasheva et al., 2015). Explicitly granted for 
Indigenous populations by ILO Convention 169, stakeholder engagement 
may be considered an extension of the human rights to participation in pub-
lic decision-making affecting one’s life (Mestad, 2002). Applying to envi-
ronmentally related social issues, the Aarhus Convention grants citizens a 
right to popular participation that includes access to information, access 
to dialogue with authorities granting permits, and access to remedy. Yet, 
despite the international and national normative framework for stakeholder 
engagement, several recent incidents across the Arctic demonstrate that 
stakeholders often do not perceive their involvement in processes related to 
renewable energy to be adequate or meaningful.
Proposed or implemented mining projects have led to local conflicts in 
Northern Scandinavia (Bjørst, 2016; Hansen, Vanclay, Croal, & Skjervedal, 
2016; Lindahl, Johansson, Zachrisson, & Viklund, 2018). Studies from other 
regions show that such conflicts can be devastating to the local community 
and undermine support from other stakeholders (Bebbington et al., 2008; 
Rodríguez-Labajos & Özkaynak, 2017). The adequacy of involvement by 
local communities and Indigenous groups and peoples in Arctic economic 
development projects has been questioned (Abram, 2016; Cambou, 2018). In 
Eastern Canada, protests around large-scale hydro-power projects testify to 
concern with environmental health and safety risks to Indigenous commu-
nities in Labrador and Newfoundland. In British Columbia, First Nations 
and others have protested the consultation processes and impacts related to 
various renewable energy projects. This is also the case in northern Fenno-
Scandinavia, where Sámi communities have challenged decisions concern-
ing the establishment of local wind project. In Greenland, new ideas have 
surfaced for involving youths in decisions that will ultimately affect their 
futures. In the following sections, we provide more details on some of these 
conflicts and developments concerning meaningful stakeholder engagement.
Stakeholder engagement on the ground
Sápmi
In Norway and Sweden, Indigenous involvement in energy projects in the 
Arctic parts of those countries has been a question of controversy for many 
years. Historically, large-scale hydroelectric projects spurred the first open 
conflicts between the Nordic governments and the Sámi people (Cambou 
& Polzer, 2020). In this context, the involvement of Sámi communities was 
often overlooked and their traditional livelihoods seriously impaired by the 
development of energy projects promoted by the nation states.
In the twenty-first century, the situation of the Sámi people has signifi-
cantly evolved as a result of the adoption of international and national laws 
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recognising their rights as a minority and an Indigenous people (Allard & 
Skogvang, 2017; Bankes & Koivurova, 2013). Yet, the impacts of projects 
related to a low-carbon transition continue to jeopardise their traditional 
livelihoods. In Northern Norway, the Nussir copper mine epitomises the 
dilemma faced by the Government of Norway between protecting the pris-
tine ecosystem and providing the country with a mineral required for batter-
ies for electric cars. However, for local Sámi reindeer herders, the project also 
means the potential loss of reindeer herding grazing pastures and the distur-
bance of the migration of reindeer and salmon fishing grounds (Koivurova 
et al., 2015, p. 32). The Sámi Parliament in Norway has opposed the Nussir 
project due to the lack of consultation with Sámi communities at the local 
level (Storholm, 2016). According to the UN Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Norwegian law does not comply with international 
standards on the rights of Indigenous peoples concerning consultation on 
the basis of the principle of FPIC (Human Rights Council, 2016, para. 29).
The expansion of wind power also highlights contestation over the rights 
of the Sámi people and what is entailed by meaningful stakeholder engage-
ment. The rise in wind energy projects to advance ambitious national climate 
goals has raised important concerns among Sámi reindeer herding com-
munities. The establishment of several wind energy projects, often large-
scale, has been contested due to their adverse effects on reindeer pasture 
and migration (Cambou, 2018). Sámi reindeer herding communities have 
criticised and lodged legal protests against such projects due to their lack 
of meaningful consultation or loss of income due to participation in con-
sultations (Cambou, 2018; Buhmann, 2018b). They also oppose wind energy 
projects because they do not benefit their communities and paradoxically 
also threaten the sustainability of their traditional livelihoods. Decisions 
by courts note the need for a collaborative effort to overcome the potential 
difficulties associated with the co-existence of both activities. Related to 
a Norwegian wind turbine project affecting a Sámi village in Sweden, the 
complaints institution to the OECD Guidelines underlines the responsibil-
ity of the company to engage with Sámi reindeer herding communities as a 
means to prevent and mitigate the adverse impact of wind projects (OECD 
Watch, 2012; Buhmann, 2018a).
These considerations underscore the need for ensuring the meaningful 
involvement of Sámi communities within energy and industrial projects 
located on their traditional lands in order to guarantee that they also reap 
some of the benefices of the energy transitions.
Greenland
Public participation in Greenland displays a contrast between solid national 
regulation and institutions, on the one hand, and the lived experience of 
meaningful stakeholder involvement, on the other (Olsen and Hansen, 2014). 
The changing climate has renewed interest in exploration and exploitation of 
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mineral resources, including hydrocarbons. The Government of Greenland 
is determined to make extractives a primary business sector, in close col-
laboration and dialogue with the country’s population (Government of 
Greenland, 2016, 2019).
Part of the Danish Kingdom, since 2009 Greenland has self-government 
with full decision-making powers in policy areas that have been claimed. 
Whereas the Inuit population, which forms the country’s majority, can be 
argued to be entitled to special protection under international law as an 
Indigenous people in regard to decisions made by the Danish Government, 
the same does not apply to decisions made by Greenlandic authorities.
While renewable energy projects in Greenland are emergent (Nukissiorfiit, 
2019), the mining sector offers insights on differences between formal require-
ments on stakeholder involvement and community perceptions of what consti-
tutes meaningful stakeholder engagement. The mining sector is re-emerging 
decades after aluminum and coal extraction closed down (Sejersen, 2014).
Greenland has not acceded to the Aarhus Convention but national pol-
icy and legislation sets high goals for public participation. In the Mineral 
Resources Act Greenland’s self-government has introduced explicit social 
sustainability assessment requirements for certain raw-material extraction 
projects (Hansen et al., 2016). The Social Impact Assessment Guidelines 
issued by the government refer to stakeholder involvement as a prerequisite 
for a good impact assessment process to promote sustainable development 
in Greenlandic society (Government of Greenland, 2016). Whereas the 
political, scientific and public debate on mineral extraction in Greenland 
has been extensive in the past decade, only two mines are currently opera-
tional (a ruby mine by a settlement of 235 inhabitants, and an aluminium 
mine located at some distance from settled areas). However, proposals to 
establish an iron mine (Isua) in the Nuuk fjord close to Greenland’s capi-
tal and a REE mine (Kuannersuit) by Narsaq town in Southern Greenland 
have sparked extensive public debate on stakeholder influence, which pro-
vides insights on what makes stakeholder involvement meaningful. The Isua 
project led to strong public mobilising to protect the fjord, led by organised 
civil society groups (Nuttall, 2012). The project was eventually called off for 
reasons that also included economic viability. The Kuannersuit project is 
still under consideration and closer to the granting of an exploration license 
than some nearby smaller REE deposits. Kuannersuit stands out by con-
taining 10% uranium that will be an unavoidable by-product of explora-
tion. This has generated concern with impacts on human and animal health 
among some locals, in particular sheep farmers, whereas others welcome 
prospects for employment. Although consultations have occurred accord-
ing to formal requirements, frustration nevertheless resulted with some 
sheep-farmers and others in the local community having a sense that the 
process was not accessible because of their locations or due to work require-
ments. The frustration was aggravated by the insecurity caused by the risk 
of uranium dust and uncertainty of actual health impacts (Buhmann et al., 
2019/2020). This example shows that conducting impact assessments by the 
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book is not enough if consultation meetings are seen to be inaccessible, and 
that complex technical and health implications must be explained in a man-
ner that makes sense from the perspective of the audience (i.e.Cunsolo & 
Ellis, 2018).
The Nordic Council has a policy of involving youth. However, studies 
show a lack of focus on engaging young people in Greenland. Such oversight 
may cause young people to miss out on having a say on project develop-
ment that will affect their futures. It may also reduce their access to relevant 
information to plan for the future in terms of education and employment 
opportunities. Research demonstrates that the use of social media as a com-
plementary communication channel enables young people to engage in pro-
ject development in a manner that is meaningful to them (Skjervedal, 2018). 
Capturing their interests, values, fears, hopes and aspirations for the future 
along with their thoughts on future extractive development in Greenland, 
this approach engaged a wide range of youth across Greenland in a manner 
they perceived as meaningful. Providing a “safe forum” for active and col-
laborative engagement, social media allowed youths to engage in their own 
time in a manner aligned with how this age group normally communicate 
and share information on a daily basis (Skjervedal, 2018).
These observations highlight the need for applying methods that are 
appropriate and relevant to specific types of stakeholders and tailoring 
the participation form(s) to the specific project, local context, and target 
groups.
Canada
While the Eastern (Atlantic) Canadian province of Newfoundland and 
Labrador sits well below the Arctic Circle, Labrador is often defined as 
a northern place due its landscape and histories of inhabitation by Inuit, 
NunatuKavut, and Innu communities (Proctor, Felt, & Natcher, 2012). The 
province is the site of the 1990s cod fishery collapse, regarded by many as 
one of the worst ecological disasters in Canadian history (Bavington, 2010). 
In the decades since the cod fishery collapse, the provincial political econ-
omy reoriented around offshore oil extraction. Given the dominance of oil 
development in provincial politics and the public imaginary, it is unsur-
prising that the province tends to resist federal government moves toward 
stronger climate policy, downplaying the responsibility of the oil sector and 
other large industry (Sodero & Stoddart, 2015).
This sets the context for understanding renewable energy transitions 
in Newfoundland and Labrador. Public discourse and planning has been 
dominated by the large-scale Muskrat Falls hydro-electric project. This new 
dam is located on the lower Churchill River in Labrador and involves a link 
across the Labrador Straits to the island of Newfoundland where it will feed 
into the provincial energy system. Muskrat Falls will allow the province to 
meet its energy needs while decarbonising the provincial energy system and 
meeting its climate change goals (Nalcor Energy, 2020).
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The project has generated considerable controversy and contention, espe-
cially from downstream Indigenous communities, including the grassroots 
movement known as the Labrador Land Protectors. The process of planning 
and approving the Muskrat Falls dam was handled by the provincial gov-
ernment in partnership with Nalcor, the public energy corporation. Many 
opponents of the project have argued that Indigenous communities were not 
appropriately consulted or engaged in the process of planning and imple-
menting this project, especially as environmental health concerns were still 
being researched and documented as the project was approved (Allen, 2017).
The negative impacts of Muskrat Falls are not only financial, which have 
been the main focus of a public inquiry. There are significant downstream 
environmental health risks. There are concerns that methylmercury from 
rotting vegetation inside the dam reservoir will flow downstream and con-
taminate fish and wildlife populations. Fish and game remain integral to 
Indigenous community diets and cultural traditions. The ability to retain 
land-based food culture is essential in a region where high food costs and 
food security are serious issues (Cox, 2019b; Penney, 2018). There are also 
concerns around slope stability related to the dam infrastructure. If dam 
infrastructure fails and collapses, then downstream communities will be 
flooded, which is a source of fear and stress (Cox, 2019a; Philpott, 2018).
Opposition to the project and calls to “Make Muskrat Right” have taken 
the form of hunger strikes and grassroots protest by the Labrador Land 
Protectors and their allies at the Muskrat Falls site, as well as at the provin-
cial legislature in St. John’s and other locations around the province (Allen, 
2017; Cox, 2019a, 2019b). On-site protests have used civil disobedience, which 
has been met with arrests and imprisonment for breaching court orders that 
restrict access to the work site. Land Protector Denise Cole has described 
protest as “an act of ceremony” and as a responsibility to Indigenous laws as 
it rejects a view of Labrador as a resource warehouse for Newfoundland and 
bears witness to the destruction of sacred spaces (Cole, 2018). Grassroots 
opposition has been amplified by formal representatives of Indigenous com-
munities, though there were also divergent responses from various commu-
nity leaders (Doherty, 2018).
The Muskrat Falls project is an example of environmental injustice and 
energy injustice, as downstream Indigenous communities are being asked 
to bear the health costs and safety risks of a mega-project that is being pro-
moted as a provincial climate change solution and core part of a renewable 
energy transition (Municipal Affairs and Environment: Climate Change 
Branch, 2011).
In contrast to Newfoundland and Labrador, British Columbia (BC) in 
Western Canada is historically a province that relies heavily on renewa-
ble energy. The province gets approximately 95% of its power from renew-
ables with hydroelectricity accounting for about 85% (National Energy 
Board, 2018) and so it is widely seen as a “green energy” province. The envi-
ronmental movement has been strong in the province for many decades, 
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indeed the “global environmental movement started in British Columbia” 
(Byers, 2012), and, in 2008, it became the first jurisdiction in North America 
to introduce a carbon tax.
Despite these contrasts with Newfoundland and Labrador there are also 
striking similarities. Just as the Muskrat Falls hydro project raised ques-
tions of environmental injustice and environmental racism in its treatment 
of Indigenous peoples, so the same issues are evident in BC’s hydro projects. 
The WAC Bennet dam, constructed in the Peace river region of northern BC 
in the 1960s, is a major contributor to hydropower but was built without the 
local Indigenous population of Kwadacha being informed, let alone con-
sulted. Their traditional territory was flooded when Williston reservoir, the 
world’s seventh largest, was formed. The livelihoods of Indigenous individ-
uals and groups were destroyed with the Kwadacha community forgotten in 
the push to develop the power source that would drive industrialisation and 
resource extraction in the northern part of the province (Loo, 2007; Stanley, 
2010). The community was promised electricity as part of the project but 
this was never honored.
This sets the historical background for the construction of the Site C dam 
in the same geographical area today, designed to further increase hydro 
capacity. The approval of this project has also proved to be contentious. 
While consultation processes did take place and there have been significant 
improvements since the 1960s when the WAC Bennet dam was constructed, 
Site C was opposed by a coalition of Indigenous groups, farmers and envi-
ronmentalists (Cox, 2018a). It is still subject to on-going legal challenge by 
the West Moberly and Prophet River First Nations with West Moberly First 
Nation’s Chief declaring the project “cultural genocide” (Cox, 2018b). The 
various review processes have been widely criticised as politically driven 
and biased in the knowledge that they viewed as important (Bakker & 
Hendriks, 2019; Muir, 2018).
Again, similar to the Newfoundland and Labrador case, the project was initi-
ated by one government and reluctantly approved by a new one on the grounds 
that sunk costs made cancellation too costly. Even when the economic case for 
the project and the impacts on Indigenous relations are recognised as problem-
atic, once started, these mega-projects become difficult to halt. This reinforces 
the need for the initial consultation processes to be thorough, transparent and 
seen as legitimate by all stakeholders and rights holders.
A further complicating factor with the Site C dam is that unspecified 
amounts of electricity from the dam will be used to develop BC’s emerging 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) export industry. Ironically, the expansion of 
renewable energy will support the expansion of fossil fuel production, in 
the form of LNG, rather than to replace it. The development of renewables 
around the Arctic therefore has also to be seen in the context of what the 
renewable energy will be used for, a question which has also arisen in the 
case of the uranium that will be a by-product from the Kuannersuit mine 
in Greenland.
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Hydro mega-projects have proven too often be contentious but there are 
smaller renewable energy projects which are much less so, including many 
involving First Nations. These include attempts by off-grid First Nations 
to replace diesel with renewables such as solar power as in the case of the 
T’Sou-Ke First Nation (Bhattacharya, 2017). Several local governments and 
Band Councils in Haida Gwaii, an island off British Columbia’s northwest 
coast, have been active in plans to reduce reliance on diesel and move to 
renewable energy sources.1 The key to these projects is that they have been 
initiated and led by local communities themselves. Higher level govern-
ments have often been facilitators by supplying needed financial support 
but the decision-making has been local community based. This provides a 
quite different model of community involvement and empowerment than 
occurs with renewable energy mega-projects.
Implications for planning and implementing 
socially sustainable renewable energy projects
These examples underscore the need to take social sustainability seriously 
in discussions and analyses of how to promote renewable energy in Arctic 
countries. This must be central in plans to expand renewal energy to both 
address climate change and provide new economic opportunities.
The Muskrat Falls controversy highlights how renewable energy transi-
tions can produce new energy injustices for local communities, in particu-
lar in the Arctic context northern Indigenous communities. Some of these, 
including Indigenous communities in Labrador, are already experiencing 
the harmful impacts of climate change more acutely than elsewhere in the 
country.
The Canadian cases also show that scale is an important factor in the 
quest for genuine community participation, involvement and ownership of 
renewable energy projects. Community participation in a way that appears 
meaningful to those affected has proven to be more feasible for smaller pro-
jects. It remains a pressing issue whether and how this can be scaled up for 
larger projects which may contribute more to combat the urgency of the 
global climate crisis.
The case of the Sámi people also highlights how the development of indus-
trial and energy projects promoting sustainable development can paradoxi-
cally jeopardise the sustainable livelihoods of Indigenous peoples. The lack 
of meaningful consultation of Sámi communities continues to loom large 
in the debate concerning the development of energy projects on their tra-
ditional lands and questions the adequacy of the legal framework of the 
Nordic countries to guarantee their rights as an Indigenous people. This 
case also demonstrates the need to integrate energy justice considerations 
in order to ensure a transition to renewable energy and economies that are 
socially sustainable and just for all.
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One of the first states to sign the ILO Convention 169, Norway was early to 
recognise the principle of FPIC. Yet, despite important legislative changes, 
the lack of meaningful consultation with the Sámi people concerning the 
development of industrial and energy projects on their traditional lands 
remains problematic. The Nussir mine case illustrates the problem when 
stakeholder consultation is perceived as an empty process. On the one hand, 
the Sámi cases demonstrate the need to improve legislative frameworks that 
ensure that the rights of the Sámi people as an Indigenous people are pro-
tected and respected by states and companies, especially when decision and 
measures concerning energy projects affects them. On the other, the Sámi 
and Greenlandic cases demonstrate that for stakeholder engagement to be 
meaningful, formal legislation must be matched by implementation and 
planning of consultations that respect existing commitments of affected 
stakeholders.
The Greenland case also highlights how broadening the range of forms 
of public participation can increase the perception of consultations as 
meaningful for those involved. Opportunities for a broad representa-
tive voice among local communities can be provided through tailoring 
the participation form(s) to the specific project, local context, and target 
groups, with a focus on creating a “safe forum’ for active and collaborative 
engagement.
The social legitimacy of renewable energy projects and the public and 
private organisations behind them require careful planning to avoid such 
injustices. This is a problem across the globe, but its acuteness hits strongly 
in the Arctic, exacerbated by past injustices between colonial settlers and 
Indigenous groups that with variations apply to all the areas discussed 
above. Moreover, the rise of conflicts in rule-of-law based Arctic states 
discomfortingly reminds us of conflicts that scholars and practitioners 
in the North often associate with countries with weak governments. Yet 
the Sápmi, Greenland and Canadian cases above all demonstrate that 
the transition from the ideals of meaningful stakeholder involvement, 
expressed in the globally applicable UNGP and elaborated through the 
OECD Guidelines and related guidance texts, is easier said than done. 
Moreover, the Greenland example illustrates that even where local law and 
regulations aim to ensure at a high level of stakeholder involvement, the 
experienced effects may be different. Jointly, the cases demonstrate that 
meaningful stakeholder engagement from the perspective of those affected 
is a core element in upholding energy justice and environmental justice in 
order to ensure that climate change solutions do not amplify other forms 
of social inequality. This also confirms findings from studies in a Global 
South context (for example, Maher & Buhmann, 2019; Zoomers & Otsuki, 
2017) that more research is needed on how to transform formal—and often 
well-intended—rules into practical application that is truly meaningful and 
effective from the bottom-up perspective.
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Conclusion
Renewable energy in the Arctic takes several forms in this chapter, includ-
ing hydro and wind power. Renewables transitions are predominantly led 
by government and corporate actors and framed in terms of technological 
and economic responses to environmental sustainability. These projects 
are often presented in pro-environmental terms of responding to climate 
change, shifting away from fossil fuels, and fitting into a governmental 
self-image of a “green society”
Contestation around renewables transition takes multiple forms, includ-
ing landscape impacts, concerns with infrastructure siting, and social 
impacts. Indigenous communities and environmental groups are actors that 
create friction and raise questions about the potential downsides of renew-
ables transitions.
Our overview shows that renewable energy projects that are promoted 
as part of necessary climate change action can have perversely negative 
impacts on community environmental health and safety as well as the tra-
ditions and income-generating activities of Arctic Indigenous groups. The 
need for energy justice underscores the importance of approaching climate 
change responses and renewable energy transitions in ways that adequately 
address local concerns and needs in a manner that is meaningful to those 
who may be adversely affected.
The urgency of mitigating climate change means a surge in renewable 
energy projects. While in line with the SDGs, in particular SDG 7 and 13, 
the examples above demonstrate the risk that such projects may cause social 
harm to local communities, including—but not limited to—Indigenous 
groups. This accentuates fundamental issues of environmental, energy and 
human rights justice, with strong connections between the environmental 
and social (including human rights) aspects. In turn, this underscores the 
pertinence of scholarship and practice considering the practical realisation 
of the SDG’s implementation provision No 67 on not causing harm and act-
ing in accordance with the UNGP’s provisions. In an Arctic context it high-
lights that compliance with rules must be complemented by practices that 
consider and respect local experiences and perceptions of impacts.
A key take-away argument of this chapter is that as circumpolar countries 
grapple with the necessities of decarbonising energy systems in response 
to climate change, we see that renewable transitions will also create new 
points of tension. Renewable does not necessarily equal socially sustainable 
or just transitions. To address this actual or potential conflict with com-
mitments under the SDG Declaration and the Paris Agreement, there is a 
need to move beyond governmental and corporate-led models of renewable 
transitions to more participatory, deliberative processes for ensuring a just 
renewables transition. Involvement of communities and other affected stake-
holders including rights-holders may help uncover alternative placements 
and local benefits. Involvement of affected stakeholders can contribute to 
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understanding and acceptance of unwelcome social impacts that are neces-
sary for the green transition in the larger interest of responding to climate 
change. It may therefore contribute to transitions that are perceived and 
accepted as socially fair under the given circumstances. Although it does 
not eliminate difficult challenges around adverse impacts, it can help alle-
viate some of the social and moral dilemmas related to urgent action to 
mitigate climate change.
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10 Enhancing energy 
justice in the Arctic
An appraisal of the participation 
of Arctic indigenous peoples in the 
transition to renewable energy
Dorothée Cambou & Greg Poelzer
Introduction
Renewable energy is a key to the transition toward a more sustainable devel-
opment. The importance of renewable energy both for mitigating the impact 
of climate change and for helping to alleviate poverty on a global scale is 
recognised widely. Policy makers also recognise its especial importance in 
the Arctic region, where temperature is warming twice as fast as the global 
average. In this context, Arctic states have placed increasing policy empha-
sis on the development of renewable energy in order to ensure a sustainable 
development of the region and recognises the importance of Arctic com-
munities’ access to energy that is not only cleaner, but also more affordable, 
accessible, and reliable (SDWG, 2019).
Yet, the full impacts—both positive and negative—of the development of 
renewable energy for Arctic Indigenous communities require much greater 
study. At the community level, scholars need to focus more attention to the 
needs and interests of Arctic communities, who remain heavily dependent 
on fossil fuels and build a program of inquiry that is systematic and com-
parative to better understand energy needs and usage within Indigenous 
communities. At regional and national levels, utility-scale renewable energy 
projects often pose a conundrum: large-scale hydro, wind, and solar pro-
jects serve to meet national objectives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; 
however, the siting of these projects are often on the traditional land and 
territories of Arctic Indigenous peoples, almost invariably infringing on 
Indigenous well-being, if not also, Indigenous rights (Lempinen & Cambou, 
2018; Cambou,2020). Thus, this situation raises clear concerns about the 
principles and considerations of basic fairness of the transition to renewable 
energy as it related to the implications for Indigenous peoples in the Arctic.
The purpose of this contribution is to examine in what extent Indigenous 
communities currently share the benefits and costs of the energy transi-
tion in the Arctic region. While all Arctic states have committed to ensure 
that “no one will be left behind in the sustainable transition” (UN General 
Assembly, 2015), this contribution questions the extent of this commitment 
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and its practical effects in relation with Arctic Indigenous peoples. In this 
regard, the analysis takes a multidisciplinary approach to the question 
while building upon the concept of energy justice with a specific focus on 
the rights of Indigenous peoples. Energy justice seeks to identify when and 
where injustices occur and just opportunities can be realised in order to 
ensure policy and legal response that contribute to a more representative and 
inclusive energy decision-making (Sovacool, Burke, Baker, Kotikalapudi, & 
Wlokas, 2017). “It calls on academics and practitioners to critically evaluate 
the implications of energy policies” and “begins with questioning the ways 
in which benefits and ills are distributed, remediated and victims are recog-
nized” (Heffron, McCauley, & Sovacool, 2015; McCauley, Heffron, Stephan, 
& Jenkins, 2013). Using the concept of energy justice, this contribution relies 
on legal, policy, and empirical arguments to demonstrate the need to take 
into account the rights of Indigenous peoples in the transition to renewa-
ble energy. In addition, the empirical study of different cases aims to pro-
vide a more nuanced analysis of the specific situation and needs of Arctic 
Indigenous communities to ensure their fair inclusion in the transition to 
renewable energy in the Arctic. For this purpose, the analysis draws upon 
different case studies and relies on various sources, including legal texts as 
well as personal observations and fieldwork experiences. Ultimately, the 
interpretation of the case studies contributes to improve knowledge about 
the progress and challenges raised by the energy transition to renewable 
energy in the Arctic context and further theorise how to ensure a transition 
that is sustainable and just for all.
In what follows, the chapter first sets out to consider the legal and pol-
icy background that links the transition to renewable energy to the social 
dimension of sustainability and the rights of Indigenous peoples. In this 
regard, Section I highlights the central tenets, rights and duties attached to 
the social commitments made by states and business to promote renewable 
energy as a means to ensure a sustainable and just transition at the inter-
national level and highlights the specific status and rights of Indigenous 
peoples in this context. Next, Section II outlines the broader contexts and 
corresponding patterns of renewable energy development in the Arctic. 
Against this backdrop, Section III examines the actual state of play of the 
energy transition and its impact on Indigenous peoples in the Arctic based 
on illustrative examples. For this purpose, the contribution examines more 
particularly the situation of Arctic communities living in Canada, Alaska, 
Russia, and in the Nordic countries of Norway and Sweden.
A just energy transition for Indigenous peoples:  
Policy and legal background
With a few exceptions, a global consensus now acknowledges that the tran-
sition from fossil fuel to renewable energy is urgent and critical to address 
climate change, ensure sustainable development and fulfil human rights. 
186 D. Cambou & G. Poelzer
Indeed, access to affordable and reliable energy is central to the fulfilment 
of basic human rights including that of life, food, shelter, health, and edu-
cation (Tully, 2006; Walker, 2015). In addition, the importance of providing 
clean energy is increasingly recognised as a baseline to ensure sustainable 
development. In this regard, the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG), which provides a set of policy commitments to ensure sus-
tainable development, recognises the central importance of affordable and 
clean energy “to nearly every major challenge and opportunity the world 
faces today” (United Nations, 2019). This is more particularly articulated in 
the implementation of SDG 7, which highlight the need to ensure “access to 
affordable, reliable, and sustainable energy,” and SDG 13, on urgent action 
to combat climate change that equally requires a transition to a new energy 
paradigm in which “flow” (renewable) energies are used and consumption is 
lower and more efficient (UN General Assembly, 2015; Council of Europe, 
2011). With the specific mention of sustainable energy in the Agenda for sus-
tainable development, the UN member states therefore recognise the global 
and urgent need for a transition to renewable energy, in order to achieve 
sustainable development and address the world’s major twenty-first century 
challenges (Calzadilla & Mauger, 2018, p. 237).
Paradoxically, however, the transition to renewable energy can also under-
mine the achievement of the SDGs and adversely affect human rights. For 
example, research has evidenced the negative impacts of large-scale renew-
able projects such as hydropower projects and biofuels production on local 
communities and Indigenous peoples as well as the environment (Zehner, 
2012; Cambou,2020). Yet, the issues concerning the social risks and justice 
concerns of renewable energy continue to be overlooked in the debate con-
cerning the sustainable transition (Calzadilla & Mauger, 2018, p. 235). In 
this context research also evidences “how major national energy policy and 
planning documents concentrate almost exclusively on energy technolo-
gies, while social considerations tend to be narrowly economic, focusing on 
energy prices, jobs and, to some extent, energy access” (Miller & Richter, 
2014, p. 76) and therefore “rarely incorporates justice dimensions” (Healy 
& Barry, 2017, p. 452). Thus, although it is argued that “‘social sustainabil-
ity’ has emerged as a theme in its own right” (Dempsey, Bramley, Power, & 
Brown, 2011), the fact remains that the environmental and economic dimen-
sions of sustainability often override social and justice concerns in practice. 
As a response, an emerging transdisciplinary scholarship on the concept 
of energy justice is currently being shaped, which highlights the need to 
integrate “justice” as a meta concept in the narrative of the energy transi-
tion (Heffron et al., 2015; Sovacool, Burke, Baker, Kotikalapudi, & Wlokas, 
2017; McCauley et al., 2013).
Beyond its academic foundation, the call for energy justice is also grounded 
in policy and legal discourses concerning sustainable development and the 
increasing importance attached to the fact that sustainable development 
relies upon the golden thread that connects economic development with 
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environmental sustainability and social equity. Furthermore, with the adop-
tion of the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, it is now unequivo-
cally recognised that sustainable development is anchored in human rights: 
The new Agenda is explicitly aimed to “realize the human rights of all” 
(preamble) and emphasises “the responsibilities of all States… to respect, 
protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms for all” (UN 
General Assembly, 2015, para. 19). Additionally, UN Member States have 
also pledged to ensure “no one will be left behind” and to “endeavour to 
reach the furthest behind first” (UN General Assembly, 2015, para. 4). In 
practice, these pledges reflect the fundamental human rights principles 
of non-discrimination and equality. Applied to the context of the energy 
transition, these pledges also mean that the transition to renewable energy 
“require the consideration of social justice in terms of fairness in access 
and allocation of resources and technologies” (McCauley et al., 2019). They 
require that the transition to renewable energy, which is grounded in the 
principle of equity, must be accessible and beneficial for all. In this con-
text, it is also recognised that “addressing the critical needs of indigenous 
peoples, the elderly, people with disabilities and other marginalized groups 
is the best way of ensuring that no one is left behind by the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development” (UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, 2017).
Since Indigenous peoples are often among the poorest and most marginal-
ised of the world’s population, the UN Agenda for sustainable development 
calls for specific attention to their situation (UN General Assembly, 2015, 
para. 23). In this respect, although Indigenous peoples have faced challenges 
to seeing their interests reflected in the Agenda, the framework highlights 
that “People who are vulnerable must be empowered” and reflects the needs 
of Indigenous peoples in several extents in the framework (i.e., four indict-
ors specifically mention Indigenous peoples) (UN General Assembly, 2015). 
In addition, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues has advised 
that the “the 2030 Agenda must be implemented in full accordance with 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and 
other relevant international agreements” (Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, 2016). In the context of the energy transition, this means that states 
must ensure the rights of Indigenous peoples, including their rights to 
self-determination, to land and natural resources and to maintain their 
traditional culture. The importance of the right of Indigenous peoples to 
participate in the energy transition is also enshrined in numerous interna-
tional instruments, which highlights the duty of states to consult and coop-
erate in good faith with Indigenous peoples in order to obtain their free 
and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their 
traditional lands or territories and other resources (UNDRIP, 2007, art. 32; 
ILO Convention 169, arts. 6–7). The right of Indigenous peoples to partici-
pation based on the principle of FPIC is a core element of their right to self- 
determination, which must be respected and protected by all states and 
188 D. Cambou & G. Poelzer
respected by corporate actors, especially when energy projects affect their 
lands and resources and the maintenance of their culture (OHCHR, 2011).
The need to pay attention to the issues of energy justice and to the right 
of Indigenous peoples to participate in the energy transition is a global 
issue that finds specific relevance across the Arctic. There are about 500,000 
Indigenous peoples living in the Arctic, which represents 10% of the total 
population in the region. While there is great diversity of cultural, histori-
cal economic and political situations, many communities share legacies of 
colonisation, the impacts of new industrial processes, and exposure to the 
effects of pollution and climate change. In addition, many Indigenous com-
munities in the Arctic still lack access to clean and affordable energy or 
more singularly face the adverse impacts of renewable energy projects. For 
example, while many Inuit communities struggle to get affordable and clean 
energy in Alaska, Canada and Greenland, the Sámi reindeer communities 
who live in Norway, Sweden and Finland face the adverse impacts of renew-
able energy projects on their traditional territory. Against this background, 
the following sections explore more closely the situation of Indigenous peo-
ples living in Canada, Alaska, Russia and the Nordic countries in order to 
identify how Indigenous peoples living in the Arctic participate and benefit 
from the energy transition.
Renewable energy in the Arctic: Context and patterns
Before we discuss the respective case studies, it is important first to outline 
the broader contexts and corresponding patterns of renewable energy devel-
opment. The Canadian North (territorial and provincial North), Alaska, 
and the Russian North and Siberia share a significant number of challenges 
and historical parallels, especially compared to the Nordic countries. First, 
size and population density matter: Russia and Canada are the two largest 
countries in the world and, Alaska is the largest state in the United States. 
To put things into perspective, the state of Alaska is about 1.5 times larger 
than the territory of Norway, Sweden, and Finland combined, but has 
less than 5% of the population of those countries combined. Canada and 
Russia have comparable territorial size to small population densities. This 
has a significant bearing on energy infrastructure, particularly electrical 
grid build-out. Whereas the Nordic countries are almost entirely grid con-
nected on the mainland, most of the territory of Alaska, eastern Siberia, the 
Canadian territories of Nunavut and the Northwest Territories, and much 
the provincial North of Canada is not. The cost of erecting and maintain-
ing transmission lines between communities of less than a thousand people 
that are separated by many hundreds of kilometers is prohibitively expen-
sive. In this regard, it is not surprising that outside the Nordic world, the 
Circumpolar North has a very high number of off-grid, diesel communities.
Second, legal recognition of Indigenous rights, especially land rights, 
have significant bearing on Indigenous participation in the electricity 
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sector. In Canada, Alaska, and Russia, Indigenous peoples enjoy formally 
recognised Indigenous land rights not found in the Nordic countries, as well 
as forms of self-government. Importantly, all three countries are federal 
countries in contrast to their Nordic Circumpolar neighbors, which on the 
one hand complicates energy decision-making as a result of jurisdictional 
complexities, but on the other hand fosters a political culture of multilevel 
decision-making. The latter creates political space for Indigenous participa-
tion in energy decision-making and ownership. Finally, socio-economic gap 
between Indigenous peoples and the broader society in Canada, Alaska, 
and Russia is significantly wider that of the Nordic countries. This is a result 
of a mix of historic factors beyond the scope of this paper. However, what is 
important to understand is that many Indigenous communities in Canada, 
Alaska, and Russia confront much higher unemployment rates, lower 
household incomes, high social pathologies, and lower formal educational 
attainment than the larger societies. In all three countries, many remote 
Indigenous communities confront the “heat-or-eat” dilemma as energy 
costs are often significantly higher than urban centers, even though house-
hold incomes of Indigenous communities is often less than half of their 
urban counterparts. These factors need to be kept in mind as they shape 
the discourse of energy transition and the role of and impact on Indigenous 
peoples, especially compared to their Nordic counterparts.
Notwithstanding important commonalities among Canada, Alaska, and 
Russia, these three cases also have important differences that shape and 
constrain Indigenous opportunities to achieve greater energy justice. In 
Canada and Russia, for instance, large-scale public utilities play significant 
roles compared to Alaska, which has a mix of private, cooperative, and par-
astatal and no state-wide public utility. In Canada and Russia, there are 
significant subsidies and cross-subsidies in many provincial and territorial 
jurisdictions, but Alaska is almost a pure market system in its electrical util-
ity sector, with subsidies limited to consumers downstream and essentially 
none available for independent power producers. In Alaska, Native Alaskan 
communities own and operate their own utilities through parastatal or 
cooperative models; in Canada and Russia, there are no Indigenous owned, 
generation and distribution utilities, although there are many Indigenous 
community-owned renewable energy generation projects, operating effec-
tively as small-scale independent or community-owned producers who sell 
energy to a larger utility. In Alaska, in the absence of a state-wide grid, 
there is little opportunity for Indigenous communities to participate as util-
ity scale, independent power producers, with the exception of the Railbelt, 
which has a transmission line that connects Anchorage to Fairbanks. In 
Canada, however, there are significant opportunities for Indigenous com-
munities to participate in utility-scale power projects, as many of these 
communities are connected to large-regional or the North American grid.
On the surface, the Nordic welfare state model would appear to apply 
to the electricity sector, including a shared Nordic grid; however, there are 
190 D. Cambou & G. Poelzer
important differences between Norway and Sweden. In Norway, as a result 
of late modern state-building foreign capital and local municipalities played 
a much larger role in the development of the electricity sector. To this day, 
there are many more, small municipal and cooperative electricity utilities in 
Norway compared to Sweden, and a number of these small communities have 
large Indigenous populations, the Sámi. While the question appears clear 
when it comes to the conflict between reindeer herding communities and 
large-scale regional and national energy projects, it is not so clear to what 
extent the Sámi people in Norway exert control and decision-making power 
through local parastatal and cooperative electricity institutions. Questions 
of energy justice are never as clear-cut in the real world as they are in the 
theory.
The participation of Indigenous peoples 
in the Arctic energy transition
The next section of the paper demonstrates how these contexts fundamen-
tally shape patterns of participation by Indigenous communities in current 
energy transitions. We suggest that four distinct patterns have emerged in the 
contemporary Circumpolar North: (a) utility-scale projects on Indigenous 
traditional territory that are opposed by local communities and/or present 
a threat to indigenous rights ; (b) utility-scale projects (typically projects 
in the order of 10MW or larger and is sold to a large-scale grid-connected 
utility) in which Indigenous peoples are owners or co-owners of the project; 
(c) community-scale projects driven by national and regional governments 
or public utilities; (d) community-scale projects driven by communities (typ-
ically less than 1 MW and intended to serve the immediate needs of a small 
community). Canada has examples of all four patterns; Alaska (b) and (d); 
Russia (a) and (c); and the Nordic countries mainly a), but with some qualifi-
cations as it relates to (b) and (d). It should be apparent, that pattern a) does 
meets least, if at all, any notions of energy justice for Indigenous peoples; 
pattern c) meets better energy justice goals; but, clearly patterns (b) and (d) 
are the most robust in achieving energy justice, as Indigenous peoples are 
able to participate in energy decision-making on a much more level playing 
field and accrue the benefits that come from those projects to improve the 
well-being of their communities. Below, this paper outlines specific exam-
ples in each of Canada, Alaska, Russia, and the Nordic countries.
Canada
Canada may have the most complex story among these cases. For most of 
the twenty-first century, the legacy of renewable energy development was 
dominated by utility-scale hydro-electric projects, for industrialisation and 
resource development, domestic and international exports markets, and res-
idential consumers. Indeed, hydro-electricity accounts for 60% of Canada’s 
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total electrical production. The Kemano Hydro facility in the northern 
British Columbia, for instance, was built for the sole purpose of producing 
electricity for an aluminium smelter in the town of Kitimat. Island Falls 
Hydro facility was built in the northern Saskatchewan to power mining 
and smelting in northern Manitoba. The James Bay project in northern 
Quebec was built not only to serve domestic needs in the province, but also 
as an export, primarily to New York State and the Eastern seaboard of the 
United States. All of the facilities generated and, in some cases, continue to 
generate significant controversies with Indigenous peoples. The large-scale 
projects in Manitoba and Quebec, in particular, flood tens of thousands of 
hectares of Indigenous traditional lands, changing hunting and fishing pat-
terns, transportation, among other things. Although many of these legacy 
hydro projects have produced impact benefit agreements and, in the historic 
case of James Bay, land claims settlements and Indigenous self-government, 
there are several notable cases still under litigation.
The policy environment in Canada today is radically different from the 
preceding century, with three new developments shaping the energy tran-
sition toward a low-carbon future: climate change and Canada’s commit-
ments to the Paris Agreement; the United Nations sustainable development 
goals; and, seeking Reconciliation between the Crown and Canada’s 
Indigenous peoples. The developments may and often reinforce positively 
energy transitions and energy justice for Indigenous people; they can also 
be at odds. This becomes evident when we contrast national and provincial 
policy imperatives with those of local Indigenous communities.
At the national level, Canada already has a high level of electricity pro-
duced by non-emitting sources at approximately 80% (65% from renewable 
energy, most of which is hydro-electricity, and 15% from nuclear energy). 
Nevertheless, Canada intends to meet the goals of reaching 90% by 2030 and 
eventually 100% of electricity from non-emitting sources. These goals align 
with both Paris commitments, as well as the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals. Meeting these goals will require adding tens of thousands of MW of 
capacity through large, utility-scale energy projects. This has the potential 
to conflict with Indigenous land rights, if not done properly. Done properly, 
meeting this goal opens up new avenues for reconciliation with Indigenous 
peoples through “steel in the ground” by creating equity ownership oppor-
tunities and long-term, sustainable revenue and employment streams.
At the local level of Indigenous communities, a very different picture 
emerges: clean energy generation and its benefits are distributed highly 
unevenly; so, too, are the costs. Canada has more than 280 off-grid diesel 
communities representing 200,000 Canadians, 144 of these communities 
are Indigenous; in other words, Indigenous people constitute about 5% of 
the Canadian population, but represent 50% of the off-grid diesel commu-
nities. Remote communities typically experience the highest energy costs, 
even though they are also the poorest in Canada. In Nunavut, for instance, 
communities have “electricity costs subsidized at 28.4  cents per kilowatt 
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hour  (kW.h) for the first 1,000  kW.h per month in the winter or the first 
700 kW.h per month in the summer. If electricity consumption exceeds these 
amounts, the consumer is charged the unsubsidized rate” (National Energy 
Board, 2018). The unsubsidised rates vary by community; for instance, the 
rate is 56.7 cents per kWh in Iqaluit and 112.3 cents per kWh in Kugaaruk 
(National Energy Board, 2018). By comparison, the rate for residents in 
Saskatchewan in 14.5 cents per kWh. If the energy justice is to be achieved 
for Indigenous communities, then meeting clean energy sustainable devel-
opment goals means addressing not only the “clean” part of renewable 
energy, but also increasing energy access and energy security. Renewable 
energy almost by definition means local energy, potentially reducing both 
transportation costs and risks of interrupted supply chains. Renewable 
energy holds the promise of the reducing energy costs for communities 
with the lowest household incomes. Locally produced energy also provides 
opportunities for increased, sustainable employment, thus raising house-
hold incomes, if only modestly across a community as a whole.
Given the above context, it is no surprise that all four patterns outlined 
in the previous section of the paper are found in Canada. We briefly provide 
examples of each below.
Meeting Paris commitments and the Clean Energy SDG continues to lead 
to contestation between utility-scale renewable energy and Indigenous rights. 
From a greenhouse emissions perspective, hydro-electric power is one the 
best options for renewable energy development. Upfront capital costs are gen-
erally very high, but operational costs per kWh are among the lowest over the 
long term. Importantly, in contrast to wind and solar, hydro-electricity has 
the huge advantage of providing dispatchable generation and with capacity 
factors typically five times greater than solar and at least double that of wind, 
even with advances in wind technology. Hydro-electricity also has the advan-
tage of providing flood control to help mitigate due to extreme weather events, 
which are becoming increasingly common due to climate change.
Notwithstanding the advantages, in Canada, the conventional wisdom is 
that mega-projects and even large-scale, conventional hydro-electric dam 
development is largely a relic of the past. There are many excellent sites for 
hydro development in Canada that are technically accessible but politically 
inaccessible. Environmental requirements, Indigenous rights claims, and 
public social licence requirements, among other things, make such projects 
very difficult to advance. However, two notable cases prove the exception 
to the rule: Site C Dam in northern British Columbia and Muskrat Falls in 
Labrador. Both of the cases have resulted in political and legal challenges 
from Indigenous communities affected by the development of these projects. 
(For details on these cases, please read Buhmann et al., Chapter 9.)
Utility-scale electricity projects, however, are also points of reconciliation 
rather than conflict. Increasingly, Indigenous peoples in Canada are seeking 
opportunities to be independent power producers. Two innovative devel-
opments, among many to date, deserve special note: First Nations Power 
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Authority and Wataynikaneyap Power. The First Nations Power Authority 
was created through agreement of the Government of Saskatchewan 
and the Federation of Sovereign Indigenous Nations in the province of 
Saskatchewan to facilitate the participation of Indigenous communities in 
the electricity sector and to provide a formalised pathway for working the 
publicly-owned crown utility, SaskPower. In its own words, “First Nations 
Power Authority (FNPA) was established as a not-for-profit to create a 
landscape favorable to Indigenous inclusion in the power sector. Created 
in 2011, FNPA was mandated to facilitate the development of First Nations 
led power projects and promote Indigenous participation in procurement 
opportunities with the crown utility in Saskatchewan, SaskPower” (FNPA, 
2019). The Province of Saskatchewan has a public goal of obtaining 50% 
of its electricity from renewable energy by 2030 from a starting point of 
24%. SaskPower is providing set-asides to FNPA to procure electricity 
from greenfield renewable energy projects that are majority owned by First 
Nations communities. Although FNPA started with smaller pilot renewa-
ble energy projects, it has now successfully tendered two utility-scale solar 
projects, 10 MW that will be owned by Cowessess First Nation and another 
10 MW jointly-owned by Starblanket Cree Nation and George Gordon First 
Nation. First Nation Power Authority also has 20 MW set aside for turning 
waste flare gas into recovered energy for electricity production. The goal for 
FNPA is to continue to increase the independent power producer oppor-
tunities for Indigenous communities not only in Saskatchewan, but across 
Canada, and FNPA has been very active with community energy planning 
with First Nation in the neighboring province of Alberta.
The construction of transmission lines is often a source of contention 
with Indigenous communities. Wataynikaneyap Power provides a counter 
example. In Northern Ontario, there are 32 electrically remote communities, 
25 of which are First Nations communities. A provincially commissioned 
study determined that creating a transmission line to connect 16 of these 
communities would create a net savings in diesel of more than $1 billion over 
the next 40 years. In addition, it would provide an opportunity to upgrade 
an outdated transmission line connecting those services with 5 additional 
communities. Whereas other Northern Ontario grid connected communi-
ties experienced approximately 3 outages per year, those on the outdated 
line experienced 14 unplanned outages per year. This is particularly hard for 
households that rely on electricity for their primary or even supplemental 
heating during winter months that commonly go to 40 degree below zero. 
The solution was to invest in a $1.6 billion transmission line connecting 
17 off-grid communities and, in the process, upgrading the transmission 
to the 5 grid-connected communities. The new transmission line be owned 
and operated as Wataynikaneyap Power LP with the 22 communities as the 
owners of Wataynikaneyap Power LP. The creating of this transmission util-
ity achieves not only Clean Energy SD goals by taking 17 communities off 
diesel, but also achieves energy justice by providing reliable and affordable 
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power and by providing Indigenous ownership and control over electricity 
transmission infrastructure.
Canada is not only making progress toward great energy justice in elec-
tricity generation and transmission, but also in local Indigenous clean 
energy generation. The federal government has launched to programs to 
eventually reduced or eliminate the reliance on diesel generators in Canada’s 
more than 280 off-grid communities, half of which are Indigenous. To that 
end, the Government of Canada has committed more than $800 million 
for remote and Indigenous communities to develop local renewable energy 
generation projects, primarily for electricity, but also for biomass heating. 
Rather than the Government of Canada dictating to communities their 
energy choices, communities apply for funding for energy projects that they 
would like to see developed for and owned by their communities. Projects 
are assessed on the financial and technical feasibility by reviewers exter-
nal to the Ministry. Critically, proposals must include a capacity-building 
plan to operate and maintain community energy projects. In addition, the 
Government of Canada has invested in training programs such as the 2020 
Catalyst Program, which provides training to Indigenous participants so 
they have the capacity to lead community energy planning in their home 
communities. Although the program is in its beginning two years as of 2019, 
already dozens of projects have been funded by the federal government, 
including a $40 million wind turbine project to be sited near the Arctic com-
munity of Inuvik, Northwest Territories, lead and owned by the Gwich’in.
Alaska
Alaska is unique within the Circumpolar North. It is the story of more than 
a half a century of Indigenous owned and operated electric utilities. No 
part of the State of Alaska is connected to the North American electrical 
grid. And, outside of the Railbelt, the only major regional transmission 
grid connection Fairbanks to Anchorage and its local environs, and of the 
immediate Juneau area, no communities in Alaska are connected to an elec-
trical grid. Moreover, there is not state-wide public or private electric utility. 
There are approximately 90 electric utilities spanning private, parastatal, 
and cooperative. In Alaska, about 45% of the electricity comes from nat-
ural gas, 25% from hydro, 15% from oil and the other 15% of the electric 
capacity comes from predominantly a mixture of coal, wind and biomass 
(EIA, 2018). Due to their dependence on fossil fuel, scarce transportation 
infrastructure and great distances between communities, Alaskans also pay 
nearly double the national average for energy, which cause or exacerbate 
social, economic and environmental issues at the local level.
However, there is also significant momentum in community-level renewa-
ble energy project in Alaska. Among the numerous success stories, two elec-
tricity stories exemplify Native Alaskan ownership and self-determination: 
the Alaska Village Electric Cooperative (AVEC) and Cook Inlet Region 
Incorporated (CIRI) Fire Island project.
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AVEC was created in 1967 as Native Alaskan owned electricity coopera-
tive. Since 1967, it has grown to include 57 Native Alaskan communities and 
is the largest electricity cooperative in the world by territory. The cooperative 
model has been highly successful and uses economies of scale and pooling of 
resources to operate an efficient and reliable utility in one of the most chal-
lenging environments in the world. One of the major challenges of remote 
communities is affording technicians who can operate generation systems, 
especially highly variable renewable energy systems. One of the solutions 
is a circuit rider program in which technicians are shared among commu-
nities and visit communities for repair and maintenance on a regular and 
scheduled basis. AVEC has been very successful in integrating renewable 
energy generation in small communities with diesel generation, especially 
wind power and it has been on the forefront of cutting-edge technologies 
such as the adoption of smart meters and prepaid card for using electricity 
in the home. These measures have resulted in greater energy literacy among 
many residents of AVEC served communities, certainly higher than that of 
most larger urban centers in North America or Europe. All of this has been 
achieved in the closest example market system with little operating subsidies, 
certainly compared to Canada, Russia, or the Nordic countries.
CIRI is the regional cooperation, formed out of the 1971 Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act. CIRI represents Native Alaskan beneficiaries in the 
Cook Inlet areas, including individuals of Athabascan, Southeast Indian, 
Inupiat, Yup’ik, Alutiiq/Sugpiaq and Aleut/Unangax descent. CIRI is an 
example of a global leader in Indigenous independent power production. 
CIRI constructed, owns, and operates a 17.6 MW wind farm on Fire Island 
just outside of Anchorage. It is the first independent power producer in the 
region and has a 25-year power purchase agreement with the Anchorage-
based utility, Chugach Electric Association. The eleven turbines have the 
capacity to provide electricity to the equivalent of 7,000 homes. CIRI not 
only is the owner of this project, but also has equity positions in renewable 
energy projects in the continental United States, thousands of kilometres 
away. CIRI demonstrates that Indigenous peoples and communities can be 
owners and drivers in the global energy transition.
With its increasing number of renewable energy facilities, the transition to 
renewable energy is underway in Alaska. Yet, it remains to be seen whether 
this development will be sufficient to achieve the goal to generate 50% of 
Alaska’s electricity from renewable energy before 2025 and enhance energy 
security and sustainability for all Indigenous communities in the region.
Russia
Indigenous communities in the Russian North and Siberia share many of 
the level energy security challenges with similar communities in Canada 
and Alaska; they also share the same challenges that large-scale renewable 
energy projects present to traditional ways of life, especially hydro-electric 
development, with Indigenous communities in the Nordic countries. 
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However, it may come as a surprise to many, but Russia is also home to 
important advances toward greater energy justice and meeting the Clean 
Energy SDG, notably in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), located in east-
ern Siberia, which constitute about one-fifth of the entire territory of the 
Russian Federation. These advances include renewable projects and assess-
ment processes, which are contributing to create greater energy security 
in Northern Indigenous communities and also accommodate Indigenous 
needs surrounding utility-scale greenfield energy development.
Among these advances, projects concerning Russian energy supply 
are notable. Although higher energy costs present significant challenges 
to Indigenous households, energy supply may be an even more threat to 
achieving energy security. Many remote communities in the Russian Arctic 
and Siberia depend on shipping supply lines to provide basic necessities, 
especially fuel for heating and for diesel electric generation. The supply 
lines are complex and require shipping along the Northern Sea Route and 
along major river systems such as the Lena. Weather conditions can result 
in significant delays and even missed shipping seasons, placing communi-
ties in highly vulnerable positions. To address both costs and vulnerabili-
ties, Sakhaenergo (Sakhaenerg is a subsidiary of PJSC Yakutskenergo, part 
of the RAO Energy Systems of the East holding company) has taken the 
initiative to build and deploy significant solar arrays in some of the most 
remote communities that Sakhaenergo serves. In fact, the largest solar facil-
ity in the Arctic is located in Batagay, located in northern Sakha Republic 
(Yakutia) over 1 MW in installed capacity. Beyond the ground-breaking 
Batagay facility, Sakhaenergo has deployed solar arrays in 16 communi-
ties with an additional total installed capacity of 1.47 MW (Bellini, 2019). 
Although these efforts clearly address Indigenous energy security, the deci-
sions to build and operate are top-down, not bottom-up, and there is no 
ownership by local communities. This case therefore fits pattern “c” of 
Indigenous participation, due to the lack of agency provided for Indigenous 
peoples in the development of the project.
The Sakha Republic (Yakutia) has also served as a pilot region within the 
Russian Federation for undertaking environmental impact assessment and 
innovative social impact assessments, the latter through a formal legally 
established process called Ethnological Expertise, which is overseen by an 
Expert Committee, whose composition includes appointments made by 
republic level Association of the Small-Numbered Peoples of Yakutia. To 
date, this process has reviewed applications for industrial resource develop-
ment on approximately 50 projects (three of which include, in 2012, the pro-
posed Cancun Hydro-electric station on the Timpton River in the southern 
part of the republic and, in 2013, two transmission lines, also in southern 
Yakutia). The Expert Committee found that RusHydro, the proponent of 
the Cancun HPS project, had not assessed the impact on traditional live-
lihoods and deemed the proponent’s assessment as inadequate and grossly 
underestimated appropriate levels of compensation owed to Indigenous 
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communities affected by the proposed project. It also placed as further 
requirement “a full environmental and social impact assessment be con-
ducted during the construction of the Cancun HPS” (Sleptsov, 2015, p. 94). 
The proponent revised its submission; it was reassessed, and was approved 
by the Expert Committee. In the case of the transmission lines, the Expert 
Committee approved the applications. Although important challenges 
remain in the Russian Arctic to consolidate Indigenous peoples’rights, 
it is suggested that this level of Indigenous agency in approval processes 
represents a progress in institution building to ensure energy justice for 
Indigenous peoples (Sleptsov, 2015).
Norway and Sweden
In comparison with other Arctic states, the Nordic countries have already 
emerged to be leaders in renewable energy and efficiency, with all coun-
tries aiming to be virtually fossil free by 2050 (Sovacool, 2017). However the 
energy transition is not without its own cost and has raised a number of social 
issues, more specifically in relation to the rights of the Sámi Indigenous peo-
ple, who live as a minority group across the territory of Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and the Kola Peninsula of Russia.
Paradoxically, the transition to renewable energy to promote sustainable 
development is among the issues that jeopardise the sustainability of Sámi 
livelihoods due to the adverse impacts of renewable energy projects on their 
traditional land and resources. Historically, it was the impact of large-scale 
hydroelectric projects that spurred the first opened conflicts between the 
Nordic governments and the Sámi people in the energy context. The transi-
tion to hydroelectric energy was grounded in the policy needs for increasing 
energy supply and ensures self-sufficiency in order to guarantee the industri-
alisation and modernisation of the nation states. However, the development 
of these projects had also for adverse effect to damage the traditional land 
and resources of Sámi communities. In the beginning of the twenty century, 
the construction of the first stage of the great reservoir at Suorva in north-
ern Sweden, signed for example the beginning of an extensive encroachment 
on reindeer husbandry and Sámi culture (Össbo & Lantto, 2011, p. 330). 
In Norway, the conflict of the Alta-Kautokeino hydropower project, which 
began in the 1970s is also notorious and has served to expose the lack of 
recognition of the rights of the Sámi as an Indigenous people in the energy 
context and more generally in mainstream national politics (Howitt, 2002, 
p. 280; Paine, 1982).
Today, the rights of the Sámi people have also become an issue of contro-
versy in the context of the transition to renewable energy. This is more par-
ticularly due to the development of wind energy projects and their adverse 
effects on reindeer herding. The establishment of wind turbines has multiple 
effects on reindeer herding (Skarin, 2016). It can affect the migration of rein-
deer, disturb grazing and calving areas and increase the workload and cost 
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of activities for reindeer herders. With the multiplication of onshore wind 
energy projects, Sámi reindeer herding communities also face the cumula-
tive effects of projects, which are magnified by the impacts of other indus-
trial development processes. Several UN reports have criticised the impact 
of these projects on the traditional livelihoods of the Sámi (UN report & 
Anaya, 2011; UN Report & Tauli-Corpuz, 2016). Renewable projects have 
also led to an increasing number of court cases highlighting the responsi-
bility of companies to mitigate the impact of wind energy in the purpose to 
allow co-existence between reindeer herding and the development of wind 
energy projects (Cambou, 2020).
Among the numerous projects that are currently being opposed by Sámi 
reindeer communities, two large renewable energy projects stand out due to 
their large-scale impacts at the local level: the Fossen project in Norway and 
the Markbygden project in Sweden.
With its 273 planned turbines, the Fossen project constitutes one of the 
largest onshore wind projects in Europe. The Norwegian Petroleum and 
Energy Ministry gave its approval for the construction of the project in 2017 
despite important concerns, protests and court petitions from the southern 
reindeer herding communities, who have traditionally used the land where 
the project is being built. The project was also authorised in defiance to the 
request of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
which asked Norway to temporarily suspend the project in order to examine 
a complaint from Sámi communities (CERD, in Reuters, 2018). In the view 
of the Norwegian ministry, the fact that the project has successfully met all 
legal national requirements and also survived a number of court petition 
justified the authorisation of the project. The project is currently underway 
and should be completed by 2020.
In Sweden, the development of renewable energy has also raised important 
issue in relation to reindeer herding. Sweden aspires to be a leader in the tran-
sition to renewable energy and for this purpose has set the target to produce 
100% renewable electricity by 2040. In this context, wind energy represents an 
important tool to achieve this goal, which has materialised with an increase 
of wind energy projects being established in the country. In the northern most 
counties, where the Sámi reindeer herders’ territories is located, the amount 
of wind turbines has increased from approximately 1,000 to more than 3,000 
turbines between 2008 and 2018. While this development is supported by 
a growing number of small and medium projects, the Markbygden project 
represents by itself 1001 turbines, which is approximately 7% of the share of 
total electricity generation in Sweden. Despite several court cases against the 
project and protests from Sámi reindeer communities, the project has been 
authorised by the government and is planned to be completed by 2021.
The Fossen and Markbygden cases epitomise pattern (a) of participation 
by Indigenous communities in renewable projects in so far as these projects 
create conflict and present a threat to Indigenous rights. In order to ensure 
a just transition, the current challenge for the Nordic governments therefore 
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remains to ensure that the transition to renewable energy does not adversely 
affect the Sámi Indigenous people by undermining their right to maintain 
their traditional culture.
Conclusion
The global energy transition toward a low carbon future means significant 
investment in renewable energy. But green energy is only good energy if gen-
erated properly and for the benefits of all people. In this regard, Indigenous 
peoples confront two main challenges, one from new, large-scale renewable 
energy projects that have the potential to undermine Indigenous land rights 
and traditional livelihoods; and the struggle to secure affordable and relia-
ble energy in their communities. At the very core is the question of how can 
energy justice be achieved for Indigenous peoples in this transition, a tran-
sition that fundamentally affects the rights and well-being of Indigenous 
peoples living in the Arctic.
In this analysis, four patterns of participation by Indigenous communi-
ties in the current energy transitions were identified: (a) utility-scale projects 
on Indigenous traditional territory that are opposed by local communities 
and present a threat to Indigenous rights; (b) utility-scale projects in which 
Indigenous people are owners or co-owners of the project; (c) communi-
ty-scale projects driven by national and regional governments or public 
utilities; (d) community-scale projects driven by communities. At the out-
set, this analysis demonstrates that many Indigenous peoples continue to 
encounter pattern (a) in all Arctic states as a result of their opposition and/
or lack of adequate participation in the development of large-scale renew-
able development projects, which do not meet their community demands 
in energy and encroach on their rights This situation is more particularly 
illustrated in the case of the Site C Dam and Muskrat Falls in Canada, the 
Fossen project in Norway and the Markbygden project in Sweden. However, 
we also have seen cases where projects meet indigenous energy security 
needs but where participation is not adequately accommodated (e.g. Sakha 
Yakutia) notably because these projects fall short of enabling Indigenous 
agency—ownership and control—over local energy generation.
In contrast, this contribution also identified patterns (b) and (d) of partici-
pation that are more adequate in achieving energy justice for Indigenous peo-
ples. When Indigenous peoples act as owner or drivers of renewable energy 
projects and are therefore able to participate in energy decision-making and 
accrue the benefits that come from those projects for improving the well- 
being of their communities, there is more certainty to achieve the sustainable 
developments goals and ensure energy justice for Indigenous communities. 
Yet, the development of such participation pattern remains insufficient 
today. This paper recommends that Arctic states at both the national and 
regional levels proactively develop robust institutional arrangements and 
policy environments that promote solutions that follow patterns (b) and (d) 
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in accordance with the rights of Indigenous peoples, in particular their 
right to maintain their traditional culture. As this paper has shown, pat-
terns (b) and (d) are not merely possible but are already in practice. If the 
Arctic states strive to promote energy justice, they will in so doing pro-
vide a global model for other regions on our planet to emulate as coun-
tries seek appropriate pathways to achieve the Clean Energy Sustainable 
Development Goal and contribute to combat climate change and its 
impacts.
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11 Adding value from marketing origin 
of food from the Arctic Norway
Bjørg Helen Nøstvold, Ingrid Kvalvik,  
& Morten Heide
Introduction
The Norwegian Arctic is important as a food-producing region, producing 
food from both marine and terrestrial resources. Fisheries, aquaculture, 
agriculture (both meat and vegetables) and reindeer herding, and process-
ing of these products are important for sustaining the economy, popula-
tion, and culture in many local communities. Within Arctic Norway, there 
is considerable variation in products and markets. Fisheries and aquacul-
ture are large-scale and export-oriented, but also include a high number of 
companies producing for the local and national market. Agriculture is quite 
marginal compared to farming in more favorable locations further south 
but produce both for the big national cooperatives and for smaller compa-
nies. All food sectors are producing both commodities and high-value niche 
products for local, regional, and national markets.
Natural conditions like harsh weather and cold climate, combined with 
a high general cost level in Norway makes it impossible to compete with 
low cost, high volume, mass-produced products from lower cost countries. 
Hence, agriculture is heavily subsidised, and it is a public debate that too 
much seafood is exported unprocessed as a result of high production costs 
in Norway (Iversen et al., 2016). At the same time, there is a growing market 
for authentic and niche food products. According to Luceri, Latusi, and 
Zerbini (2016), emphasising the geographic origin of a product is one way of 
ensuring authenticity, quality, and food safety to consumers, and hence, a 
potential marketing strategy for added value for producers. In an Arctic con-
text then, a very relevant question is whether there is a potential for attain-
ing added value by exploiting the image of the Arctic region in marketing of 
food products. Studies by van Ittersum, Candel, and Meulenberg (2003) and 
Kuznesof, Tregear, and Moxey (1997) show that a condition for region of 
origin branding to positively influence consumers’ perception of food prod-
ucts is that the product and its qualities coincide with what the consumer 
associate and perceives as authentic for the region. Successful use of Arctic 
origin in the branding of food products from the Arctic requires knowledge 
about what consumers perceive as “authentic Arctic food products” and the 
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characteristics of such products. In this study, we examine Norwegian con-
sumers’ perceptions of Arctic food because it is reasonable to assume that 
the perception of consumers within the Arctic region differs from that of the 
consumers outside the region. Consequently, the marketing strategies might 
need to be different if you target a local/regional market or a market outside 
the region. The consumers are therefore split into two groups: local consum-
ers, that are consumers who live within the Arctic region themselves, and 
consumers from the southeastern part of Norway around the capital where 
the population density is the highest. Knowledge about consumer prefer-
ences can provide input about targeted marketing, which can increase sales 
and added value of Arctic food products. To complement the analysis, we 
also examine the producers’ view of their own products and to what degree 
and how they take advantage of “Arctic qualities” and the Arctic origin in 
their marketing. By doing this, the study reveals to what degree producers’ 
marketing strategies correspond with the consumers’ perception of Arctic 
food, illustrated in Figure 11.1. Based on this, we discuss the potential for 
adding value by exploiting the Arctic origin in the marketing of food from 
Norwegian Arctic, in the region and outside the region.
Background: Artic Norway – geographical, 
cultural, and economic setting
With a total mainland area of 324,000 km2 and 5.3 million inhabitants, 
Norway is one of the least densely populated countries in Europe. The 
built-up area, including roads, amounts to only about 2%, and a further 
3% is cultivated agricultural land. Norway has a 2,500 km coastline, with 
90,000 km2 of sea within the baseline and an exclusive economic zone of 
788,000 km2 of the mainland, providing plenty of suitable space for aqua-
culture production and good fishing grounds. In addition, the zone outside 
the Svalbard archipelago is important for fishing (see Figure 11.2).
Figure 11.1 Consumer and producer perceptions, and the marketing of Arctic food.
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Based on climatic parameters only a tiny fraction of mainland Norway 
is in the Arctic. If defined by the Arctic Circle (located at a latitude of 
66°33′ North), about half of Norway is however considered the Arctic. This 
includes the two northernmost counties (Troms and Finnmark) and approx-
imately half of the third northernmost county (Nordland). Politically, how-
ever, all the three counties are considered part of Arctic Norway or Northern 
Norway, and the Norwegian High North policy is directed at all three coun-
ties (in addition to Svalbard, the archipelago in the Barents Sea between 74° 
and 81° North, which have a small population involved in mining, research, 
and tourism). Similarly, food policies directed at the three northernmost 
Figure 11.2 Arctic Norway.
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counties (Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark) are termed Arctic agriculture 
(Anon., 2011a, 2016). The area covers more than one-third of the land area 
(113,000 km2) and more than half of the coastline, but only 9% of the popu-
lation (486,000 persons). Arctic Norway is therefore characterised by scat-
tered settlements and long distances.
There are two bigger cities (in a Norwegian context Tromsø and Bodø, 
with 75,000 and 51,000 inhabitants respectively are relatively big cities), four 
medium-sized cities (Harstad, Alta, Mo i Rana and Narvik, ranging from 
25,000 to 20,000 inhabitants), and a good handful of smaller cities in addi-
tion to a large number of smaller communities (see Figure 11.2). In addition 
to the majority population, Norway has a Sami population. The main Sami 
settlements are in Finnmark, but also in the rest of the region, in addition to 
some areas further south.
Food production, both land-based and sea-based, is important for settle-
ment in the rural areas in Northern Norway. In addition to several thousand 
employed in primary harvesting and production, there are more than 600 
companies in northern Norway producing food products for local, national, 
and international consumers (see Table 11.1). On a global scale, even the 
largest seafood factories and dairies in Arctic Norway are considered 
SMEs (small- and medium-sized enterprises with less than 250 employees 
Table 11.1 Food production in Arctic Norway (in 2016)
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and annual turnover up to EUR 50 million) (EC, 2016). Still, in a North 
Norwegian context they are quite large and contribute with significant rev-
enue to the Norwegian national, regional, and local economy. Most com-
panies are however more in the scale of micro to small enterprises (1–50 
employees).
The government emphasises the need for increased and sustainable food 
production and the need to take advantage of national resources (Anon., 
2016). It is a government aim to have food production in the whole coun-
try. As mentioned, both fisheries and aquaculture are big scale and export- 
oriented, while agriculture is rather small scale and heavily subsidised. 
Agricultural production in Norway, and Northern Norway, in particular, 
is taking place under challenging climatic and geographical conditions, 
specific programs are therefore created to support it. Increased food pro-
duction in Arctic Norway is a part of the government’s high north policy 
(Anon., 2011a), and Arctic food production has benefitted from the gov-
ernment’s increasing interest in local food, amongst other voiced in several 
reports to the Parliament (Anon., 2011b, 2015). The government in June 2019 
announced that it would double its economic support to “Arctic agriculture” 
from 2 to 4 mill NOK annually (Anon., 2019). As such, the government is 
taking action to promote food production in the Arctic. Even though food 
security is not a pressing matter in Arctic Norway compared to some other 
Arctic areas, these initiatives contribute to the Norwegian government’s ful-
fillment of the obligation to realise the UN Sustainable Development Goal 
#2. In particular, providing knowledge, financial services and opportuni-
ties for value-adding of local food are important initiatives in a Norwegian 
Arctic context.
It is the Gulf Stream that allows agriculture production in Northern 
Norway. You will not find the same production on the same latitude in the 
other Arctic states. Even though the production is lower than further south 
(yield per acre), the unique climatic northern growth conditions with long 
days and low temperatures, provide some advantages for food and fodder 
products. For instance, broccoli contains more C-vitamin, while carrots 
and turnips get a sweeter taste, and the cloudberries get bigger (Johansen, 
Uleberg, & Mølmann, 2018). The cold climate also gives very little diseases, 
and hence the use of pesticides and medicines is very low and animal welfare 
high (Johansen, Uleberg, & Mølmann, 2018). Future climate changes also 
offer possibilities for northern horticulture production through prolonged 
growing seasons in Northern Norway. As for seafood, the most productive 
areas and biggest fishing grounds are in the north (in the Lofoten area and 
in the Barents Sea), and Nordland and Troms are the two biggest counties 
for aquaculture production and are still increasing. Primary processing is 
taking place in all three counties, while the number of secondary processing 
companies is decreasing as one moves northwards.
Primary processing includes slaughtering, sorting and cleaning, process-
ing, and packing of a raw material product from primary production. It can 
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also include adding some conservatives (salt and sugar), drying, freezing, 
etc. Secondary production is used to denote processing that significantly 
changes the product by adding other ingredients and produce a consum-
er-ready and value-added product (Elde et al., 2018). The differences in the 
number of secondary production companies are not surprising, given the 
much smaller population in the northernmost county, and hence also a 
smaller local market.
There are about 3,000 farmers in Northern Norway and 950 reindeer 
owners. In addition, about 2,000 persons are working in the processing 
industry. The agricultural processing industry in Norway is dominated by 
large cooperatives owned by the farmers, like TINE (dairy) and Nortura 
(meat). In addition, there are some other large companies and many small, 
local enterprises. The number of small companies in the agricultural sector 
has been increasing rapidly the last decades due to increasing demands for 
locally produced special food products (Norsk mat, 2018), and today there 
are about 500 local food producers in Northern Norway.1
As for fisheries, there are approximately 4,500 people directly employed 
in fishing and another 3–7,000 working in the fish processing indus-
try throughout the year in Northern Norway. In aquaculture, 2,000 are 
employed in the main industry and 5,500 in supporting industries. Despite 
declining employment in the industry as a whole, production is higher than 
ever before. There are 100 landing stations/primary processing companies 
and 40 aquaculture companies. There are about 80 companies producing 
for the national market. The fisheries’ catch varies considerably from year to 
year. In 2015, about 94,000 tons were landed in the north, which constitutes 
42% of the total landings in Norway (SSB, 2016). About half of the produc-
tion of farmed salmon is taking place in Northern Norway, with 517,000 
tons in first-hand sales from Northern Norway in 2015. The economic sig-
nificance of the farming industry, for Norway as a whole, by far exceeds the 
traditional fisheries. Only a small amount of Norwegian seafood goes to 
domestic consumption (<5%). Still, Norway is self-sufficient in seafood, as 
well as in dairy products.
Despite growing importance for the economy and employment, food pro-
duction in the Arctic region is associated with some challenges. Not only 
are the food producers faced with challenging environmental conditions, 
the region also suffers from poor and/or costly infrastructure, limited entre-
preneurial capacity, relatively small local markets and long-distance to 
bigger markets. Most food producers in the Norwegian Arctic region are 
as mentioned small and micro-sized companies, with less than 5 employ-
ees. It is a known challenge for such small companies to manage all aspects 
of running a healthy company (Dawar & Frost, 1999), and according to 
Statistics Norway approximately 70% of SMEs fail within five years (SSB, 
2019). Those who survive though, have a four time increase in the number of 
employees, proving the importance of these SMEs to rural Arctic commu-
nities (SMB Norge, 2018).
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Competence is the key to success. The government supports regional 
Centers of Expertise for local food production, where one center is cover-
ing the Arctic region. The aim is to build competence in small- and medi-
um-sized local food producers and increase the value of the Arctic food. In 
addition, food producers have established various types of network corpo-
rations to overcome or mitigate some of the challenges of being a small pro-
ducer. The networks are often partly publicly funded through Innovation 
Norway. Most networks are geographically linked (like Nordlandsmat or 
Vesterålsmat), while others are limited to a product type like Lofotlam (sheep 
meat) and Arktisk kje (goat meat). In addition to knowledge exchange and 
support, the main areas of cooperation are distribution, sales, and market-
ing (Natcher et al., 2019). There has been an initiative to develop a regional 
food label, “Northern Norwegian food label” (Nordnorsk Matmerke) 
(Nordnorsk Landbruksråd, 2018). The aim was to increase value creation 
through better visibility of Arctic food products in stores and give the prod-
ucts an advantage in the market. Originally, only the agricultural sector 
was involved, but it was a stated goal to include seafood from the region. 
The idea was to develop an area of origin label for products based on raw 
material and processed in the Norwegian Arctic region. Despite the lack 
of realisation of the label, so far, this shows that many actors in the sector 
have a belief in the branding of Arctic origin. Still, it does not seem to exist 
any thorough analysis neither of the use of Arctic origin in branding of food 
products or of which attributes or characteristics has the highest potential 
in branding of Arctic food.
Research question and analytical approach
Internationally there is increasing consumer interest in the origin of food, 
traceability, and in supporting local companies (Feldmann & Hamm, 2015; 
Hingley, Boone, & Haley, 2010). Especially for high-quality food products 
the use of regional origin is often successfully incorporated in the branding 
(Luceri et al., 2016; Trognon, 1998), conveying a message of authenticity and 
tradition (Ilbery & Kneafsey, 1998) and health and sensor properties (Bryla, 
2015). Displaying origin can, therefore, function as a risk reduction, reas-
suring consumers about where the products come from and how they have 
been produced (Luceri et al., 2016). In some cases, it can even replace the 
need for building a brand name (van Ittersum et al., 2003).
There is also an expressed desire to reduce the number of steps the food 
goes through from production to plate (Murtagh, 2015). It is in the con-
text of this consumer interest and concern, and the governmental support 
one sees growth in the production of local food products. Several studies 
show consumers’ preference for food from their own region, i.e. local food 
(see, for instance, Aprile, Caputo, & Nayga, 2016; Feldmann & Hamm, 
2015; Ilbery, Morris, Buller, Maye, & Kneafsey, 2005). Local food is get-
ting increasingly important also for the Norwegian consumer, reflected in 
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increasing sales numbers in the retail sector. In 2013, local foods had twice 
the increase in turnover compared to other food products. Norwegians also 
show an increased willingness to pay for food from their own region (Ipsos 
MMI, 2014). Local and regional foods however also have potential for distri-
bution toward national consumers. Extending the local or regional market to 
a national market offers a larger segment of high-end customers with a high 
willingness to pay. The marketing strategy might, however, need to be differ-
ent. If local food producers aim to extend their market outside their region, 
should the products be marketed the same way as in the local market? And 
should they brand their product based on origin toward consumers outside 
the region? To answer this, one needs to know how consumers outside the 
region perceive food from this region, compared to the local consumer.
Within marketing, branding, i.e. the  marketing  practice of creating a 
name, symbol or design or a combination of these that identifies and differ-
entiates a product from other products, is one way to achieve higher willing-
ness to pay, increase market penetration and/or develop new markets (Keller, 
1998; Murphy, 1998). A successful brand is known to give better prices, more 
loyal consumers, and strengthen the company’s reputation (Keller, 1998; 
Murphy, 1988). Even established companies can increase turnover and/or 
profit through small adjustments in how and what they communicate about 
their products and to whom. Branding is, however, expensive, time-consum-
ing, and a risky process, and exploiting existing positive associations toward 
the product, company or region of origin could be beneficial. A brand is 
more than a name, and to create a value of a brand name a set of associations 
need to follow (Aaker, 1991). As shown by Trognon (1998), if a region already 
is perceived positively based on subjective associations, these associations 
might be successfully used as part of the branding if they are transferable 
to the regional product. A regional product is defined as a product whose 
quality and/or fame can be attributed to its region of origin and which is 
marketed using the name of the region of origin (van Ittersum et al., 2003). 
Examples of products marketed as regional specialties are abundant, like 
Parma ham, Champagne, and Florida Oranges. The regional image can have 
an influence on how the product is perceived, and according to van Ittersum 
et al. (2003) the place of origin can also have very little or even a negative 
influence on the evaluation of the product. To avoid this, it is eminent that 
the particular product is perceived as authentic for the region and that the 
consumers should perceive the region to be suited for production of the prod-
uct (Kuznesof et al., 1997; van Ittersum et al., 2003. The qualities associated 
with these products may or may not be scientifically documented, like more 
vitamins, sweeter, etc. (Johansen, Uleberg, & Mølmann, 2018).
The question raised here is therefore, whether and how can the Arctic 
origin be used to create a higher perceived value for consumers in the Arctic 
region and in a national market? From this follows two groups of questions: 
(1) What do consumers perceive as authentic “Arctic food”? What are the 
characteristics of Arctic food? And is there a difference in these perceptions 
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between consumers living in or outside the Arctic region? (2) Based on the 
above, is there a potential for promoting food from the Arctic more effec-
tively by utilising certain characteristics, in the region and outside the region, 
and for different food products? What are the producers doing today, and is 
there a potential for increased value creation by adapting marketing com-
munication? Arctic food is defined as food based on raw materials from the 
Arctic which is also being processed in the Arctic region.
Material and methods
A survey was conducted of 472 consumers, 246 in Arctic Norway and 226 
in Southern Norway, in the area around the capital. The consumers were 
all more than 18 years of age. The aim was to reveal what type of food 
consumers think of as Arctic food and what qualities they ascribe to Arctic 
food. By having respondents both within and outside the Arctic region, we 
would be able to test our assumption about different perceptions of Artic 
food between those living in the Arctic region and consumers in the south. 
Attaining knowledge about how consumers perceive food originating from 
their own region (local Arctic food) compared to consumers living outside 
of the region (Arctic food), will provide producers with important knowl-
edge about Arctic origin as a marketing opportunity in the differed markets.
The survey first had a section aiming to capture association about spe-
cies and characteristics. This part started with an open-ended question, 
followed by closed questions. This is to make sure also the consumers’ 
own thoughts are captured without any influence from the survey’s prede-
termined characteristics (Altintzoglou, Sone, Voldnes, Nøstvold, & Sogn-
Grundvåg, 2018). In the open question, the consumers were asked to state 
what were the three first words that came to mind when thinking about 
Arctic food. In the closed questions the consumers were asked to state how 
much they associated predefined factors to food from the Arctic region. The 
scale was running from 1 to 7, where 1 was denoting “not at all” and 7 “very 
much.” Brands of the Arctic food products for sale in the Tromsø groceries 
and specialist stores were used to identify relevant factors.
A similar survey was developed targeting food producers in Arctic Norway. 
The survey was sent to 86 companies, of which 29 companies responded. The 
aim of this survey was to gather information about how the producers mar-
ket their products, what they think are their main selling points, and to see if 
these correspond to the consumers’ perception of Arctic food. The produc-
ers were also asked an open question first; “What words would you use for 
marketing the Arctic origin of your food products?” They were then asked, 
“Do you use any of the following words in your marketing” and were asked 
to rate their answers from 1 “not at all” to 7 “to a large degree.” The words 
were based on the same information as the consumer factors.
The rank order of importance of factors that describe and add value to 
Arctic food was tested using Friedman’s related samples test (a Shapiro–Wilk 
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test showed that normality was violated). Differences in importance between 
individual factors were determined using Wilcoxon related samples test for 
pairwise comparison.
Findings: Consumer perceptions, producer 
perceptions, and the Arctic food marketing
In the following first the results from the consumer study are presented fol-
lowed by the results from the producer survey. The results will then be dis-
cussed in the next chapter.
What is the Arctic food – species and characteristics 
from the consumer perspective?
The survey started with an open question, asking the consumers to state 
three words that describe what they associate with Arctic food. Some 
chose to describe species, some wrote different characteristics, and some 
both. More than 900 different words were given. The words were sorted, 
categorised (species or characteristics), and translated. Some choices were 
made when sorting a word into “species” or “characteristics,” for instance 
“reindeer meat,” “reindeer steak,” and “reindeer” were all translated into 
“reindeer” as a species. When a specific traditional dish was stated, for 
instance “boknafisk” (cured cod), it was translated and categorised as a 
characteristic of Arctic food and not categorised under the main ingredi-
ent species (in this case cod). The reason for this is that typical traditional 
dishes and food preparation is more related to culinary heritage and tra-
dition than species.
The species “berries” consists of several types of berries. Cloudberries 
were mentioned the most. Also, lingonberries and blueberries were men-
tioned. As they all are wild berries, they were generalised into “berries.” 
Two respondents mentioned strawberries, but these were not included 
as they are cultured. Words like flavor, flavorful, rich flavor, tastes good, 
jummy, and good taste have all been included in the characteristic “tasty.” 
And as mentioned, specific traditional dishes and types of cooking like tør-
rfisk (dried cod or other whitefish), lutefisk (dried whitefish treated with lye), 
klippfish (salted and dried whitefish), biljo (a specific reindeer stew/soup) 
and the generalisation “traditional food” have all been included in the char-
acteristic “tradition.”
For the respondents in Northern Norway, we see that the species “rein-
deer” is most stated (100) when thinking about Arctic food. With the excep-
tion of “berries” (45), four types of seafood; “fish” (81), “cod” (49), “king 
crab” (32), and “salmon” (23) are the species most stated after “reindeer,” as 
illustrated in the word cloud in Figure 11.3.
The respondents in the South of Norway clearly state “fish” (110) the 
most, while “reindeer” comes second (60). As in Northern Norway, “Cod” 
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(71) and “King crab” (60) are the seafood species most stated. “Berries” (all 
types of wild berries) (28) are the fifth most mentioned, while “salmon” (22) 
comes sixth, as illustrated in Figure 11.4.
The consumers who rather thought of quality characteristics when 
thinking about Arctic food gave a wide range of descriptions. More 
Figure 11.3 Species suggested by Northern consumers.
Figure 11.4 Species suggested by Southern consumers.
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than 130 different words were used. Sorted, categorised, and translated, 
Figure 11.5 shows the main characteristics identified by the northern and 
southern respondents, respectively.
The results show that consumers mainly think of different seafood species 
as Arctic, this range from cod, whale, and saith to seaweed and urchin (in 
total 600). Terrestrial species can be grouped into two; farmed and wild. 
Reindeer, game and wild berries are mentioned more often (a total of 266) 
than farmed vegetables (26) and animals (24). This applies to both northern 
and southern consumers.
For the northern consumers the characteristics “pure” (32), “local” (31) 
and “tasty” (30) were mentioned the most. “Tradition” (25), “quality” (22) 
Figure 11.5  Quality characteristics mentioned by Northern and Southern consumers.
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and “fresh” (20) were also frequently used. For the southern consumers 
“tradition” (46) was by far the most mentioned characteristics, both the 
word tradition itself and description of traditional cooking and traditional 
dishes. “Healthy” (20) was the second most mentioned characteristic, fol-
lowed by “fresh” (14) and “pure” (14).
In the next part of the survey, the consumers were asked to think about 
food from the Arctic and then rate different characteristics for how much 
they associate them with Arctic food (Figure 11.6). Different colors and 
nuance of color indicate significant differences between traits so that the 
dark green, lighter green and pale green are significantly different. The 
characteristics are then grouped into three groups; green, blue and, red 
where green is considered to be the most important factor, blue medium 
importance, and red considered a group of not important factors.
The analysis shows that the characteristics the consumers mostly use to 
describe food from the Arctic are “natural,” followed by “healthy.” “Cold 
Arctic climate,” “living in the wild,” “preserved nature,” “untouched 
nature,” and “traditional food” are all in the group of the third most asso-
ciated characteristics of food from the Arctic. “Traditional food,” the char-
acteristics that scored the highest in the open question also scores high in 
the rating. Being pale green, it is in the third strongest group of associations 
with Arctic food.
The data was split between the responses from the Northern and 
Southern consumers. The consumers in Northern Norway gave a sig-
nificantly higher score to “local food,” “environmentally friendly,” 


















What caracteristics describes food from the Arctic?
Consumer perspective
0 2 631 5
Figure 11.6  What characteristics describe food from the Arctic? Consumers’ 
perspective.
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with * in Figure 11.6. The respondents from Southern Norway associate the 
characteristic “Sami” more to Arctic food than do the northerners, marked 
with ** in Figure 11.6. Otherwise the factors were not significantly differ-
ent, meaning the factors were rated with equal importance between north 
and south.
Producer perspective—what characterises the Arctic food
The producer respondents were all SMEs with less than 20 employees and 
turnover lower than 40 mill NOK, and 50% had less than 5 mill NOK in 
turnover. 19 of the 29 companies were selling within the Arctic region, and 
10 of these had their sole market here, while one also sells nationwide and 
two moves from their regional market directly on to export. Only four com-
panies sell both within- and outside the region and exports. 15 of the compa-
nies have their main market within Norway, but outside the Arctic region, 
three of these also export their products. When asked to rate their major 
challenges, market-related issues were chosen by 18 companies.
Parallel to the question to the consumer about what they perceive as 
characteristic of Arctic food, the producers were asked in an open ques-
tion which characteristics they would use to promote their products. As 
shown in the word cloud (Figure 11.7), “pure” (25), “Arctic” (23), “flavor” 
(23), and “natural” (19) are the words used the most. Within “flavor” words 
like “flavorful,” “strong flavor,” “nice flavors,” and “natural flavors” are all 
included. A wide variety of words describing the nature where the products 
are grown or raised are used by several producers, like “the fish lives in pure 
cold waters” or “luscious grassland with natural herbs and an eternal spring 
under snow-covered mountains.”
Figure 11.7 Producers’ choice of characteristics in communication of their products.
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For the producers, the open question was followed by closed questions 
where they were asked to rate to what extent they used different words in 
communicating about their own products. The results are presented using 
a median because the producers are very polarised in their answers. The 
answers are not checked for significance due to the low number of respond-
ents. Figure 11.8 presents the scores where the different colors represent the 
median scores for the factors. The group that is used the most includes the 
words “natural,” “traditional,” “local,” and “healthy.” It must be mentioned 
that the closed question in the questionnaire did not include “z,” “Arctic 
origin,” and “purity of taste.” There was no difference in the choice of words 
between producers aiming for regional or national markets. Between the 
open and closed questions tradition and healthy are hardly mentioned in the 
open question but gains a high score in the closed question.
Discussion
The question raised in this study is whether there is a potential for adding 
value by exploiting the regional origin in the marketing of food products 
from the Arctic, within and outside the region. Where one expected to find 
many differences between perceptions of northern and southern consumers, 
results show a high degree of correspondence. Below the similarities and 
differences will be further explored, starting with the consumer dimension, 
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Figure 11.8 Words used for communication of products.
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The consumers and the North-South dimension
Recalling the findings from van Ittersum, Candel, and Meulenberg (2003) 
and Trognon (1998) that for region of origin branding to be successful, 
there has to be correspondence between the product and its qualities and 
the consumer’s perception of the region, the survey set out to identify what 
consumers perceive as authentic for the Arctic region. The results showed 
a high degree of consistency between the consumers in Arctic Norway and 
outside. The open questions to let the consumer state what is on the top of 
their mind when asked what they associate with Arctic food, show that some 
think of species while others first and foremost think of qualities. Different 
types of seafood and reindeer are by both northern and southern consum-
ers considered to be the most “Arctic” food products. This is not surpris-
ing, as the majority of reindeer herding is taking place in the northernmost 
region, and the major seasonal fisheries are taking place in the north, like 
the Skrei fisheries (breeding cod) and the fall saith fisheries. Branding such 
species or products of these species as Arctic products might, therefore, add 
value to the product. More surprisingly is it maybe that King crab seems 
to have thoroughly established itself as an Arctic species in the mind of the 
Norwegian consumers, both in the north and in the south. King crab is an 
Arctic crab species, but it is a relatively new species in Norway, first being 
commercially harvested in the early 2000s. This illustrates that it is not only 
traditional species or products that can be marketed as Arctic and that it 
is possible for new species and products to be established as Arctic. For 
instance, the more exotic species like urchin and seaweed, which were men-
tioned by a few consumers, may have potential as “Arctic food products” in 
the future.
Besides reindeer and seafood, berries were among the top five species 
mentioned, both in the north and south. Thus, it seems that wild-caught, 
harvested and gathered products that are perceived to be “wild” is more 
authentic Arctic food than agricultural products like potatoes, vegeta-
bles, and farmed animals. This despite efforts being done within collective 
branding of the origin of such species, for instance Målselvnepe (turnip 
from Målselv), Lofotlam (lamb from Lofoten).
When it comes to qualities, the northern consumers have strong asso-
ciations with “purity,” “taste” (always in a positive sense), “high quality,” 
and “health.” The southern consumers to a large degree mention the same 
characteristics, but here “traditional food production or dishes” are men-
tioned the most. Most of the characteristics are corresponding with current 
food trends focusing on health-related qualities; less processing, purity of 
production, purity of flavor, and no additives (Asioli et al., 2017). For the 
producers in Arctic Norway, the bias toward traditional dishes or methods 
can be both positive and negative, depending on what type of products they 
want to promote. The study indicates that a highly modern and/or novel 
product should maybe not be branded as an Arctic product. The food trend 
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of convenience is apparently not put in context with Arctic food, and if a 
producer should use Arctic origin in the branding of such a product it might 
only be successfully applied if the raw material used in the product is asso-
ciated with Arctic food (i.e. some type of ready meal based on reindeer). On 
the other hand, this also might mean a higher acceptance for products that 
are not so convenient.
It is interesting that favorable taste (sweet berries, pure seafood, and 
strong and rich taste) are amongst the first thoughts in the mind of the con-
sumer, both in the south and the north. Elements of taste were not included 
in the part where the consumer was to rate different set qualities because 
this was not identified in the marketing of the products in shop that were 
used as a basis for the survey. In the set qualities characteristics related to 
nature and the environment came out strong. It seems that food produc-
tion in the Arctic is considered to take place on the terms of nature (being 
untouched, preserved, wild and natural). These aspects could also be con-
nected to health, as a clean and natural production often is considered using 
fewer preservatives, fewer additives, etc. Within these most important char-
acteristics, there is no difference between perception in the south and in 
the north. This implies that a stronger focus on healthy and natural aspect 
could be a useful marketing strategy, both regionally and nationally.
The survey shows that the consumers in the north to a much higher degree 
think food from their own region is more “sustainable,” more “environ-
mentally friendly” and has “better nutritional content.” This could be used 
more actively by producers aiming for a regional consumer. The potential 
of exploiting documented better nutritional content or more favorable taste 
should be utilised. In general, the results indicate that it is not necessary to 
develop a different branding strategy for the southern and northern markets. 
Though, if you are including less important elements like better nutritional 
content or sustainability when communicating about your product this will 
resonate more with the northern consumers. Commonly used phrases like 
“grown under the midnight sun” or “the northern lights” are generally not 
considered to ascribe value neither for northern nor southern consumers. 
One could assume that this would resonate more with foreign tourists and 
such phrases are observed on many food products that seem to be targeting 
tourists in the region. Using such characteristics might however result in 
the product losing out on local customers. Whether it fits the expectations 
of tourists and to what degree national customers disregard these products 
remains to be studied.
Luceri et al.’s (2016) argument is that emphasising the geographic origin of 
a product has a positive effect on consumers because it ensures authenticity, 
quality, and food safety. The survey shows that consumers, both in north-
ern and southern Norway have associations of especially quality and food 
safety to food from the Arctic. In the open-ended questions pure, “healthy” 
and “fresh” are dominating. In the closed-ended question “health” and 
“natural” are significantly higher rated than other characteristics. The 
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results indicate that not only does the Arctic origin give the assurance about 
food safety (natural and fresh) as emphasised by Luceri, Latusi, and Zerbini 
(2016), it also incorporates several health-related elements (pure, clean, and 
fresh) that is important according to Bryla (2015). Finally, the Arctic origin 
includes authenticity and traditional elements (tradition and real), char-
acteristics identified by Ilbery and Kneafsey (1998) to be important. This 
shows that food from the Arctic has high potential for benefitting on Arctic 
origin branding.
The consumer – producer dimension
In the open-ended question, the producers taking part in the survey list nat-
ural, flavor, pure and healthy as the characteristics they would use in com-
munication of their own food products. The closed question also enhances 
the importance of tradition and environmental concerns, like preserving 
nature, environmentally friendly and sustainability. Natural, tradition 
and healthy corresponds with the most chosen criteria by the consumers. 
Traditional was specially mentioned in the south. This shows that the pro-
ducers to a high degree understand and do take advantage of the Arctic 
origin of their products by using words that resonate with that of the con-
sumers. It might, however, seem that the producers are less aware of the 
potential in exploiting the associations to the wild, cold Arctic climate and 
untouched nature in their branding. This might be because the produc-
ers in the survey do not think that their products are based on such “wild 
material.” But it might also be that the producers are unaware of the strong 
association the consumer has between food from the Arctic and the nature 
associated with the Arctic region. For instance, reindeer producers might 
focus on their natural and traditional production rather than the associa-
tion to a (more or less) wild animal, the wild nature where they live, and the 
cold Arctic climate creating this nature, and hence product. The produc-
ers and consumers give the same rating to the elements like midnight sun, 
northern lights and polar night. These are not very important when it comes 
either to association or communication of Arctic food.
Conclusion
The study has explored Arctic origin as a marketing opportunity for food 
producers in Arctic Norway. The assumption was that it is possible to 
achieve added value based on Arctic origin in strategic marketing, but that 
to do this, it is vital to know what consumers perceive as Arctic qualities. 
The study finds a high correspondence between northern and southern con-
sumers on what they associate with the Arctic food products both in regard 
to species; reindeer, seafood, and game, and in regard of characteristics; 
natural, pure, healthy, tasty, and traditions. This means that a producer 
often can use the same strategy in their communication with their northern 
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and southern customers. They can also extend their markets, from regional 
to national without extensive change in their branding, unless they have a 
strong focus on a local food image.
Another important finding is that many of the characteristics associ-
ated with Arctic food are in line with current international food trends, 
like health, natural, authenticity, and tradition. Within these associations, 
we, therefore, see many opportunities for branding products based on their 
Arctic origin. The associations of the Arctic as something wild, pure, and 
untouched, thus using “Made in the Arctic” in strategic marketing would 
correspond with these traits.
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Introduction
Arctic peoples and economies have long been linked with reliance upon 
living marine resources. Fisheries livelihoods center on both capture 
fisheries and its related industries (fish processing, gear manufacturing, 
harbor operations, etc.), and subsistence fisheries that contribute to local 
mixed economies (Vilhjálmsson et al., 2005; SADA Report, 2014; Zeller, 
Booth, Pakhomov, Swartz, & Pauly, 2011). The rich, productive waters of 
the Arctic supply over 10% of the world's marine fish catches (CAFF, 2013) 
and delete for culturally important traditional fisheries to the over 40 ethnic 
groups of the Arctic (Fondahl, Filippova, & Mack, 2015). Further, although 
aquaculture production for all of the Arctic hasn’t changed much since 
2014, it remains an important economic sector and has opportunities for 
growth (FAO, 2020). The Arctic marine socio-ecological ecosystem is expe-
riencing continuous, rapid change, including shifts in the range of fisheries, 
decreasing sea ice coverage, increased risk of pollution, and varying forms 
of economic development and governance changes that can have both pos-
itive and negative impacts (Lam, Cheung, & Sumaila, 2014; Burgass et al., 
2019; Kaiser, Pahl, & Horbel, 2018). As interest in the Arctic marine space 
increases, it is ever more important for research and policy to address spe-
cific challenges at local, regional, national, Arctic, and global levels. For 
example, as areas of the Arctic are becoming more and more accessible due 
to melting sea ice, there is increasing interest in developing new fisheries in 
the northern seas (Lam et al., 2014). Even though these fisheries would gen-
erate a positive economic benefit for the Arctic, developing the area bears 
a potential ecological risk (Lam et al., 2014). Another example is that of 
access to local fisheries, whether commercial or subsistence, where access 
rights to specific resources are governed without the interests of small-scale 
actors in mind (Briant, 2018; Chambers, Einarsson, & Karlsdóttir, 2020). 
This creates systems of inequity that can impact the well-being and self- 
actualisation goals of sustainable development. While fisheries and aqua-
culture can provide continued and perhaps expanded opportunities for 
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renewable Arctic economies, barriers and uncertainties related to climate 
change, socio-economic change, environmental impacts, and institutional 
and political obstacles can create challenges.
Information reviewed in this chapter will provide background information 
and identify opportunities and constraints related to fisheries and aquacul-
ture to increase our understanding of renewable economies in the Arctic. 
The specific objective of this chapter is to use the best available data to con-
tribute to scholarship, policy and future development by identifying oppor-
tunities and threats for current and fisheries and aquaculture activities in 
the Arctic. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the best 
available knowledge related to fisheries and aquaculture in the Arctic from 
an interdisciplinary perspective, including the impacts of climate change. To 
narrow the scope, this chapter does not cover other living marine resources 
such as marine mammals or seabirds. Next, Section 3 identifies opportunities 
and threats related to renewable economies based on fisheries and aquacul-
ture in the Arctic related to governance challenges. Section 4 then identifies 
knowledge gaps relevant for the research community by highlighting areas 
for future research under the framework of the United Nation Sustainable 
Development Goals (UN SDGs). The chapter concludes by offering key con-
siderations for Arctic communities and decision-makers interested in renew-
able economies that include fisheries and aquaculture.
Background
There is a wealth of scholarship on Arctic fisheries and aquaculture (see, for 
example, Zeller et al., 2011; Kourantidou et al., 2021). Rather than extensively 
reviewing the literature, this section highlights the current state of knowledge 
of Arctic marine socio-ecological systems, which will then be used to highlight 
specific focus areas under the SDGs in Section 3. The PAME (Protection of 
the Arctic Marine Ecosystems) Working Group of the Arctic Council identifies 
18 LME’s (Large Marine Ecosystems) of the Arctic. Not all waters of Arctic 
nations are in the 18 Arctic LME's, and non-Arctic nations may fish in Arctic 
waters. Therefore, the information presented below denotes the best available 
data based on either Arctic LME's, sub-Arctic waters, or Arctic nations.
Fisheries
Subsistence fisheries
The Arctic has a long history of Indigenous fisheries, heavily relying on 
marine resources such as fish and mammals (AHDR, 2004; CAFF, 2013). 
Various traditionally harvested food sources are an important part of the 
diet in Arctic Indigenous communities such as in the Canadian and Alaskan 
Arctic with whitefishes (Coregonis sp.), salmon (Onchorchynchus sp.), char 
(S. alpinus) and trout (Salvelinus sp.) representing the most frequently 
consumed fish species (Kuhnlein & Receveur, 2007). In Greenland, the 
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population largely consists of Indigenous inhabitants, making up approxi-
mately 90% in 2019 (Statistics Greenland, 2019). Up until today, small-scale 
commercial fisheries and hunting are an important economic aspect in the 
eastern, southern, and northern parts of Greenland (Pálsson, n.d.).
Commercial fisheries and processing
According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), the Arctic can be divided into the Fisheries Statistical Area 18 and 
27 (Zeller et al., 2011). Area 18 can be subdivided into the 8 Large Marine 
Ecosystems (LME) of the Kara Sea, Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea, Chukchi 
Sea, Beaufort Sea, Arctic Archipelago, Baffin Bay, and Arctic Ocean (Zeller 
et al., 2011). Using the PAME designation of the 18 Arctic LME's, the com-
mercial fishery catch in 2014 is outlined below in Table 12.1, using Sea 
Around Us data (seaaroundus.org).
Table 12.1  Commercial fishery catch in Arctic large marine ecosystems (LME) in 2014
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While some of the most productive fishing grounds are located in the 
sub-Arctic region, such as the Barents and Bering Sea, with 633 fish species 
occurring of which 58 are considered commercial, the Arctic basin is com-
parably deserted with only 3 commercial species out of 63 (Meltofte, 2013; 
SADA report, 2014). These productive fisheries are usually characterised by 
only one or two species, with the Bering Sea being dominated by Pollock 
and the Barents Sea by a cod-capelin system (SADA report, 2014).
The Russian area of the Arctic consists of the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea 
and the East Siberian Sea as well as the Chukchi Sea, which is also bordered 
by the United States (Zeller et al., 2011). In accordance to the overall low 
fishery production of the Arctic waters, the Russian Arctic areas sustain 
a low number of fish species (Pauly and Swartz, 2007; Zeller et al., 2011). 
There were significant increases in the population of Siberia during the 
Soviet regime, and the current expanding industrialisation of the Russian 
Arctic between the 1960s and today has further expanded the population of 
the region. The implications of potentially increasing capture fisheries tar-
geting such limited fish populations in adjacent Arctic waters is uncertain, 
but reported estimates of current fisheries production from this region may 
not accurately reflect its potential in this regard (Zeller et al., 2011).
Commercial fishing in the Kara Sea is dominated by six species of white 
fish, making up about 80% of the landings (Zeller et al., 2011). In the Laptev 
and East Siberian Seas, there are no commercial fisheries being operated and 
instead just small-scale fisheries (Newell, 2004). The East Siberian Sea does 
have populations of pink salmon (Oncorhynchus gorbuscha) and Dolly Varden 
(Salvelinus malma) that could sustain commercial harvesting on the grounds 
of size, but these populations are facing the risk of overfishing (Newell, 2004). 
In the area of the Chukchi Sea, the human population has been steadily 
decreasing with about 1,000 people remaining in coastal areas where they 
rely heavily on marine food sources (Newell, 2004; Zeller et al., 2011).
In 2009, under the United States Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act, an Arctic management area was implemented north 
of Alaska, reaching from the Seward Peninsula to the Canadian border 
and therefore covering parts of the Chukchi and Beaufort Sea (NPFMC, 
n.d.). In this area, all commercial fishing for finfish, crustaceans, and other 
animals except for marine mammals and birds, is prohibited to protect the 
sensitive ecosystem from potentially destructive fishing activities (NPFMC, 
n.d.). However, fisheries in the sub-Arctic waters of Alaska accounted for 
2.67 M tons of catch or $1.872 billion 2010 USD in 2014 (seaaroundus.org) 
and are a vital economic activity in coastal communities.
Aquaculture
In the Arctic, harvesting fish from aquaculture is limited, however, there is 
room for growth in the sector for mainly finfish aquaculture (SADA report, 
2014; Barbier & Burgess, 2017). There is also a small but growing niche 
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production of seaweeds and shellfish (Allison, Badjeck, & Meinhold, 2011). 
Norway, by far, dominates aquaculture production in the Arctic, mainly 
through salmon farms, followed by the USA and Canada (AP, 2012; SADA 
report, 2014). Norway's production of Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) was val-
ued at 2.2 billion EUR in 2010 (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, 2020). 
In Alaska, finfish aquaculture is prohibited (ADF&G, n.d.) but the aquacul-
ture sector produces shellfish, such as Pacific oyster (Magallana gigas) and 
blue mussels (Mytilus trossulus), and kelp, which generated 1.53 million USD 
in 2017 (Pring-Ham, 2018). Meanwhile in Canada, as in Alaska, no measur-
able aquaculture currently takes place in Arctic waters, but in the sub-Arc-
tic Pacific waters of British Columbia, 88,834 tons of finfish were produced 
in 2018, generating a value of 791 million CAD (Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada, 2020). In the Canadian Atlantic, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, 
and Newfoundland combine to produce 51,634 tons in 2018 for a value of 
480 million CAD (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2020). Salmon pen aqua-
culture is rapidly expanding in Iceland, with backing from Norwegian com-
panies. In 2018, 19,000 tons were produced, consisting mostly of salmon and 
Arctic char for an export value of 13.1 billion ISK in 2018 (Statistics Iceland, 
2020). In Russia, there are cultivation rights for 30 salmon and trout sites 
in the Murmansk and Karelia regions, with the strategic goal of increasing 
by 16–18 farms in 2025 to produce up to 25–30,000 tons of salmonids. This 
growth coincides with the steady demand for and consumption of salmo-
nids in Russia during the last decade along with the identification of aqua-
culture as a top priority in the agri-food section by the country's authorities.
Impacts of climate change
Based on model predictions, the effects of climate change will be most acute 
in the Arctic, with sea surface temperatures expected to rise more than in 
temperate latitudes (Team, Pachauri, & Meyer, 2014). The rate of climate 
change is considered to be two times faster in the Arctic than in other 
regions, and it is projected that the rate of ocean warming might be up to 
seven times faster than projected changes in terrestrial landscapes (Burrows 
et al., 2011). As an example, with 1.5°C of ocean warming, mobile species, 
such as plankton and fishes, might be driven to relocate at higher latitudes. 
Those species that cannot move, such as kelps and corals, would undergo 
high mortality, causing damage to dependent ecosystems (Hoegh-Guldberg 
et al., 2018). With either the mortality of sessile specie or the range expansion 
of mobile species, the marine ecosystem complexes may experience great 
change. In the Arctic, change has already shown some impacts on the envi-
ronment, both the abiotic and biotic components (Wassmann et al., 2011; 
Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018, AMAP, 2018). Other chemical changes occur 
due to the absorption of anthropogenic carbon dioxide have already been 
observed in the Beaufort Sea and in Alaska's coastal waters (Sumaila, 2015), 
resulting in ocean acidification that can affect the growth and development 
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of organisms that build shells. This in turn impacts a wide range of marine 
species further down the food web that depend on shelled organisms for 
food (AMAP, 2018). However, documenting particular changes is not easy 
due to a lack of reliable baseline data, which is needed for a comparison to 
the current situation (Wassmann et al., 2011).
Expected changes in the Arctic include more than just warming air and 
water temperatures; for example, the observed mean annual spatial extent 
of sea ice has been decreasing 3.5–4.1% per decade and precipitation is 
expected to increase between 30 and 50% (Team, Pachauri, & Meyer, 2014). 
The reduction in the duration of shore-fast sea ice will likely yield greater 
coastal erosion due to more impactful winter storms, with coastlines in 
many locations of the Beaufort Sea expected to undergo high rates of ero-
sion (Gibbs & Richmond, 2015; Jones et al., 2009). Increased coastal erosion 
in the central Beaufort Sea has amplified the suspension of sediment load, 
thereby reducing benthic and water column primary production (Bonsell & 
Dunton, 2018). Such large-scale changes in environmental conditions in the 
nearshore region of the Arctic have significant implications for the ecologi-
cal responses of local fishes as well as other marine organisms.
Physical impacts on marine ecosystems
All fishes are impacted by variability in their surrounding environment 
(Fechhelm, Fitzgerald, Bryan, & Gallaway, 1993). Water temperature and 
salinity are perhaps most influential, and deviations from “normal” condi-
tions can lead to significant energetic costs through increased temperature 
regulation, metabolism, and osmoregulation (Bœuf & Payan, 2001; Edsall, 
1999). Fish species that are forced to inhabit environments with conditions 
outside their optimal requirements can experience reductions in growth and 
recruitment and/or higher mortality (Arnesen, Jørgensen, & Jobling, 1993; 
Dutil, Lambert, & Boucher, 1997). To optimise growth and survival, fish 
may seek environments which provide conditions to optimise growth and 
survival (Monaghan, 2008); to locate such conditions may include shifts in 
geographic distribution (Hansen & Closs, 2009; Křivan, 2003). As a result, 
the magnitude, duration, and variability of environmental factors all play 
a significant role in determining the fish species composition, abundance, 
and rate-dynamic parameters, especially in dynamic environments such as 
the Arctic.
Despite the variable environment, nearshore Arctic waters support a 
variety of fishes. Whitefishes, such as Arctic Cisco Coregonus autumna-
lis, Broad Whitefish C. nasus, Least Cisco C. sardinella, and Humpback 
Whitefish C. pidschian, are amphidromous species that are tolerant of mod-
erate levels of salinity and often undergo long-range migrations (de March, 
1989; Fechhelm et al., 1993). For example, Arctic Cisco in Alaskan waters of 
the Beaufort Sea originate in the Mackenzie River, Northwest Territories, 
Canada, and are transported as juveniles >500 km along the shore via 
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easterly wind-driven surface currents (Fechhelm & Fissel, 1988; Fechhelm & 
Griffiths, 1990). However, other coregonids (for example, Broad Whitefish, 
Humpback Whitefish, and Least Cisco) spawn in rivers throughout north-
ern Alaska and Canada (Craig, 1984, Craig, 1989; Fechhelm, Bryan, & 
Griffiths, 1994). Regardless of species, juvenile whitefishes spend the short 
growing season (late June into September) feeding in coastal estuaries and 
deltas of the Beaufort Sea and overwinter in freshwater pools or upwelling 
areas in coastal tributaries (Craig, Griffiths, Haldorson, & McElderry, 
1985; Fechhelm, Martin, & Gallaway, 1999; Seigle & Gottschalk, 2013). The 
gadids Arctic Cod (Boreogadus saida) and Saffron Cod (Eliginis gracilis) are 
also ecologically important and support the Arctic marine ecosystem with 
their high abundance and energetic content (Elliott & Gaston, 2008; Harter, 
Elliott, Divoky, & Davoren, 2013; Thorsteinson & Love, 2016). These species 
serve as a key link between lower trophic levels (for example, calanoid cope-
pods and amphipods) and higher trophic organisms (for example, seabirds 
and marine mammals; Harter et al., 2013). Pacific salmon Oncorhynchus 
spp. have been documented in the Arctic at increasing frequency in recent 
years, with a natal population in the Mackenzie River in Canada and poten-
tially other rivers of the central Beaufort Sea in Alaska (Gatt, Hamman, 
Priest, & Sutton, 2019; Irvine, Macdonald, & Brown, 2009).
Impacts to coastal communities: Food security, 
economic opportunity, and local infrastructure
In addition to their key role in the ecology and food-web structure of coastal 
marine ecosystems, nearshore fishes also provide important subsistence 
food resource for local Indigenous communities (Fechhelm, Streever, & 
Gallaway, 2007; Thorsteinson & Love, 2016). As a consequence, the effects 
of climate change could significantly impact fishing activities of Indigenous 
peoples (Galappaththi, Ford, Bennett, & Berkes, 2019). As higher levels of 
acidity are already documented for the Beaufort Sea (Zhang, Yamamoto-
Kawai, & Williams, 2020) and Alaska's waters (Monacci, Cross, Hurst, 
Long, & Rossin, 2019), Indigenous communities might eventually not have 
enough nearshore marine resources available to harvest as fish stocks will 
be decreasing due to lower prey availability (Sumaila, 2015). As a result, 
climate change has the potential to disrupt food security for humans. 
While there are no commercial fisheries in federal waters of Arctic Alaska, 
subsistence fisheries in nearshore areas are important socio-cultural and 
nutritional contributions to local Inupiaq communities (Fechhelm et al., 
2007; NPFMC, 2009). Communities along the Chukchi and Beaufort Sea 
coastline, such as Utqiaġvik, Nuiqsut and Kaktovik, are dependent on the 
subsistence harvest of marine organisms, including abundant whitefishes 
found in the river deltas and nearshore coastal waters (Craig, 1987; Braund 
et al., 2012). Although the economic impact of these fisheries is limited, eco-
logical changes in the Arctic would have substantial ramifications for both 
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food-web structure and dynamics as well as human communities (Moerlein 
& Carothers, 2012). As a result, the  importance of Arctic fishes to coastal 
communities necessitates the examination of potential effects of climate 
change prior to understanding how ecosystems and food security may be 
impacted in the future (Reist et al., 2006).
There is also uncertainty involved in projecting fisheries catches for com-
mercial stocks under climate change (Cheung et al., 2016) and how the fish-
ing industry might change. While it can be assumed that fisheries-dependent 
communities could adapt to fluctuating fish stocks or might even profit in 
the short term, their overall adaptive capacity is limited due to the threat-
ened infrastructure and other socio-economic factors (Alvarez, Yumashev, 
& Whiteman, 2020; Ford, McDowell, & Pearce, 2015). The adaptive capac-
ity of Arctic fishing communities can be defined as the ability to cope with 
external stresses, such as climate change, and the ability to modify or 
change (Kokorsch & Benediksson, 2018). It is an integral part of commu-
nity resilience which describes “[…] the ability of a community to cope and 
adjust to stresses caused by social, political, and environmental change and 
to engage community resources to overcome adversity and take advantage 
of opportunities in response to change” (Amundsen, 2012, p. 1). However, 
the adaptive capacity and community resources are somewhat limited and 
dependent on economic factors, decision making power and resource access 
that are usually not part of the local agency (Landauer & Juhola, 2019; Ford 
et al., 2015). Relevant locational factors include infrastructures for the com-
munities in general and the fishing industry in particular. Especially fisher-
ies dependent communities with a monotonous local or regional economy 
are predicted to face difficulties due to climate change. Community infra-
structure, local agency and a diversified economy  are, however, key param-
eters for resilience building and the preparedness for transformative shocks 
(drastic shifts or sudden changes) or structural changes (slow and gradual 
processes) (Kokorsch, 2018). 
Arctic coastal communities are not only dependent on the infrastruc-
ture at the shoreline, but also the hinterland and transportation systems 
onshore are of relevance. Thus, climate change related threats to renew-
able fisheries economies are not limited to melting sea ice and rising sea 
levels, but include coastal erosion, thawing permafrost, extensive precipi-
tation, flooding and severe weather (Landauer & Juhola, 2019; Moon et al., 
2019; Melvin et al., 2017). Hence, some communities, for example in coastal 
Nunavut or Alaska, will face multiple threats and socio-economic burdens 
(Alvarez et al., 2020; Melvin et al., 2017; Walker & Peirce, 2015). It can 
be expected that climate change will lead to significantly higher costs for 
maintenance, restructuring or new construction of critical infrastructure 
(Larsen et al., 2008; Pahl & Kaiser, 2018; Streletskiy, Suter, Shiklomanov, 
Porfiriev, & Eliseev, 2019; Suter, Streletskiy, & Shiklomanov, 2019). While 
rising costs for infrastructure are not a problem per se, in the Arctic it hits 
communities and industries that are commonly investment-intensive and 
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face small profit margins (Stephen, 2018; Suter et al., 2019). Recommended 
proactive investments in adaptation and infrastructure preparedness are 
subject to debate regarding their financing and responsibility (Landauer 
& Juhola, 2019; Melvin et al., 2017). From this perspective, it is debatable 
to what extent renewable economies can be sustained, in a setting in which 
critical infrastructure is vulnerable. In other terms, the economic funda-
mentals (literally and figuratively) might not be renewable but need to be 
constantly renewed.
Apart from the impact on infrastructure and local economies, several 
socio-cultural and demographic consequences for coastal communities 
due to climate change can be identified: cultural heritage loss, health dis-
parities and worsening food and water security (Alvarez et al., 2020; Fritz, 
Vonk, &, Lantuit, 2017; Irrgang, Lantuit, Gordon, Piskor, & Manson, 2019; 
Stephen, 2018). The combination of these factors might lead to intensified 
out-migration or the relocation of some communities, thereby impacting 
the workforce for economic activities. The attractiveness of the fishing sec-
tor (capture fisheries and subsistence fisheries) on and offshore will be neg-
atively affected by the threats outlined above; fisheries are a business sector 
that can be characterised as unstable and climate change is an additional 
hindrance for new entrants to the industry in the long run. Aquaculture 
might be an alternative business strategy for Arctic coastal communities 
and an opportunity to respond to the changes and threats.
Impacts to aquaculture
Aquaculture is likely not as affected by climate driven change in the envi-
ronment as the commercial fisheries, since location, population density 
and resource availability are controlled factors (SADA report, 2014). 
Significant environmental changes might change the distribution of the 
aquaculture industry throughout the Arctic (SADA report, 2014), but over-
all aquaculture in the Arctic will likely see positive effects from warming 
water temperatures (Hermansen & Troell, 2012). For example, the climate- 
induced temperature rise on the Norwegian coasts is likely to range between 
0.5 and 2.5°C and will play out differently during different seasons. Despite 
large uncertainties, and just a few detailed studies that specifically target 
climate change impacts on Arctic aquaculture, the direct effects of temper-
ature change on the aquaculture industry can be modelled with fairly good 
accuracy, including effects on fish growth and impacts on the whole industry. 
Present optimal conditions for open sea cage salmon farming in Norway 
lie between 62 and 64° North latitude. Further south, summer tempera-
tures are higher than optimum, and further north, temperatures are too 
low throughout the year. Increased sea temperatures will generally move 
this optimal zone further north. For fish farms in colder locations than 
optimal, production can increase with 11–15% per degree increase in tem-
perature (Lorentzen, 2008). For farms at optimum or higher temperatures, 
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production will decrease. Salmon farms in the Arctic generally experience 
lower than optimum temperatures and will therefore likely experience 
improved productivity. Species like cod and halibut have narrower temper-
ature  ranges and should respond in a similar way (Troell et al 2017). As a 
buffer against uncertain climatic impacts of sea-pen aquaculture, employ-
ing recirculating aquaculture system (RAS) technologies is seen as a means 
of reducing exposure to climatic extremes. The RAS are expensive in terms 
of both capital and operational costs and require high levels of technical 
expertise (Murray, Bostock, & Fletcher, 2014). The long-term reliability of 
RAS still needs to be demonstrated. Aquaponics, the production of fish 
and plants in an integrated system, is proposed as a means of producing 
food in areas where freshwater is limited (Somerville, Cohen, Pantanella, 
Stankus, & Lovatelli, 2014).
Opportunities and threats related to governance systems
The management of the Arctic areas of those nations adjacent to the 
Arctic Circle lies within each country's national governance (Burgass et al., 
2019). Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), each country is obliged to prevent overfishing by national 
fisheries within the EEZ (Pinsky et al., 2017. However, some issues reach 
beyond just one jurisdiction and therefore require nations to work together 
and develop joint management strategies (Pinsky et al, 2017; Van Pelt, 
Huntington, Romanenko, & Mueter, 2017). Therefore creating new, more 
legally binding cooperative fisheries governance mechanisms and strength-
ening existing agreements, has been identified as a pressing need (Molenaar, 
2012; Molenaar, 2013).
The Arctic Council was created to provide a forum for enhancing and 
expanding international collaboration in the Arctic, but any focus on fos-
tering such collaboration with regard to sustainably managing fisheries in 
this region has largely been “off the table” (Molenaar, 2013). As reported 
by Schatz et al. (2020), “the Arctic Council decided in 2007 that fisheries 
issues should be considered ‘within the context of existing mechanisms’.” 
However, Molenaar (2012) has observed that “there is no juridical obstacle” 
for the Arctic Council to take a more active role, and it has engaged in some 
broader international fishery management-related discussions through its 
standing committees. While the Arctic Council has not “explicitly reversed” 
its formal position with regard to governance and international coordina-
tion and management of fisheries in the region, it could, and perhaps should, 
take a more active role (Molenaar, 2013).
As extensively reviewed and summarised by Molenaar (2012, 2013), the 
existing governance framework for fisheries in the Arctic encompasses 
global, regional and bilateral fora and instruments, as well as limited 
Indigenous co-management arrangements (Ayles, Porta, & McV Clarke, 
2016). However, all of these arrangements, instruments and fora are 
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constrained by lack of sufficient data, inadequate domestic regulation, gaps 
in important Arctic Coastal State fora and instruments, and gaps in high 
seas coverage with Regional Fishery Management Organizations (RFMOs) 
and other arrangements (Molenaar, 2013). This last identified shortcom-
ing was more recently addressed in 2018 by the signing and ratification of 
the “Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central 
Arctic Ocean” (2020). This agreement was signed in Ilulissat, Greenland, 
by the five Arctic states of Norway, Denmark (for the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland), Canada, the United States, and Russia as well as by Iceland, 
Japan, Korea, and China (European Commission, 2018; Harvey, 2018; 
NOAA Fisheries, 2018). Such broader participation in creating new, and 
enhancing existing, Arctic fisheries management instruments and agree-
ments continues to be a significant challenge and needs to be actively pur-
sued (Molenaar, 2012) as it was for this agreement.
This CAOF agreement has been represented as the first preventive, inter-
national agreement of such magnitude (Harvey, 2018; Rayfuse, 2018; NOAA 
Fisheries, 2018). Currently there is no fishing activity actively occurring in the 
CAO, but exploratory fisheries have been conducted in that area in the past 
(Harvey, 2018). The agreement provides for some limited continuation of this 
exploratory fishing activity under requirements to be developed within three 
years of the agreement's ratification. For a period of 16 years following rati-
fication, commercial fishing is limited, “pursuant to conservation and man-
agement measures for the sustainable management of fish stocks adopted by 
one or more regional or sub-regional fisheries management organizations or 
arrangements” (Article 3,1a), and any “conservation and management meas-
ured that may be established” by the parties (Article 3,1b). Encompassing 
an area of approximately 2.8 million km2, commercial fishing will only be 
allowed after this 16-year period if international management strategies are 
developed and implemented to manage such fisheries (NOAA Fisheries, 
2018). Furthermore, the agreement also requires (Article 4,2) the establish-
ment of a “Joint Program of Scientific Research and Monitoring” to better 
understand the ecosystem and potential impacts of fisheries as well as create 
a baseline needed to document future development (Harvey, 2018; NOAA 
Fisheries, 2018). This joint program also explicitly includes the integration of 
“Indigenous and local knowledge” (Article 4,4). By largely prohibiting com-
mercial fishing activity for the period the agreement is in force and effect, not 
only are fish populations present in the CAO protected from overexploita-
tion, but potential pollution and damage caused by the vessels will be very 
limited (Harvey, 2018). However, before the agreement comes into force, all 
nations that have signed the agreement must ratify their commitment which, 
as of August 2019, has only been done by Canada, the EU, Russia, and the 
United States (US Dept of State, 2020). Some analyses of the agreement have 
predicted that closing the high seas could eventually benefit coastal fisheries 
as the high seas would become recovery areas from which a spill-over effect 
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could replenish harvested fish stocks in coastal areas (Sumaila et al., 2015). 
However, the agreement has also been the subject of some criticism. Schatz 
et al. (2019) provides a comprehensive and exhaustive legal analysis of the 
agreement that identifies potential conflicts and ambiguities, concluding that 
“the success of the newly concluded CAOF Agreement cannot be assessed 
from a purely legal standpoint, but largely depends on the political will of its 
parties to implement the rights and obligations codified therein in an effec-
tive, lawful and legitimate manner.”
Arctic Coastal States and non-Arctic countries have participated in both 
unilateral National actions to address fishery management in their Arctic 
waters and have engaged in international collaborations. The United States 
was the first nation to set an example on protecting their Arctic waters by 
adopting, in 2009, a Fishery Management Plan for their Arctic manage-
ment area that bans commercial fishing activity (NPFMC, n.d.). China 
has not only shown interest in the development of the Arctic but has been 
involved in Arctic politics over the past decades, such as its involvement as 
an observer in the Arctic Council (Pan and Huntington, 2016; Østhagen, 
2019, Kuo, 2019). Particularly on Svalbard, China has established consid-
erable infrastructure to conduct research on natural science as well as on 
opportunities to utilise Arctic resources to strengthen further the relation-
ship to Arctic states (Pan & Huntington, 2016; Østhagen, 2019; Kuo, 2019). 
Besides their interest in possible Arctic sea routes, there are incentives for 
involvement in potential Arctic fisheries to ensure enough resources for 
China's growing population, recognising that local fish stocks are in decline 
(Østhagen, 2019, Kuo, 2019). The European Union lacks direct access to the 
Arctic Ocean, but the EU states of Finland, Sweden, and Denmark are geo-
graphically positioned close to the Arctic (Østhagen, 2019). Interest in being 
involved in the policy of developing the Arctic has been expressed by the EU 
(Østhagen, 2019). The EU's Arctic Policy as well as their Ocean Governance 
policy highlights various goals, including sound stewardship of the high 
seas, developing a responsible strategy to access the Arctic's resources, and 
at the same time respecting the rights of Indigenous communities in the 
Arctic (European Commission, 2018).
While it is clear that progress is being made towards creating and imple-
menting a governance framework for fisheries in the Arctic, the challenges 
are significant. Many countries are involved that often have conflicting 
interests. It could be argued that the power, and much of the responsibility, 
lies with the Arctic Coastal States in achieving this goal, but many other 
countries have interests in the future of Arctic fisheries, and their perspec-
tives must be heard. Most importantly, the Indigenous peoples of the North 
are very much affected by the outcome of these deliberations over fisher-
ies resource allocations and conservation, and need to be at the table and 
share equally in the decision making. Many hard choices and trade-offs 
need to be made as this new and hopefully integrated and comprehensive 
236 C. Chambers, T. Henke, B. Barr et al.
fisheries governance framework is crafted. As Jensen and Rottem (2010) 
have observed, “The Arctic region does not suffer under a state of virtual 
anarchy, despite outward appearances.”
The future of aquaculture in the Arctic
Recent international policy directives from the UN recommend replacing 
meat with seafood to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C, and that 
increasing food production in the ocean through aquaculture is a key strat-
egy in reaching the climate goal set in the Paris Agreement. Other direc-
tives for growth, such as the EU Blue Economy Report, identify worldwide 
opportunities for aquaculture production, and Arctic nations are among 
those with strong potential due to the environmental changes discussed 
above. However, governance of aquaculture in the Arctic is in constant flux 
and this presents a challenge for communities planning for growth.
In the United States, the Advancing the Quality and Understanding 
of American Aquaculture Act was introduced in the US Senate in 2018 
(S 3138 – 115th Congress) and the United States House of Representatives 
(HR6966 – 115th Congress) to encourage aquaculture to meet the global 
demand for seafood (Resneck, 2018; Bittenbender, 2019). As this new bill could 
impact the ban of finfish aquaculture in Alaska, the United States Rep. Don 
Young responded by filing the Keep Fin Fish Free Act to ensure the health of 
wild fish stocks (Bittenbender, 2019). While the 2018 bills did not progress, a 
2020 version was introduced to the United States House of Representatives 
in March and is progressing through Committee reviews (HR 6191 – 116th 
Congress). More recently, the United States president has signed an executive 
order intended to expand United States aquaculture production rapidly due 
to pressures from the COVID-19 pandemic to increase domestic food produc-
tion and reduce foreign trade (EO 13921, 85 Fed. Reg. 28,417 (May 12, 2020)).
In Russia, there is a clear example of how the growth of aquaculture is 
linked with political decisions that are not easily reversed. Sanctions intro-
duced in August 2014 that prohibited imports of trout and salmon to Russia 
from Norway, the EU, United States, Canada, and Australia meant that 
Russian companies expanded to replace the near 200,000 tons of those 
products that previously came from outside Russia (Adamowski, 2017). 
While the growth in Russia is expected to continue, it is unclear how future 
governance decisions might impact the growth of aquaculture.
In Norway, aquaculture licensing and permitting processes can be a hin-
drance in an uncertain future. Legal requirements limit production sites 
because a license is granted for one region and cannot be transferred to 
any of the other four regions in place for aquaculture management. Model 
predictions show a significant improvement in productivity for the north-
ern farms and vice versa for the farms furthest south and a corresponding 
northward shift in production if the restrictions are lifted (Hermansen & 
Heen, 2012).
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Discussion: Renewable economies, SDGs, and knowledge gaps
Because renewable economies are so tightly linked with sustainable develop-
ment, the authors chose to organise the discussion around the UN SDGs (UN 
2020). The UN SDGs are a list of 17 priority goals that serve as a call to action 
for countries around the world, and provide a basis of comparison for tracking 
the progress of sustainable development (UN, 2020). All SDGs are relevant 
for Arctic nations; however, it has been noted that the SDGs were not created 
with the Arctic in mind and certain goals are difficult to scale down (Sköld, 
Baer, Scheepstra, Latola, & Biebow, 2018). Specifically, goals related to pov-
erty, food, education, water, and sanitation are not often thought of as impor-
tant topics in Arctic nations due to a dichotomy in the UN between developing 
and developed nations, but these issues can have high variance in the Arctic 
depending on country and region (Kroll et al 2019; Menezes & Chater, 2018). 
It has been suggested that the SDGs can be addressed through the develop-
ment of indicators that are Arctic-specific (Sköld, Baer, Scheepstra, Latola, 
& Biebow, 2018). Following this line of thought, the authors of this chapter 
selected seven SDGs that have the most relevance in identifying knowledge 
gaps for Arctic fisheries and aquaculture. Based on the information provided 
in Sections 2 and 3, we identify below 2–3 priority points for each SDG that 
identify areas of future focus for researchers and decision-makers that will 
help track indicators and therefore the fulfillment of SDG targets. For ease of 
dissemination, the following section presents a series of graphics. With each 
SDG, bullet points are listed to provide recommendations by the authors for 
priority areas of research questions that would create relevant data to assess 
the goal under the lens of Arctic fisheries and aquaculture.
Figure 12.1  SDG 1 “No Poverty” and related research topics. (SDG image repro-
duced from https://sdgs.un.org/goals)
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Figure 12.2  SDG 2 “Zero Hunger” and related research topics. (SDG image repro-
duced from https://sdgs.un.org/goals)
Figure 12.3  SDG 3 “Good Health and Well-being” and related research topics. 
(SDG image reproduced from https://sdgs.un.org/goals)
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Figure 12.4  SDG 5 “Gender Equality” and related research topics. (SDG image 
reproduced from https://sdgs.un.org/goals)
Figure 12.5  SDG 8 “Decent Work and Economic Growth” and related research 
topics. (SDG image reproduced from https://sdgs.un.org/goals)
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Conclusion
As reviewed in this chapter, many reports produced for the Arctic Council, 
among others, have detailed the best available knowledge of Arctic fisheries 
and aquaculture. The goal of this chapter was to put that knowledge in the 
context of renewable economies and sustainable development to provide key 
considerations for Arctic communities and decision makers. The UN SDGs 
are not a perfect framework to guide policy concerning renewable econo-
mies in the Arctic, but instead provide a starting point to build effective 
future policy and research for renewable, sustainable Arctic fisheries and 
Figure 12.6  SDG 10 “Reduced Inequalities” and related research topics. (SDG 
image reproduced from https://sdgs.un.org/goals)
Figure 12.7  SDG 14 “Life Below Water” and related research topics. (SDG image 
reproduced from https://sdgs.un.org/goals)
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aquaculture. This chapter has reviewed the prevailing social, economic, and 
climate-related challenges to Arctic fisheries and aquaculture, and provided 
a path forward by creating recommendations for future focus related to seven 
SDGs that are most closely related to fisheries and aquaculture: No Poverty 
(1), Zero Hunger (2), Good Health and Well-being (3), Gender Equality (5), 
Decent Work and Economic Growth (8), Reduced Inequalities (10), and Life 
Below Water (14). Through the focus on SDG's, this chapter highlights the 
need for Arctic-specific data collection and modeling that is not currently 
clearly visible through larger indicator data sets in fisheries and aquaculture. 
For example, poverty indicators, hunger elimination national objectives, job 
satisfaction and well-being data sets, and gender and technology aspects 
are not often considered with specific focus on fisheries and aquaculture. 
However, these industries and livelihoods, when practiced renewably and 
sustainably, may be key factors in fulfilling Arctic-specific SDGs. The path 
forward to renewable economies in the Arctic related to fisheries and aqua-
culture must start with better and more detailed Arctic-specific focus related 
to commercial and subsistence fisheries and aquaculture.
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Introduction
In 2016, the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) endorsed The 
Arctic as a Food Producing Region research project. Involving research teams 
from Iceland, Norway, Canada, Greenland, and Russia, the objective of the 
project was to assess the potential for increased production and added value 
of foods originating from the Arctic, with the overarching aim of improving 
food security, while enhancing the social and economic conditions of Arctic 
communities. Although the Arctic was recognised as an important food- 
producing region, there was a shared sense that the Arctic was not meeting its 
full potential, either in terms of satisfying local food needs or for maximising 
its domestic or international export potential. Yet beyond speculation, much 
of which was informed by individual or anecdotal experience, there was little 
understanding of the current production capacities of Arctic food sectors or 
where opportunities may lie for sustainable growth. The aim of the project 
was, therefore, threefold: (1) complete an inventory of the current levels of 
Arctic food production in terms of products, volumes, revenues; (2) iden-
tify the constraints and opportunities for increased production value-added 
opportunities; and (3) identify potential pathways and new value chains for 
expanding Arctic food production and distribution opportunities.
We conceptualised the Arctic food systems in terms of primary, second-
ary, and tertiary production. Primary food-producing industries include 
fishing/aquaculture, herding, and agricultural production of raw material, 
including harvesting, milking, and livestock production before slaughter. In 
this case, the original character of the product is not changed. Secondary 
processing includes slaughtering, processing, packing, and transport of a 
product/raw material from primary production. This includes adding some 
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conservatives (salt and sugar), drying, freezing, etc., to obtain a more value- 
added consumer-ready product. Tertiary production involves significant 
changes being made to the product, by adding other ingredients for con-
sumer readiness.
Each country lead selected a number of products/species and food pro-
ducers in their respective countries to be considered, highlighting the prin-
cipal value chain characteristics for their regions. While some latitude was 
exercised in each study region, the research was guided by a common set 
of questions: What is the status and potential for various food production 
opportunities in the Arctic? What are the added values of these products 
when marketed by their special qualities and unique origin? What con-
ditions are important to the further development of the Arctic as a food- 
producing region?
In this chapter, we provide a summary of food production in three regions 
of the Arctic. These include: (1) the entirety of Iceland; (2) Norway’s three 
northernmost counties—Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark; and (3) northern 
Canada, including Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Nunavik, and 
Labrador. In presenting these findings, it is important to acknowledge that 
we compiled national-level data on commercial food production only. Food 
production in and for Indigenous communities was emphasised in the areas/
countries where this was relevant but did not include subsistence or food 
production at the household level. Also not captured are the cultural values 
that Indigenous peoples assign to many of the foods that have both commer-
cial and subsistence value. For example, while Norway’s national statistics 
capture the economic contribution of the reindeer industry, statistics alone 
fall short of measuring the cultural significance of reindeer to the Saami. 
Similarly, export data for seals were compiled for northern Canada, includ-
ing the volumes and revenues garnered from the export of meat, pelts and oils. 
These data in no way capture the cultural importance of harvesting, sharing, 
and consuming seal meat by Inuit in northern Canada. Despite this gap, the 
commercial results we have compiled clearly demonstrate the significant con-
tribution that commercial food production is making to the Arctic economy, 
and also shows the enormous untapped potential for Arctic food production 
to contribute to the economic and social well-being of Arctic communities.
A summary of the Arctic commercial food production
Fish and aquatic food resources
Iceland
The export of fish and fish products are by far the most important export 
items from Iceland and contribute significantly to the Icelandic economy. 
Fish products are exported from Iceland to more than 90 countries, with the 
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EU, United States, and Nigeria markets having the most commercial value. 
Cod, in particular, is the most important export species. The total cod catch 
in 2016 was 264 154 tons, of which 70,000 tons (26.5%) were caught by small 
vessels. In 2016, 669 tons of lumpfish caviar, 731 tons of salted lumpfish roes, 
and 2,700 tons frozen lumpfish blocks were exported from Iceland, worth an 
estimated 2,084 million ISK. A number of Arctic char farming operations 
are situated at different locations around Iceland. All operations are land-
based and use water that, according to EU’s water framework, is classified 
as being of unique quality extracted from springs, boreholes, and wells.
Northern Norway
From 2012 to 2016, Norway exported fish products worth 339,207,335,000 
Norwegian krone (NOK). Norway’s biggest market for fish products was 
Poland, which imported a value of 32,449,669,000 NOK in the same period. 
Other notable importing countries include France, Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, Russia, Sweden, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, 
China, the United States, Portugal, and Italy, who together imported over 
10 billion NOK, which accounted for 78% of all Norway fish exports from 
2012 to 2016. The fish export value in Norway increased from 50.8 billion 
NOK in 2012 to 89.2 billion NOK in 2016, demonstrating an annual percent-
age increase of 8.8% in 2013, 11.5% in 2014, 7.3% in 2015, and 23.9% in 2016. 
Over this period, the value of fish exports from Norway increased by 75.6%. 
Only a small amount of the Norwegian seafood goes to domestic consump-
tion. In fact, it is estimated that 95% of the fishery and aquaculture products 
are exported to 140 other countries. The most important species in terms 
of export volume include salmon, trout, cod, mackerel, herring, and saithe.
Northern Canada
Marine products accounted for 89% (3,470,745 tons) of northern Canada’s 
total food export. Since 1988, approximately 3,470,745 tons of fish and 
aquatic products were exported from the Canadian north, adding more 
than $18 billion, or approximately $600 million per year, to the Canadian 
economy. The major commercial fisheries in northern Canadian are turbot, 
shrimp (northern and striped), and Arctic char, that are shipped fresh and 
frozen as a whole and as fillets. Other commercial products include dried 
fish, fish meal, molluscs, live fish, and other aquatic invertebrates. Among 
133 export destinations, the United States, China, Japan, Denmark, and 
Russia are the leading importers of northern Canadian seafood. The rev-
enue generated from commercial fisheries has increased slightly in recent 
years, from $709 million in 2010 to $798 million in 2019. The fish harvest 
in the Canadian Arctic underwent substantial changes from 1950 to 2018. 
From 1950 to 1960, the total harvest increased from 1,924.7 tons/year to 
3,286.9 tons/year. A decline from 1960 until the early 1990s to 850 tons/year 
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brought the harvest down to almost one third of the peak harvest in the 
1960s. From 1994 to 2018, a slight increase led to a fish catch of 993.6 tons 
in 2018. In addition to fisheries, Canada has exported (2005 and 2014) 




There are over 3,000 sheep farms in Iceland. These farms tend to be small 
and family owned. The sheep farming is as old as the human settlement of 
Iceland. Iceland is very well suited for sheep farming with plentiful grass-
lands and highland pastures. Lambs graze in the highlands until slaugh-
tered in the autumn. The grazing areas are comprised of native vegetation, 
which enhances the quality and reputation of Iceland’s lamb industry.
There are ten slaughterhouses for sheep in Iceland. During the 2017 slaugh-
ter season, 560,500 lambs were slaughtered. The average carcass weight was 
16.5 kg and total production was 9,200 tons of lamb meat (carcasses). The 
value was 6,200 million ISK for lamb meat sold at the domestic market. The 
volume of exported lamb and sheep meat was 4,100 tons. The challenges 
for sheep farmers are low income and the need for off-farm employment. 
The slaughterhouse industry has a strong position on the market and needs 
a considerable share of the market value. The sheep farming industry also 
faces competition from other more profitable meat sectors. Beyond meat 
production, sheep farming includes secondary production. For example, 
skyr production has been a part of the Icelandic cuisine since settlement. 
The industrialisation of skyr started in the 1930s. Gradually domestic pro-
duction of skyr decreased and by 2010 only a few farms were reported as 
skyr producers. In the last few years several farms have started to produce 
skyr according to the traditional methods that have been accompanied 
in growth in domestic sales. Skyr has in the past been sold mainly within 
Iceland but in recent years has been increasing in international exports. 
About 4,500 tons are produced annually. A total volume of about 1,300 tons 
are exported for a value of about 500 million ISK. The remaining 3,200 tons 
are sold on the domestic market.
Northern Norway
The largest agricultural production systems in Northern Norway are based 
on meat production. Abundant high-quality grazing areas are an important 
reason for quality production, but also benefits from substantial barn capac-
ity. In the primary production, there are 1,312 producers of cattle (mainly 
dairy farmers), 1,608 sheep producers, 115 pork producers, and approxi-
mately 30 dairy goat farmers. The total primary production was 186,462 
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sheep, 28,061 cattle, and 103,600 pigs slaughtered in 2016. In that same year, 
there were approximately 1,000 employees in the secondary and tertiary 
industry in northern Norway. The meat products are sold locally, region-
ally, and nationally. The industry is characterised of high level of process-
ing. There are possibilities for increased meat production in the north, both 
by utilising the total potential in the outfield grazing fields for increased 
primary production and by increasing the value-added by producing local 
specialty products. Northern Norway also produces dairy cattle, sheep, and 
goat. This industry is more less dominated by large cooperatives owned by 
the farmers, including TINE (dairy) and Nortura (meat), which are supplied 
by roughly 500 local producers.
The reindeer industry in Norway is closely connected to the Saami-culture 
and heritage. Only persons of Saami descent can be owners of reindeer, a 
right protected by law. In 2017, 3,233 persons were registered as reindeer 
owners in Norway. However, slaughtering and processing of the animal 
products is open to the qualified general public. The majority of reindeer 
are found in Finnmark (75%), while Troms and Nordland have approxi-
mately 6% and Trønderlag has 14%. The reindeer are semi-domesticated, 
which means they roam freely, where they consume grass during summer 
and lichen during winter.
Northern Canada
The value of live animals and animal products exported from northern 
Canadian has increased steadily over the last 30 years. During the 1990s, the 
average revenue from sales was roughly $858,814 CAD per year. However, 
by 2000, annual sales increased to $2.5 million CAD, or an increase 300%. 
Overseas exports fluctuated from 2000 to 2017, with the highest values being 
$3.5 million in 2003 and $4 million in 2011.
The western Canadian Arctic area near Sachs Harbor and Ulukhaktok is 
known for its large-scale commercial harvest of muskoxen. Usable parts from 
a muskox include meat, hide, wool (Qiviut), and horns. Northern communi-
ties export these items to markets in southern Canada. In addition to hunting 
for subsistence and marketing purposes, guided sport hunting-and-outfitting 
based tourism connected to muskoxen provides a source of food and income 
for northern communities. In the Northwest Territories (NWT), the Inuvialuit 
Regional Corporation helps Sachs Harbour residents hold a community 
muskox hunt on Banks Island. The muskox population on the island fluctu-
ates between 80,000 and 120,000 animals. At present, the community harvests 
a few hundred muskoxen annually (roughly 4% of the total estimated popula-
tion). On average, the hunt brings $70,000 worth of wages to Sachs Harbour 
and employed more than 20 community members in meat processing and an 
additional 30–35 hunters involves in the actual harvest (Ryan, 2006).
Although caribou hunting in northern Canada supports household sub-
sistence and inter-settlement trade, the feasibility of commercial hunts is 
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limited. As supplies from wild harvests are intermittent, this influences the 
commercialisation of caribou meat or any other types of sales of caribou 
in southern markets. The uncertainty of supply makes buyers from outside 
Canada hesitant to enter into contracts with northern producers, reducing 
the viability and commercial value of the caribou harvest.
Agricultural production
Iceland
Geothermal energy for heating and electricity produced by hydroelectric 
power stations for illumination are the basis of vegetable production in 
greenhouses in Iceland. Most of the greenhouses are located in clusters where 
geothermal energy is available. Several greenhouses operate through long 
winters by using electrical illumination. The vegetables typically grown year-
round in greenhouses include tomatoes, cucumbers, bell pepper, and lettuce, 
but in some cases also includes spinach, cabbage, kale, and herbs. Some 
greenhouses have successfully grown strawberries but have been challenged 
financially when competing with the lower imported prices. Agricultural 
products are marketed primarily for domestic markets. The greenhouse pro-
duction of cucumbers, tomatoes, and bell pepper was 3,500 tons in 2016. 
The total value of greenhouse and out-door vegetable production in Iceland 
was 3,800 million ISK 2016. The value of greenhouse products is a consid-
erable part of this, estimated to be about 1,500 million ISK. The number of 
employees in vegetable production was roughly 237 and for related services 
107 employees were involved (outdoor production included). The greenhouse 
vegetable production in Iceland meets only a part of the domestic demand. 
The market share for domestic tomatoes and cucumbers is the highest 
(70–90%) but lowest for lettuce and bell pepper (about 10%). The import of 
vegetables is therefore considerable. Vegetable production could be increased 
considerably, however there is import competition. Barley production in the 
country is 10,000 to 16,000 tons per year. Only about 2% of the barley is used 
for food, but this proportion could be increased.
Northern Norway
The agricultural production in northern Norway is the northernmost active 
agricultural system in the world. It is only possible because of the warm air 
carried by the North-Atlantic current and because of the latitudinal place-
ment of the region; growing conditions that are characterised by short grow-
ing season and 24-hour day daylight in mid-summer. The main horticultural 
production is potatoes that are grown on about 460 hectares. Vegetables 
and berries are grown on about 65 hectares with about equal distribution in 
Troms and Nordland counties. Key strengths for horticultural production 
in Northern Norway are the natural growing conditions with cool summers 
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and long days. These conditions imply little problems with pests and diseases 
and require low use of pesticides and herbicides. There are also indications 
of specific quality attributes of horticultural products produced under these 
growing conditions. It has been documented in several horticultural prod-
ucts grown in Northern Norway that the low temperature, in combination 
with 24-hour light and longer photosynthetic activity, causes more crispy 
and juicy products with sweeter taste compared to the same product pro-
duced further south. It is usually not a result of the increased amount of sug-
ars, but rather less production of different kind of bitter-tasting substances. 
Several food producers in Northern Norway are using these particular bio-
logical attributes together with the product origin, for marketing products 
with ‘Arctic quality.’ This is used in the successful marketing of a locally 
produced potato variety gulløye, as “the potato of the midnight sun.”
Northern Canada
From 1988 to 2017, 3641 tons of roots, tubers, cucumbers, beans, chick-
peas and mushrooms were harvested in the Canadian Arctic and exported 
(mostly frozen) to countries around the world. The highest volume was in 
peas, with 492 tons exported to China in 2006, and potatoes, with 275 tons 
($107,621) exported to Russia in 2014. During that same period, blueber-
ries, cranberries, bilberries, raspberries, and blackberries accounted for 
3,377 tons in export. The Netherlands and other European Union countries 
were the major markets for fruit and nut products from northern Canada. 
From 1988 to 2017, the total weight of oil seeds, oleaginous fruits, straw, 
and fodder exported from northern Canada reached 1,202 tons ($1,689,154) 
and contributed 13% to the total weight of farm exports. Other farm prod-
ucts including live trees, teas, cereals, malts, starches, resins, and vegeta-
ble saps, were also exported with a weight of 964 tons ($1,346,561). Unlike 
the large commercial farms in the Canadian prairies, agricultural produc-
tion in the Canadian north is conducted small-scale farms, community 
gardens, and greenhouses. The 2016 Census of Agriculture indicated that 
there were 142 farms operating in Yukon, encompassing a total farm area 
of 10,330 hectares, with 6,801 ha involved in pasture and the production of 
crops. The number of farms operating in Yukon has fluctuated since the 
2001 Census of Agriculture, from a high of 170 (2001) to a low of 136 (2006), 
though the total area in production has not changed as notably.
Discussion
The objective of the Arctic as a Food Producing Region project was to iden-
tify new food production opportunities that could lead to sustainable eco-
nomic development for Arctic communities. Preliminary results show that 
within the Arctic region there are considerable opportunities for commer-
cial food production, both for export and for meeting local food needs. 
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Food industries are producing large volumes of food commodities that are 
culturally compatible with Indigenous/local food preferences and also have 
high export value.
There are, however, large variations in actual and potential production 
and harvesting volumes, both between Artic Nations, species, and product 
groups. The volume variations at a national level can, for instance, be seen 
in the export statistics. These differences will have a large effect on prod-
uct development and marketing strategies chosen by producers as a whole. 
Whereas variations exist in production levels, critical infrastructure, mar-
keting access, lack of available raw material, and skilled workforce, and 
environmental issues are some of the main challenges shared by all. Arctic 
food industries also experience production or harvesting limitations, due to 
national regulations (for example, quotas, health, and safety legislations) or 
natural conditions of the Arctic (for example, climate, availability of food 
sources, and resource availability). Second, high transport costs and export 
tariffs on high-value food products, affect the profitability of food-pro-
ducing companies, for example, contributing to less processing of seafood 
within the Norwegian or Canadian borders. Third, there is a general short-
age of skilled labor in many rural and remote areas. Since food harvesting 
and/or production in most instances are located in districts/regions with low 
population density, acquiring knowledgeable and flexible employees can 
be a constraint to industry development. For example, the population in 
northern Iceland has been declining over the last few decades and this could 
develop to a critical constraint to industry growth. Iceland, except for the 
capital area, is sparsely populated, with changing demographics impact-
ing regional innovation capacity. Qualified human recourses are impor-
tant to allow for industry innovations that will be necessary to capitalise 
on existing and emerging markets. Lacking the necessary labor and human 
resource capacities may then limit investment interest that will be the key to 
stabilising the populations of remote regions.
The Arctic climate poses obvious constraints to the development of food 
industries, particularly in the context of agricultural expansion and diver-
sification. This includes hampering the adoption of new food-producing 
technologies that are more readily available in southern markets. For exam-
ple, in southern Canada, the largest algae cultivation systems to date use 
open pond systems. These autotrophic systems, however, have limited appli-
cability in Canada’s northern climate. Given the high capital and operating 
costs of closed photobioreactor systems, most analysts are skeptical that eco-
nomically sustainable algae cultivation can take place in northern Canada. 
Factors limiting algae biomass production in northern Canada include lim-
ited solar irradiance, high capital costs, high energy and operating costs, few 
opportunities for colocation with symbiotic industry partners (Pankratz, 
Oyedun, Zhang, & Kumar, 2017).
Legislation at various levels of government also prohibits or severely 
restricts local food production, particularly for export markets. The 
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requirement to meet federal food safety and inspection has also restricted 
the commercial development of these foods for export, which in turn, has 
limited entrepreneurial development. Other country-specific legislation can 
further impede industry development. For example, in Canada a federally 
supported food program (Nutrition North Canada) subsidises the trans-
portation costs for selected foods shipped from the south to northern com-
munities. The objective of the program is to help make healthy foods more 
affordable and accessible to northern communities. On average, the pro-
gram provides an annual subsidy of $65 million, nearly half of which subsi-
dises the transport of meat, fruits, and vegetables. As of 2018, 121 northern 
communities were eligible for subsidised food rates. While well-intentioned, 
the subsidy program has in some cases caused economic disincentives for 
local food producers, as the subsidised costs of imported foods are often 
lower than actual costs of food produced in the north. Adding further chal-
lenges to local food production in northern Canada are the Comprehensive 
Land Claims (CLC). The settlement of Comprehensive Land Claims (CLC) 
recognises Indigenous ownership of over 600,000 km2 of land, protection of 
traditional ways of life, confers exclusive and preferential harvesting rights, 
and provides for Indigenous participation in land and resource manage-
ment decisions. CLC have the potential to facilitate entitlement and access 
to food as they contain specific provisions that protect Indigenous hunting, 
harvesting, and fishing rights. While the settlement of CLC has in many 
ways empowered Indigenous peoples in Canada, the specific provisions 
found in these agreements have also created barriers to the development 
of food-related industries. While the provisions vary from one CLC to 
another, most contain explicit language that prohibits the commercial sale 
of traditional foods. The only exception being the Nunavut Land Claims 
Settlement that was signed in 1993.
Opportunities
Notwithstanding the challenges noted above, there are opportunities for 
increased food production in the Arctic. While the Arctic climate is a con-
straint to some areas of food production, new opportunities may also arise 
from global warming, especially within land-based production. Agriculture 
in Arctic regions is considered marginal, due to short growing seasons with 
low growth temperatures. The forecasted increase in temperature due to 
global warming is predicted to be greater in the Arctic than the global aver-
age. As the growing season is being prolonged, it creates opportunities for 
new and or marginally productive agricultural species, especially annual 
species and even barley cultivation.
Opportunities for increasing food production and adding value, improv-
ing product quality, and increasing food tourism and local markets also 
exist. This has been the case in northern Canada where the production of 
prepared or value-added foods has been steadily increasing since 1990s. 
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Since 2000, the export volume of prepared foods has increased by approx-
imately 18,000 tons per year, or an increase of 384%. These exports consist 
mainly of value-added fisheries products (for example, farmed char), but 
also includes agricultural products (berries, teas, and beverages) that are 
contributing to local economies and food security of the region.
Identifying special chemical attributes within raw materials and using 
this for marketing or as extractions of valuable compounds used within the 
industry may also be an opportunity for growth. Other food innovations 
could include the introduction of full utilisation methods and new produc-
tion methods, for example using waste products from the seafood to pro-
duce medicine or fabrics or seaweed production as both a food source and 
for CO2 sequestration. Iceland has a variety of biological resources available 
for sustainable and responsible utilisation, some of which are underutilised. 
The major underutilised resources include side streams, such as those found 
in the marine and agricultural industries. However, data on these resources 
are sparse, resulting in ineffective decision-making and inefficiencies in 
technological innovations.
Iceland, Norway, and Canada each have the advantages of adding value 
to the products by further processing and product development or identify-
ing the local value by historic background or Arctic quality for increasingly 
growing consumer market. Iceland and Norway are already identifying spe-
cial chemical attributes within the raw material produced in the Arctic cli-
mate and using this for marketing or as extractions of valuable compounds 
used within the industry. For these reasons, some of main opportunities for 
increased food production and value-adding revolves around niche prod-
ucts and storytelling, better use of surplus biomasses, improving product 
quality, and increasing food tourism and local markets.
There are also opportunities for increased food production in the Arctic 
given the demand for high-quality foods, which are culturally compatible, 
and sustainably produced. Local niche products are being developed for 
specialised markets. New opportunities might include domestic food pro-
duction in farms and villages to meet local needs while reducing carbon 
footprint. These are proving to be an interest to tourists who are visiting 
northern regions and who are receptive to local foods and food-related 
experiences. The continued growth of the tourist industry could become 
important for the food-related economy of the northern regions. The 
increasing number of tourists also increases the demand for food. To satisfy 
this demand, local food production will need to increase production or risk 
an even greater reliance on food imports. The tourism industry provides 
an opportunity for food producers to increase production and develop new 
products. Regional products are of particular interest to tourists and also 
help to increase sustainability and support local food producers and spin-
off industries.
Food originating from the Arctic may also have a marketing advan-
tage. Consumers generally prefer food that is healthy, with good taste, and 
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produced in a sustainable manner, and increasingly they prefer food with 
a unique story. Food from the Arctic may score high on all these charac-
teristics. There are significant opportunities for developing high-value 
niche “Arctic products” for tourist markets and other selected regional and 
national markets. Consumer preference studies conducted in Norway (this 
volume) and Canada (Yang et al., 2020) indicate that consumers feel the 
consumption of Arctic foods allow them to experience Indigenous cultures 
and tradition, while supporting Indigenous communities economically. 
Compared to other places of origin, Canadian and Norwegian consum-
ers place higher value on the features of Arctic origin, and would choose 
to purchase wild-caught fish by remote/Indigenous producers over other 
southern-based alternatives. Consumers have also shown support for new 
certification standards for Arctic sustainability and authenticity, which 
could be further used as a marketing advantage.
Summary
Our results indicate that within the Arctic region there are considerable 
opportunities for commercial food production, both for export and for 
meeting local food needs. Yet Arctic food industries are also challenged by 
a plethora of social, economic, climatic, and logistical constraints. Despite 
the growth in commercial food production in the Arctic, there remain a 
considerable number of constraints to industry development, including lack 
of necessary infrastructure, fragmented supply chains, limited access to a 
skilled workforce, absence of innovation in product development, and lim-
ited access to, and knowledge of, domestic markets and consumer interest. 
While these challenges are experienced unevenly across the Arctic regions, 
Arctic food industries, as a result, tend to be fragmented with tenuous pro-
fessional connections and limited communication streams. These condi-
tions have in part led to their general overreliance on raw food exports, 
imported packaged foods, bottlenecking of distribution points, and limited 
innovation in primary and secondary product development. These condi-
tions, in turn, have accelerated a nutrition transition among populations 
characterised by an erosion of diet quality, increased consumption of 
ultra-processed foods.
Land-based plant production in the Arctic has not received much atten-
tion over the years, although it may be of global importance to utilise the 
production capacities of the northern regions. The effects of global warming 
have the potential to provide new opportunities for growing new crops and 
cultivars with a higher yield potential within a prolonged growing season. 
To identify the capacity for increasing plant production and agriculture 
in Arctic areas, it is of major importance to understand the mechanisms 
behind the effects of climate change on plant production and plant persis-
tence. Screening of available genetic resources in the Arctic is important 
for selecting well-adapted plant material both for crop production and for 
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the preservation of biodiversity. Implementing technological solutions into 
production systems will further increase the production potential. For the 
successful development of rural plant production, knowledge transfer is cru-
cial. This can be achieved by strengthening and enlarging the R&D network 
to support collaboration across national borders in the Arctic. Engaging 
Indigenous communities and industry stakeholders could enhance innova-
tions in agriculture and create new markets and employment opportunities 
for northern communities. A better insight into the effective use of available 
plant genetic resources could also give social and economic advantages for 
the future rural population in Arctic regions. Future opportunities also lie 
in new and better storage methods for seasonal raw material and full utili-
sation of raw materials.
Icelandic Food and Biotech R & D (Matis), has already established sev-
eral food innovation centers at various locations in the country. Support 
from regional innovation centers has been a successful strategy for small-
scale product development. The intention is to improve regional food 
production further and the Icelandic government is expected to increase 
funding for local and regional innovation in food sectors. This is impor-
tant, as small-scale local and regional food producers and entrepreneurs 
need financial assistance in the early stages of food innovation. Norway has 
adopted a similar approach to stimulating innovation in the food sectors. 
There has been a focus on building various types of network cooperation 
between the local food companies. These networks are often partly funded 
through Innovation Norway. Most networks are geographically linked like 
Nordlandsmat or Vesterålsmat, but some are also focused on a specific prod-
uct type like Lofotlam (sheep meat) and Arktisk kje (goat meat). These net-
works focus on overcoming the challenges of being a small producer in the 
north by achieving large-scale advantages and capitalising on economies 
of scale in distribution, sales, and marketing. Evaluations conducted by 
Innovation Norway found that industry success most often requires busi-
ness objectives to be clearly defined and offer value to all parties in the value 
chains. In addition, it was found that success takes time and trust between 
the companies, especially if they see themselves as competitors, is required. 
Some of the more successful networks in Norway have evolved for over a 
decade like LofotenMat (founded in 2007) and Fjellfolket (funded in 2006). 
During this time governmental support has been critical for build up the 
local food sector in Norway and in launching the Centre of Expertise in 
2002 for local food production, with a northern hub is located at Nibio in 
Tromsø. The target industry groups are small to medium-sized food produc-
ers whose shared goals include adding increased value to Arctic food prod-
ucts through innovation, skills development, and entrepreneurial training.
We believe the time is right for a pan-Arctic focus on food production and 
sustainable economic development. Investing in Arctic food systems trans-
formation requires a systems-based approach to policy formulation and 
investment grounded on a solid foundation of interdisciplinary research 
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that connects capacities and institutions across the Arctic. Likewise, achiev-
ing the food security for all Arctic peoples requires a robust research agenda 
that is developed and implemented in a concerted manner with consistent 
investment. The international experience and development discourse are 
much better informed by research in the Global South. The International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), for example, was established in 
the 1970s alongside substantial investments in agricultural research and the 
establishment of the global, multi-hub Consultative Group on International 
Agriculture Research (CGIAR), with the explicit purpose of facilitating 
independent research that would deal with socioeconomic policies for agri-
cultural development and to improve the understanding of national food 
policies to promote the adoption of innovations in food producing technol-
ogies. With the establishment of national ‘hubs’, a cluster-based approach to 
Arctic food innovation could similarly draw together Arctic food producers 
with governments, Arctic Indigenous communities, universities, research 
centers, vocational training providers, and industry associations and young 
people. Such a concerted focus on food production and Arctic sustaina-
ble development would prove capable of responding to global challenges 
and would define the Arctic’s role in sustainable development locally and 
around the world.
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14 The nexus between water, 
energy, and food (WEF) 
systems in Northern Canada
David Natcher & Shawn Ingram
Introduction
In 2015, the United Nations introduced Transforming the World: the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development. The 2030 Agenda was endorsed by 
the world’s leaders to serve as an action-oriented road map for safeguarding 
the welfare of current and future generations (Lim, Søgaard Jørgensen, & 
Wyborn, 2018). At the core of the Agenda are 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) that serve as benchmarks for achieving equality, prosper-
ity, and environmental sustainability. Each of these 17 SDGs has specific 
targets (N=169) and associated indicators (N=232) that are used to measure 
advancements toward the attainment of each SDG.
While Agenda 2030 has been heralded as a platform for protecting our 
environment for current and future generations, some (e.g., Nilsson, Griggs, 
& Visbeck, 2016) warn that simply “ticking off” SDG targets without consid-
ering cross-sectoral interactions may result in ill-informed and unintended 
outcomes. For example, Lim et al. (2018) argue that there is an inherent risk 
in global goal formation, whether in the case of SDGs or its predecessor, 
the Millennium Development Goals, when targets are compartmentalised, 
siloed, and viewed through a reductionist lens (Costanza et al., 2015; Nilsson 
& Costanza, 2015). In these cases, the complexities of individual SDGs may 
be obscured, and critical interactions in the global system can go unnoticed 
(Lim, Søgaard Jørgensen, & Wyborn, 2018). The United Nations acknowl-
edges the risks of treating SDGs as discreet and unrelated and has called 
for greater attention to the interactions between SDG targets. This includes 
careful consideration of both the synergies and trade-offs associated with 
SDG attainment. Synergies include the positive effects of achieving multi-
ple SDG targets through simultaneous interventions, for instance through 
mutually beneficial infrastructure developments, whereas trade-offs occur 
when advancements toward one target have a negative impact on the abil-
ity to reach other targets, whether due to environmental degradation or 
intensive use of resources (Fader, Cranmer, Lawford, & Engel-Cox, 2018). 
For example, Pradhan, Costa, Rybski, Lucht, and Kropp (2017) found 
that SDG 1 (Ending poverty) has synergetic relationships with most of the 
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other SDGs, while SDG 12 (Responsible consumption and production) is 
most commonly associated with trade-offs. Accounting for the positive and 
negative spillover effects of SDG attainment is therefore essential to for-
mulating sustainable solutions to global challenges (McCollum et al., 2018; 
Rasul, 2016).
Various methodologies have been developed to systematically map and 
rank the level of interactions between SDG targets (Nilsson, Griggs, & 
Visbeck, 2016). These approaches have generally been referred to as nexus 
research and are used to define, measure, and analyse the connections and 
interactions between SDGs. There are multiple fields of nexus research but 
the relationship between water (SDG 6), energy (SDG 7) and food (SDG 
2) (WEF) has received considerable research attention (Endo, Tsurita,
Burnett, & Orencio, 2017). This focus has been attributed, in large part,
to the pervasive interactions that occur between WEF systems (Bhaduri,
Ringler, Dombrowski, Mohtar, & Scheumann, 2015; Biggs et al., 2015).
Over the past decade, WEF nexus studies have been conducted at the 
global (Fader, Cranmer, Lawford, & Engel-Cox, 2018), national (Mainali, 
Luukkanen, Silveira, & Kaivo-Oja, 2018), and regional levels (Kulat, 
Mohtar, & Olivera, 2019; Liu, 2016), and all have concluded that WEF 
nexus research is informative for resource planning and developing effec-
tive policies for sustainable development (Pittock, Orr, Stevens, Aheeyar, 
& Smith, 2015). This was the impetus for the Arctic Council to adopt 
the United Nations’ SDGs to inform its own strategic policy direction; 
noting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is global in scope 
but also applicable to Arctic regions. In particular, the Arctic Council’s 
Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) endorsed the prin-
ciples of Agenda 2030 and made a commitment to use SDG targets as 
guideposts for advancing the sustainable development of Arctic regions 
(SDWG, 2017). Yet before those guideposts can be determined, the SDWG 
acknowledged that a better understanding of the potential synergies and 
trade-offs between SDG targets was needed before regional implementa-
tion could be considered.
Although WEF nexus studies have been conducted in regions around 
the world, no assessment has been conducted in an Arctic setting. It is in 
this context that our study for northern Canada was conducted. As defined 
by the Arctic Council, northern Canada includes Yukon, Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut, Nunavik, and Labrador. This study serves as a pre-
liminary assessment of the nexus between: SDG 2—ending hunger and 
achieving food security for all; SDG 6—ensuring the availability and sus-
tainable management of water and sanitation for all; and SDG 7—ensur-
ing access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all 
(Table 14.1). By evaluating the current state of WEF security in northern 
Canada, and making visible the synergies and trade-offs between WEF-
SDG targets, policy makers in Canada will be in a more informed position 
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to carry out integrative planning. This is particularly necessary given the 
relatively high rates of WEF insecurities currently experienced in northern 
Canada compared to the rest of Canada (see CCA, 2014; Egeland, 2009; 
Natcher, Shirley, Rodon, & Southcott, 2016; Poppel, 2015); insecurities that 
may be compounded by the social and ecological stresses that are expected 
to accompany climate change.
Following this introduction, we provide a brief review of the current 
status of WEF security in northern Canada. This includes current assess-
ments of household food security, access to clean water, and dependence of 
non-renewable energy sources. We then discuss the data used in this assess-
ment and the methodology employed to calculate interactions between 
WEF-SDG targets. Our results are then presented, and are followed by our 
conclusion that highlights our key findings and recommendations for future 
research.
Table 14.1  United Nations sustainable development goals and targets (SDG 2, 6, and 7)
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WEF (in)security in Northern Canada
Communities in northern Canada experience higher rates of water, energy, and 
food insecurity relative to the national average. These conditions have evoked 
national (e.g., CCA, 2014) and international attention (e.g., De Schutter, 2012). 
Below, we offer a general portrait of WEF systems in northern Canada.
Water (in)security
Nearly all residents in northern Canada have access to adequate drink-
ing water and sanitation services. For example, roughly 99% of Inuit in 
Nunavut have hot and cold running water, a flush toilet, and a septic tank 
or sewage system (Poppel, 2015). However, northern Canada residents do 
not have universal access to improved water and sanitation services, with 
most gaps occurring in remote and rural areas (Bressler & Hennessy, 2018). 
Approximately 74% of communities in Northwest Territories and Nunavut 
have trucked water supplies and waste disposal systems, with 16% having 
below/above ground water distribution systems, and 10% using a combi-
nation of water buckets, privies, or trucked services (Environment and 
Climate Change Canada, 2013). The overreliance on trucked water and 
waste removal has placed increased pressures on water utilities and con-
strains the ability for northern communities to deliver reliable water and 
sanitation services.
The quality of drinking water is also variable and is subject to seasonal 
fluctuations, often due to environmental or climate-related impacts, which 
at times affects water safety. In Nunavut, 13% of residents have indicated 
their water is not safe for drinking in general, while 21% indicated it is not 
safe for drinking at least some times throughout the year (Poppel, 2015). 
Nunavut residents have also indicated that environmental and climate- 
related events have led to decreases in water quality and quantity, damage 
to water and sanitation infrastructure, and water maintenance and treat-
ment issues (Bressler and Hennessy, 2018). The government of Northwest 
Territories (GNWT) reported that seven communities within the NWT 
had boil water advisories at some point in 2018 (GNWT, 2019). However, 
the GNWT anticipates climate change to have a negative impact on water 
quality and quantity, with detrimental changes caused by increased tem-
peratures, extreme weather events, variability in precipitation, and impacts 
to critical infrastructure (GNWT, 2018). Climate change is also contribut-
ing to water scarcity, with some northern cities like Iqaluit preparing for 
water shortages by 2024. In addition to population growth and increasing 
demand, Iqaluit’s water system is challenged by warmer weather and declin-
ing levels of rainfall that have led to water shortages (Bakaic et al., 2018).
Territorial governments have developed proactive plans to address water 
insecurity. For example, in 2014, Yukon released its water strategy and 
action plan with the overall goal of maintaining the quality, quantity, and 
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health of Yukon water for both people and the environment. Priorities for 
achieving these goals include maintaining and improving access to safe 
drinking water, promoting the sustainable use of water, improving water 
management programs, and planning for water needs now and in the 
future (Government of Yukon, 2014). In Northwest Territories, the territo-
rial government introduced its updated 2018 water plan, Northern Voices, 
Northern Waters: NWT Water Stewardship Strategy. The plan is a guide to 
long-term stewardship of water resources in the territory for maintaining 
the quality, quantity, and rates of flow of territorial waters, ensuring resi-
dents have access to safe, clean, and plentiful drinking water at all times, 
and ensuring that aquatic ecosystems remain healthy and diverse (GNWT, 
2018). Notwithstanding these policy commitments, communities in north-
ern Canada continue to be challenged by high rates of water insecurity, 
which leaves residents at heightened risk of experiencing a multitude of 
adverse health outcomes (Sarkar, Hanrahan, & Hudson, 2015; Bressler and 
Hennessy, 2018).
Energy (in)security
Nearly all residents in northern Canada have access to electricity. However, 
the sources for energy vary, with much of the energy produced through 
non-renewable and inefficient technologies. Because of the long distances 
between populated areas in northern Canada, there is limited grid connec-
tivity. Additionally, the northern territories generate a negligible amount of 
their own electricity, combining to produce less than 1% of the total elec-
tricity production in Canada (Government of Canada, 2019). While some 
areas have isolated power grids for electricity transmission, the remoteness 
of many communities in northern Canada makes it difficult, either due to 
high costs or the physical geography, to supply power through conventional 
distribution systems. Northern communities are therefore overly depend-
ent on imported fuel, mainly diesel, to generate their power and electricity. 
Global shifts in energy prices are expected to further threaten the energy 
security of northern communities (Larsen & Fondahl, 2015). There is, how-
ever, considerable regional variability in energy generation. For example, 
in Yukon, 95% of the total electricity is derived from hydroelectric genera-
tion, although diesel and natural gas generation are required during periods 
when hydroelectric generation is insufficient to meet peak power demands. 
Yukon does have electricity transmission lines that connect the majority of 
the territory to its hydroelectric grid, although five communities remain off-
grid and rely on diesel-fired generation exclusively.
In the Northwest Territories (NWT), roughly 75% of power is generated 
from hydroelectricity. The NWT has two regional hydro-based electricity 
grids, the Snare Grid north of Great Slave Lake and the Taltson Grid south 
of Great Slave Lake. In all, 26 of 33 NWT communities are able to receive 
electricity through transmission and distribution lines; however, remote 
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communities and industries that are not connected to either grid rely pri-
marily on diesel powered generators as their electricity source. Due to the 
low population density and relatively expensive generation costs, NWT 
residents pay among the highest electricity rates in the country, reaching 
approximately 30 cents per kilowatt hour (Government of Canada, 2019). 
The availability of hydroelectric power is also subject to annual and sea-
sonal weather variabilities. For example, in 2017 which experienced limited 
precipitation, only 39% of the NWT’s energy was derived from hydroelec-
tric generation, with 57% generated from diesel, 2% from wind, 2% from 
natural gas, and 1% from solar power (Government of Canada, 2019). In 
response to energy insecurity, the Government of the NWT has introduced 
a draft 2030 Energy Strategy that calls for the installation of wind turbines 
and solar panels in smaller, off-grid communities to reduce their reliance 
on diesel power and to broaden connectivity to the existing hydroelectric 
power grids.
In Nunavut, nearly all of the territory’s energy is produced from die-
sel-fueled power generation (Government of Canada, 2019). In the absence 
of electrical transmission grids, communities in Nunavut rely on standalone 
diesel generators for their energy needs. In total, approximately 55 million 
liters of diesel are consumed annually for power generation. Diesel fuel sup-
plies are typically transported to communities during the summer and then 
stored for year-round use (Government of Canada, 2019). The Government 
of Nunavut has introduced solar technologies in some communities (for 
example, Iqaluit, Kugluktuk), and liquefied natural gas and biomass ener-
gies are being considered. Electrical transmission lines from Manitoba have 
also been proposed with construction potentially beginning as early as 2022.
Food (in)security
In the 2014 State of Knowledge of Food Security in Northern Canada 
assessment, a stark picture was presented on the high rate of food inse-
curity experienced by Canada’s northern communities, particularly among 
Indigenous populations. While northern food insecurity is experienced 
differently depending on one’s age, gender, and the community and region 
in which one lives (Natcher et al., 2016), the overall statistics for northern 
Canada are nonetheless alarming. For example, it is estimated that Inuit 
living in Nunavut have the highest food insecurity rate of any Indigenous 
population in a developed country (CCA, 2014). Among Inuit children, 90% 
experience conditions of hunger on a regular basis, 76% miss meals, and 
60% often go an entire day without eating (Egeland, 2010). These conditions 
are contributing to delayed and declining physical, social, and emotional 
health among Indigenous youth (CCA, 2014). Households with children also 
report disproportionately high rates of food insecurity relative to house-
holds without children (CCA, 2014). For instance, the IPY Inuit Child 
Health Survey found that 70% of Inuit preschoolers in Nunavut lived in 
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food insecure households, while 24% of children under five years old lived 
in homes reporting severe food insecurity (Egeland, 2009). Furthermore, 
according to the 2007–2008 Nunavut Inuit Child Health Survey, only one 
third of Inuit children had healthy body weights for their age or height and 
72% of children had decayed or extracted teeth (Egeland, 2009). Altogether, 
the high rates of food insecurity experienced by northern communities have 
contributed to a general decline in the physical (Compher, 2006), nutritional 
(Kuhnlein, Receveur, Soueida, & Egeland, 2004) and emotional health 
(CCA, 2014) of northern residents.
The challenges associated with security in the northern food systems have 
been further exacerbated by extraordinarily high commercial foods costs in 
northern communities. For example, the Action Canada Foundation (2014) 
estimated that the purchase price of food items in Nunavut were 140% 
higher on average than the purchase price for the same food products in 
southern Canada. In the community of Old Crow, Yukon, residents pay an 
average of $496/week for a healthy food basket. This same food basket can 
be purchased for $206 in the Yukon’s capital city of Whitehorse (Natcher 
et al., 2016). These cost differences can be attributed to the added expense 
of northern transport (estimated >20%) (Sorobey, 2013), higher electricity 
rates (roughly 84%) (CCA, 2014), and additional labor, storage, and building 
maintenance costs (Duhaime & Caron, 2013). When combined, these added 
costs result in northern residents paying as much as $13 for a head of cau-
liflower, $9 per kilogram (kg) for tomatoes, and $7/kg for carrots (Nunavut 
Food Price Survey, 2017).
To offset these costs, the federal government has, since 2011, provided sub-
sidies to northern retailers who are then expected to pass those savings on 
to consumers. For example, in 2016 Nutrition North Canada (NNC) spent 
$64.8 million to subsidise the northern transport of 25.5 million kg of perish-
able goods. This included $21 million (32% of budget) to subsidise the ship-
ment of 7.4 million kg of fruits and vegetables. However, a review of NNC 
found that the volumes and delivery times for food shipments remained 
highly variable, resulting in compromised food quality and reduced con-
sumer acceptability. Despite the best intentions of NNC, high costs, coupled 
with poor retail quality, often removes fruits and vegetables from household 
food baskets; foods that are then replaced by non-perishable foods that lack 
equivalent nutritional value. These conditions have added to what many 
characterise as a public health crisis in northern Canada (CCA, 2014).
Data and methodology
Data
When assessing SDG indicator data, the United Nations (2018) suggests that 
data should be disaggregated as much as possible, for example by sex, age, 
race or ethnicity, and geographic location. To assess SDG target interactions 
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in northern Canada, we drew on various public data sources made available 
by federal and territorial governments and various published resources on 
Arctic well-being and development. For example, much of the primary energy 
data was from the Government of Canada’s National Energy Board (2019), 
which provided energy profiles describing the energy production, energy con-
sumption, electricity use, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in each terri-
tory. We examined these energy profiles for each territory separately to assess 
energy security throughout the Canadian Arctic. We also considered the 
GHG emissions related to energy production in order to evaluate the climate- 
related impacts of producing power in these regions. In addition to these data 
sources, territorial governments have developed their own strategic planning 
documents for WEF sectors. These include, for example, the Yukon’s 5 Year 
Strategic Plan for Energy (2019–2024), the Yukon Water Strategy and Action 
Plan, and the Local Food Strategy for Yukon (2016–2021).
Additional indicator data were derived from various ‘state of knowledge’ 
reports, such as the Arctic Human Development Report (Larsen & Fondahl, 
2015), the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) (Poppel, 2015), 
Aboriginal Food Security in Northern Canada (CCA, 2014), and the Inuit 
Adult and Children’s Health Surveys (Egeland, 2009; Egeland, 2010). These 
data sources may not align perfectly with U.N. recommended data sources, 
but they do provide a relatively accurate proxy representation of the indica-
tors for northern Canada.
Methods
Various approaches have been used for analyzing and measuring trade-offs 
and synergies between WEF systems (Endo et al., 2015). For this research 
we adopted the approach developed by Fader et al. (2018) who, building 
on Nilsson et al. (2016), provides a step-wise methodology for calculating 
and ranking the degree of interaction between WEF-SDG targets. Whereas 
Fader et al. (2018) conducted their analysis on an international scale, we 
adapted their methodology for regional application in northern Canada.
In this approach, positive interactions between WEF-SDG targets occur 
when common infrastructure requirements are required to achieve each tar-
get and when the targets have a positive net impact on ecosystem services. 
Conversely, negative interactions occur when two targets require the same 
scarce resource inputs and if the target pair imposes a negative net impact 
on ecosystem services. The magnitude of the synergy or trade-off between 
any two targets is then represented by the sum of the positive and negative 
interactions between the two targets, where positive sums indicate synergies 
and negative sums indicate trade-offs between two targets. This methodol-
ogy has been widely employed due to its transparency and for illustrating 
the inherent connections between WEF targets.
This methodology does have limitations, most notably in the method’s sub-
jectivity. Because each interaction score depends on the expert knowledge, 
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considerations, and information available to those conducting the analy-
sis, some interpretation is required. Thorough and careful consideration 
needs to be given to how each target could be met, as it could alter the 
resulting interaction scores. For example, target 2.1, ending hunger, could 
be met through conventional food production and transportation methods 
or through traditional food procurement methods such as hunting and fish-
ing, with each method requiring different input and infrastructure needs 
that require consideration. This subjectivity could lead researchers to reach 
different conclusions based on their considerations of how each SDG target 
could or would be met. Notwithstanding this limitation, this methodology 
does make apparent the various interactions that occur between WEF-SDG 
targets in an accessible and transparent format.
In our analysis, we first evaluated the resource input needs, infrastructure 
requirements, and the risks and benefits toward ecosystem services asso-
ciated with achieving each target. Three resource inputs were assessed for 
each target: (1) water, (2) land and soil, and (3) electricity and fuel. A neg-
ative interaction occurs between two targets if they both require the same 
input since they are considered to be in competition for that scarce resource. 
Therefore, a −1 is attributed to the total interaction score for each input that 
both targets require.
Similarly, three types of infrastructure requirements were evaluated for 
each SDG target: (1) health care and hospitals, (2) education, technology, 
and research, and (3) “gray infrastructure”, which includes infrastructure 
such as streets, pipes, rails, airports, dams, energy production, sewage, 
and water treatment. Contrary to input needs, a positive interaction occurs 
between two targets when they require the same infrastructure type since it 
is assumed that the required infrastructure can be used or developed in a 
way that helps achieve both targets. Therefore a +1 is attributed to the total 
interaction score for each infrastructure type that both targets require.
Lastly, each SDG target was evaluated in terms of if the potential risks 
or benefits it posed toward provisioning and regulating ecosystem services. 
Supporting ecosystem services were included within regulating services for 
the purpose of this analysis. A value of −1 is assigned for each ecosystem 
service the target poses a risk to, +1 is assigned for each ecosystem service 
the target produces benefits toward, and 0 is assigned if the target has no 
impact on the ecosystem service. If the net benefits from the two groups of 
ecosystem services outweigh the risks, +1 is attributed to the total interac-
tion score for that target pair. Conversely, −1 is attributed to the total inter-
action score if the net ecosystem service risks are greater than the benefits. 
If the risks and benefits to ecosystem services between two targets are equal, 
no score is attributed to the total interaction score.
Every pairwise combination of targets in SDGs 2, 6, and 7 were evaluated 
in this manner. The total interaction score (TIS) between two targets is the 
sum of the negative input interactions, positive infrastructure interactions, 
and the net effect on ecosystem services. Written in equation form, this 
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appears as TIS = RI + INF + ES where RI is the resource input trade-offs 
impact, INF is the infrastructure synergies impact, and ES is the ecosystem 
services impact. RI can range in value from −3 to 0, INF can range in value 
from 0 to +3, and ES can take on a value of −1 if ecosystem services risks are 
greater than benefits, +1 if ecosystem services benefits are greater than risks, 
and 0 if the benefits and risks are equal or there are no risks or benefits. 
Therefore, the total interaction score for any pair of targets can range from 
−4 to +4, where the greater the absolute value of the total interaction score, 
the greater the magnitude or strength of the trade off or synergy is between 
the two targets (Table 14.2).
Results
SDG target interactions
Out of 210 interactions, only 12 were found to be negative, while 15 target 
pairs had no interacting effect (Table 14.3). Only three interaction scores 
were lower than −1, whereas 132 are greater than +1. Overall, roughly 87% 
of all interactions were found to be synergistic of some magnitude. This 
indicates that achieving or addressing one WEF target would have positive 
spillover effects on the others. Our findings are consistent with other WEF 
assessments, which have typically found that synergies between targets out-
weigh the trade-offs (Fuso Nerini et al., 2018; McCollum et al., 2018). For 
example, Fader et al.’s (2018) global WEF assessment determined 166 syn-
ergistic interactions to only 26 trade-offs, with water-related targets having 
the most synergistic potential.
One reason for the large number of synergies is the positive impacts on 
ecosystem services. By design, the SDG targets almost universally promote 
ecosystem services, and one point is added to the total interaction score of 
any two targets that result in a net positive environmental impact. This is 
especially important in northern Canada where WEF targets that benefit 
ecosystem services can assist in climate change mitigation. The need for 
Table 14.2 Scale of possible total interaction scores between WEF-SDG targets
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research, technology, education, and improved infrastructure in northern 
Canada also contributes to the present synergies. For example, building 
roads, water lines, or clean power sources in or between communities can 
improve access to food, water, and clean energy that could help achieve 
multiple targets simultaneously.
All negative interactions involve at least one target from SDG 2 (zero hun-
ger). This is primarily due to the significant amount of resources needed to 
achieve targets in SDG 2 such as ending hunger (2.1), ending malnutrition 
(2.2), and increasing agricultural productivity (2.3). These targets all require 
intensive resource inputs such as land, water, energy, and fuel in order to be 
met, and since there is a limited amount of these inputs available, trade-offs 
occur between the targets that need and consume these scarce resources. For 
example, in order to eliminate hunger, a strategy may be to increase agri-
cultural production. However, increased agricultural output may require a 
greater use of inputs (for example, synthetic fertiliser), which necessitates 
increased energy consumption and may pose adverse effects on water qual-
ity and quantity, both resulting in trade-offs.
To illustrate the target pair assessment procedure in practice, consider 
the interaction between the target pair of 2.2, to end malnutrition, and 2.3, 
to double agriculture productivity and incomes of small-scale food produc-
ers, as an example. Ending malnutrition in northern Canada will require 
all three input groups as water, land and soil, and electricity and fuel will 
be required whether the food is produced in northern Canada or elsewhere 
Table 14.3  Interaction scores between WEF-SDGs 2,6, 7 targets for Northern Canada
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and then transported to the region. Similarly, all three input groups are 
required to double agriculture productivity and income as they are all nec-
essary for food production by conventional agriculture or by harvesting 
wildlife from natural habitats and fisheries. Therefore, the two targets are 
in competition for all three resources, resulting in a −3 contribution to the 
total interaction score.
In terms of infrastructure needs, all three infrastructure groups are also 
deemed necessary to end malnutrition. Health care would be needed to 
assess the prevalence of malnutrition among northern residents and possi-
bly provide nutritional supplements to address and mitigate malnutrition. 
Technology and research would be required to increase food production 
while streets, rails, airports, or other types of gray infrastructure would be 
required to transport food and health care to northern regions with limited 
access. Increasing food production and distribution would also require edu-
cation, technology, and research as well as gray infrastructure to produce, 
transport, and sell commercial food products. However, target 2.3 does not 
require health care or hospital infrastructure to be achieved. Therefore, 
there are two infrastructure synergies between targets 2.2 and 2.3, resulting 
in a +2 contribution to the total interaction score.
We then examine and assess the impact each target could have on eco-
system services. Ending malnutrition could pose benefits and risks to pro-
visioning services as there would be benefits from greater food production, 
but achieving this could also reduce the availability of other resources or 
raw materials such as water and forested land. Achieving target 2.3 could 
pose similar risks and benefits to provisioning services as ending malnu-
trition. Therefore, the presence of both risks and benefits for each target 
results in a zero-sum impact. For regulating services, both targets could 
pose risks as the actions necessary to achieve each target could negatively 
impact climate regulation, water quality, or wildlife habitats for example. 
While efforts could be made to minimise the negative impacts on regulat-
ing services, any action taken to achieve either target was deemed unlikely 
to provide benefits toward regulating services. Therefore, the risks toward 
regulating services outweighed the benefits for the two targets, resulting in 
a −1 score.
We then calculate the total interaction score for targets 2.2 and 2.3 as the 
sum of the results from the input trade-offs, infrastructure synergies, and 
net ecosystem services impact. Both targets required all three inputs, result-
ing in a −3 score, while the targets shared two infrastructure requirements 
resulting in a +2 score, and the net ecosystem service impact was deemed to 
be negative resulting in a score of −1. Therefore, the total interaction score 
for targets 2.2 and 2.3 was −2, indicating that the targets are counteracting 
and are in competition with one another (Table 14.4).
For comparison, we can also consider a case where a positive interaction 
score occurs using the target pair of 6.3, to improve water quality through a 
variety of methods, and 7.2, to substantially increase the share of renewable 
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energy. The resource inputs deemed necessary for target 6.3 were electricity 
and fuel, which could be used to reduce the amount of untreated wastewa-
ter, a component of the target, in order to improve water quality. Target 
7.2 could require water as a renewable energy source, while the other input 
groups were deemed unnecessary as any land, soil, electricity, or fuel require-
ments would be negligible. Therefore, the two targets do not share any input 
needs and no negative score is attributed to the total interaction. In terms 
of infrastructure, health care and hospitals would not be required for either 
target. Education, research, and technology could help reduce pollutants, 
treat wastewater, and increase recycling to improve water quality while also 
helping develop and establish renewable energy sources. Similarly, gray 
infrastructure such as pipes, sewage, and water treatment facilities could 
improve water quality while energy production infrastructure could aid the 
development of renewable energy sources. Therefore a +2 is attributed to the 
total interaction score for these two shared infrastructure needs. Lastly, nei-
ther target poses risks toward any ecosystem service group but they do pro-
vide benefits. Improving water quality would benefit both provisioning and 
regulating services, while implementing renewable energy sources would 
reduce pollution produced from non-renewable energy sources in the region 
and therefore benefit regulating services. Therefore, achieving targets 6.3 
and 7.2 would have a net positive effect on ecosystem services, resulting in a 
+1 score attributed to the total interaction score. The sum of the interaction 
scores is then +3 between targets 6.3 and 7.2, indicating that these targets are 
supporting and each target strongly facilitate the achievement of the other 
(Table 14.5).
Table 14.4 Example of a negative interaction score
Table 14.5 Example of a positive interaction score
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Conclusion
This research was conducted as a pilot to demonstrate the potential use-
fulness of WEF nexus research in Arctic regions. Although WEF nexus 
research has been conducted in countries and regions throughout the world, 
no such studies have been conducted in the Arctic. A focus on northern 
Canada was particularly warranted given the high rates of WEF insecurity 
that are being experienced by northern communities, particularly among 
the Indigenous population. These insecurities are reflected in limited access 
to clean water, an over-dependence on non-renewable energy sources, and 
having the highest rates of Indigenous food insecurity among all industrial-
ised nations. As unacceptable as these current conditions are, these insecu-
rities will likely be compounded by the effects of climate change.
Owing to the high rates of WEF insecurity in northern Canada, our 
methodology was motivated by the need for integrative thinking that makes 
visible the interconnectedness of WEF systems. Historically, WEF systems 
have been treated independently with little policy or institutional coordina-
tion occurring between sectors (Nilsson, Griggs, & Visbeck, 2016; Rasul, 
2016). The goal of this research was to highlight their inherent connections 
in order to support decision-makers in identifying sustainable solutions to 
WEF related challenges. In doing so, we found that the synergies between 
WEF-SDGs far outweigh the potential trade-offs. In total, 87% of all inter-
actions were found to be synergistic of some magnitude. This indicates 
that achieving or addressing one WEF target would have positive spillover 
effects for the others.
This assessment ultimately illustrates that interactions and connections 
exist between almost all WEF targets. Policy and decision makers should 
consider how each target interacts with others when addressing WEF secu-
rity in order to take advantage of positive interactions and minimise neg-
ative outcomes. Having synergies significantly outweigh trade-offs signals 
an opportunity to simultaneously address multiple WEF-SDG targets in 
northern Canada through mutually beneficial actions that capitalise on 
and promote synergetic policies. This information can now be used to 
inform integrated planning efforts that are cognizant of respective resource 
requirements for achieving WEF security in northern Canada.
As informative as our findings may be, we encourage future WEF analy-
ses to be conducted at regional and sub-regional scales. Regional differences 
exist in population, geography, economy, and access to new technologies. 
Conducted at finer scales, WEF nexus assessments could promote more 
nimble policy responses than are not so easily achieved at the national level. 
Regional WEF assessments may also prove more effective at incorporat-
ing the social and cultural values of residents as assessment criteria. Where 
cultural values are known, the methodology can be expanded to include 
an evaluation of the potential impacts on cultural ecosystem services, 
Indigenous livelihoods, and the territorial rights and interests of Indigenous 
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peoples. Such considerations are consistent with the Arctic Council’s frame-
work for sustainable development, which calls for social equity, protecting 
and promoting cultures, and strengthening the capacity of Indigenous 
peoples (SDWG, 2017). The inclusion of Indigenous participation is also 
reflected in the Canadian government’s commitment to respecting the 
rights of Indigenous peoples in Canada’s national SDG strategy (BCCIC, 
2019). Until those regional assessments are conducted, we are hopeful that 
this research can offer a pathway for untangling the inherent complexities of 
WEF systems in northern Canada.
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